no contagion from Cote D’Ivoire, Liberia, Nigeria, Algeria, Chad, or Senegal to Mali in 2007, pending confirmation from Abdalla.
Senegal, 1990 (vs. MFDC – State A could be Burkina Faso, Liberia, Mali, or Togo)
-
No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary. Only substantive mention of influence of another conflict: “The government has also claimed that both Iraq and Libya have sent weapons to MFDC fighters via Mauritania.” No indication this is tied to onset, however.
-
No mention of potential State As in Sheldon Gellar, Senegal: An African Nation Between Islam and the West, Second Edition (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 115-117.
-
No mention of potential State As in Sheldon Gellar, Democracy in Senegal: Tocquevillian Analytics in Africa (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 160.
-
Hence I will code no contagion from Burkina Faso, Liberia, Mali, or Togo to Senegal, pending confirmation from Gellar. Gellar confirms in 5/11/10 e-mail.
Mauritania, 1975 (vs. POLISARIO – State A could be Nigeria, Morocco, or Chad)
-
No mention of Nigeria or Chad in UCDP conflict summary. POLISARIO fought against Moroccan and Mauritanian occupiers simultaneously from 1975 (after Spanish withdrawal); I don’t really consider this as contagion so much as two branches of the same conflict.
-
No mention of Nigeria or Chad’s contribution to onset in Tony Hodges, Western Sahara: The Roots of a Desert War (Westport, Conn.: Lawrence Hill & Company, 1983).
-
No mention of Nigeria or Chad’s contribution to onset in John Damis, Conflict in Northwest Africa: The Western Sahara Dispute (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1983).
-
No mention of Nigeria or Chad’s contribution to onset in Erik Jensen, Western Sahara: Anatomy of a Stalemate (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2005).
-
Hence I will code no contagion from Nigeria, Morocco, or Chad to Mauritania, pending confirmation from Hodges.
Niger, 1991 (vs. FLAA – State A could be Burkina Faso, Liberia, Mali, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, Morocco, Algeria, or Chad)
-
No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary.
-
Chad Niger, 1991. “Some young Tuaregs and Moors who had no jobs were recruited as mercenaries by Colonel Mu’ammar al-Gaddafi’s Islamic League and sent to fight in Chad and Lebanon where they learned to handle weapons.” (Carolyin Norris, “Mali-Niger: Fragile Stability,” UNHCR Centre for Documentation and Research, WRITENET Paper No. 14/2000 (2001), p. 3.)
-
Mali Niger, 1991. “Some of the young repatriated people [in Niger] protested against this misuse of aid and were arrested in Tchin-Tabaraden. Other Tuaregs attacked the police station of this town to release their companions and the reaction of the Nigerien authorities was disproportionately brutal. … Some Nigerien Tuaregs fled to neighboring Mali and were arrested in the town of Menaka. Malian Tuaregs launched an armed attack to release them in June 1990, provoking retaliation by the Malian military, which effectively marked the beginning of the rebellion in Mali.” (Carolyin Norris, “Mali-Niger: Fragile Stability,” UNHCR Centre for Documentation and Research, WRITENET Paper No. 14/2000 (2001), p. 5.) By this account, the Niger rebellion preceded the Mali rebellion. Either way, it’s clear these rebellions were linked. No mention of other potential State As.
-
But later: “This different approach, linked to the better integration of Nigerien Tuaregs, also explains why the rebellion started in Mali and only later extended to Niger. … The determining factor, which pushed the Tuareg rebellion in both countries into armed conflict, was the massive disappointment in the National Conferences held in Niamey and Bamako in 1991. These National Conferences, which aimed to provide a forum where the people could challenge their leaders after decades of single party rule, were seen by the Tuaregs as a unique occasion to have their needs heard and, in the case of Niger, to secure justice for the violations committed by the army at Tchin-Tabaraden. But neither the demands for justice nor federalism were addressed, making confrontation virtually certain.” (Norris 2001, 7)
-
No mention of potential State As in Yvan Guichaoua, “Circumstantial Alliances and Loose Loyalties in Rebellion Making: The Case of Tuareg Insurgency in Northern Niger (2007-2009),” MICROCON (University of Sussex) Research Working Paper 20 (2009), pp. 8-12.
-
Hence I will code no contagion from Burkina Faso, Liberia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, Morocco, or Algeria to Niger in 1991, pending confirmation from Guichaoua. Guichaoua confirms in 5/11/10 e-mail.
Niger, 1994 (vs. CRA – State A could be Liberia, Mali, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, Morocco, Algeria, Egypt, Chad)
-
This is just a continuation of Niger 1991 – CRA (also Tuareg) split off from FLAA and demanded autonomy for northern Niger rather than a federal system (UCDP conflict summary). I am removing Niger 1994 as a potential case of contagion.
Niger, 1996 (vs. FDR – State A could be Liberia, Mali, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, Algeria, Egypt, or Chad)
-
Chad Niger, 1996. UCDP conflict summary: “In the early 1990s, the situation deteriorated further, when several thousand Chadian Toubous took refuge in the southern part of the region, following the coup d’état in Chad. This reinforced tensions between the mainly nomadic Fulani ethnic group and settled Toubous and in 1993 and 1994 there were frequent clashes between these groups over grazing rights. Events in neighboring Chad also fuelled a vast traffic of weapons in the area. All this created a climate of chronic insecurity and frustration and in October 1994 the rebel group FDR … emerged.” No mention of other potential State As’ contribution to onset.
-
No mention of potential State As (besides Chad) in terms of contribution to onset in Brigitte Thébaud and Simon Batterbury, “Sahel Pastoralists: Opportunism, Struggle, Conflict and Negotiation: A Case Study from Eastern Niger,” Global Environmental Change, Vol. 11 (2001): 69-78.
-
No mention of potential State As (besides Chad) in Erika Forsberg, “Conflict Diffusion: Ethnic Kin as a Transmitter of Internal Conflict,” Paper presented to the International Studies Association Annual Convention, Honolulu, March 1-5, 2005, p. 3.
-
Hence I will code no contagion from Liberia, Mali, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, Algeria, or Egypt to Niger in 1996, pending confirmation from Batterbury. Batterbury confirms in 5/11/10 e-mail.
Niger, 2007 (vs. MNJ – State A could be Cote D’Ivoire, Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal, Algeria, or Chad)
-
Since Niger Mali 2007, the reverse cannot be true (hence Mali is not a potential State A for Niger 2007).
-
Côte D’Ivoire Niger, 2007. Yvan Guichaoua e-mail, 5/11/10: “I suspect that these conflicts had an indirect effect on the Niger insurgency through the weapons markets. AK47s typically travel a lot between the coast of the Guinea Gulf and the Sahel. The end of hostilities in SL or CI has made guns cheaper. Tuareg insurgents also trade arms with rebel groups in Chad.”
-
Liberia Niger, 2007. Yvan Guichaoua e-mail, 5/11/10: “I suspect that these conflicts had an indirect effect on the Niger insurgency through the weapons markets. AK47s typically travel a lot between the coast of the Guinea Gulf and the Sahel. The end of hostilities in SL or CI has made guns cheaper. Tuareg insurgents also trade arms with rebel groups in Chad.” [Could code this as Sierra Leone Niger, but the real center of the West African conflict he’s referring to is Liberia.]
-
Chad Niger, 2007. Yvan Guichaoua e-mail, 5/11/10: “I suspect that these conflicts had an indirect effect on the Niger insurgency through the weapons markets. AK47s typically travel a lot between the coast of the Guinea Gulf and the Sahel. The end of hostilities in SL or CI has made guns cheaper. Tuareg insurgents also trade arms with rebel groups in Chad.”
-
No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary.
-
No mention of potential State As (except rejection of Algeria’s involvement in onset) in Stefan Simanowitz, “Bluemen and Yellowcake: The Struggle of the Tuareg in West Africa,” Media Monitors Network, March 29, 2009 (http://usa.mediamonitors.net/content/view/full/60963).
-
No mention of potential State As in Human Rights Watch, “Niger: Warring Sides Must End Abuses of Civilians,” December 19, 2007 (http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2007/12/18/niger-warring-sides-must-end-abuses-civilians).
-
No mention of potential State As in Jeremy Keenan, “Uranium Goes Critical in Niger: Tuareg Rebellions Threaten Sahelian Conflagration,” Review of African Political Economy, No. 117 (2008): 449-466. Keenan does accuse Algeria’s intelligence services of playing a role in instigating the MNJ rebellion (pp. 458-459), but the Algiers interest in Niger does not appear to be related to its own conflict with Islamists.
-
No mention of potential State As in Yvan Guichaoua, “Circumstantial Alliances and Loose Loyalties in Rebellion Making: The Case of Tuareg Insurgency in Northern Niger (2007-2009),” MICROCON (University of Sussex) Research Working Paper 20 (2009), pp. 12-22. Again briefly discusses Algeria on p. 7, note 3: “Algeria has been playing a crucial role in the conflict, offering a sanctuary to the insurgents and providing them with shelter, supplies … and opening its hospitals to wounded fighters. … One can hypothesize several reasons behind Algeria’s tolerance toward MNJ combatants: … Algeria needs the support of Tuaregs from Mali and Niger to fights the Islamists – now rebranded Al-Qaeda Maghreb – causing political disorder in the region.” This would be an Algerian interest in Niger tied to its own conflict with Islamists, but Guichaoua doesn’t seem to see Algeria as contributing to the conflict onset. I’ll ask. (He agrees – Algeria did not contribute to conflict onset.)
-
Hence I will code no contagion from Nigeria, Senegal, and Algeria to Niger in 2007, pending confirmation from Guichaoua. Guichaoua confirms in 5/11/10 e-mail.
Côte D’Ivoire, 2002 (vs. MJP, MPCI, MPIGO – State A could be Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Niger, Senegal, or Sierra Leone)
-
Liberia Côte D’Ivoire, 2002. “Evidence of a direct link between the Ivorian military leaders of the MPCI and Taylor has yet to be established. However, a Taylor insider informed ICG that two top Taylor aides, Mohamed Salamé, the ambassador-at-large in Abidjan and Taylor’s main financier and arms broker, and General Melvin Sobandi, Minister of Post and Telecommunications in Monrovia, travelled to Bouaké on 17 September 2002 to deliver money.” (International Crisis Group, “Tackling Liberia: The Eye of the Regional Storm,” Africa Report No. 62 (2003), p. 18) The conflict began on 9/19/02. No mention of other potential State As (except a marginal manpower contribution from Sierra Leone) in pp. 14-28, the part of the report dealing with Côte D’Ivoire.
-
Burkina Faso does appear to have supported the 9/19/02 coup outright, but the link between the 1987 Burkinabe coup in the 2002 Ivoirian conflict is tenuous. The original pan-Africanists initially left Côte D’Ivoire alone – it wasn’t until its longtime president died in 1993 that Burkina Faso got interested in overthrowing its government (p. 26).
-
Extending Burkina Faso’s influence to 2002 would add 3 cases of potential contagion: Côte D’Ivoire 2002, Niger 1996 (most certainly not one), and Guinea 2000 (possibly one).
-
According to UCDP conflict summary, potential State As were not directly involved in onset. “At the outset of the conflict numerous diplomats and regional experts voiced a fear that the conflict would become entangled with the civil wars to the west of Ivory Coast, i.e. in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea. … Reflecting this concern, the conflict in Ivory Coast has been rife with accusations, counteraccusations and denials of foreign involvement in the fighting. However, these claims are all extremely difficult to verify, and no clear evidence has been presented by either side in the conflict. … Stronger evidence of cross-border links exists when it comes to the western groups, MJP and MPIGO, as there were consistent reports of Liberians fighting together with the rebels. However, it is unclear if the Liberian soldiers were part of the Liberian army, or if they were mercenaries fighting for loot. There were also rumors of Sierra Leonean ex-rebel group RUF being involved in the fighting in western Ivory Coast.” Both MJP and MPIGO arose after the initial onset of the conflict in September 2002. No other states mentioned as potential contributors.
-
No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in pp. Jessica Kohler, “From Miraculous to Disastrous: The Crisis in Côte D’Ivoire,” Centre for Applied Studies in International Negotiations (2003), pp. 11-35. Again, Liberian involvement is strongly alleged in the emergence of the western rebel groups (MJP and MPIGO), but these emerged after the initial onset of the conflict.
-
No mention of potential State As (besides Liberia and Burkina Faso – see above) in International Crisis Group, “Côte D’Ivoire: The War is Not Yet Over,” Africa Report No. 72 (2003), pp. 1-16.
-
Hence I will code no contagion from Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Niger, Senegal, or Sierra Leone to Cote D’Ivoire, pending confirmation from Kohler. Unfortunately I can’t track her down.
Guinea, 2000 (vs. RFDG – State A could be Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Niger, Senegal, or Sierra Leone)
-
Liberia Guinea, 2000. UCDP conflict summary: “The governmental conflict in Guinea was closely tied to regional instability and developments in neighboring countries. The rebels, RFDG …, sought to oust the perceived undemocratic regime of Guinea, and received strong support from Liberia’s President Charles Taylor.”
-
Sierra Leone Guinea, 2000. UCDP conflict summary: “There were also indications that cooperation took place between RFDG and RUF (Revolutionary United Front) in the battles.”
-
Guinea-Bissau Guinea, 2000. UCDP conflict summary: “Placed in an extremely volatile region, where conflicts had raged during more than a decade, Guinea was up until 2000 a haven for roughly 500,000 refugees from war-torn Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau.” No mention of Niger or Senegal.
-
No mention of Niger or Senegal’s contribution to Guinea onset in Prosper Addo, “Mercenarism in West Africa: A Threat to Ghana’s Democracy?” Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre Paper No. 2 (2004).
-
Hence, in the absence of a third source, I will code no contagion from Niger or Senegal to Guinea, pending confirmation from Addo … who unfortunately cannot be located.
Burkina Faso, 1987 (vs. Popular Front – State A could be Cameroon, Ghana, or Togo)
-
No mention of any potential State As in UCDP conflict summary, except “Vocally anti-imperialist, Sankara had strained relations with many members of the international community, and cultivated ties with radical powers at the time, such as Ghana and Libya.”
-
No mention of any potential State As in Godfrey Mwakikagile, Military Coups in West Africa since the Sixties (Huntington, N.Y.: Nova Science Publishers, 2001), pp. 18-24.
-
No mention of any potential State As in Pierre Englebert, Burkina Faso: Unsteady Statehood in West Africa (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), pp. 52-63, 152-157.
-
Hence I will code no contagion from Cameroon, Ghana, Togo, or Gambia to Burkina Faso, pending confirmation from Englebert. Englebert confirms in 5/11/10 e-mail.
Liberia, 1980 (vs. Forces of Samuel Doe – State A could be Mauritania)
-
No mention of Mauritania in UCDP conflict summary.
-
No mention of Mauritania in Godfrey Mwakikagile, Military Coups in West Africa since the Sixties (Huntington, N.Y.: Nova Science Publishers, 2001), pp. 93-98.
-
No mention of Mauritania in D. Elwood Dunn and S. Byron Tarr, Liberia: A National Polity in Transition (Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow Press, 1988), pp. 86-98.
-
No mention of either potential State A in G.E. Saigbe Boley, Liberia: The Rise and Fall of the First Republic (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983), pp. 80-135.
-
Hence I will code no contagion from Mauritania to Liberia in 1980, pending confirmation from Mwakikagile.
Liberia, 1989 (vs. NPFL – State A could be Burkina Faso, Cameroon, or Togo)
-
Gambia Liberia, 1989. See below.
-
Ghana Liberia, 1989. Stephen Ellis writes in 5/7/10 e-mail: “There was a group of Liberian politicians – generally known as the ‘progressives’- working for a revolution in Liberia from the late 1970s. They were quite well networked internationally, especially in Ghana and Gambia. There was a direct influence on events in Liberia from the Gambian revolutionaries and also the Ghanaians.” (See also Ellis 1995 below.)
-
Burkina Faso Liberia, 1989. “Burkina Faso lent several hundred of its soldiers to Taylor in the early stages of Liberia’s war. Burkinabe leader Blaise Compaoré had obtained Taylor’s release from a Ghanaian jail a few years earlier and later introduced him to Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi, who sought to punish Doe for closing down the Libyan embassy in Liberia in 1981 and for supporting U.S. anti-Libyan policies.” (Adekeye Adebajo, Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002), p. 48. Arguably this link with Burkina Faso would not have existed had Compaoré not staged his coup in 1987; Compaoré had specific personal links to Taylor (friend of daughter of President of Cote D’Ivoire, who was Taylor’s main sponsor – Stephen Ellis, “Liberia 1989-1992: A Study of Ethnic and Spiritual Violence,” African Affairs, Vol. 94, No. 375 (1995): 165-197, p. 180). No mention of Cameroon or Togo as contributors to onset.
-
Paul Richards (see “Sierra Leone” below) writes in 4/30/10 e-mail: “The forces loaned by Taylor to establish the RUF in Sierra Leone 1991-2 included some francophone African fighters. I discussed some evidence on this point in a piece comparing rebellions in Liberia and Sierra Leone cited in the book you have been reading [Richards 2002, cited in the Sierra Leone 1991 entry below]. Some eyewitnesses I interviewed in 1991 and 1992 claimed these francophone rebels were from Burkina Faso, and the 2004 conflict mapping document of No Peace Without Justice (which is a very detailed account of the war, chiefdom by chiefdom from 1991 to 2001, drawing evidence from some 400 locally based eyewitnesses, including some - though not many - RUF members) confirms this idea, though of course based on testimony from 15 years later. Both Charles Taylor of the Liberian NPFL and (more especially) Foday Sankoh of the Sierra Leone RUF assisted in the coup that overthrew Thomas Sankara and installed Blaise Compaoré in Burkina Faso in 1987.” This suggests that without the coup in Burkina Faso, neither Taylor nor Sankoh would have had as significant support from Burkina Faso.
-
UCDP conflict summary: “In the initial attack on Liberia, Taylor had the assistance of the government of Burkina Faso.” Not clear on why. No mention of Cameroon or Togo.
-
No mention of any potential State As in Godfrey Mwakikagile, Military Coups in West Africa since the Sixties (Huntington, N.Y.: Nova Science Publishers, 2001), pp. 98-103.
-
No mention of Cameroon or Togo in Stephen Ellis, “Liberia’s Warlord Insurgency,” in Christopher Claphman, ed., African Guerrillas (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), pp. 155-160.
-
No mention of Cameroon or Togo in Stephen Ellis, “Liberia 1989-1992: A Study of Ethnic and Spiritual Violence,” African Affairs, Vol. 94, No. 375 (1995): 165-197. However, several other notes:
-
“The core group of NPFL guerillas, Libyan-trained and supplemented by … internationalist revolutionaries from Gambia and Sierra Leone…” (p. 167)
-
“During visits to Libya probably between 1986 and 1989, Taylor had met a number of Gambians who had taken part in a coup attempt … in 1981 with Libyan backing. … They included Kukoi Samba Sanyang, known to the NPFL as ‘Dr Manning.’ At the beginning of operations in 1989, Dr Manning was officially listed as Taylor’s vice-president, although he soon abandoned the NPFL after being edged out of the leadership by Taylor, and retired to manage a bar.” (pp. 168-169)
-
Suggests Gambia (1981) Liberia (1989) is a case of contagion. I will code it so for now, pending confirmation from Ellis.
-
“In Accra Taylor befriended the Burkinabe ambassador, … at a time when Captain Thomas Sankara of Burkina Faso and Chairman John Rawlings of Ghana were close friends, and both had quite close relations with Libya. … Liberian exiles in Accra succeeded in contacting the new ruler of Burkina Faso, Blaise Compaoré, who prevailed upon the Ghanaian authorities to release Taylor into his own custody.”
-
Suggests that Taylor was friendly with Burkina Faso before the 1987 coup there, and that Burkina Faso might have sponsored Taylor’s insurgency even if Sankara had stayed in power. However, it appears that the specific links between Taylor and Compaoré were quite strong (see above), so I will still code this as contagion.
-
Hence I will code no contagion from Cameroon or Togo to Liberia in 1989, pending confirmation from Ellis. Ellis confirms in 5/7/10 e-mail.
Sierra Leone, 1991 (vs. RUF – State A could be Burkina Faso, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Senegal, or Togo)
-
Liberia Sierra Leone, 1991. UCDP conflict summary (on Liberia): “Taylor instead established a ‘state’ of his own in the territory he controlled, which was named ‘Greater Liberia.’ At one point making up around 90% of Liberia’s total territory, ‘Greater Liberia’ became the centre of an enormous war-economy empire, from where Taylor sold and smuggled timber, iron ore and diamonds. In 1991 Taylor expanded his empire into Sierra Leone’s diamond-rich territory, where he assisted Foday Sankoh in launching the Revolutionary United Front’s (RUF) attack on the government of Sierra Leone.”
-
Burkina Faso Sierra Leone, 1991. No mention of potential State As (besides Liberia) in UCDP conflict summary on Sierra Leone, except: “Burkina Faso also acted as a supporting party to RUF, providing the movement with valuable supplies throughout the conflict.”
-
Paul Richards writes in 4/30/10 e-mail: “The forces loaned by Taylor to establish the RUF in Sierra Leone 1991-2 included some francophone African fighters. I discussed some evidence on this point in a piece comparing rebellions in Liberia and Sierra Leone cited in the book you have been reading [Richards 2002, cited below]. Some eyewitnesses I interviewed in 1991 and 1992 claimed these francophone rebels were from Burkina Faso, and the 2004 conflict mapping document of No Peace Without Justice (which is a very detailed account of the war, chiefdom by chiefdom from 1991 to 2001, drawing evidence from some 400 locally based eyewitnesses, including some - though not many - RUF members) confirms this idea, though of course based on testimony from 15 years later.
Share with your friends: |
