Proliferation is bad even when it spreads to allies.
Matthew Kroenig, member of the Council on Foreign Relations, assistant professor at Georgetown University, held academic fellowships from the National Science Foundation, the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, and the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation at the University of California, research focuses on international security, nuclear proliferation, soft power, and terrorism, writes for Security Studies, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, received the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Award for Outstanding Achievement, 6/17/2008 (“Beyond Optimism and Pessimism: The Differential Effects of Nuclear Proliferation,” Matthew Kroenig, Accessed online at http://www.matthewkroenig.com/Kroenig_Beyond%20Optimism%20and%20Pessimism.pdf, Accessed on 7/22/2011)
One could argue that the effects of nuclear proliferation depend on whether nuclear weapons spread to friends or enemies. 118 Richard Haas, President of the Council on Foreign Relations, hasargued in favor of a double standard for U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy because he claimsthat the United States is more threatened by nuclear-armed foes than it is by nuclear-armedfriends.119 While it is true that the nature and the degree of the threat posed by nuclearproliferation varies depending on who possess them, the friend/enemy distinction overlooks the fact that nuclear proliferation to friends still causes many problems for power-projecting states and that non-power-projecting states are not necessarily concerned when nuclear weapons spread to nonallies. As Great Britain’s Lord Palmerston famously remarked, nations have no permanent friends, they only have permanent interests. Nuclear proliferation does not provide an exception to this rule. For power-projecting-states, nuclear proliferation to both friends and enemies entails substantial strategic costs, though the type of cost is different in each case. States will not worry much that nuclear proliferation to an ally will deter a military invasion, since it is highly unlikely that states would want to invade an allied state. This does not mean, however, that nuclear proliferation to a friendly state is cost free. Power-projecting states incur many other strategic costs when allies acquire nuclear weapons. Nuclear proliferation leading to regional instability that could potentially compel a costly intervention can occur whether the new nuclear state is an ally or an enemy. In fact, as we saw above, the fear of regional instability in the Middle East was a principal reason why the United States and the Soviet Union both opposed nuclear proliferation to Israel in the 1960s.120 Further, nuclear proliferation to an allied state can encourage rivals to seek their own nuclear deterrent, contributing to further nuclear proliferation. As we saw above, officials in Washington feared that nuclear proliferation in Israel would lead Arab states to develop their own nuclear programs. Moreover, the concern often expressed by power-projecting states that nuclear proliferation will undermine alliance relationships is primarily a fear about the spread of nuclear weapons to allied states. Indeed, the United States has almost always opposed the proliferation of nuclear weapons to allied states.121 The United States is not alone in this regard. Moscow also prohibited its allies from acquiring nuclear weapons and had great success: no member of the Warsaw Pact ever acquired the bomb.122Further, friendship is not a necessary prerequisite for promoting nuclear proliferation. Recent scholarship has examined the factors that lead states to export sensitive nuclear materials and technology.123 This study reveals that in no case has a state ever provided sensitive nuclear assistance to a state with which it shared a formal alliance.124 As argued above, states provide sensitive nuclear assistance more according to whom they are constraining and less according to whom they are helping.
Asian Prolif Bad – Arms Races
Asian prolif causes arms races – escalates to nuclear warfare
Cimbala 5 – Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University, author of books and articles in professional journals on topics related to national security, he has served as a consultant on arms control to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, US Department of State, and private defense contractors (Stephen J., The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, “East Wind Deadly: Nuclear Proliferation in Asia,” vol. 18, issue 4, 12/1/2k5, http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=East+Wind+Deadly%3A+Nuclear+Proliferation+in+Asia&rft.jtitle=The+Journal+of+Slavic+Military+Studies&rft.au=Cimbala%2C+Stephen&rft.date=2005-12-01&rft.issn=1351-8046&rft.volume=18&rft.issue=4&rft.spage=535&rft.epage=558&rft_id=info:doi/10.1080% 2F13518040500341809&rft.externalDBID=FSMS&rft.externalDocID=976978281 /mr)
The spread of nuclear weapons in Asia during the first two decades of the twenty-first century has the potential to disrupt existing security arrangements within and outside of the region, to provide a catalytic agent for an outbreak of conventional or nuclear warfare, and to consign to the ash heap of history optimistic projections about the triumph of economic globalism and political postmodernism in the twenty-first century. The spread of nuclear weapons in the first two decades of the twenty-first century may have effects similar to the spread of military plans for rapid mobilization and prompt offensives among great powers a century ago. European political leaders in July and August, 1914, plunged from crisis into war without fully comprehending how prior decisions about force deployment, and plans for preemption in the initial period of war, would help to trigger the very conflict they hoped to deter. In a similar fashion, nuclear proliferation after the Cold War may escape the constraints that kept nuclear ownership limited and nuclear adventurism under control between 1945 and 1991. In the new world order, nuclear weapons threaten to tilt the balance between the satisfied and dissatisfied states, or between defensively and offensively minded powers, until deterrence collapses into itself. Among regions or military theaters of operation of interest to the United States, Asia presents the most dangerous imminent possibility of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) colliding with serious political grievances and inadequate supports against deterrence failure. The spread of nuclear weapons in Asia and in the Middle East with military reach into Asia (or vice versa) could involve the United States and other great powers in actual war or in a continuing minuet of crises short of war. In addition, prevention or rollback of nuclear proliferation in Asia may no longer be possible. Containment and deterrence, supported by arms limitations, might be the only feasible options, regardless of their downside risks. In the discussion below, we project to the year 2020 or shortly thereafter, entering the third decade of the twenty-first century. Eight candidate Asian nuclear powers are provided with hypothetical forces, making possible comparisons among states' forces on a variety of dimensions related to arms race and nuclear crisis stability. The political context of an Asian nuclear arms race is obviously different from the environment that surrounded United States – Soviet competition throughout the Cold War. Therefore, variations in the performances of national forces may be more significant for crisis and arms race stability in an eight-sided arms competition, compared to the two way street of the Cold War.