Prolif good – War


AT Nukes Only For Deterrence



Download 1.7 Mb.
Page32/67
Date23.04.2018
Size1.7 Mb.
1   ...   28   29   30   31   32   33   34   35   ...   67

AT Nukes Only For Deterrence




New powers will see nuclear weapons as useful for offensive warfighting, not deterrence.


Russell ‘3 (Richard, Prof. Nat’l. Sec. Affairs – National Defense U. Near East and South Asia Center for Strategic Studies and Adjunct Prof. Security Studies in Center for Peace and Security Studies – Georgetown U. Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Journal of Strategic Studies, “The Nuclear Peace Fallacy: How Deterrence Can Fail”, 26:1, March, InformaWorld)

How major regional powers view nuclear weapons is a critical question. Do statesmen in the Middle East and South Asia value nuclear weapons principally for their deterrent qualities? Or do they believe that nuclear weapons could serve strategic and tactical purposes in war? During the cold war, American strategic thought on nuclear weapons was heavily influenced by Bernard Brodie, who argued that nuclear weapons were only good for deterring wars, not for fighting them.38 Do contemporary regional powers find logic similar to Brodie's equally convincing in contemporary circumstances? Is it possible that Brodie does not translate or resonate in non-Western cultures? As Peter Feaver has pointed out, the strategic culture of nation-states is a critical factor because it is produced by 'the long shadow of military and political history which generates attitudes about the usefulness of military force (and particularly nuclear weapons) as an instrument of state policy'." He warns that, 'The ambiguity of the strategic culture factor is ample reason for being cautious about making dogmatic claims for its precise influence in proliferating countries.'40 Other nation-states might take away a 'lesson of history' from the American use of nuclear weapons against Japan in World War I1 that nuclear weapons can be strategically used to win wars. In fact, in the early stages of developing American nuclear doctrine, the United States was inclined to view nuclear weapons as merely another weapon, much as we view artillery, aircraft or tanks. Betts reveals that for 20 years after World War I1 American 'presidents had an almost facile inclination to introduce vague nuclear threats in military confrontations despite the apparent vulnerability of the United States to Soviet retaliation'. ' President Eisenhower, for example, threatened to use nuclear weapons during the Korean War and in the disputes between China and Taiwan." These situations illustrate the point that nation-states may view nuclear weapons as effective tools for imposing their wills upon those of adversaries.




Exts – Deterrence Fails (Non-State Actors)




Terrorists and rogue states are not deterred by nuclear arsenals


Beebe and Kaldor 10 (Shannon, Adjunct Professor, George Washington University’s Elliot School of International Affairs, and Mary, British academic, currently Professor of Global Governance at the London School of Economics, where she is also the Director of its Centre for the Study of Global Governance, “The Ultimate Weapon is no Weapon”, 2010, Perseus Book Group, Print)

Actually, President George W. Bush used a similar argument. In the National Security Strategy of 2002, it was argued that deterrence does not work against rogue states and terrorists. Suicide bombers and mad leaders do not fear retaliation; indeed, they might welcome retaliation since they do not care about human life and it would prove that they are involved in a war against the West. This explains Bush’s emphasis on counter-force to deal with proliferation – hence the threats against Iran. But if leaders like Ahmadinejad are not rational, even a threat could be dangerous. And if deterrence only works against states that are rational, why do we need nuclear weapons at all? Surely no rational state would threaten to use them. We need another approach.


Deterrence theory is not applicable to modern circumstances because of irrational actors or weak security – Pakistan proves

Pant 10 (Harsh, teaches at King's College London in the Department of Defence Studies and is an Associate with the King's Centre of Science and Security, “Causes and Consequences of Nuclear South Asia: The Debate Continues …”, September 14, Routledge)

The last few years have been particularly difficult for the global non-proliferation and arms control regime. From Iran to North Korea, from the nuclear black market of A.Q. Khan to Brazil, new challenges are emerging virtually every other day that threaten to undermine the global arms control architecture. Forced by India’s open challenge to the global arms control and disarmament framework in May 1998, major powers in the international system have been re-evaluating their orientation towards global arms control and non-proliferation. The Indian nuclear tests in 1998 were the first open challenge to the system, especially by a “responsible,” opposed to a “rogue,” member of the international community. Some might argue that surreptitious Chinese weapons proliferation and clandestine nuclear programs undercut the arms control regime long before the Indian nuclear tests. Nonetheless, India’s nuclear tests significantly altered the contours of the existing security architecture already under stress in the post Cold War era. India’s open defiance marked the real beginning of the end of the non-proliferation regime as the world had known it until then, forcing the international community to look at nuclear proliferation through a different lens. For a long time, the West has viewed nuclear weapons in South Asia with dread because of the possibility that conventional warfare between India and Pakistan might escalate into a nuclear war. Indian and Pakistani officials, on the other hand, have continued to argue that, just as the threat of Mutual Assured Destruction resulted in “hot peace” between the US and the former Soviet Union during the Cold War, nuclear weapons in South Asia will also have a stabilizing impact. Since September 11, 2001, however, the nature of the problem for the region and the world at large has changed, insofar as the threat now appears to be Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal being used by radical Islamists if they can manage to wrest control of it. There is little hope that the rational actor model on which classical nuclear deterrence theory is based would apply as much to Islamist terrorist groups as it would to the Pakistani government. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, there were suggestions that the US had explicitly sought guarantees from the Musharraf government that its nuclear arsenal was safe. The present turmoil in Pakistan continues to raise concerns about the safety, security, and command of its nuclear stockpile. Though Pakistan’s government is always quick to dismiss reports that its nuclear weapons are in danger of falling into the wrong hands as “inspired” and stresses that Pakistan provides the highest level of institutionalized protection to its strategic assets, the credibility of such claims remains open to question.


Non-state actors operate outside of traditional deterrence theory

Pant 10 (Harsh, teaches at King's College London in the Department of Defence Studies and is an Associate with the King's Centre of Science and Security, “Causes and Consequences of Nuclear South Asia: The Debate Continues …”, September 14, Routledge)

The underlying reality in South Asia is that despite a number of crises post-1998, nuclear deterrence remains robust insofar as state-tostate ties are concerned. The real problem now is that of the non-state actors who may try to sabotage this stability. The jihadi groups that have been nurtured by the Pakistani State to further its agenda in Kashmir and elsewhere have now turned against their sponsors. This new problem complicates the old nuclear deterrence model in the South Asian context. And, it is this issue that should be the focus of future studies of the consequences of nuclearization in South Asia




Download 1.7 Mb.

Share with your friends:
1   ...   28   29   30   31   32   33   34   35   ...   67




The database is protected by copyright ©ininet.org 2020
send message

    Main page