Impact turns + answers – bfhmrs russia War Good
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Harbor Teacher Prep-subingsubing-Ho-Neg-Lamdl T1-Round3, Impact Turns Aff Neg - Michigan7 2019 BFHMRS
1NC – ! ECS/SenkakuSmall tensions in the Senkaku Islands escalate to nuclear war—military build-up key to deter ChinaO’Hanlon 19 (Michael, senior fellow and director of foreign policy research, The Brookings Institute, “The Senkaku paradox: Preparing for conflict with the great powers,” published may 2nd, 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/05/02/the-senkaku-paradox-preparing-for-conflict-with-the-great-powers/, accessed 7/17/19, JME.) A scenario of the type sketched above would create a huge dilemma for the United States and allies—a situation I call the “Senkaku Paradox.” Mutual-defense treaty commitments under Article V of both the NATO and U.S.-Japan treaties would appear to commit Washington to defend or liberate such allied territory. Yet, that could lead to direct war with a nuclear-armed great power over rather insignificant stakes. A large-scale U.S. and allied response could seem massively disproportionate. But a non-response would be unacceptable and invite further aggression. Washington needs better, less escalatory, and, thus, more credible options for such limited but serious scenarios. They should not formally displace existing policy, under which there is a strong implication of prompt U.S.-led military action to liberate any allied territory that might be attacked or seized by an aggressor. This current policy may have deterrence benefits, as well as reassurance benefits for allies, so it should not be formally scrapped. But such commitments may not be fully credible. They also may not give U.S. and allied policymakers sufficiently flexible and smart options in the event of deterrence failure. The right kind of response would have four main elements: Reinforcement of U.S. and allied military positions near the point of initial Russian or Chinese attack to deter any further aggression. A prompt buildup in the size (and cost) of overall U.S. military forces so as to make such new deployments sustainable, unless the crisis were resolved quickly. A strategy for economic war that applied a mix of sanctions tailored to the scale of the initial attack, including: a possible mix of broad-based tariffs; targeted sanctions against the assets and movements of individuals and companies most involved in the attack; sectoral sanctions against high-tech industries to slow Russia’s or China’s future economic growth; and possibly financial sanctions as well. If the aggression continued or intensified, consideration of asymmetric military attacks against Chinese or Russian interests in other theaters such as the Persian Gulf where the United States and allies have enjoyed preeminence and escalation dominance. Some would view such a strategy, which sought not to fire the first shot against Russia or China as long as possible, as irresolute or weak. It would not be. It would, however, be patient — concerned less about promptly reversing an initial aggression than at ensuring it was punished and that it did not metastasize. Adoption of this strategy requires a modest number of near-term actions as well. The U.S. and allies need to be better prepared for possible economic war, particularly against China. They can do so by taking steps to bolster its national defense stockpiles of key minerals and metals (many of which today come primarily from China) and ensuring that their dependence on China within global supply chains for key technologies not exceed a specified percent. Europe also needs to continue to improve its infrastructure for importing liquefied natural gas as a backup in case energy imports from Russia are interrupted in a future crisis. In military terms, the U.S. also needs to improve and increase its capabilities in areas such as long-range strike and stealth, hypersonic weapons, missile defense and nonlethal weapons of the type that might be used to incapacitate oil tankers bound for Chinese shores (for example). In the new age of great-power rivalry, it is time to get more creative, and more granular, about how we prepare for war—so as to make deterrence more effective and prevent war in the first place. For the kinds of scenarios considered here, insisting on prompt liberation of the notional small Estonian town or uninhabited Senkaku island after enemy attack could, in effect, destroy the village to save it. Such a direct counterattack might also greatly increase the danger of escalation, including to nuclear war. A Russia or China that found itself decisively losing a conventional conflict might choose to create nuclear risks or even utilize nuclear weapons tactically, in the hope of changing the conflict’s course. But fortunately, we have good options that avoid the Catch-22 of risking either nuclear war over small stakes on the one hand and appeasement and an ensuing weakening of the global order on the other. Download 0.83 Mb. Share with your friends:
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