Prolif good – War


Prolif Bad – Irrationality



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Prolif Bad – Irrationality




Rationality is a uniquely poor assumption for nuclear war planning.

Mozley, 1998 


[Robert, Prof. Physics and Arms Control Export – Stanford U., “The Politics and Technology of Nuclear Proliferation”, p. 15]

Kenneth N. Waltz, who over a decade ago published The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better, has been very influential. In that paper he concluded that general proliferation would create a more stable situation among nations. His only qualification of this argument is the suggestion that the proliferation be gradual. His paper is comprehensive in its discussion of the dangers of proliferation. However, through his best-case analysis of these dangers, he reached the conclusion that more proliferation was better. Watlz’s paper ignores the limitations of a generalization based on the single example of the Cold War. He is not bothered by the knowledge that each situation of conflict is different. He assumes that all national decisions are made rationally and that nations actually carry out the wishes of their leaders. He does not allow for errors, incompetence, or insubordination. In the situation in which a national leader does not want to start a conventional war, and finds that some of his directives are being ignored by the national bureaucracy, he will generally have time, measured in weeks, to correct any national actions he did not intend. If he is trying to correct actions that lead to nuclear war, he may have only a few minutes.



Prolif Bad – Miscalc



Proliferation risks miscalculation.


Mozley ’98  (Robert, Prof. Physics and Arms Control Export – Stanford U., “The Politics and Technology of Nuclear Proliferation”, p. 12)

A lack of technical proficiency in less-developed nations can result in unstable bombs. Normally, a nuclear weaon is made to produce a nuclear explosion by the detonation of conventional explosives, which in turn compresses a shell or sphere of uranium or plutonium to a much higher density, of supercritical value. This conventional explosion must be brought about with very accurate timing. A nation unable to master this technology can compensate by using more fissile material, which makes the weapon more nearly critical before detonation. Such a weapon will of necessity be more easily set off by a detonation of its conventional explosive, which could occur if it were dropped and would certainly happen if a plan carrying a weapon were to crash. A New York Times Magazine article reported on the findings of U.S. inspectors when they examined the design of the nuclear bomb the Iraqis had developed: The inspectors found out one other thing about the Iraqi bomb – it is highly unstable. The design calls for cramming so much weapon-grade uranium into the core, they say, that the bomb would inevitably be on the verge of going off- even while sitting on the workbench. “It could go off if a rifle bullet hit it,” one inspector says, adding: “I wouldn’t want to be around if it fell off the edge of this desk.”


Prolif Bad – Pre-Delegation




Risk of preemption means pre-delegation making nuclear escalation more likely.


Russell ‘3 (Richard, Prof. Nat’l. Sec. Affairs – National Defense U. Near East and South Asia Center for Strategic Studies and Adjunct Prof. Security Studies in Center for Peace and Security Studies – Georgetown U. Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Journal of Strategic Studies, “The Nuclear Peace Fallacy: How Deterrence Can Fail”, 26:1, March, InformaWorld)

To guard against nuclear 'decapitation' nation-states might delegate release authority for the use of nuclear weapons to lower echelons of command. The delegation of release authority would ensure that field commanders had the means to retaliate against an adversary that had succeeded in eliminating the country's leadership in the capital or to ensure that fielded forces could resort to nuclear weapons to defend against offensive ground operation^.^^ Indeed, such a scenario has an historical precedent. Gaddis points out that during the Cuban missile crisis, Khrushchev had authorized the commander of Soviet forces in Cuba to use tactical nuclear weapons if an American military attack was underway and he could not reach Moscow to confirm permission to use them.50 More recently, Saddam Hussein claimed to a delegation of US senators, visiting Iraq months before Saddam ordered the invasion of Kuwait, that he had predelegated launch authority for chemical weapons to military commanders in the event of an Israeli nuclear strike on Baghdad.s' Presumably Saddam would have be willing to predelegate authority for nuclear weapons retaliation had he had that capability at the time. Indian civilians - in control of India's nuclear weapons - have prepared sealed instructions to be opened by military commanders in the event that Pakistani or Chinese nuclear strikes have destroyed the civilian command authority in New Delhi.52 A field commander faced with the prospect of defeat might have fewer reservations about resorting to nuclear weapons than a statesman far removed from the battlefield.

Prolif Bad – Preemption



Prolif encourages “use or lose” mentality – risks preemption and war

Cimbala 8 – Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University, author of books and articles in professional journals on topics related to national security, he has served as a consultant on arms control to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, US Department of State, and private defense contractors (Stephen J., The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, “Connecting the Dots: Nuclear Arms Control and Proliferation After Bush and Putin,” vol. 21, issue 2, pg. 259-278, 6/3/2k8, http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Connecting+the+Dots%3A+Nuclear+Arms+Control+and+Proliferation+After+Bush+and+Putin&rft.jtitle=The+Journal+of+Slavic+Military+Studies&rft.au=Cimbala%2C+Stephen&rft.date=2008-04-01&rft.issn=1351-8046&rft.volume=21&rft.issue=2&rft.spage=259&rft.epage=278&rft_id=info:doi/10.1080%2F13518040802067094&rft.externalDBID=FSMS&rft.externalDocID=10_1080_13518040802067094 /mr)

The outcomes of these scenarios are not necessarily surprising, but they are informative. Relative to the United States and Russia, other nuclear powers have force structures with less diverse, and almost certainly less survivable, launch platforms. One reason for this is that, at least until now, only a few states have had the capacity to deploy and operate ballistic missile or cruise missile submarines. The operation of ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) requires not only a fleet with appropriate weapons systems and sophisticated command-control, but also numbers of highly trained crew and a certain tradition of elitist nuclear navalism. A more prudent choice for newer or smaller nuclear powers in search of more survivability might be to deploy cruise missile firing submarines – but on the basis of Russian experience with the sinking of the Kursk in 2000, this is no small challenge either. The weapons of choice for smaller and newer nuclear states will almost certainly be land based ballistic missiles and tactical or operational-tactical aircraft. Short and medium range ballistic missiles have spread to many countries, including some that would like to join the nuclear club. North Korea, with or without nuclear weapons, has been a continuing source of ballistic missile proliferation. Land based ballistic missiles have simple command-control compared to nuclear submarines, and they have a higher probability of penetrating any enemy defenses compared to attack aircraft. The disadvantages of ballistic missiles are two: they cannot be recalled after launch (unlike aircraft), and they are first strike vulnerable, encouraging a “use them or lose them” mentality in a crisis. One of the ironies of spreading short, medium or even intermediate range ballistic missiles around the planet is that the shorter the range of the missile, the less may be the warning of attack to the defender. Knowing this, defenders anticipating attack may prefer to jump the gun for one of two reasons: a decision for preemption, based on the assumption that an attack is already in progress or has been decided upon and is imminent; or, a decision for preventive war, on the assumption that war “now” is better than war “later” which is unavoidable. The Bush administration has to some extent elided the difference between preemption and prevention in its declaratory policy for anticipatory attacks against terrorists or rogue states armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). 15 15See Karl P. Mueller, et al., Striking First: Preemptive and Preventive Attack in U.S. National Security Policy (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2006), for an assessment of past and present U.S. experience. View all notes The discussion here makes a different point. The difference between the defender's perceived risk of a preemptive attack, compared to a preventive strike, may become gradually less clear, in proportion to the time between missile launch and arrival at the intended target. In the same way that I might muddle the distinction between a “mild” and a more serious heart attack if I were frightened out of my wits by either, a target state with some first strike vulnerable forces might not wait for the actual onset of a crisis to parse the distinction between preemption and prevention. Short form: give enough short range and medium range ballistic missiles to enough angry people with WMD, and you have a recipe for mass destruction on the installment plan.

Future proliferators will use nukes, not deter. Preemption is likely.


Cimbala ‘7 (Stephen, Distinguished Prof. Pol. Sci. – Penn. State Brandywine, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, “NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND DETERRENCE IN ASIA: THE VIEW FROM VLADIVOSTOK”, 20, InformaWorld)

Deterrence (or compellence) theories depend for their effectiveness on an understanding of war or crisis as a bargaining process, in which utilities are defined commensurably as between the belligerents. The existing and future probable proliferators in the Middle East and Asia may see nuclear weapons as absolutes or gold standards of modern military power. They may also believe that preemptive (or preventive) war is preferable to riding out an attack that appears to be imminent (or inevi- table). Smaller nuclear arsenals may tempt nuclear first strikes or first uses as the cutting edge of a first strike. From a systems perspective, deterrence in a multipolar nuclear world is not necessarily more likely to break down than in a bipolar one: but the term “necessarily” is used advisedly. More nuclear-armed states with dyadic or other conflicts may create a tipping point, beyond which deterrent fatigue gives way to com- petition in preemptive strategies. Such a process occurred on the eve of World War I, escalating the assassination of an archduke into a war of unprecedented destruction.
Prolif causes preemption – lowers threshold of deterrence, encourages first strike fears, and causes positive feedbacks that escalates

Cimbala 6 – Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University, author of books and articles in professional journals on topics related to national security, he has served as a consultant on arms control to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, US Department of State, and private defense contractors (Stephen J., Comparative Strategy, “Missile Defenses in a “Deuces Wild” Context: Proliferation, Terror and Deterrent Disorder,” vol. 25, issue 1, 1/1/2006, http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Missile+Defenses+in+a+%22Deuces+Wild%22+Context%3A+Proliferation%2C+Terror+and+Deterrent+Disorder&rft.jtitle=Comparative+Strategy&rft.au=Stephen+J+Cimbala&rft.date=2006-02-01&rft.issn=0149-5933&rft.volume=25&rft.issue=1&rft.spage=1&rft.externalDBID=FCST&rft.externalDocID=1182855721 /mr)

The implications of ballistic mi.ssile defenses fornuclear weapons spread, and for the related possibility of nuclear terrorism, depend upon: (1) advances in missile defense technolojzy relative to offenses: (2) the political goals and intentions of ''.status quo" and revisionist actors, within and across regions; and (3) the transferability of nuclear technology and know-how across state lines into the hands of extreme revisionist states or terrorists. Scholars and expert policy analysts have, since the end of the Cold War, disagreed about the viability of the nonproliferation regime based on the Nuclear Non-Proiiferation Treaty (NPT). Defenders of the NPT regime credit it with the past accomplishment of having slowed the nuclear arms race during and even after the Cold War. Critics suggest that the NPT regime, however well it perfoimed in the past, is unsuited to the demands of the twenty-first century. Skeptics point to the greater risks of nuclear weapons spread among states, especially in Asia, and the interest of rogue or revisionist states and terrorists in acquiring WMD, including nuclear weapons.'Shocks to the NPT system have heen administered by the declared nuclear statuses of India, Pakistan, and North Korea, bringing the number of acknowledged nuclear powers to eight (Israel does not acknowledge its assumed nuclear weapons capability). Iran has declared its intent to complete a nuclear fuel cycle for peaceful purposes, but the U.S., its European allies and the IAEA suspect that Iran plans to develop nuclear weapons to support an assertive regional political strategy. Although few have noticed, Japan's stocks of weapons-grade plutonium combined with its scientific and technological expertise make it a "virtual nuclear power" on standby, capable of acquiring nuclear weapons within months of a decision to do so.' ^ Eailure to reverse North Korean nuclear proliferation creates additional incentives for Japan to go nuclear. A nuclear-armed Japan, in tum, raises anxieties among China, Russia and both Koreas. If the NPT system is in disrepute or disarray, then the competent management of further proliferation may include the option of defenses against ballistic missiles of theater or longer ranges. States" options faced with the possibility of nuclear blackmail include: (I) conventional or nuclear preemption against the blackmailer's offensive weapons; (2) acquiescence to the blackmailer's demands; (3) reliance on a strategy of "deterrence by denial" that would deny the blackmailer his objectives by deploying effective BMD; (4) reliance on a strategy of deterrence by credible threat of unacceptable second strike retaliation; or (5) some combination of one or more of the above, depending upon the political situation and state of the art in military capabilities. The various options have costs and benefits. The Bush administration has endorsed preemption as an option against terrorists and rogue states, especially those that might be armed with WMD. But if the option of preemption becomes a rule and not an exceptional mode of conduct, it lowers the threshold of deterrence, encourages first strike fears, and pushes states toward the adoption of nuclear prompt launch. Option number two, acquiescence to the demands of a nuclear blackmailer, may be forced upon a state in a crisis, but once it happens, the victim has every incentive to acquire its own nuclear capability. A strategy of "deterrence by denial" (option three) would return classical strategy to the second nuclear age, offensive and defensive technologies—and military options supported by those systems would compete at the margin for operational and strategic ascendancy. The fourth option, classical Cold War deterrence redux. based on the threat of mutual societal vulnerability, does not require defenses but may find that defenses are "friendly" supports to deterrence in a post-Cold War international system pregnant with aspiring new nuclear states. The uncertainty of the NPT regime, and the evident march of the revisionists toward nuclear competency, will require states to move away from sole reliance upon option four (mutual vulnerability) to a retaliatory capability combined with defenses (option three). How capable these defenses need to be depends upon the opposed threats with which they must cope. No state among the current or prospective nuclear powers requires nuclear arsenals and the variety of delivery vehicles available to the U.S. and to the Soviet Union during the High Cold War. Minimum deterrent forces that are survivable and capable of inflicting historically unprecedented damage on any attacker's society will suffice to give pause to sensible leaders. Defenses that supported second-strike postures by limiting damage and protecting retaliatory forces could make minimum deterrent forces more viable, and preemption less appealing.
Prolif causes preemption

Cimbala 5 – Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University, author of books and articles in professional journals on topics related to national security, he has served as a consultant on arms control to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, US Department of State, and private defense contractors (Stephen J., The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, “East Wind Deadly: Nuclear Proliferation in Asia,” vol. 18, issue 4, 12/1/2k5, http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=East+Wind+Deadly%3A+Nuclear+Proliferation+in+Asia&rft.jtitle=The+Journal+of+Slavic+Military+Studies&rft.au=Cimbala%2C+Stephen&rft.date=2005-12-01&rft.issn=1351-8046&rft.volume=18&rft.issue=4&rft.spage=535&rft.epage=558&rft_id=info:doi/10.1080% 2F13518040500341809&rft.externalDBID=FSMS&rft.externalDocID=976978281 /mr)

Because the consequences of even a small nuclear war would be socially and ethically unacceptable, the decision path for getting there resists modeling by the standards of rational policy making. One study calls our attention to the problem that preemption is often mischaracterized by students of conflict: The fear of preemption is a natural one for military planners and political leaders, but the concept of preemption is often poorly understood. Preemption is not an offensive strategy but a defensive one. It is an attack motivated by the expectation that the opponent has already launched an attack or is about to. The object of preemption is to beat the enemy to the punch. It is because preemption is a defensive strategy and not an offensive one that it is so dangerous; one side or both could strike out of fear and despite the apparent consequences. 8 Stephen J. Cimbala, “Conflict Termination and Intrawar Deterrence,” Ch. 5 in Cimbala and Waldman, eds., Controlling and Ending Conflict, pp. 131–164, citation pp. 135–136, italics added. View all notes Nuclear proliferation may increase the abstract possibility of a nuclear crisis and of a mistaken decision for preemption. But there is no deterministic relationship between more weapons and a greater likelihood of bad decisions. 9 For arguments on both sides of the issue whether nuclear weapons spread will increase the probability of nuclear war, see Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995). Academics can always offer competing arguments, but few (if any) current or former U.S. government officials with experience in nuclear force planning or arms control have argued that “more is better” with regard to nuclear proliferation. View all notes The present discussion leaves us somewhere between linear and nonlinear models of nuclear proliferation, leaning toward the latter. As untidy as this decision might be, from a strictly scientific point of view, it fits the spongy reality of world politics and the uncertainty of forecasting social unknowns. In the next section, we develop a specific scenario for multiple Asian nuclear actors and test out some propositions about their arsenals.
Fears of attack and subjectivity of nuclear forces guarantees preemption

Cimbala 5 – Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University, author of books and articles in professional journals on topics related to national security, he has served as a consultant on arms control to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, US Department of State, and private defense contractors (Stephen J., The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, “East Wind Deadly: Nuclear Proliferation in Asia,” vol. 18, issue 4, 12/1/2k5, http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=East+Wind+Deadly%3A+Nuclear+Proliferation+in+Asia&rft.jtitle=The+Journal+of+Slavic+Military+Studies&rft.au=Cimbala%2C+Stephen&rft.date=2005-12-01&rft.issn=1351-8046&rft.volume=18&rft.issue=4&rft.spage=535&rft.epage=558&rft_id=info:doi/10.1080% 2F13518040500341809&rft.externalDBID=FSMS&rft.externalDocID=976978281 /mr)

We noted previously that decisions for war or nuclear blackmail will probably be driven by political variables more than military ones. Nevertheless, even in the case of nuclear forces which are intended more for coercion than for actual use, it can matter a great deal how they are deployed, and operated, short of war. The deployments and operational modes for nuclear forces may seem as if they are “hard” or “objective” facts, and to some extent they are: whether weapons are to be land or sea based, how many warheads or re-entry vehicles are carried by a particular missile, and so forth. On the other hand, nuclear force deployments and operational characteristics also have subjective properties. Weapons, launchers, and command-control protocols “communicate” intentions with respect to the probable or possible behaviors of states and their leaders: intentions that might not be correctly interpreted or understood by other states. During a crisis in which one or more states contemplate the possibility of nuclear attack, countries will not only listen to one another's diplomatic statements: they will also watch what the other fellow is doing, including his military capabilities and maneuvers, for clues about his future behavior.
Proliferation causes preemption

Cimbala 5 – Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University, author of books and articles in professional journals on topics related to national security, he has served as a consultant on arms control to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, US Department of State, and private defense contractors (Stephen J., The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, “East Wind Deadly: Nuclear Proliferation in Asia,” vol. 18, issue 4, 2005, http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=East+Wind+Deadly%3A+Nuclear+Proliferation+in+Asia&rft.jtitle=The+Journal+of+Slavic+Military+Studies&rft.au=Cimbala%2C+Stephen&rft.date=2005-12-01&rft.issn=1351-8046&rft.volume=18&rft.issue=4&rft.spage=535&rft.epage=558&rft_id=info:doi/10.1080%2F13518040500341809&rft.externalDBID=FSMS&rft.externalDocID=976978281 /mr)

In addition to the plausible interest of terrorists in nuclear weapons, there is also the disconcerting evidence of nuclear entrepreneurship resulting in proliferation. The A.Q. Khan network of Pakistani and other government officials, middlemen, scientists and nondescripts trafficked for several decades in nuclear technology and know-how. The Khan network, described as a Wal-Mart of nuclear proliferation, apparently reached out and touched North Korea, Libya, and Iran, among others. 1 Graham Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe (New York: Henry Holt, Times Books, 2004), pp. 61–63. View all notes States seeking a nuclear startup can save enormous time and money by turning to experts in and out of government for help, and the knowledge of how to fabricate nuclear weapons is no longer as esoteric as it was in the early days the atomic age. In response to 9, 11 and to the possible failure of nuclear containment in Asia and the Middle East, the Bush administration has sought to reinforce traditional nonproliferation with an interest in preemptive attack strategies and missile defenses. U.S. superiority in long range, precision weapons makes preemption technically feasible, provided the appropriate targets have been identified. U.S. policy guidance apparently also allows for the possible use of nuclear weapons in preemptive attack against hostile states close to acquiring their own nuclear arsenals. 2 Lawrence Korb, with Peter Ogden, The Road to Nuclear Security (Washington, D.C.: Center for American Progress, December 2004), p. 5. View all notes Missile defenses are further behind the curve, compared to deep strike, but the first U.S. national missile defense (NMD) deployments took place in 2004, under the Bush administration commitment to deploy defenses based on several technologies against rogue state or terrorist attacks. Preemption strategies and defenses are controversial in their own right. For present purposes, however, they are simply talismans of U.S. government awareness and acknowledgment that containment and deterrence can no longer complete the anti-proliferation tool kit.

Prolif causes preemption and war – empirics and nature of states prove

Cimbala 5 – Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University, author of books and articles in professional journals on topics related to national security, he has served as a consultant on arms control to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, US Department of State, and private defense contractors (Stephen J., The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, “East Wind Deadly: Nuclear Proliferation in Asia,” vol. 18, issue 4, 2005, http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=East+Wind+Deadly%3A+Nuclear+Proliferation+in+Asia&rft.jtitle=The+Journal+of+Slavic+Military+Studies&rft.au=Cimbala%2C+Stephen&rft.date=2005-12-01&rft.issn=1351-8046&rft.volume=18&rft.issue=4&rft.spage=535&rft.epage=558&rft_id=info:doi/10.1080%2F13518040500341809&rft.externalDBID=FSMS&rft.externalDocID=976978281 /mr)

The five-sided nuclear competition in the Pacific would be linked, in geopolitical deterrence and proliferation space, to the existing nuclear deterrents of India and Pakistan, and to the emerging nuclear weapons status of Iran. An arc of nuclear instability from Tehran to Tokyo could place U.S. proliferation strategies into the ash heap of history and call for more drastic military options, not excluding preemptive war, defenses, and counter-deterrent special operations. In addition, an eight-sided nuclear arms race in Asia would increase the likelihood of accidental or inadvertent nuclear war. It would do so because: 1 some of these states already have histories of protracted conflict; 2 states may have politically unreliable or immature command and control systems, especially during a crisis involving a decision for nuclear first strike or retaliation; unreliable or immature systems might permit a technical malfunction that caused an unintended launch, or a deliberate, but unauthorized, launch by rogue commanders; and 3 faulty intelligence and warning systems might cause one side to misinterpret the other's defensive moves to forestall attack as offensive preparations for attack, thus triggering a mistaken preemption. To this point, we have discussed the problem of an Asian nuclear arms race as an abstract, albeit sufficiently alarming, problem. In the sections of the article to follow, we want to pin down the concept by detailed interrogation of one hypothetical scenario: an eight-sided nuclear polygon of force structures and, therefore, of probable operational performances in deterrence, in crisis management and, if necessary, in war. Before being scenario specific, however, we need to resolve, or at least address, matters of “philosophy of analysis” or analytic points of departure, pertinent to this study.




Proliferation causes preemption – escalates to war – human nature proves

Cimbala 5 – Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University, author of books and articles in professional journals on topics related to national security, he has served as a consultant on arms control to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, US Department of State, and private defense contractors (Stephen J., The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, “East Wind Deadly: Nuclear Proliferation in Asia,” vol. 18, issue 4, 2005, http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=East+Wind+Deadly%3A+Nuclear+Proliferation+in+Asia&rft.jtitle=The+Journal+of+Slavic+Military+Studies&rft.au=Cimbala%2C+Stephen&rft.date=2005-12-01&rft.issn=1351-8046&rft.volume=18&rft.issue=4&rft.spage=535&rft.epage=558&rft_id=info:doi/10.1080%2F13518040500341809&rft.externalDBID=FSMS&rft.externalDocID=976978281 /mr)

Arms races offer challenges to modelers not quite as bad as war—but almost. When the arms racing takes place with regard to weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear ones, the omnipresence of Donald Rumsfeld's “known unknowns” intrudes. If the spread of WMD is linear, then traditional measures of containment, such as treaty regimes and trade embargoes, may work. If nuclear proliferation becomes nonlinear, with positive feedback, then more active anti-proliferation steps may need to be taken: including preemption, defenses, and nuclear counterterrorism. A chaotic process of nuclear weapons spread would resist modeling altogether. 5 The distinction between nonlinearity and chaos is explained in Colin S. Gray, Strategy for Chaos: Revolutions in Military Affairs and the Evidence of History (London: Frank Cass, 2002), Ch. 4. View all notes There exists a mathematics of chaos theory, but it would fall short of the complexity of human behavior related to decisions about state policy and nuclear decision making, especially those not yet taken. The question of modeling strategy is complicated by the significance of behavioral factors, including leaders' cognitive processes, personalities, and decision making proclivities. For example, in discussing the problem of nuclear preemption, Paul K. Davis summarized a number of “dangerous ideas” that might arise inappropriately and find acceptance in crisis. 6 Paul K. Davis, “Behavioral Factors in Terminating Superpower War,” Ch. 6 in Stephen J. Cimbala and Sidney R. Waldman, eds., Controlling and Ending Conflict: Issues Before and After the Cold War (Westport, Ct.: Greenwood Press, 1987), pp. 165–182. View all notes The dangerous ideas might even be true, to a point: they would simply be dysfunctional to the de-escalation of a nuclear crisis and to the avoidance of a mistaken decision for preemption. Davis' list of dangerous ideas in this context, includes leaders' assumptions about the opponent and about circumstances: We must preempt because he is about to launch a first strike: —he is crazy; —his doctrine will require him to do so under these circumstances; —he has double crossed us; he's not really standing down, but preparing for attack. We must preempt, because the other side is out of control. —the other side is not doing what its leaders promised; its military is probably taking control, the military may not be cohesive, and it appears that the military is preparing a strike. We will have to attack: —a third country is about to launch a strike, and the lid will then be off, even if our adversary understands what is happening; The cost of going second rather than first is very high: —we might be able to decapitate the other side's regime or command-control system, causing him to quit, retaliate ineffectively or collapse in paralysis; —we might be able to disarm the other side sufficiently as to ensure our own survival; —we might be able to change the balance of forces so drastically that the other side would be coerced into surrender or ceasing its aggression and negotiating an acceptable outcome; —our decapitation is possible, and would be catastrophic; —the military cost of going second rather than first is high, even if we are assuredly able to retaliate; —by a first strike, we might actually survive an attack if it were less than fully effective. Our only chance to survive is by conducting a first strike and hoping it is more effective than our confidence level indicates. 7 Ibid., pp. 170–171. I have deleted some items and revised some wording from the original. View all notes Because the consequences of even a small nuclear war would be socially and ethically unacceptable, the decision path for getting there resists modeling by the standards of rational policy making. One study calls our attention to the problem that preemption is often mischaracterized by students of conflict: The fear of preemption is a natural one for military planners and political leaders, but the concept of preemption is often poorly understood. Preemption is not an offensive strategy but a defensive one. It is an attack motivated by the expectation that the opponent has already launched an attack or is about to. The object of preemption is to beat the enemy to the punch. It is because preemption is a defensive strategy and not an offensive one that it is so dangerous; one side or both could strike out of fear and despite the apparent consequences. 8 Stephen J. Cimbala, “Conflict Termination and Intrawar Deterrence,” Ch. 5 in Cimbala and Waldman, eds., Controlling and Ending Conflict, pp. 131–164, citation pp. 135–136, italics added. View all notes Nuclear proliferation may increase the abstract possibility of a nuclear crisis and of a mistaken decision for preemption. But there is no deterministic relationship between more weapons and a greater likelihood of bad decisions. 9 For arguments on both sides of the issue whether nuclear weapons spread will increase the probability of nuclear war, see Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995). Academics can always offer competing arguments, but few (if any) current or former U.S. government officials with experience in nuclear force planning or arms control have argued that “more is better” with regard to nuclear proliferation. View all notes The present discussion leaves us somewhere between linear and nonlinear models of nuclear proliferation, leaning toward the latter. As untidy as this decision might be, from a strictly scientific point of view, it fits the spongy reality of world politics and the uncertainty of forecasting social unknowns. In the next section, we develop a specific scenario for multiple Asian nuclear actors and test out some propositions about their arsenals.

Proliferation lead to preemptive strikes


Richard Maass, PhD candidate whose primary research interests concern international security, IR theory, US foreign policy, and qualitative and mixed-method research, Spring 2010 (“Nuclear Proliferation and Declining U.S. Hegemony,” Hamilton College, Accessed online at http://www.hamilton.edu/documents//levitt-center/Maass_article.pdf, Accessed on 7/19/11)

Rather than accept a decline of relative military and political power, states may feasibly consider a preventative war to prohibit the proliferation of rival states. Sagan suggests that the course of preventative war will “more likely be chosen when military leaders, who minimize diplomatic considerations…have a significant degree of influence over the final decision” (Sagan and Waltz, 2003, pg. 61). Military officials have an extremely narrow view of war and the ramifications of actions taken during war. In his address to the National Security Council in 1954 regarding the U.S.S.R.’s growing nuclear program, Admiral Radford stated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) could guarantee a successful outcome in a nuclear war if preemptive strategies were adopted (Sagan and Waltz, 2003, pg. 61). Several members of the JCS adopted the preventative war mentality during the early stages of the Cold War, and believed that nuclear superiority could in fact be used in conflict (Dingham, 1989, pg. 63). While the U.S. has never engaged in a preventative war, Sagan argues that the likelihood of preventative wars occurring “will increase in the future since strict centralized civilian control over military organizations is problematic in some new and potential proliferant states” (Sagan and Waltz, 2003, pg. 61). Regardless of proliferation policies, proliferating states create security issues for the United States and the world. As the process of proliferation spreads, so does the threat of preventative war, and thus the probability of nuclear conflict.

Iran and North Korea prove.

Isenberg 8 (David, analyst in national and international security affairs. He is also a member of the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy, an adjunct scholar with the Cato Institute, contributor to the Straus Military Reform Project, and a US Navy veteran, “The Return of Limited Nuclear War?” May 2, The CATO Institute, http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=9375)

The authors take exception to the view that deterrence is still a valid strategy, as it was against the Soviet Union during the Cold War. They argue that deterring the use of nuclear weapons by threatening retaliation could be "highly problematic in many plausible conflict situations involving nuclear-armed regional adversaries for the simple reason that adversary leaders may not believe that they will personally be any worse off for having used nuclear weapons than if they were to forgo their use." The authors write that for different reasons — Kim Jong Il out of a sense that he has little to lose and Iran's leadership out of nationalist ambition fueled by religious-revolutionary zeal.Both countries may be willing to accept a great deal of risk once conflict breaks out. The monograph points out North Korean and Iranian leaders have compelling reasons to consider using nuclear weapons. It notes: The prospect of the United States forcibly overthrowing them is not an abstract proposition. Both of the U.S. national security strategy documents released by George W. Bush declared that the ultimate goal of the United States is "ending tyranny." And both North Korea and Iran are cited as examples of the types of regimes about which the United States harbors grave concerns. And, given that the leaders of such "regional adversary states" recognize that their military forces are locked into a position of marked inferiority against U.S. conventional forces they cannot prevent large-scale U.S. forces from deploying to their regions or mounting an attack. The report states if diplomacy fails, over the next 10 years, they could field between a dozen and three dozen fission weapons. In fact, they might even be tempted to use them early on in any conflict. This would be a scenario the United States has never before confronted. The monograph states that in certain circumstances U.S. leaders can not be confident of deterring regional adversaries from using their limited arsenals, even if the United States maintains its nuclear superiority.


The act of proliferation invites first strikes even if deterrence applies -- prolif good authors concede.


Asal and Beardsley ‘9  (Victor, Assistant Prof. Pol. Sci. – SUNY Albany, and Kyle, Assistant Prof. Pol. Sci. – Emory U., Conflict Management and Peace Science, “Nuclear Weapons as Shields*”, 26:3, Sage)

While we do not attempt to resolve the debate between proliferation optimists and pessimists, there are two notable implications to that debate. First, nuclear weapons do confer observable benefits to the possessors by making them less likely to be targets of violent aggression. This helps further explain why states bear considerable costs to achieve them. Note however, that nuclear weapons do not make states completely immune to hostile acts of aggression, as evident in the Israeli–Arab and India–Pakistan cases. Future studies might better assess crisis behavior that is “off the equilibrium path” from the logic presented here to understand under which situations states bear considerable risks by using violent aggression against a nuclear state.The second impli- cation is that proliferation does not necessarily translate into either greater stability or net utility gains in the international system. We demonstrate that proliferation is undesirable for both other non-nuclear states and members already in the nuclear club. Both types of states will lament the loss in ability to use heavy handed coercive diplomacy. Moreover, the attempt at proliferation itself appears to be destabilizing to the international system as the nuclear program states tend to be the target and source of much hostility. We found that program states have some heightened tenden- cies toward aggression, despite the incentives to lie low during the development stage. This is puzzling and a potentially fertile topic of future study.






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