In discussions on migration, a basic distinction is often made between ‘voluntary’ and ‘forced’

Climate change and migration
305
of climate change on ecosystems including those that support human life (Myers 2002). They, along with climate change activists, seethe emergence of refugees forced or induced to move by environmental degradation as likely to be harmful to the migrants themselves and a (security) problem for destination countries (Christian Aid 2007). This threat has been used to urge greater global commitment to the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. The second group, which comprises many social scientists, including migration researchers, sees migration as a multicausal process, rarely driven solely by environmental factors, with benefits as well as costs. Accordingly, in some communities some forms of migration may well be suitable options for climate change adaptation (Black et al. 2011). Black et al. state that it is unlikely that a whole population would leave an affected area as a result of most forms of climate change, whilst even those who might are relatively unlikely to cross an international border, let alone travel across continents to reach an economically more developed Western country.
(2008: 6)
This may hold true for the majority of cases globally but there area number of situations in the Pacific where entire islands, especially those that comprise atolls, and possibly whole countries, may become uninhabitable. Such climate change migrants may have to find their way to other island countries or to countries on the Pacific Rim such as Australia, New Zealand and the USA.
There are many scenarios of possible sources of environmental migrants including exposure to sea level rise such as small islands in the Pacific and Caribbean and low lying deltas such as large parts of Bangladesh. In addition, there are places affected by more frequent and/or greater magnitude climatic events, such as floods and tropical cyclones, as well as areas exposed to more droughts such as sub-Saharan Africa and people displaced by resource based conflict (McAdam 2011). However, in the migration literature, environmental degradation is not generally considered to be a major push factor driving permanent relocation, although natural disasters (such as floods, tropical cyclones and drought) often lead to some temporary displacement. The numerous drivers of migration tend to be dominated by economic and social push and pull factors.
Environmental degradation maybe an underlying cause of economic and social problems in a particular migrant source and, as it intensifies with climate change, there maybe fewer resources available to those affected to cover the costs of migration, especially international migration (White 2011). Thus, intra-country rather than international movement may increase. There are very few empirical studies that show clear links between weather patterns, such as extreme events, and long-term or permanent displacement of people. Past examples of environmental variability or extremes are not necessarily useful analogues for contemporary climate change. A critical difference under conditions of climate change is that a return to normalcy may not occur and displaced communities may find overtime that they are unable to return home. As mean conditions change, places may become steadily less able to support their populations. Sea level rise is an example of such change.
Climate change may also result in changing patterns (frequency and/or magnitude) of extreme weather conditions. If communities are affected more frequently by extremes, they may eventually not be able to stay in the same exposed conditions as periods of normalcy become shorter. In the case of sea level rise, communities maybe displaced by extreme events

John R. Campbell and Richard D. Bedford
306
(such as storm surges or king tides) and return precluded by changing mean conditions. It is necessary to explore the possibilities of climate change degrading some environments in ways that are unidirectional or permanent, that may render places increasingly marginal as sites of human habitation or, at the extreme, uninhabitable. In such cases climate change migration, as distinct from movement in response to extreme events, may become an important social process as Graeme Hugo (1996) observed two decades ago.
Under the most extreme scenarios, where locations become unable to support their populations, whole communities maybe forced to relocate. Campbell (2014) identifies three aspects of human security for island dwellers land security (the physical existence of space upon which to live, habitat security (a place that enables an assured existence in terms of health and physical safety) and livelihood security (the ability of a place to fulfil people’s subsistence needs. Climate change migration is likely to arise where a combination of these elements becomes compromised. Where the director indirect effects of climate change are limited, migration of only part of the population maybe considered as a positive outcome because it may relieve pressure on local resources and declining local livelihoods for those who remain maybe supplemented through remittances. Where the habitability is totally destroyed, and cannot be recovered through other adaptation options, forced migration becomes the only option (see also Alexander Betts in this volume on forced migration.

Download 437.72 Kb.

Share with your friends: