Prolif good – War

Download 1.7 Mb.
Size1.7 Mb.
1   ...   22   23   24   25   26   27   28   29   ...   67

Prolif Bad (Robock)

Prolif dramatically increases the risk of nuclear war -- causes nuclear winter.

Robock 10 (Alan, Professor of Environmental Sciences at Rutgers University, editor of Reviews of Geophysics, PhD from MIT in meteorology and fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, “Nuclear Winter”, May, Wiley Periodicals)

Nuclear winter is the term for a theory describing the climatic effects of nuclear war. Smoke from the fires started by nuclear weapons, especially the black, sooty smoke from cities and industrial facilities, would be heated by the Sun, lofted into the upper stratosphere, and spread globally, lasting for years. The resulting cool, dark, dry conditions at Earth's surface would prevent crop growth for at least one growing season, resulting in mass starvation over most of the world. In addition, there would be massive ozone depletion, allowing enhanced ultraviolet radiation. More people could die in the noncombatant countries than in those where the bombs were dropped, because of these indirect effects. Nuclear proliferation is now expanding the threat. A nuclear war between India and Pakistan could produce so much smoke that it would produce global environmental change unprecedented in recorded human history. Although the number of nuclear weapons in the world has fallen from 70,000 at its peak in the 1980s to less than 10,000 currently deployed, a nuclear war between the United States and Russia could still produce nuclear winter. This theory cannot be tested in the real world. However, analogs can inform us about parts of the theory, and there are many that give support to the theory. They include the seasonal cycle, the diurnal cycle, forest, fires, volcanic eruptions, and dust storms on Mars. The only way to be sure to prevent the climatic effects of nuclear war is to rid the world of nuclear weapons.
The US must take every measure possible to prevent further proliferation -- the alternative is the end of the world.

Robock 10 (Alan, Professor of Environmental Sciences at Rutgers University, editor of Reviews of Geophysics, PhD from MIT in meteorology and fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, “Nuclear Winter”, May, Wiley Periodicals)

The suicidal nature of the use of nuclear weapons is one of the most important policy implications. If country A used enough weapons only against military targets to prevent country B from retaliating, in what is called a ‘first strike’, the climatic consequences could be such that everyone in country A could die. Nuclear weapons, therefore, become an instrument of suicide and not an instrument of defense.10,38 Soon after the nuclear winter theory was established, Carl Sagan gave a briefing on the subject to Senators, Congressmen, and staff on Capitol Hill. He described how the smoke from burning cities and industrial areas after a nuclear war would be so thick as to block out so much sunlight that the Earth's surface would become so cold and dark for so long that agriculture would be impossible and most of the people in the world would starve to death. After the presentation, one of them called him aside and said, ‘Look, if you believe that the mere threat of the end of the world is enough to change thinking in Washington and Moscow, you haven't spent much time in those cities!’ (Ref 10, p. 6). Albert Einstein said, after nuclear weapons were invented, ‘Our world faces a crisis as yet unperceived by those possessing power to make great decisions for good or evil. The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking and we thus drift toward unparalleled catastrophe’.39 Yet it does seem that nuclear winter has provided a context to reexamine all the existing policy assumptions about nuclear war. People are gradually changing the way they think. And it happened only because scientists have tried to warn the world of the dangers of current policies.

Prolif Bad (War – General)

Statistical evidence shows nuclear weapons increase the probability of war and escalation.

Geller ‘90 (Daniel, Former Prof. Pol. Sci. – U. Mississippi, Journal of Conflict Resolution, “Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Crisis Escalation”, 34:2, June, p. 306-307)

This analysits has focused on escalation patterns in serious interstate disputes among nations with both identical and different levels of weapons technology. Initiator and target conflict action was examined in terms of four dispute categories based on distinctions in military technology. The findings indicated that dispute escalation probabilities are affected by weapons technology -the distribution of nuclear capabilities does impact the patterns of escalation in serious international disputes. It was demonstrated that disputes between nuclear powers are more likely to escalate (short of war) than are nonnuclear disputes; and in conflicts between nuclear and nonnuclear states, the possession of nuclear weapons has no evident inhibitory effect on the escalation propensities of the nonnuclear opponent. Moreover, a Markov analysis indicated that disputes between nuclear powers are more likely to evolve in a tit-for-tat (reciprocating) manner than are nonnuclear conflicts. An initiator's threat and display of force or use of force is most likely to elicit target behavior at the same hostility level. The probabilities of a nuclear state taking no military confrontation action in response to any form of provocation from another nuclear power are relatively small when measured against other reaction probabilities or in comparison to nonmilitary target behavior in nonnuclear disputes. Conversely, in mixed confrontations, nonnuclear dispute initiators and targets act much more aggressively than do their nuclear rivals. These findings, and particularly the ones pertaining to escalation patterns between nuclear states, support the competitive risk-taking theses of Kahn (1965), Schelling (1966), Osgood and Tucker (1967), and Snyder and Diesing (1977). They indicate an actual raising of the provocation threshold and an expansion in the use of coercive tactics-threats, military displays, and force short of war - for achieving political objectives in nuclear disputes. Regarding conflict action in mixed disputes, the greater aggressiveness of nonnuclear participants against that of their nuclear rivals can be explained by: (1) a disbelief that the opponent will use nuclear force (either because of its lack of military significance, or because of political and ethical inhibi- tions), or (2) a greater intensity of nonnuclear state interests in a local conflict compared to that of the nuclear state. The principal policy implication of this analysis is that nuclear weapons cannot be relied upon to impede escalatory dispute behavior by either nuclear or nonnuclear antagonists. At best, the evidence (to date) suggests that secure, second-strike nuclear forces are sufficient to prevent a direct nuclear attack by an opponent on one's own territory (Howard, 1984; Jervis, 1984, 1988; Russett, 1989). Nuclear disputes, however, show a pronounced tendency to escalate (short of war) and to engage coercive tactics that include the limited use of force. In confrontations between nuclear and nonnuclear states, war is a distinct possibility, with aggressive escalation by the nonnuclear power probable. If force is to be brought to bear in either of these dispute types, usable conventional military power is likely to prove critical.
Statistical evidence shows nuclear weapons deter neither conflict nor escalation

Geller ‘90 (Daniel, Former Prof. Pol. Sci. – U. Mississippi, Journal of Conflict Resolution, “Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Crisis Escalation”, 34:2, June, p. 303)

The first-order analysis indicates that in nuclear disputes an initiator's threat and display of force or use of force is most likely to provoke a target response at the same hostility level. Moreover, the probabilities of no military confrontation action as a response by the target to either of the initiator conflict behaviors are slight. Conversely, in nonnuclear disputes, a threat or display by the initiator has the greatest probability of meeting with no military confrontation action from the target. On the basis of this analysis, it can be seen that disputes between nuclear nations are more likely to evolve in a tit-for-tat (reciprocating) manner than are nonnuclear conflicts. The probabilities of a nuclear state taking no military confrontation action in response to provocation from another nuclear power are relatively small when measured against other reaction probabilities or in comparison to nonmilitary target behavior in nonnuclear disputes. This evidence is further confirmation of Hypothesis 1 and the thesis of competitive risk taking in nuclear disputes. The escalation patterns in the remaining two conflict classes are almost the obverse of those discussed above. In mixed disputes between nuclear and nonnuclear states, nuclear targets have a greater probability of not responding to provocation than nonnuclear targets; nuclear targets are also much less likely to use force in response to either form of provocation than are nonnuclear targets. In short, nonnuclear dispute initiators and targets behave more aggressively than nuclear states in mixed disputes. This evidence provides additional support for Hypothesis 2 and weakens the argument for the salience of nuclear weapons in confrontations with nonnuclear states.

Proliferation leads to catastrophic scenarios and threats exist now – India, Pakisan, North Korea, Iran, and Iraq prove

Gartzke and Kroenig 9 (Eric, Department of Political Science @ University of California San Diego, Matthew, Department of Government @ Georgetown University, “A Strategic Approach to Nuclear Proliferation”, March 2009, Journal of Conflict Resolution)

Nuclear weapons have occupied a central role in international politics ever since their introduction onto the world stage in 1945. The use of nuclear weapons by the United States on Hiroshima and Nagasaki is widely believed to have compelled Japanese surrender and brought World War II to a close. The vast nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union were fundamental to the bipolar, strategic relationship that structured international politics for more than fifty years during the Cold War. And while many analysts had hoped that the collapse of the Soviet Union would lead to a reduction in the influence of nuclear weapons in international affairs, it was not to be so. The threat of nuclear proliferation resurfaced as India, Pakistan, and more recently, North Korea have conducted nuclear tests. Other regional powers, including Iran, Iraq, and Libya, are pursuing or have pursued nuclear capabilities. The terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, demonstrated that if terrorists, intent on carrying out mass-casualty attacks, acquired nuclear weapons, the results could be catastrophic. The ease with which states or terrorists could potentially acquire sensitive nuclear materials was exemplified by the black market nuclear proliferation ring operated by Pakistani scientist A. Q. Khan. Indeed, in his 2007 annual report to Congress on the projected threats to the national security of the United States of America, Director of National Intelligence J. Michael McConnell concluded that nuclear proliferation poses one of the greatest threats to U.S. national security.1
Proliferation causes regional destabilization – escalates to nuclear conflict

Cimbala 99 - - Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University, author of books and articles in professional journals on topics related to national security, he has served as a consultant on arms control to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, US Department of State, and private defense contractors (Stephen J., Armed Forces & Society, “Accidental/Inadvertent Nuclear War and Information Warfare,” vol. 25, issue 4, /mr)

A third reason for the continued importance of nuclear deterrence is the spread of nuclear weapons among "opaque" proliferators and the potential for additional non-nuclear states to acquire these and other weapons of mass destruction. The opaque proliferators, whom virtually everyone now includes in the category of nuclear competent actors, are India, Israel, and Pakistan. Experts disagree about the sizes of their weapons inventories or deployment capabilities on short notice; more significant, even their military and scientific experts have stopped denying the all but certain nuclear-acquired status of these three countries. In addition to these opaque proliferators, other candidate non-nuclear states thought to be pursuing nuclear capability include Libya, Iran, Iraq, and (until 1994) North Korea. The potential for regional destabilization once any of these currently non-nuclear states acquires nuclear weapons is enhanced, given their apparent interest in other weapons of mass destruction and in delivery systems for nuclear, chemical, and/or biological weapons. 10

New proliferators are inherently unstable – escalation.

Richard Maass, PhD candidate whose primary research interests concern international security, IR theory, US foreign policy, and qualitative and mixed-method research, Spring 2010 (“Nuclear Proliferation and Declining U.S. Hegemony,” Hamilton College, Accessed online at, Accessed on 7/19/11)

Regime stability in both these proliferating and existing nuclear states constitutes a major international security issue. Command and control issues (meaning nuclear arsenals’ vulnerability to accidental and unauthorized use) cause special concerns. If the assumptions of rational framework theory don’t hold, it “raises doubts about whether any state can build a large nuclear arsenal that is completely secure from accident” (Sagan and Waltz, 2003, pg. 73). Emerging nuclear states often lack the financial resources needed to produce safe weapons designs. The international community’s non-proliferation posture also strongly inhibits the ability to conduct full-scale nuclear weapons tests, preventing the development of effective and safe designs. Combined with the domestic instability present in many proliferating states, this lack of testing makes accidental detonations become extremely plausible. Domestic stability is critical, as “political unrest can increase the risk of nuclear weapons accidents by encouraging unsafe transportation, or testing operations”(Sagan and Waltz, 2003, pg. 82). During China’s Cultural Revolution, Marshal Nie Rongzhen launched a test missile eight hundred kilometers across China, armed with a live nuclear warhead, to display the successes of its nuclear program (Sagan and Waltz, 2003, pg. 82). Nie’s decision shows that newly proliferating states may determine their actual behavior by the illogical objectives of military organizations within those states. The parochial interests of these military organizations may not coincide with national interest, and so lead to accidental uses of nuclear weapons. This further degrades deterrence measures despite rational state interests to the contrary. Strict military control over nuclear arsenals also creates both domestic and international security hazards, as military officials and weapons operators in limited combat theaters have different interests than civilian politicians charged with implementing policy. Steve Sagan describes the mentality of military officials in terms of their own interests: Even when a professional military service acts in relatively rational ways to maximize its interests---protecting its power, size, autonomy, or organizational essence---such actions do not necessarily reflect the organizational interests of the military as a whole, much less the national interests of the state (Sagan and Waltz, 2003, pg. 52). Military leaders minimize diplomatic considerations in any given conflict, focusing instead on their ultimate objective, victory. Soldiers train to win; they ignore secondary considerations and repercussions. During China’s proliferation in the 1960’s, senior U.S. military officials advocated a preemptive destruction of its developing arsenals, arguing that “the attainment of a nuclear capability by Communist China will have a marked impact on the security posture of the United States and the Free World” (Sagan and Waltz, 2003, pg. 192). Military officials view proliferation and possession of nuclear weapons by other states as detrimental to U.S. national security and relative power.

Nuclear proliferation will end life as we know it – four thousand million will die instantly in the event of nuclear war

Schultz et al 7 (Mr. Shultz, a distinguished fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford, was secretary of

state from 1982 to 1989. Mr. Perry was secretary of defense from 1994 to 1997. Mr. Kissinger, chairman of Kissinger Associates, was secretary of state from 1973 to 1977. Mr. Nunn is former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons”, January 4, Wall Street Journal,

Leaders addressed this issue in earlier times. In his "Atoms for Peace" address to the United Nations in 1953, Dwight D. Eisenhower pledged America's "determination to help solve the fearful atomic dilemma -- to devote its entire heart and mind to find the way by which the miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life." John F. Kennedy, seeking to break the logjam on nuclear disarmament, said, "The world was not meant to be a prison in which man awaits his execution." Rajiv Gandhi, addressing the U.N. General Assembly on June 9, 1988, appealed, "Nuclear war will not mean the death of a hundred million people. Or even a thousand million. It will mean the extinction of four thousand million: the end of life as we know it on our planet earth. We come to the United Nations to seek your support. We seek your support to put a stop to this madness." Ronald Reagan called for the abolishment of "all nuclear weapons," which he considered to be "totally irrational, totally inhumane, good for nothing but killing, possibly destructive of life on earth and civilization." Mikhail Gorbachev shared this vision, which had also been expressed by previous American presidents. Although Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev failed at Reykjavik to achieve the goal of an agreement to get rid of all nuclear weapons, they did succeed in turning the arms race on its head. They initiated steps leading to significant reductions in deployed long- and intermediate-range nuclear forces, including the elimination of an entire class of threatening missiles. What will it take to rekindle the vision shared by Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev? Can a world-wide consensus be forged that defines a series of practical steps leading to major reductions in the nuclear danger? There is an urgent need to address the challenge posed by these two questions.
Proliferation is the greatest threat – nuclear war would kill hundreds of thousands, crush the economy, and destroy stability

Allison 10 (Graham, Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; Douglas Dillon Professor

of Government; Faculty Chair, Dubai Initiative, Harvard Kennedy School, “Nuclear Disorder: Surveying Atomic Threats”, Foreign Affairs, volume 89, issue 1, pages 74-85,

Obama has put the threat of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism at the top of his national security agenda. He has called it "a threat that rises above all others in urgency" and warned that if the international community fails to act, "we will invite nuclear arms races in every region and the prospect of wars and acts of terror on a scale that we can hardly imagine. "Consider the consequences, he continued, of an attack with even a single nuclear bomb: "Just one nuclear weapon exploded in a city -- be it New York or Moscow, Tokyo or Beijing, London or Paris -- could kill hundreds of thousands of people. And it would badly destabilize our security, our economies, and our very way of life." Obama's mission is to bend the trend lines currently pointing toward catastrophe. Most of the actions required to achieve this mission must be taken not by Washington but by governments around the world, which will act on the basis of their own assessments of their interests. But in an effort to encourage them to act and demonstrate U. S. leadership, Obama has pledged to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in the United States' national security strategy, negotiate a follow-on arms control agreement with Russia to decrease U. S. and Russian nuclear armaments, ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, endeavor to ban the production of fissile material worldwide, and provide additional authority and resources to the IAEA. In the hope of rolling back North Korea's arsenal and stopping Iran short of building a nuclear bomb, he has opened negotiations with both countries, signaling a willingness to live with these regimes, however ugly, if they forgo nuclear weapons.

Download 1.7 Mb.

Share with your friends:
1   ...   22   23   24   25   26   27   28   29   ...   67

The database is protected by copyright © 2020
send message

    Main page