Krepon and Black, 11- BA from Franklin and Marshall College (July/August, Michael and Samuel, Nuclear Nonproliferation, “Good News and Bad News on the NPT,” mat)
The past is so much with us that it can sometimes obscure the present. This is certainly true with respect to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), whose quinquennial review is scheduled to begin on May 3. During past reviews, the health and well-being of the NPT regime has been measured primarily by the actions of the five states recognized by the treaty as possessing nuclear weapons. Under Article 6 of the treaty, all five—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—are obligated to act in good faith to facilitate the progressive reduction and eventual elimination of their nuclear stockpiles. As permanent members of the UN Security Council, the “P-5” also have special responsibilities to address proliferation dangers that, as reaffirmed by the council on September 24, 2009, constitute “a threat to international peace and security.” During the Cold War, the P-5 produced, in the aggregate, tens of thousands of nuclear weapons, tested these weapons more than 2,000 times, and threatened to use them during harrowing crises or in warfare. Most of this wretched excess was the doing of the Soviet Union and the United States. Given this history, past review conferences understandably produced action plans that focused primarily on what the first five proliferators needed to do to strengthen the regime. Continued pressure on the P-5 is certainly warranted because they still possess more than 20,000 nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, well-rehearsed speeches blaming the P-5 for the ills of the global nonproliferation regime obscure recent trends and impressive gains. Looking back, the NPT has made extraordinary strides. The treaty entered into force on March 5, 1970, with just 43 member states. Among the original absentees were China and France. Initial safeguards at nuclear facilities were rudimentary. The original International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) guidance on the structure and contents of safeguards agreements contained three paragraphs on implementation, all of which focused heavily on minimizing the burden placed on safeguarded facilities. For example, this guidance stated that the IAEA should “avoid hampering” the development of nuclear expertise and international cooperation including “international exchange of nuclear material.” By comparison, the IAEA’s 1997 Model Additional Protocol is far more specific, uses stronger language (“shall” instead of “should”), and authorizes far more encompassing inspections, setting a new standard for responsible nuclear stewardship. Over time, the NPT’s membership has grown to almost as many states as belong to the United Nations. In 2008 the IAEA carried out 2,797 inspections, design information verifications, and complementary access visits in 163 countries, which required 14,121.5 calendar-days in the field. Despite the power and influence nuclear weapons are presumed to possess, the NPT has established nonproliferation as a global norm. States pursuing nuclear weapons programs after the NPT entered into force have been cast as outliers. The IAEA Board of Governors has found two states, Iran and North Korea, to be in noncompliance with their safeguards agreements. Others, including South Korea and Syria, have conducted activities that, when exposed, have been viewed by the IAEA as matters of serious concern, prompting the agency to request clarifications or dispatch inspection teams. Although a number of non-nuclear-weapon states have strengthened their commitment to the NPT over the past two decades, the most impressive gains during this period have been made by four of the P-5. These gains can be measured by six key indicators of nuclear weapons’ utility: actual battlefield use, threats of battlefield use, overall stockpile size, warheads deployed, nuclear weapons tests, and fissile material production for weapons. Based on these six indicators, compliance with the NPT’s core obligations by four of the P-5 has become stronger, and the value they have placed on nuclear weapons has plummeted since the Cold War ended. Despite these gains, which are described below, the outcome of the 2010 NPT Review Conference is in doubt, as is, more importantly, the health and well-being of the NPT regime. Threats to the well-being of the regime now lie increasingly in the actions of outlier states, the politicization of deliberations by the IAEA board, and the reluctance of key non-nuclear-weapon states to step up to their obligations as guardians of the treaty. The profound nature of the positive trends described below has been underappreciated for three primary reasons. First, the residual P-5 capabilities remain large, reflecting the excessive size of their arsenals in past decades. Second, old ways of thinking linger in P-5 nuclear enclaves, where attempts to buck these trends capture headlines, even when they are ineffectual. For example, Bush administration efforts to add new warhead designs to the U.S. nuclear stockpile garnered global attention but died quickly on Capitol Hill. Third, nuclear posture reviews, treaty ratification, and entry-into-force provisions are designed or controlled by those who seek to brake, rather than accelerate, enduring trends. By rightly focusing on how much remains to be done to reduce nuclear weapons stockpiles and to end nuclear testing permanently, supporters of the NPT wrongly fail to appreciate how much the stock price of nuclear weapons has fallen for major powers over the past two decades. Waning Utility Consider the particulars, starting with the battlefield use of nuclear weapons. When the nuclear age began, no one was so bold or so foolish as to predict that the “winning weapon” would remain sheathed for more than six decades. Others have analyzed at length the reasons for this unexpected and enormously important tradition of restraint. What matters most, for the purposes of this article, is the inescapable conclusion that a weapon not used on battlefields loses its military utility. Every year that passes without the use of nuclear weapons in crisis or warfare makes it more difficult for a political leader to authorize subsequent use, while making the user more of an international pariah. A second criterion is the political utility of nuclear weapons. Even if unused on a battlefield, nuclear weapons could still have political utility in that they could influence behavior in crises and in war. During the Cold War, the United States often directed nuclear threats against China during the Korean War and in crises over Formosa/Taiwan. The Soviet Union and the United States also ramped up their readiness to use nuclear weapons during Cold War crises to influence decision-making. U.S. maneuvers were most evident when nuclear-armed aircraft carriers and strategic bombers were forward deployed during a crisis. On some occasions, instructions to increase readiness for use of nuclear weapons were broadcast in ways that could easily be intercepted. Now, U.S. aircraft carriers do not carry nuclear weapons on board, and Washington typically moves theater missile defense capabilities rather than B-52s into harm’s way when tensions increase in troubled regions. Nevertheless, veiled nuclear threats by the P-5 have not ceased entirely. Russian leaders have not so subtly implied that the Czech Republic and Poland could become targets for nuclear detonations if they choose to host U.S. theater missile defense components. In addition, the United States has clarified on a few occasions, including the run-up to both wars against Saddam Hussein, that the use of weapons of mass destruction against U.S. forces, friends, and allies would be met with a devastating response. Rare, public threats by British and U.S. leaders in recent decades have been directed only at countries that are not in good standing with the IAEA and are presumed to have weapons of mass destruction in violation of UN Security Council resolutions. The pattern of nuclear-tinged threats over the past two decades has changed markedly from the Cold War. The most harrowing crises since the Cold War ended have involved outliers to the NPT. India and Pakistan have experienced four crises since 1990 in which veiled or blunt nuclear threats have been exchanged, and North Korea periodically engages in nuclear bluster when it wishes to raise temperatures on the Korean peninsula. Verbal threats in periods of heightened tension in South and East Asia have been complemented by the flight testing or movement of nuclear-capable missiles. The record is clear: states that seek political utility from nuclear weapons during periods of heightened tension now reside primarily outside the NPT. Declining Numbers A third measure of nuclear weapons utility is stockpile size. According to data compiled by Stan Norris and Hans Kristensen, global nuclear stockpiles reached their peak in 1986 at more than 65,000 warheads. Moscow and Washington have reduced their stockpiles by approximately 50,000 warheads below their Cold War peaks. The stockpiles of France and the United Kingdom have been in decline since 1981 and 1992, respectively. The British and French stockpiles are now respectively 43 percent and 32 percent smaller than they were in these peak years. Of the P-5 nuclear arsenals, only China’s is believed to be growing, albeit modestly. Another important barometer is the number of nuclear weapons deployed. Since the Cold War ended, Moscow and Washington have reportedly removed from operational status more than 19,000 nuclear weapons. The number of nuclear weapons deployed by France has been reduced by at least 125. The United Kingdom has reduced its arsenal by approximately 200 deployed nuclear weapons. Of the P-5, only Beijing is increasing the number of warheads it deploys. Every test of a nuclear weapon is a declaration of utility. In 1962 alone, there were an astonishing 178 nuclear weapons tests. From 1965 to 1974, there was an average of 62 tests per year. In the following decade, the average was 54 tests per year. From 1985 through 1994, the average number of tests dropped to 18 per year. Since 1996, the P-5 have not conducted a single declaration of utility in the form of a nuclear weapons test. A final yardstick is fissile material production for weapons. Four of the P-5—again, with the exception of China—have officially declared a moratorium on fissile material production. Beijing may be refraining from new fissile material production for weapons, but it has yet to publicly confirm this. In summation, by all six key indicators, the utility of nuclear weapons has declined dramatically for four of the P-5 over the past two decades. Stockpiles and numbers of deployed nuclear weapons are declining significantly. The potential for military conflicts between major powers has diminished greatly, along with accompanying threats to use nuclear weapons. Probably none of the P-5 is now producing fissile material for weapons. None of the five has tested nuclear weapons for 15 years, an extraordinary and previously inconceivable stretch of time. Finally and most importantly, no country has resorted to battlefield use of a nuclear weapon since 1945. Significant Gains This track record deserves respect rather than denigration. To be sure, Cold War stockpiles and nuclear testing were excessive by any measure. Yet, the extent of reductions in Russian and U.S. stockpile sizes and nuclear force structures reflect significant shifts in perceived utility, not merely the shrinkage of wretched excess. The structure of international relations has changed since the Cold War ended. Berlin, Cuba, and Taiwan no longer evoke nuclear flashpoints. Major powers now lose standing by brandishing nuclear weapons against each other or against non-nuclear-weapon states. Major powers that seek to gain influence now do so by means of economic and energy-related indicators, not by nuclear weapons. When Moscow seeks to pressure its neighbors, it gains more leverage by threatening to cut off natural gas supplies than by threatening nuclear strikes. The NPT is both a beneficiary and a cause of these positive trends. The extent of causality can admittedly be debated, except in one crucial respect: The treaty’s indefinite extension in 1995 was clearly linked to the subsequent completion of negotiations and entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). This pledge was partially delivered in 1996 but has yet to be honored fully. Nonetheless, the positive linkage between the NPT and nuclear testing is clear: If there were no connection between nuclear testing and the indefinite extension of the NPT, the P-5 would surely have tested old or new weapons repeatedly during the past 15 years. Nuclear trend lines for four of the P-5 have been decidedly positive over the past four review conferences. Supporters of the NPT, who have pushed long and hard for these trend lines, can be justifiably proud of their work, even though they habitually see the glass as half-empty. Temporary reversals of these enduring trends could occur at any time, which would compound P-5 responsibility for the NPT’s uncertain state. Their most important duty as treaty guardians and as veto-wielding members of the Security Council is to deal purposefully with compliance concerns. In their dealings with Iran and North Korea, however, Beijing and Moscow sometimes have higher priorities than to uphold NPT compliance. Russian and U.S. nuclear stockpiles remain extremely large, and although further reductions are in store, Moscow has demonstrated limited enthusiasm for widening their scope to include tactical nuclear weapons. The Bush administration did serious harm to NPT norms by championing a civil nuclear deal with India without compensatory steps to shore up the treaty. Meanwhile, Beijing still acts as a free rider to the NPT regime, rather than taking on responsibilities commensurate with its growing power. China’s intentions and force structure remain opaque, while its modernization programs are proceeding at a faster pace than those of other states with nuclear weapons. Beijing, like Washington, has still not ratified the CTBT. Other complaints could no doubt be added to this list, but there is undeniable, impressive evidence that, on balance, the contributions of four of the P-5 to the NPT regime have grown significantly in recent decades. In contrast, outliers to the NPT are relying more heavily on nuclear weapons. Three of the four NPT outliers—India, North Korea, and Pakistan—are the only states to have tested nuclear devices since 1996 and are enlarging their fissile material and weapons stockpiles. Israel, the fourth non-NPT state, has not done nearly enough to support the NPT by means of parallel steps that reinforce the treaty’s objectives and purposes. The NPT regime’s weaknesses are growing for other reasons as well. The IAEA board has not acted consistently and coherently to uphold treaty obligations. Many states resist “second-generation” norms of responsible nuclear stewardship, particularly those associated with strengthened safeguards, materials protection, and accountancy. Key non-nuclear-weapon states that are needed to serve as guardians of the NPT have been missing in action in Vienna and New York. Egypt threatens to hold the NPT hostage to its regional interests. Above all, the nuclear program of Iran, a noncompliant party to the treaty, casts a long shadow over the NPT regime. These positive and negative trend lines will intersect with uncertain effect at the 2010 NPT Review Conference. Four of the five major powers have contributed most of the significant gains for the NPT regime over the past two decades, but all five still have a long way to go in fulfilling their treaty obligations. Although the P-5’s trend lines are mostly positive, the same cannot be said for the IAEA, for states outside the treaty, or for those undermining it from inside. http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_03/LookingBack The NPT soles escalating arms races- the impact is extinction
Mueller, 1 – Professor of IR (Harald, Prof International Relations at Univ. Frankfurt “The Future of Arms Control”, Nuclear Weapons: A New Great Debate)
Globally, non-proliferation or prohibition agreements, particularly those relating to weapons of mass destruction (WMD), are a precondition for banning existential dangers for global stability, ecological safety and, in extremis, even the survival of the human race. Arms control can createsufficient security and stability to motivate countries to commit themselves to cooperation in other sectors where it is mutually profitable and indeed indispensable for solving problems for society and the economy in the age of globalisation. Such agreements also impact heavily on regional balances and help, if successful, to prevent the greatest dangers of escalation of existing regional conflicts. Successful arms control agreements build shared security interests among erstwhile rivals and enemies. Hence, they even help to de-escalate the general level of regional conflict. This brings us to the second major significance of the triad of arms control, disarmament and humanitarian law. Taken together, these present an important and powerful alternative to a security policy based entirely on self-help and its extension, defensive alliances. While defence capabilities present, in the final instance, the essential backbone of any security system, arms control, disarmament and humanitarian law form a first line of security that consists of internationally agreed rules. The security dilemma which leads to costly and risky arms races and, in extreme circumstances, even to war, can be considerably lessened if there are generally accepted rules for upper limits of troops, military equipment, for the shape of military doctrines and the form of exercises, which give states the confidence that their neighbours do not harbour aggressive intentions. These rules delineateclear distinctions between acceptable and unacceptable behaviour, andthus help to distinguish between the rule-abiding membership of such a security regime and the (hopefully very few) rule-breakers against which the capabilities of the lawful majority can then be directed.
The NPT prevents proliferation -- specifically is checking wildfire Asian prolif
Dunn 9— former Assistant Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and served as Ambassador to the 1985 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference (Lewis, Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 16, No. 2, July 2009, http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/npr_16-2_dunn.pdf)
Metric: Does NPT adherence provide a leverage point for outside influence and action to preventproliferation? NPT adherence clearly provides a point of leverage, although the nature of that leverage* and its likely effectiveness*could vary depending on the country. In Iran’s case, its adherence to the NPT has been most useful as a rallying point for outside efforts to pressure Iranian leaders to think anew about their goals. UN Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), and 1835 (2008) all reaffirmed the council’s support for the NPT, while Resolutions 1747 and 1803 both emphasized ‘‘the need for all States Parties to that Treaty to comply fully with all their obligations.’’ Moreover, some key European countries’ support for actions to stop Iran’s uranium enrichmentactivities has been linked to a belief*accurate or not*that Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons would put at risk the overall NPT structure.19 Amid continuing tensions between the George W. Bush administration and other countries, Iran’s NPT obligations provided a ready basis to argue that the issue was not simply one of the United States versus Iran. To use a hypothetical example, let us imagine that due to some combination of the most recent North Korean volte-face on giving up its nuclear weapons, tensions with China, and uncertainty about the U.S. security link, pressures grow in Japan to pursue nuclear weapons. In this case, outside powers could use Japan’s NPT adherence as a THE NPT: ASSESSING THE PAST, BUILDING THE FUTURE 149 leverage point to urge the Japanese leadership to think carefully about whether to take that step. Japan’s NPT adherence*and the need for it to go through procedures to withdraw from the NPT*would also help buy time for new initiatives to deal with future Japanese security concerns. Still another example of the leverage provided by NPT membership concerns possible action to be taken after a country has violated its obligations and broken out of the NPT. Iran may yet be a future case in point. Should Iran acquire nuclear weapons, the international community will need to take many actions to contain the regional and global spillovers.20 Those actions could well include measures to make Iran pay a price for violating the NPT*to signal resolve to Iran, to its threatened neighbors, and to the wider NPT community. The fact that Iran would have violated its legal obligations under the NPT would provide a stronger foundation for any such international punitive actions. Metric: Did widespread NPT adherence help reverse the perception that runaway proliferation was unavoidable? In the early 1960s, there was a growing fear that widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons was possibly unavoidable. President John F. Kennedy warned in 1963 that a world with many dozens of nuclear weapon states might emerge. This fear of runaway proliferation gave urgency to the negotiation of a nonproliferation treaty, not least because of the belief that growing worldwide use of nuclear power would place access to nuclear weapons material in the hands of many countries.21 Such warnings of runaway proliferation, however, could well have become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Fearful of a world of nuclear powers, many countries might have sought nuclear weapons lest they be left behind. Responding to such fears, the United States took actions to enhance the nuclear security of its European non-nuclear allies. In parallel, the United States, the Soviet Union, and many other countries joined together to create what became the nonproliferation regime. The NPT was and remains a key part of that regime. Steadily growing membership in the NPT after its opening for signature in 1968*including critical countries inEurope and Asia*provided a valuable symbol that demonstrated to many countries that runaway proliferation was not the wave of the future. So did the prospect of an international system of nuclear safeguards*run by a then-new International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)*to prevent diversion of nuclear weapon materials from peaceful nuclear uses. In effect, partly because of more traditional security mechanisms and partly due to the growing NPT membership, early fears of a world of runaway global proliferation became a self-denying prophecy. Today, fears have again emerged that runaway proliferation could develop. It is often argued that the spread of nuclear weapons is at a ‘‘tipping point,’’ that there is a danger of ‘‘cascading’’ proliferation, and that we could be entering a ‘‘new nuclear age.’’22 In this context, however, widespread adherence to the NPT alone will not suffice to counter fears of nuclear weapon proliferation. Rather, the NPT’s contribution to countering 150 LEWIS A. DUNN fears of runaway proliferation will depend heavily on whether there is a widespread perception that countries are complying fully with their NPT obligations. Article II Net Assessment. The direct impact of Article II in preventing proliferation is mixed. Negotiation of the NPT with its ‘‘no manufacture, no acquisition’’ obligation forced a number of countries to decide whether or not to pursue nuclear weapons. Faced with that decision, important countries chose to renounce nuclear weapons. In deciding, states were motivated by a mix of considerations, and the NPT helped crystallize their decisions. By contrast, some prominent NPT parties have stayed in the NPT while pursuing nuclear weapons: North Korea, Iraq, and Libya*and quite possibly Iran. The indirect impact of Article II may be more compelling. The ‘‘no acquisition, no manufacture’’ obligation provides a nonproliferation leverage point for rallying outsiders, for engaging in dialogue with countries rethinking their nonproliferation commitment, and for taking action after NPT breakout. Successful negotiation of the NPT and Article II contributed significantly to reversing earlier fears of runaway worldwide proliferation. Today, adherence to Article II still provides a potentially valuable means to counter renewed fears of such a world*assuming there is compliance with NPT obligations. Steps to Strengthen Article II via the 2010 NPT RevCon. The lack of an agreed understanding of no ‘‘manufacture’’*of what actions would violate Article II obligations* remains an oft-noted weakness of the NPT. First among the five NPT NWS, and then perhaps more widely, it may be time to seek an agreed understanding. Continued efforts to use the review process to create a consensus on what broad actions violate the ‘‘no manufacture’’ obligation could be pursued in parallel. Both sets of actions would make it harder for an NPT party to pursue nuclear weapons while claiming to meet its NPT obligations. Close consultations among the great powers on how to make Iran pay a high price for NPT breakout would be another step. As argued above, how the international community responds to an Iranian bomb*should one emerge*would have a significant impact on the prospects for containing proliferation in the Middle East, negating the gains to Iran of acquiring nuclear weapons, and limiting the wider erosion of the NPT regime.
Brink of rapid prolif – NPT key.
Stares ‘7(Paul, VP for Conflict Analysis and Prevention – US Institute of Peace, NY Times, “To Ban the Bomb, Sign the Peace”, 1-30, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/30/opinion/30stares.html?_r=1&pagewanted=print)
OF all the crises facing the new United Nations secretary general, Ban Ki-moon, the fraying nuclear nonproliferation system is arguably the most consequential. Mohamed ElBaradei, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, has warned of 30 “virtual new weapons states” on the horizon. Obviously, the more countries that possess the bomb, the higher the risk of a nuclear accident, the theft of a weapon, sales of technology and hardware, and a serious miscalculation leading to nuclear war.
Nonprolif prevents extinction.
Hassan ‘7 (Hassan Hamid, States News Service, “IRRESPONSIBLE WEAPONS TRANSFERS, SOARING DEATH TOLL FROM SMALL ARMS, LIGHT WEAPONS UNDERSCORE 'PRESSING NEED' FOR ARMS TRADE TREATY, DISARMAMENT COMMITTEE TOLD”, 10-23, L/N)
HASSAN HAMID HASSAN ( Sudan) said that weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery represented an imminent danger to the survival of humanity, and to the integrity and credibility of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. He had in mind the illicit network in nuclear technology and the great risk of access to such weapons by terrorist groups and non-State actors. The adoption of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) had been a very important step forward in the fight against the proliferation of nuclear weapons and their delivery means. However, if the implementation of that important text was to succeed, international, regional and subregional institutions must play their role in assisting developing countries in their implementation efforts. The non-proliferation of nuclear weapons should move towards a global disarmament process and discourage the new arms race.