Prolif good – War


Prolif sparks arms race –> extinction



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Prolif sparks arms race –> extinction.

Clinton, ’10Secretary of State

[Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State; “No Greater Danger: Protecting our Nation and Allies From Nuclear Terrorism and Nuclear Proliferation;” delivered 4/9/2010; http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/04/139958.htm] Jay

Secretary Clinton delivers remarks entitled “No Greater Danger: Protecting our Nation and Allies from Nuclear Terrorism and Nuclear Proliferation” at the University of Louisville as part of the McConnell Center's Spring Lecture Series. Secretary Clinton said: "I want to speak about why nuclear arms control, nonproliferation, and nuclear security matter to each of us, and how the initiatives and the acronyms that make up our bipartisan work on these issues are coming together to make our nation safer. "There is a reason that presidents and foreign policy leaders in both parties are determined to address this danger. A nuclear attack anywhere could destroy the foundations of global order. While the United States and old Soviet Union are no longer locked in a nuclear standoff, nuclear proliferation is a leading source of insecurity in our world today. "And the United States benefits when the world is stable: our troops can spend more time at home, our companies can make better long-term investments, our allies are free to work with us to address long-term challenges like poverty and disease. But nuclear proliferation, including the nuclear programs being pursued by North Korea and Iran, are in exact opposition to those goals. Proliferation endangers our forces, our allies, and our broader global interests. And to the extent it pushes other countries to develop nuclear weapons in response, it can threaten the entire international order."

Impact – Miscalc

Prolif risks immediate miscalc and escalation.

ICNND, ‘9 – International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament

[Gareth Evans and Yoriko Kawaguchi, Co-Chairs of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament; “Eliminating Nuclear Threats: A Practical Agenda for Global Policymakers;” published 2009; http://www.icnnd.org/reference/reports/ent/pdf/ICNND_Report-EliminatingNuclearThreats.pdf] Jay



3.1 Ensuring that no new states join the ranks of those already nucleararmed must continue to be one of the world’s top international security priorities. Every new nuclear-armed state will add significantly to the inherent risks – of accident or miscalculation as well as deliberate use – involved in any possession of these weapons, and potentially encourage more states to acquire nuclear weapons to avoid being left behind. Any scramble for nuclear capabilities is bound to generate severe instability in bilateral, regional and international relations. The carefully worked checks and balances of interstate relations will come under severe stress. There will be enhanced fears of nuclear blackmail, and of irresponsible and unpredictable leadership behaviour. 3.2 In conditions of inadequate command and control systems, absence of confidence building measures and multiple agencies in the nuclear weapons chain of authority, the possibility of an accidental or maverick usage of nuclear weapons will remain high. Unpredictable elements of risk and reward will impact on decision making processes. The dangers are compounded if the new and aspiring nuclear weapons states have, as is likely to be the case, ongoing inter-state disputes with ideological, territorial, historical – and for all those reasons, strongly emotive – dimensions. 3.3 The transitional period is likely to be most dangerous of all, with the arrival of nuclear weapons tending to be accompanied by sabre rattling and competitive nuclear chauvinism. For example, as between Pakistan and India a degree of stability might have now evolved, but 1998–2002 was a period of disturbingly fragile interstate relations. Command and control and risk management of nuclear weapons takes time to evolve. Military and political leadership in new nuclear-armed states need time to learn and implement credible safety and security systems. The risks of nuclear accidents and the possibility of nuclear action through inadequate crisis control mechanisms are very high in such circumstances. If this is coupled with political instability in such states, the risks escalate again. Where such countries are beset with internal stresses and fundamentalist groups with trans-national agendas, the risk of nuclear weapons or fissile material coming into possession of non‑state actors cannot be ignored. 3.4 The action–reaction cycle of nations on high alerts, of military deployments, threats and counter threats of military action, have all been witnessed in the Korean peninsula with unpredictable behavioural patterns driving interstate relations. The impact of a proliferation breakout in the Middle East would be much wider in scope and make stability management extraordinarily difficult. Whatever the chances of “stable deterrence” prevailing in a Cold War or India–Pakistan setting, the prospects are significantly less in a regional setting with multiple nuclear power centres divided by multiple and cross-cutting sources of conflict.

Impact – Terrorism



Prolif lets terrorists gain nuke materials – risks extinction.

ICNND, ‘9 – International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament

[Gareth Evans and Yoriko Kawaguchi, Co-Chairs of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament; “Eliminating Nuclear Threats: A Practical Agenda for Global Policymakers;” published 2009; http://www.icnnd.org/reference/reports/ent/pdf/ICNND_Report-EliminatingNuclearThreats.pdf] Jay



4.1 There is a significant and continuing fear internationally of nuclear terrorism – shared by the public and decision-makers alike. The UN Secretary-General has labelled nuclear terrorism “one of the most serious threats of our time”. U.S. President Obama has been equally blunt: “There is no graver danger to global security than the threat of nuclear terrorism, and no more immediate task for the international community than to address that threat.” 4.2 That fear is justified. There are terrorist actors in existence – as the whole world has known since Al Qaeda’s orchestration of 9/11 – who would, if they could, cause massive and indiscriminate havoc in almost any one of the world’s major cities. And there is every reason to fear that they can match that intent with capability. There is quite a high risk that they could produce a “dirty bomb”, combining conventional explosives with radioactive material, to devastating psychological effect. The risk is very much smaller that they could produce a far more physically destructive nuclear explosion, given the scale of the technical and logistical problems that would have to be overcome. But it is not negligible. And the possibility of cyber attacks on nuclear command and control centres is growing ever more significant. 4.3 Possible terrorist actors might either be acting independently of state backing, or have state sponsors. Since 1995, there have been several cases that confirm the danger that either group of actors can have access to – and no scruples about using – devices or substances with the potential for mass killings. The Aum Shinrikyo attacks in Tokyo in 1995 and the unsolved anthrax attacks in the United States in 2001 were the first two. Another was the poisoning of Alexander Litvinenko in London in 2006 with Polonium210, which reminded the world that individuals can obtain a key material for detonating nuclear weapons and smuggle it undetected through the airports of countries on high alert against terrorist threats. 4.4 In the case of a nuclear weapon, it would require a large, well organized and well funded group to build, let alone buy, such a weapon, maintain security at all stages, and successfully transport it to the intended site for detonation. It is now known that Al Qaeda some years ago attempted to obtain enriched uranium, and that senior members of the group had at least one meeting with two Pakistani nuclear experts. The apparently dispersed and diffuse nature of its current organization and funding, after being under siege for most of the last decade, make the central organization, such as it is, a less likely candidate now than in the past for such a role. But it has offshoots and imitators in many countries. The danger posed by any such group would 4.5 be much enhanced by state backing, whether for nuclear materials or know-how, or simply for the necessary funding. The number of states likely to give deliberate support of this kind would be very small. Even regimes with a long history of, if not irrationality, at least playing by different rules to everyone else, would be unlikely to lend such assistance without first making an assessment of the likely consequences should they be identified – including the possibility of nuclear retaliation (the chances of which would be significantly higher if those states were already nuclear-armed themselves). A more substantial concern is that states with weak or fragile institutions, multiple internal power centres, and imperfect arrangements for securing weapons and dangerous materials, might end up providing such support even in the absence of any explicit government intent or direction to do so. 4.6 It should be borne in mind that the face of terrorism in ten to fifteen years may well be quite different from today’s. The politics of war and peace, and of security, may well shift from religion-based terrorism to eco-terrorism. In this scenario, there may be an even greater prospect that scientific and technical personnel from the richest countries will aid eco-terrorist use of nuclear weapons or materials.

Greatest threat to extinction.

Curtis, ‘8 – president of the Nuclear Threat Initiative

[Charles B. Curtis; “Reducing the Global Nuclear Danger: International Cooperation – the Indispensable Security Imperative;” published 2008 under the commission of the Better World Foundation; http://www.nti.org/c_press/speech_curtis_reducing1107.pdf] Jay



Leaders in the White House, the Congress and in the community of nations have repeatedly acknowledged the threat of a terrorist nuclear attack. They have used inspiring words and made solemn commitments to counter the danger. But our collective deeds have not matched our words – we need to re-invigorate our actions at home and abroad. If a 10-kiloton nuclear device goes off in any major city anywhere in the world, it could kill hundreds of thousands in a single stroke. The loss of life would not be the only impact, however. The world economy would suffer a substantial blow – damaging the weakest economies the most. Today’s levels of spending and global investment would plunge and might not recover for a generation, or more. The balance between security and liberty worldwide would move strongly against liberty. The effects would be far greater if there were not just one nuclear weapon, but the threat of a second or a third. This is a danger not just to life, but to our way of life. There is more talk today about the threat of a terrorist nuclear attack because we are finally coming to accept that the probability is much higher than we had thought. When Thomas Kean, the chairman of the U.S. 9/11 Commission1, was asked if he thought there was a real possibility of a nuclear attack on an American city in his lifetime, the former New Jersey governor replied: “We talked to nobody who had studied this issue who didn’t think it was a real possibility.” When you combine that “real possibility” with the destructive effects of a nuclear weapon, you have our greatest threat. With so much at stake, every one of us has reason to ask: “Are we doing all we can to prevent a nuclear attack?” The emphatic answer is “No, we are not.” What must be done to address the global nuclear danger? Here are four priority steps: • Reduce the worldwide supply of nuclear weapons by preventing the emergence of new weapons states and by taking concrete, verifiable actions to reduce the inventories of already-existing nuclear powers. • Limit the spread of nuclear weapons technology by putting in place a system of reliable fuel assurances to support peaceful uses of nuclear power. • Secure all nuclear weapons material such as plutonium and highly enriched uranium to the highest standards by promoting best practices and giving technical assistance to any and all states with nuclear capacity. • Gain agreement on and implement a multi-state effort to address the root causes of the discontent underlying the virulent form of radical Islam that seeks these weapons for the purpose of inflicting mass death. The U.S. and the international community – through a series of unilateral, bilateral and multilateral means – are doing some part of all of these things. Each step is recognized as important, but no step is seen as urgent. We have not acted and are not acting with the seriousness of purpose the threat demands.

Heg Solves Prolif

Heg key to solve prolif.

Curtis, ‘8 – president of the Nuclear Threat Initiative

[Charles B. Curtis; “Reducing the Global Nuclear Danger: International Cooperation – the Indispensable Security Imperative;” published 2008 under the commission of the Better World Foundation; http://www.nti.org/c_press/speech_curtis_reducing1107.pdf] Jay

So how might this sense of urgency and seriousness of purpose be fostered? In a word: leadership. In the past, great nations grew great and remained great without relying heavily on cooperation with other nations. They believed they could guarantee their own security. That era, however – like it or not – is gone. The great leaders of our globally interconnected and interdependent age will be those who convince not only their own citizens, but all citizens, that if we are going to enjoy peace and prosperity in the 21st century, then all nations must cooperate in fighting and defeating the dangers that threaten us all. That’s a simple formula, but devilishly complicated in execution. Nuclear materials are distributed around the globe in many countries. Terrorists trying to acquire nuclear materials will not necessarily go where there is the most material; they will go where the material is most vulnerable. That means that the global-security chain is only as strong as its weakest link. It also means that – to a degree never seen before in history – rich and powerful nations will need the cooperation of small and poorer nations to safeguard their security. Our safety absolutely depends on it. If the United States cannot defend itself on its own, then it must rouse the world to action, but there, precisely, is the rub. It will be hard for the United States to lead the world to action at a time when it has earned a reputation around the world for spurning international cooperation and for endlessly trumpeting the idea of “American exceptionalism.” The United States must work diligently to regain its credibility as a country that can act in the cause of common security and for the common good – if it is to have the authority to call the world to more urgent action in defense of nuclear terror.


Prolif O/W Nuclear War



Prolif outweighs nuclear war – greater destruction and higher probability.

Clinton, ’10 – Secretary of State

[Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State; “No Greater Danger: Protecting our Nation and Allies From Nuclear Terrorism and Nuclear Proliferation;” delivered 4/9/2010; http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/04/139958.htm] Jay

Now, this is a lot of activity. But it’s fair to ask whether it matters to people in New York or in Los Angeles or Louisville or, frankly, anywhere else beyond Washington, D.C. Discussions of nuclear issues are often conducted in a language of acronyms – NPR, NPT, SALT, SORT, START. At the White House two weeks ago, a reporter asked me why everyone’s eyes glaze over when we talk about arms control. Now, I’m sure that won’t happen in this audience today. Because it is easy to conclude that this is a subject that doesn’t have much impact on our daily lives or that this issue is a relic of the Cold War. I’m old enough to remember, even though I wasn’t around in 1933 – (laughter) – I am old enough to remember when I was in elementary school having those duck-and-cover drills. You remember those, Mitch. I bet there are a lot of heads – there’s a lot of heads nodding out there. I mean, why in the world our teachers and our parents thought we should take cover under our desks in the case of – (laughter) – of a nuclear attack is beyond me. But every month, we practices. And we’d get up and we’d get under our desks and we’d put our hands over our heads and we’d crouch up. We lived with the Cold War. We lived with the threat of nuclear weapons. And it seems so long ago now, but it was so real in our daily lives. It wasn’t something left to presidents and senators and secretaries of state, it was something you talked about around the dinner table. And it made the threat of nuclear war something that nobody could escape. So today, it seems like a good time ago. And it would be easy to think, well, that’s a relic of the past. But that is not the case. The nature of the threat has changed. We no longer live in constant fear of a global nuclear war where we’re in a standoff against the Russians with all of our nuclear arsenal on the ready, on a haired-trigger alert. But, as President Obama has said, the risk of a nuclear attack has actually increased. And the potential consequences of mishandling this challenge are deadly. So, I want to speak about why nuclear arms control, nonproliferation, and nuclear security matter to each of us, and how the initiatives and the acronyms that make up our bipartisan work on these issues are coming together to make our nation safer. There is a reason that presidents and foreign policy leaders in both parties are determined to address this danger. A nuclear attack anywhere could destroy the foundations of global order. While the United States and old Soviet Union are no longer locked in a nuclear standoff, nuclear proliferation is a leading source of insecurity in our world today.

***No Prolif***


No Loose Nukes
No loose nukes.

Muller and Steinbach, ’10 – *chair of polisci at Ohio State AND **Israeli nuke expert

[John Muller, Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies, Mershon Center Professor of Political Science at The Ohio State University; John Steinbach, Israeli nuclear weapon expert; “Was Obama Nuke Summit Necessary or Just ‘Nuclear Alarmism’? And What About Israel’s Arsenal?” published 4/14/2010; http://www.democracynow.org/2010/4/14/was_obama_nuke_summit_necessary_or] Jay

AMY GOODMAN: But Professor Mueller, why is it so hard for groups to get so-called “loose” nukes? JOHN MUELLER: Well, mainly because they don’t exist. No one has really been able to find anything that’s a loose nuke. If you did actually buy or sell — buy or steal a nuclear weapon, what you’d find is that it’s got a lot of locks on it, and there’s very few people who know how to unlock it. In the case of Pakistan, for example, they keep their weapons in pieces, so you’d have to steal or buy one half, find — go to another secure location and buy or steal the other half, somehow know how to put tab A into slot B, and set it off. The number of people — as I say, the number of people who know how to set them off is very small. The people who designed them are not — do not know how to set them off. And the people who maintain them do not know how to set them off. So just getting the bombs — and they also have locks on them which will, if tampered with, will cause a conventional explosion, which will cause the weapon itself to self-destruct, effectively, in a conventional explosion. So the danger is extraordinarily small, it seems to me.

No Prolif



No interest in weapons, and difficult to obtain.

Kidd, ’10 – deputy director general of the World Nuclear Association

[Steve Kidd, deputy director general of the World Nuclear Association, and former Director of Strategy & Research at WNA; “Nuclear proliferation risk--is it vastly overrated? The recent well-publicised outpourings of anxiety about the potential consequences of nuclear terrorism overlook the fact that nuclear weapons are usually a matter for states, rather than individuals;” published in Nuclear Engineering Internaional, 55.671, June 2010] Jay



A significant amount of media attention has recently attached itself to the nuclear security meeting convened by US president Barack Obama and the five-yearly review conference for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which followed soon afterwards. The fear of so-called 'rogue nations' acquiring nuclear weapons, or terrorist organisations creating outrages by misuse of nuclear materials, clearly remains strong. Many column inches also continue to be devoted to various North Korean nuclear activities and to Iran's alleged intentions to pursue a weapons programme. There therefore remains a fear that this may cast a shadow over the nuclear renaissance, particularly as many people clearly believe that nuclear energy and bombs are merely two faces of the same coin. But it is surely not unreasonable to question whether these fears are being substantially inflated and possibly manipulated by various interest groups in order to suit their own purposes. There is, however, no doubt that nuclear materials could conceivably be diverted from a civil nuclear power programme into the production of nuclear weapons or alternatively, major fuel cycle processes (notably enrichment and reprocessing of used fuel) could be employed to produce weapons rather than fuel for civil reactors. Similarly, it is understandable that concerns over the security of civil nuclear facilities have multiplied since the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York. The possibility of aircraft crashing into such plants has naturally now been raised, as have possible terrorist incursions at plants either to acquire materials for weapons or to misuse the facility to create an explosion or a major radioactive release [see also 'Security since September 11th,' NEI March 2010, pp 14-9]. Rather like the risks of operating nuclear power plants themselves, these possibilities largely boil down to assessing very low probability events which may have big consequences. Human beings are notoriously bad at this and frequently reach what seem to be illogical conclusions. This is highlighted by a recent book by a US academic, John Mueller, Atomic Obsession-Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda [ISBN #978-0195381368]. Mueller argues very persuasively (but certainly also controversially) that the impact of nuclear weapons has been substantially overstated both in terms of their likely destructive power (in the hands of any party other than one of the five recognised nuclear weapons states) but also in their real impact on human history since 1945. He emphasizes how slow proliferation of weapons has been in reality, partly because the difficulties of acquiring nuclear materials and developing weapons technology are much greater than commonly stated, but also because all but a few countries have no real interest in acquiring weapons, as they make little sense beyond supposedly increasing national prestige. Similarly, the task of the atomic terrorist is far from simple. If it were as easy as many people claim, why haven't there been any incidents, even when the controls on nuclear materials were far looser than today? And why do terrorist incidents (with the possible exception of the sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway in 1995) usually involve low tech methods, such as people attaching bombs to themselves or taking over commercial airlines armed with box cutters and then flying them into prominent buildings? There may not be, in reality, any substantive black market in nuclear materials, despite the stories we regularly hear of nuclear trafficking. The comparison sometimes made with narcotic drugs is not reasonable; although drug seizures are known to be the tip of a very large iceberg, controls on the production, trade and transport of nuclear materials are much stiffer and potential buyers are very limited in number.



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