Gonzaga Debate Institute 2010 Scholars Lasers da

Impact Shield – ABLs Fail

That five-year goal came and went as the program was plagued with technical issues and rising costs. The Air Force’s original plan for operating the ABL called for seven aircraft dispersed to two combat theaters, three in each location with one additional aircraft that could be used if any aircraft were down for maintenance. The service estimated each ABL would cost between $1 billion and $1.5 billion, and that it would take at least two years to roll one off a production line. Critics seized on the cost of the aircraft—ABL would have been the second most expensive production aircraft behind the B-2 bomber—and a questionable operating concept. Because the ABL would be a slow moving, very large target, USAF planned to have fighter aircraft escort it on missile defense sorties, adding to the operating cost. The Missile Defense Agency in a 2006 report to Congress revealed an operating concept that required “at least three aircraft for a near-continuous single combat air patrol station.” Additional aircraft “may be required depending on the length of deployment, capabilities of the aircraft available, and whether or not the combatant commander needs near-continuous or continuous coverage,” MDA added. “The specific quantity of operational assets required for deployment periods of seven days, 30 days, 90 days, and one year” had not been determined. The aircraft would also be limited in where they could be used.

By 2006 the Airborne Laser program had hit hard times, beset by delays and major technical problems. For the following two years, the laser program was relegated to a technology demonstration status while a planned five-aircraft purchase by the Air Force was put on hold. As of early 2009 the beam had been fired in the air and was performing well to ranges beyond 100km. According to an American Physical Society report in 2004, the Airborne Laser could shoot down a typical liquid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) from up to 600km away. However, against solid-fuel ICBMs, which are more resistant to heating, the useful range would be about 300km. The weapon system's ability to compensate for atmospheric conditions between it and its target was a make-or-break matter, and at that time it was doing fine. ABL may be able to carry out as few as 6-10 "shots" before refuelling, though a reload of the toxic chemical fuels for an ABL would fill two C-17 transport planes. The ABL was expected to achieve effective range of at most 400km. While impressive, the system would be hard to use against Russia and China, since the ABL would be unlikely fly into these countries’ airspace during crisis. 

The YAL-1 can hit ballistic missiles during their boost phase and has a range of 200-250 km. The effective range is limited by the laser unit's power, the laser beam's atmospheric dissipation, atmospheric aberration affecting siting accuracy and the laser-beam gas breakdown effect which has not yet been eliminated. Moreover, an excessively powerful laser unit could overheat the fuselage and cause the plane to crash. These factors and the system's low rate of fire currently make it possible only to intercept individual missiles at short range. It appears that such systems will be unable to neutralize an all-out nuclear strike in the next 20-30 years. Speaking of a hypothetical Russian-U.S. conflict, airborne laser weapons would have to be deployed in Russian air space in order to be able to intercept Russian missiles in their boost phase and during the separation of their multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs). In fact, they would have only 3-5 minutes to accomplish this objective. However, even Russia's problem-ridden air-defense system would not allow a B-747 to roam free in national air space. Airborne laser weapons present a greater threat to strategic ballistic missile submarines which either patrol Russian territorial waters or international waters. However, there is one limitation. As the submarines spend most of their time underwater, laser-carrying aircraft could not quickly reach the optimal firing position necessary for a successful missile interception.