Prolif good – War



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Oil Shocks Impact




Oil shocks devastate the economy, collapse global trade and guarantee escalation.


Cook et al 10 – Malcolm, East Asia Program Director at the Lowy Institute for International Policy (June 2010, MacArthur Foundation and the Lowy Institute, Raoul Heinrichs, Rory Medcalf, Andrew Shearer, “Power and Choice: Asian Security Futures,” http://asiasecurity.macfound.org/images/uploads/blog_attachments/Asian_security_futures_-_final_version.pdf)

Asia, the most dynamic region in the world, is dependent on energy originating in the world’s most turbulent region, the Middle East. Indeed, the combination of instability and war in the Middle East (and the possibility of more ahead), together with Asia’s increasing dependence on that volatile region, has reaffirmed the salience of energy as an issue with potentially deep implications for Asia’s future security order. Today, the level of oil production in the Middle East is relatively flat and the discovery and development of new fields is progressing unevenly. With renewable sources of energy many years away from becoming a viable replacement for hydrocarbon-based fuels, concerns about the scarcity of energy resources have the potential to engender both competition and cooperation among the major powers of Asia. In regional terms, Asia is already the world’s largest consumer of energy, with between 70-80 per cent of imported oil coming directly from the Middle East. Approximately half of China’s oil supply originates in the Middle East. India, despite importing considerably less by volume, relies on this region for over 60 per cent of its total oil imports. At almost 85 and 90 percent repectively, Japan and South Korea (with their heavily industrial economies) depend on the Middle East to an even greater extent. While the United States relies on imports from the Middle East to a far lesser extent, it nevertheless continues to underpin security in both regions – Asia and the Middle East – and across the sea lanes that connect them. What would the implications be for Asia of an acute crisis in the Middle East, resulting in prolonged disruptions to the steady supply of oil? 10 Of course much would depend on the specific nature of the crisis – the way it started, its chief protagonists, duration, and the means by which it was resolved. 108 Nevertheless, it is possible to draw a few general, if speculative, conclusions. Perhaps the most immediate and pronounced effect of a major disruption in the flow of oil would be serious economic upheaval throughout the region, manifest in a collapse in production and trade and either the gradual or rapid reversal of regional economic integration. Massive inflation – not only in the price of oil, but all goods which need to be shipped – could quickly result in slowing GDP growth, higher unemployment, poverty, diminished investment and lower asset values. Social unrest and international political stability would be likely to ensue. For China in particular, this would pose a severe challenge, compromising both the strength of its regional position and at the same time undermining the basis of its leadership’s claim to internal legitimacy. If, as the previous chapter suggested, the response to this might be to fan the flames of Chinese nationalism by adopting a more assertive regional posture – a way of compensating for its economic underperformance – the prospects for an Asian concert would be greatly diminished as new tensions either reinforce the status quo – US primacy – or usher in a more contested balance of power. On the other hand, there are strong forces for cooperation when it comes to energy. Despite its military modernisation and efforts to diversify supply, China’s energy supplies from the Middle East and North Africa are vulnerable to interdiction. Japan also outsources its energy security to the United States. As a consequence of their continued dependence on the United States to provide access to oil markets and freedom of passage across vital sea lanes, all the major powers of Asia – China, Japan, even India – have strong incentives to promote a cooperative approach to energy security and to maintain stable, working relationships. Furthermore, any breakdown in the global supply of oil will mean a concomitant rise in the cost of oil for all importing countries. A self-defeating ‘energy security dilemma’ could arise as each country tries to secure its energy resources, thereby intensifying competition in world energy markets, and in turn increasing the salience of national energy security strategies. 109 As a region, Asia’s general interest promises to be best served by enhancing cooperation and coordination to preserve open access to global oil markets. Indeed, nascent counter-piracy operations around the Gulf of Aden 110 reflect the possibilities inherent in a more cooperative approach to energy security. Another possible outcome to a prolonged oil shortage, especially in the wake of such a crisis, would be a general attempt among the powers of Asia to bolster their political and military influence in the Middle East and Central Asia, to position themselves more favourably should similar circumstances arise in future. Japan and South Korea have been pursuing major investment in Middle Eastern oilfields and operations to produce natural gas for many years now. China meanwhile has already cultivated what it describes as a ‘strategic oil partnership’ with Saudi Arabia; it is a major arms supplier in the region and its close ties with Iran have already begun to impede Sino-US relations, as Washington struggles to gain or sustain Beijing’s support for more extensive sanctions against Iran in relation to its ongoing nuclear program (itself a potential catalyst for just such a crisis). India is also a major importer of Saudi oil. To be sure, China is not yet capable of becoming a major strategic challenger in the Middle East, lacking as it does the necessary force-projection assets. For the foreseeable future, therefore, it is likely to rely on its partnerships to dilute the singularity of US primacy in that critical region. Nevertheless, as its power and influence expand, China might seek out a much more prominent role in the Middle East – a development that the United States is not only likely to resist in the Middle East, but potentially in Asia and other parts of the world as well. Once again, this would most likely hasten the emergence of a balance of power. Finally, the most serious risk of a serious oil crisis is that it might unleash an intense security competition in Asia itself. This scenario has an unfortunate historical basis. It was concern for the security of its energy supplies, especially in the wake of Washington’s oil embargo (1941), which in part motivated Japan to occupy oilfields in maritime Southeast Asia in World War II. To what extent does the rise of China, with its rapidly expanding power and growing dependence on foreign energy supplies, portend the renewal of intense competition over energy in the coming decades? Perhaps the most serious risk is that China’s efforts to secure and consolidate its oil supply will arouse the insecurity of other regional powers. 111 China has expansive claims in the South and East China Seas, through which a great proportion of Japan’s energy is transported. Furthermore, as China’s energy dependence intensifies, as the price of energy increases with continued demand, and as new uncertainties emerge regarding freedom of access, the capacity to at least deny the use of sea lanes that connect the Persian Gulf to the Pacific will become a more urgent strategic priority for a number of regional navies.

Prolif and NPT File


***PROLIF GOOD*** 1

Akila, Andrew, Elsa, Karthik, Jesse, Jon, Meg, Meyer, Viveth, Zach 1

Prolif Good – War 3

Prolif decreases war. 3

Asal and Beardsley 7—professors of political science (Victor Asal and Kyle Beadsley, “Proliferation and International Crisis Behavior”, Vol 44, No. 2, March 2007, Journal of peace research, pp. 139-155, JSTOR, ZBurdette) 3

Prolif solves major war 3

New proliferators decrease the likelihood and damage of war—5 reasons 4

-caution 4

-deescalation due to fear of retaliation 4

-deterrence by punishment 4

-nuclear use causes immediate sobriety 4

-no motive to seek victory 4

Waltz 95 4

New proliferators dramatically reduce the risk of war 4

Waltz 95 4

Prolif prevents the escalation of wars 5

Waltz 95 5

Even if low-scale violence does occur it won’t escalate 5

More nuclear states increase stability—the cold war became even more stable when europe joined the fray 5

Waltz 95 5

Asal & Beardsley Methodology Good 6

Our studies are best -- 6

1) Empirics 6

Asal and Beardsley 7—professors of political science (Victor Asal and Kyle Beadsley, “Proliferation and International Crisis Behavior”, Vol 44, No. 2, March 2007, Journal of peace research, pp. 139-155, JSTOR, ZBurdette) 6

2) Data 6

Asal and Beardsley 7—professors of political science (Victor Asal and Kyle Beadsley, “Proliferation and International Crisis Behavior”, Vol 44, No. 2, March 2007, Journal of peace research, pp. 139-155, JSTOR, ZBurdette) 6

3) Accuracy and robust results. 6

Asal and Beardsley 7—professors of political science (Victor Asal and Kyle Beadsley, “Proliferation and International Crisis Behavior”, Vol 44, No. 2, March 2007, Journal of peace research, pp. 139-155, JSTOR, ZBurdette) 6

Prolif Good – Deterrence 7

Nuclear weapons prevent and descalate war—deterrence, caution, lack of motivation, and miscalc 7

Waltz 95 7

Nuclear weapons prevent and deescalate war. 8

Waltz 95 8

Nuclear weapons are the best means of deterring conflict; the world before them was wrought with war 9

Prolif good -- creates stability through state survival and deters conventional and nuclear conflict through balancing. 9

Exts – Cold War Proves 11

Cold war proves nuclear deterrence is good 11

India/Pakistan Prove 12

India and Pakistan prove prolif has a stabilizing effect 12

AT Deterrence Failures 13

Uncertainty makes the cost of war too high 13

Even low chance of retaliation is sufficient to deter 13

Even if deterrence failure occurs, prolif guarantees it doesn’t escalate. 13

Waltz 95 13

More ev. 14

Waltz 95 14

AT Any Risk of Prolif O/W 15

Study ONLY empirical outcomes. The ONLY relevant question is the net body count and nuclear prolif clearly reduces it. Single risk of accident isn’t enough. 15

Prolif Good – Conventional War 17

Proliferation solves nuclear and conventional conflict 17

Asal and Beardsley 7—professors of political science (Victor Asal and Kyle Beadsley, “Proliferation and International Crisis Behavior”, Vol 44, No. 2, March 2007, Journal of peace research, pp. 139-155, JSTOR, ZBurdette) 17

Conventional war is really deadly. 17

Exts – Prolif Solves Conventional War 19

40 to 1. Benefits outweigh the costs. 19

Prolif solves conventional war and arms racing 19

Waltz 95 19

Preventing proliferation guarantees devastating conventional wars in all global hotspots. 19

Conventional War Bad – General 21

Conventional war sucks. 21

Conventional War O/W Nuclear War 22

Conventional war is just as devastating as nuclear war 22

Conventional war escalates to nuclear war. 22

Conventional weapons are increasing in lethality 22

Conventional War Bad – Terrorism 24

War causes terror 24

AT Conventional War Unlikely 25

Conventional war is probable. Sound deterrent strategies should guide policy analysis. 25

Multiple nations are gearing up for conventional war-fighting now. Absent adjustment the world will face risks of large-scale conflict. 25

AT Prolif Bad – General 27

Their impact claims are based on a flawed analysis 27

AT Accidents 28

The risk of accidents is low -- nukes are on balance better for stability. 28

AT Anonymous Strike/Blackmail 29

No risk 29

Waltz 95 29

AT Arms Race 30

Only small arsenals -- solves stability -- three reasons. 30

Nuclear capabilities make arms races irrelevant 31

Waltz 95 31

Deterrence disincentivizes arms racing 31

Waltz 95 31

AT Arsenal Insecurity – General 33

Small arsenals, self-interest, and ingenuity keep weapons secure 33

AT Civil War/Unstable States 34

Lower risk of prolif in those states and no escalation. 34

Waltz 95 34

AT Crisis Instability 35

Prolif solves crisis stability – first strike capability. 35

Prolif creates a perception of second strike capabilities that solves crisis instability. 35

Even if prolif causes more crises, it forces leaders to back down before they escalate. 35

AT Faulty Arsenals Destabilize 36

Nope 36


Waltz 95 36

Even atrocious arsenals can deter 36

Waltz 95 36

AT Irrationality 37

Leaders aren’t irrational -- they’re focused on state survival 37

All actors are at least rational enough, even non-state/terrorist groups. 37

Prolif stabilizes radical regimes -- Libya proves. 37

Waltz 95 37

AT Mil Control → First Use 38

Doesn’t happen. 38

Waltz 95 38

AT Miscalc 39

Prolif solves miscalc. 39

No miscalc 39

AT Nuclear Hitler 40

Won’t happen 40

Waltz 95 40

AT Offensive Use – General 41

Nuclear use by small states would not escalate – the costs are too high 41

Waltz 95 41

AT Overconfidence 42

The uncertainty of nuclear response means even an overconfident actor wouldn’t attack 42

Waltz 95 42

AT Preemptive Strikes 43

The high probability of 1st strikes failing is sufficient to prevent them 43

Empirical studies prove no preemption. 43

No offensive use. 44

Waltz 95 44

AT Preventative Strikes 45

No preventative wars 45

Political constraints check preventive war 45

nope 46


Waltz 95 46

AT Rivalries 47

Even bitter rivals are deterred by nuclear use 47

Waltz 95 47

AT Theft/Terrorism 48

NOPE – bunches of warrants 48

No terror / stolen – MAD theory but smaller scale 48

Terrorists have no motivation for a nuclear attack 49

Nope – if there was terrorism – there’d be more control 50

AT Unequal Prolif 51

Unequal prolif means no retaliation 51

2nd Strike capability allows deterrence to work even between misbalanced forces 51

Waltz 95 51

Prolif Good – BW Shift 53

Bioweapon use causes extinction. 53

Clifford Singer, Spring 2001. Director of the Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security at the University of Illinois at Urbana—Champaign. “Will Mankind Survive the Millennium?” The Bulletin of the Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 13.1, http://www.acdis.uiuc.edu/research/S&Ps/2001-Sp/S&P_XIII/Singer.htm. 53

Exts – Stopping Prolif → BW 54

Preventing proliferation encourages biological weapon acquisition. 54

Nuclear Deterrence Good – CBW Attacks 55

Presence of nuclear weapons prevents a CBW attack. 55

Bioweapons O/W Nuclear War 56

Bioweapons outweigh nuclear war -- short circuits deterrence. 56

Bio-weapons use outweighs and turns nuclear war. 56

Alexander, 2007 56

Bioweapons cause extinction and outweigh nuclear war. 57

Prolif Good – Satellites 59

Proliferation causes satellite surveillance expansion. 59

That’s key to the global environment 59

Extinction. 59

Cairns, 2004 59

Prolif Slow 62

Proliferation will be slow and will not cause instability or terrorism -- their impacts are fabricated as the result of political and economically motivated scaremongering. 62

Prolif is inevitable, slow, and stabilizing—no offense 63

Prolif will stay slow and won’t snowball. 66

Waltz 95 66

Prolif slow and inevitable 67

Waltz 95 67

Small Arsenals 68

Won’t build large arsenals – solves conflict. 69

Small arsenals check 69

Exts – Yes Build Small Arsenals 71

No adversaries = no large buildup 72

AT Arsenals Too Small for Deterrence 73

Even small arsenals are sufficient for deterrence. 73

New proliferators will have strong deterrence credibility in spite of limited arsenals 73

Even small arsenals can effectively deter 73

Waltz 95 73

***PROLIF BAD*** 75

Prolif Bad (Below) 77

Prolif guarantees great power intervention – escalates to nuclear war. 77

Prolif Bad (Kissinger) 78

Prolif causes extinction -- deterrence fails and can’t replicate Cold War stability -- accidents, miscalc, terrorism, preemption. 78

Prolif Bad (Krieger) 80

Proliferation risks extinction. benefits don’t justify jacking with the future of humanity. 80

Prolif Bad (Sokolski) 81

A proliferated world would risk escalatory regional nuclear wars. 81

Sokolski, 2009  81

Prolif Bad (Roberts) 82

In the new world order proliferation will be rapid and destabilizing – even Waltz assumes proliferation is slow 82

Prolif Bad (Robock) 83

Prolif dramatically increases the risk of nuclear war -- causes nuclear winter. 83

Prolif Bad (War – General) 84

Proliferation leads to catastrophic scenarios and threats exist now – India, Pakisan, North Korea, Iran, and Iraq prove 84

New proliferators are inherently unstable – escalation. 85

Risk of Prolif O/W 88

Even if the risk is relatively low the consequences are too high to risk. 88

Prolif Bad – Accidents 90

Proliferation creates significant accidental and unauthorized nuclear risks -- India and Pakistan prove they won’t take sufficient protective measures. 90

Prolif causes an arms race – accidental nuclear war 91

Prolif Bad – Crisis Instability 92

Prolif causes crisis instability in post-Cold War era 92

Crisis Instability T/Deterrence 93

Crisis instability kills deterrence 93

Prolif Bad – Deterrence Failures 94

Regional deterrence failures are likely. They’ll escalate to draw in the US. 94

Deterrence failure is likely. Incomplete intelligence and irrationality in a regional crisis. 94

Cimbala, 2007  94

New proliferators will make deterrence less stable: historical animosity, short-range and civil-military relationships. 95

Cimbala, 2007  95

Deterrence is unstable. Failure is likely even with minimal deterrence. 96

None of the requirements for rational deterrence will apply. 99

Nuclear deterrence will only solve under near perfect information – in most likely situations it can’t solve conflict and only increases the risk 100

Deterrence isn’t automatic. 101

AT Cold War Proves Deterrence Solves 102

Deterrence theory failed in the Cold War and will continue to fail – incites war 103

AT Indo-Pak Proves Deterrence 106

Indo-Pak crises prove deterrence failure is possible and nukes don't prevent escalation. 106

AT Indo-Pak Proves Deterrence (Kargil) 108

US intervention, not nuclear weapons prevented Kargil escalation. 108

AT Nukes Only For Deterrence 110

New powers will see nuclear weapons as useful for offensive warfighting, not deterrence. 110

Exts – Deterrence Fails (Non-State Actors) 111

Terrorists and rogue states are not deterred by nuclear arsenals 111

Prolif Bad – Irrationality 113

Rationality is a uniquely poor assumption for nuclear war planning. 113

Mozley, 1998  113

Prolif Bad – Miscalc 114

Proliferation risks miscalculation. 114

Prolif Bad – Pre-Delegation 115

Risk of preemption means pre-delegation making nuclear escalation more likely. 115

Prolif Bad – Preemption 116

Future proliferators will use nukes, not deter. Preemption is likely. 116

Proliferation lead to preemptive strikes 120

The act of proliferation invites first strikes even if deterrence applies -- prolif good authors concede. 121

Prolif Bad – Preventative Strikes 123

Prolif increases preventive attempts 123

Prolif Bad – Preemption/Preventative Strikes 125

Prolif causes preventive and preemptive strikes -- empirical proof. 125

Prolif Bad – First Strikes Impact 126

Tech diffusion causes first strikes. 126

These states will be left uninhabitable. 126

AT No Preemption – Deterrence 127

Deterrence can’t check preemption – fears cause irrational decisionmaking 127

AT No Preemption – Intel 128

Intelligence over-confidence means they'll chance preemptive strikes. 128

AT No Preemption – Rationality 129

Nuclear arsenals won't deter intervention. 129

AT No Preventative War 131

Historically rare nature of preventive war is irrelevant. It is likely in the future against nuclear prolif. 131

AT Diplomacy Checks 134

Diplomacy doesn’t check war – countries will look to military actions before cooperation 134

AT Intel Checks 135

Bad c and c makes prolif a war risk. 135

AT Nuclear Irrelevancy 136

Nuclear irrelevancy doesn’t accurately depict the world 136

AT Safety Measures 138

Small countries will build large arsenals and lack stable C and C 138

AT Small Arsenals 139

Actual dynamics of conflict prove there will be a rapid arsenal buildup and according loss of command and control. 139

AT Prolif Slow (General) 143

Neorealism dictates that states will continue to proliferate indefinitely if they have the technical capabilities 143

AT Prolif Slow (No Tipping Point) 145

We are at the nuclear tipping point – consensus of experts 145

AT Rationality Checks 146

Rationality of states is irrelevant – even the tiny possibility of miscalculation or misunderstandings would plunge the world into the dark ages 146

AT Realism 147

c. structural weaknesses 148

f. In the context of proliferation, RIST and RDT theories fail 151

AT Waltz 153

Waltz’s theory is flawed 153

Waltz’s rational deterrence theory fails 153

Prolif → BMD 156

Prolif causes BMD buildup 156

Prolif Bad – Environment 157

Prolif causes massive environmental destruction. 157

Prolif Bad – Heg 158

Prolif destroys heg and diplomacy -- 158

a. Proliferation affects each state differently. The largest determinant of whether proliferation is good or bad is an individual state’s power projection capabilities – this understanding of proliferation is comparatively better for policymakers. 158

b. Proliferation hurts power-projecting states like the US while strengthening our enemies – proliferation hurts hegemony by decreasing our ability to leverage coercive diplomacy 159

Exts – Prolif Kills Heg 160

Proliferation erodes hegemony 160

Constrains conventional military freedom 160

b. Deter’s military intervention 160

c. reduces effectiveness of coercive diplomacy 162

d. Trigger regional instability 163

e. Undermines alliance structures. 164

F. dissipates strategic attention 165

h. Sets off further proliferation 166

Conversely, new proliferation makes our enemies stronger by allowing them to constrain our freedom of action: all our internal links are reverse causal 167

Prolif Bad – Hegemonic Transition 171

Prolif makes major power transitions more dangerous and increases the likelihood of catalytic conflicts escalating. 171

Prolif Bad – Terrorism 173

Exts – Prolif → Terrorism 174

Nuclear proliferation increases the risk of nuclear terrorism; preventing it solves 174

Proliferation will increase terrorist theft of nuclear materials which escalates to an arms race. 175

Prolif risks a nuclear terrorist attack. 175

Prolif guarantees non-state actor acquisition -- extinction. 176

AT Prolif Solves War (General) 178

Prolif creates numerous chances for conflict. Letting prolif happen causes far more destructive wars. 178

Proliferation won’t deter war -- bad command and control, rapid response risks inadvertent war and proliferation would be rapid. 178

AT Prolif Solves Conventional War 181

nuclear war isn't close to deterring conventional wars. And this holds escalatory potential. 181

War is still likely. Subordinates, first strike and lack of survivability. 181

Empirically nuclear proliferation increases the risk of conventional war – high costs encourage conflict 182

Prolif transforms ongoing disputes into shooting wars. 182

Doesn’t solve lower level conflicts. 183

AT Asal & Beardsley 184

Proliferation only reduces the risk of war by 37%, but risks absolute destruction 184

AT Allied Prolif Good/Stable 185

Proliferation is bad even when it spreads to allies. 185

Asian Prolif Bad – Arms Races 187

Asian prolif causes arms races – escalates to nuclear warfare 187

Asian Prolif Bad – Preemption 188

Asian prolif specifically causes preemption – nuclear war 188

Asian Prolif Bad – Terrorism 191

Asian proliferation risks instability and nuclear terrorism. 191

Asian prolif causes terrorism. 191

AT Prolif Good (Asia Specific) 193

Their prolif good turns assume a Soviet and American influence – they don’t apply to Asia 193

Iran Prolif Bad 194

Iranian prolif undermines deterrence – guarantees crisis 194

Middle East Prolif Bad – General 195

Middle East prolif causes destabilizing arms races, escalation, and nuclear terrorism. 195

IHT ‘6 (Noah Feldman, “Nuclear holocaust: A risk too big even for martyrs?” 10-27, http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/10/27/news/bombforweb.php) 195

Middle East Prolif Bad – Heg 196

Middle East proliferation eviscerates US hegemony 196

Missile Prolif Bad – Escalation 198

Proliferation causes escalation 198

Proliferation causes interstate regional conflict 198

Missile Prolif Bad – NPT 199

Missile prolif destabilizes the world and collapses non-prolif efforts. 199

***RANDOM PROLIF-RELATED*** 201

NPT Good – Terrorism 203

The NPT is key to nonproliferation- solves extinction and terrorism 203

NPT Good – Prolif 205

The NPT solve prolif- symbolic steps reduce the likelihood of war 205

Brink of rapid prolif – NPT key. 207

Nonprolif prevents extinction. 207

AT US Actions → Prolif 209

Prolif is based on regional concerns -- not motivated by US action. 209

Global Disarm Attempts Bad 211

Removal process would lead to nuclear miscalculation -- empirical examples prove. 211

Even if its successful, it causes categorically greater instability and escalation than the SQ. 211

AT NPT Solves Prolif 213

No wildfire prolif- the NPT isn’t key 213

Arms control can’t solve irrational actors -- only deterrence checks that. 214

AT CBMs Solve 215

Confidence-building measures fail -- increases the risk of preemption and conflict. 215

Opacity Bad – Stability 217

Proliferation won’t be stable under opacity. 217

Opacity Good – Stability 218

Opaque prolif solves stability 218

Opacity Good – Theft/Terrorism 219

Opacity prevents nuclear theft. 219

AT Opacity Not Solve Deterrence 220

Opaque prolif still solves deterrence 220

***RANDOM UNRELATED*** 222

Yes – Global Nuclear Modernization 224

Threat is high now – states are modernizing their arsenals and research is advancing rapidly 224

Yes – China Buildup 225

China is a challenger -- building up nuclear stockpiles. 225

Yes – Russia Buildup 226

Russia is developing its capabilities now -- multiple warrants. 226

Yes – Rogue State/Terrorist Threat 227

Rogue states are a huge threat – even if they won’t attack, they will sell nuclear arsenals to terrorists 227

Yes – Nuclear Terrorism 228

Nuclear terrorisms high probability. 228

Terrorists can acquire nuclear materials. 228

Terrorists can get the bomb – Pakistan, North Korea, or the Black Market 229

Nuclear terrorism is feasible -- crushes the global economy 230

Yes – Nuclear Winter 232

Nuclear winter theory is true – their experts rely on limited, outdated experts 232

Oil Shocks Impact 235

Oil shocks devastate the economy, collapse global trade and guarantee escalation. 235



--- Prolif ---


***Prolif Good***
Impact – Democracy


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