Prolif good – War

Asian Prolif Bad – Preemption

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Asian Prolif Bad – Preemption

Asian prolif specifically causes preemption – nuclear war

Cimbala 5 – Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University, author of books and articles in professional journals on topics related to national security, he has served as a consultant on arms control to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, US Department of State, and private defense contractors (Stephen J., Comparative Strategy, “Nuclear Prolifeartion in Asia and Missile Defense,” vol. 24, issue 4, 10/1/ 2005, /mr)

The spread of nuclear weapons in Asia is arguably the most dangerous trend in international security policy. There are several reasons for policy makers and international relations scholars to be concerned about this development. First, Asia is the source of a number of historical and/or contemporary political rivalries: India and Pakistan; China and India; Russia and China; Russia and Japan; North and South Korea; Japan and the two Koreas; Japan and China. A number of these states already possess nuclear arsenals and plan to increase them in size and diversity. A second reason for the significance of nuclear proliferation in Asia is that the United States has vital security and economic interests in the region—and some of them are in conflict with one another, at least at the margin. The U.S. has security and defense commitments to South Korea, Japan and Taiwan. It has strong and growing trade and other economic relationships with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The Bush administration has also moved to improve U.S. economic and security relationships with India. Bush and Indian officials reached agreement in July, 2005 (pending Congressional approval) for the United States to supply India with civilian nuclear technology and conventional military equipment. Pentagon officials estimated that India might, under the new arrangements, purchase as much as $5 billion worth of conventional weapons.1 Warmer security relations and greater arms sales between the U.S. and India had implications for China and for Pakistan. Chinese observers might reasonably conclude that the U.S. rapprochement with India was intended as a counterweight against the PRC’s own military ambitions. In July, 2005 a Pentagon assessment of China’s military capability and potential contended that the PRC was increasing its nuclear arsenal and specifically noted that Chinese missiles are capable of striking India, Russia and “virtually all of the United States.”2For its part, Beijing objected to the U.S. assessment as inflammatory. The defense agreement with India also reverberated in Islamabad. Pakistan remained a key ally in the U.S. war on terror and, notwithstanding recent thaws in their relationship, a potential military opponent of India. And, as the U.S. sought to balance its relationships among India, China and Pakistan, it had to consider as well the implications for proliferation of its proposed agreement with India. Members of the 44-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group would have to be persuaded that aid to India’s civilian nuclear industry would not be transmutable into support for its weapons program. According to the U.S.-Indian agreement of July 20, 2005, India committed itself to forego additional nuclear tests, to open its civilian nuclear reactors to international inspectors, and to withhold nuclear technology or materials from possible proliferators.3 On the other hand, the open door for U.S. aid to India’s civilian nuclear industry, despite India’s unwillingness to sign the NPT, raises issues of equity in U.S. policy of nuclear containment. As one editorial commented: “Help in building civilian nuclear reactors is a carrot for countries that agree not to build nuclear weapons. If India can build such weapons and then munch the carrot anyway, why should others not aim to do likewise?”4 Part of the answer may be that geopolitics and national interests, in New Delhi and inWashington, took precedence over the norms of nonproliferation. The case of technology and arms transfers to India is but one example of the intricacy of U.S. policy objectives, including nonproliferation, in the region. A third reason for concern about the spread of nuclear weapons in Asia is that the Cold War assumptions about U.S.-Soviet behavior, related to nuclear deterrence and crisis management, are not really transferable to the Asian context. Stabilizing forces that existed between 1946 and 1989 with regard to the development and deployment of American and Soviet strategic nuclear weapons do not exist in early twenty-first century Asia. A first difference is that the U.S. and Soviet nuclear arms competition was two sided. Each had only to watch the other in order to make plausible threat assessments. The eventually enormous sizes of the American and Soviet nuclear weapons establishments virtually guaranteed an historically unprecedented, and socially unacceptable, outcome if deterrence failed. But the analytical problem of focusing intelligence collection and analysis on “the threat” from Washington or Moscow was politically simplified compared to the present, and plausible future, condition of regional nuclear multipolarity in and near Asia. Nuclear Proliferation in Asia 315 A second difference, relative to stabilizing forces present during the Cold War but not necessarily now, is that the American and Soviet military establishments were under firm political control. The possibility of an American Seven Days in May or Dr. Strangelove scenario, in which the political control over military forces was usurped by serving officers, was obviated by constitutional and other checks and balances. For different reasons, the Soviet system also provided for firm party control of military selection and training, especially in the higher ranks. Neither state was at risk, even during crises that might have involved the use of nuclear weapons, of military overthrow or of “Red Commanders” cutting party leaders out of the wartime chain of command. Conversely, there is little reason to be complacent about the spread of nuclear weapons among states in Asia where our knowledge of their political and military-procedural control systems is limited at best. What are the use controls, enablement codes, or “fail-safe” procedures in North Korea, in Pakistan, or in a possibly future nuclear-capable South Korea and Japan? Whose fingers will actually be on the nuclear trigger during a crisis, and what happens if civilian and military leaders devolve into competing factions? States in Asia other than Russia and China do not have decades of experience in the management of nuclear forces, including the alerting and standing down of nuclear-capable land based missiles, aircraft and sea-based forces—and their supporting command, control and communications systems. A third difference between the ColdWar and the present and future situation in Asia is related to the size, diversity and vulnerability of delivery systems for nuclear weapons in the two situations. The U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear weapons were deployed in land-based, sea-based, and air-launched basing modes. The numbers and diversity of these platforms made a credible first strike unthinkable for either side, especially after the achievement of military-strategic parity in broad categories of launchers and weapons. On account of the high survivability of U.S. and Soviet mature ColdWar forces, strategies of preemption were unpromising, and therefore unappealing to policy makers and commanders. In contrast, the present and foreseeable forces of Asian nuclear powers will be smaller and less survivable compared to the post-parity American and Soviet forces. Instead of more than ten thousand warheads capable of being delivered over intercontinental ranges, current and future Asian powers will probably deploy hundreds instead of thousands of warheads. In addition, the survivability of these weapons under plausible conditions of attack, together with the responsiveness and endurance of their command-and-control systems, will also be in doubt, compared to the American and Soviet Cold War forces. Smaller forces with less survivability, other things being equal, invite first-strike strategies and planning based on preemption or “launch on warning” compared to second-strike retaliation. Finally, a fourth aspect of forces deployed by present and future Asian military powers, compared to American and Soviet Cold War forces, is their contiguity to their assigned targets and to the forces of their regional opponents. The “strategic” (meaning, of intercontinental range and directed against the most vital targets) nuclear weapons of regional actors in Asia may include ballistic missiles and aircraft of theater or shorter ranges. Medium or even short-range ballistic missiles and “tactical” aircraft, or offshore naval vessels of similar range, may be able to deliver fast attacks with potentially “strategic” effects against military or value targets. These less-than-intercontinental-range delivery systems will shorten times for warning and response on the part of the defender, compared to systems of longer range. Short flight times and requirements for rapid decision by the defender encourage hair-trigger responses, including prompt launch or even preemption. The importance of this factor of contiguity between WMD-equipped forces and their targets was apparent during the 1991 U.S. and allied coalition war against Iraq. Many air 316 S. J. Cimbala sorties had to be assigned to detection and attempted destruction of the Iraqi SCUD missiles launched against Israel. The U.S. also deployed Patriot antimissile defenses to Israel in order to provide some partial protection against missile attacks and to encourage Tel Aviv not to enter the war against Iraq. Israeli leaders feared with good reason that Saddam Hussein might fire SCUDs with biological or chemical warheads into their cities. Perhaps Hussein chose not to, on account of U.S. warnings that his use of WMD would open the door to retaliation in kind, not excluding the possible use of nuclear weapons. Whatever his reasoning, the episode showed how easy it would be for aggressors with only short-range missiles capable of carrying nuclear or otherWMDto pose a strategic threat to nearby states and their societies. In the analysis that follows, we will posit force structures that provide limited numbers of truly long-range weapons systems (i.e., intermediate- or intercontinental-range missiles and bomber delivered weapons of comparable distances). Nevertheless, it must be borne in mind that in addition to those long-range weapons included in our hypothetical, projected forces, other delivery systems of shorter range could also be used as nuclear-capable launchers. Therefore, our illustrative forces probably err on the conservative side, in terms of their total capabilities for complicating the problems of the defender relative to that of the attacker. The next section explains our methodology and follows through with the pertinent analysis.
Asian proliferation causes preemption

Cimbala 5 - Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University, author of books and articles in professional journals on topics related to national security, he has served as a consultant on arms control to the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, US Department of State, and private defense contractors (Stephen J., Defense & Security Analysis, “Nuclear weapons in the Twenty-first century: From simplicity to complexity,” vol. 21, issue 3, 10/1/ 2005, /mr)

The possibility of further proliferation in Asia, in response to the acknowledged or obvious nuclear statuses of India, Pakistan and North Korea, could not be ignored.^ Nuclear weapons could appeal to South Korea or, even, to Japan. In addition, the Middle Eastern and south Asian politico-military template was complicated by the imminence of an Iranian nuclear capability, unless Tehran was persuaded to reverse course by American and European pressure. Israel might try to pre-empt an Iranian decision to go nuclear, although its official policy in the spring of 2005 was to support US and European coercive diplomacy to that effect. Nuclear weapons could make north and south Asia (to include parts of the Middle East from which nuclear capable missiles could reach into Asia) a geo-strategically crowded neighborhood: Russia, China, North Korea, South Korea, Japan, India, Pakistan, and the US could all have vital interests and nuclear forces to support those interests. The Bush administration National Security Strategy emphasizes that the threat from rogue states or terrorists in possession of weapons of mass destruction requires rethinking of Cold War assumptions about deterrence. The direction that post-Cold War revisionism should take is far from obvious, however. The concept of assured retaliation by survivable retaliatory forces as one component of stable deterrence, as opposed to the entire basis of military-strategic relationships among major powers, is likely to endure into the twenty-first century. Populations will remain hostage to the effects of mass destruction weapons, including those delivered by terrorists. Protection of populations through active and passive defenses may improve, compared to Cold War standards. But population protection can never be absolute, and small numbers of nuclear weapons can inflict large amounts of societal destruction. In addition, nuclear weapons can be used to attack targets other than value targets such as cities. Pre-emptive or retaliatory strikes against military forces are also possible. During the Cold War, scenarios focused on massive US-Soviet force exchanges involving thousands of weapons. Each side feared that the other would execute a disarming first strike against its retaliatory forces. Much of this danger was exaggerated, but it drove analysis at the margin. And, although we are well past the Cold War, US and Russian nuclear forces are still sized against one another's capabilities, regardless of political intentions, as the "gold standard" against which other nuclear powers are compared. The Moscow Treaty of 2002 signed by Presidents Bush and Putin calls for reductions in the numbers of deployed warheads on each side's strategic launchers to 270 • STEPHEN J, CIMBALA between 2,200 and 1,700 by 2012.^ Although parity in numbers of weapons is important to the two sides, each is trusted, according to the protocols of the Moscow Treaty, to implement its own reductions according to its own state priorities. This permissive approach to verification reflects the non-hostile political relations between the US and Russia after the Cold War. In addition to the canonical scenario of a massive US-Russian nuclear exchange, it is equally or more likely that nuclear weapons in the future will be used for coercive diplomacy or in actual attacks as part of regional "access denial" strategies. In this respect, the object of a North Korean or Iranian nuclear capability, for example, would be to preclude the intervention in a local conflict of US or allied hostile forces. In Iraq, with nuclear weapons already available on SCUD launchers, this would have posed a very different problem for US planners of Desert Storm in 1990 and 1991. The same holds true for the US war to impose regime change on Iraq in 2003.

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