AT Prolif Bad – General
Asal and Beardsley 7—professors of political science (Victor Asal and Kyle Beadsley, “Proliferation and International Crisis Behavior”, Vol 44, No. 2, March 2007, Journal of peace research, pp. 139-155, JSTOR, ZBurdette)
The negative impact of proliferation on the security environment, however, may be seen in a very different light if the security and political interests of the USA do not drive the analysis. Indeed, several non-US perspectives reject non-proliferation arguments, as 'divid ing states into "responsible" ones who can set and change the rules of the game and those "irresponsible" nations who have to accept the rules leads to discriminatory ideas of non proliferation (Mashhadi, 1994: 107; see also Goheen, 1983).2 Or, as Singh (1998) bluntly states, arguments for non-proliferation may be dismissed as ‘Nuclear Apartheid’.
No accidents – incentives for safety measures.
[Jordan, PhD Candidate in Pol. Sci. – U. Chicago, Dissertation, “STRATEGY FOR PANDORA'S CHILDREN: STABLE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AMONG MINOR STATES”, 125]
Of course, all else being equal, a nuclear state probably would like to have pretty good negative command and control. Nuclear accidents and misuse are generally bad things and one should like to avoid them. However, there are clear advantages to being perceived as having weak mechanisms of negative command and control. Ideally, a state will want to have good negative command and control but be perceived as having poor negative command and control. Limited nuclear proliferators in the Third World will have a relatively easy time appearing to be out of control, like the terrorist bank robber in our illustration. To be clear, even if Third World proliferators actually do not have poor mechanisms of negative command and control, the fact is that much suspicion and doubt exist with regard to Third World states' command and control capabilities, and thus they will have an easy time convincing opponents and observers that they are nervous that their switches are hair-triggered and that if they are pressed too hard their nuclear weapons might just "go off” unintentionally.
Centralized control in new proliferators solves.
[Jordan, PhD Candidate in Pol. Sci. – U. Chicago, Dissertation, “STRATEGY FOR PANDORA'S CHILDREN: STABLE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AMONG MINOR STATES”,]
In short, while Third World states may not have the electronic use-control devices that help ensure that peripheral commanders do not "get out of control” they have other advantages that make the challenge of' centralized control easier than it was for the superpowers. The small numbers of personnel and organizational simplicity of launch bureaucracies means that even if a few more people have their lingers on the button than in the case of the superpowers, there will be less of a chance that weapons will be launched without a definite, informed and unambiguous decision to press that button.
The risk of accidents is low -- nukes are on balance better for stability.
Joseph and Reichart 98—Robert G. Joseph and John F. Relchart are director and deputy director of the Center for Counterproliferation Research, National Defense University, and members of the National War College faculty. Ambassador Joseph is a fonner principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for international security policy. Dr. Reichart is a former member of the State Department policy planning staff (“The Case for Nuclear Deterrence Today”, Winter 1998, ZBurdette)
Accidents, unauthorized use, and the “hair trigger.” It is a truism that there is and always has been some level of risk of accidental or inadvertent use of nuclear weapons. But, just as there is a risk of a major dam breaking or an accident at a nuclear power plant, the real issue is how to manage and mitigate these risks. Current programs that make our stockpile and that of the former Soviet Union more secure are essential. But reducing the numbers of warheads does not in itself guarantee a reduction in risk. In any event, the risk of accidents or unauthorized use, though real, must be judged low, and this risk must be measured against the national security benefits gained from retaining nuclear weapons.
AT Anonymous Strike/Blackmail
Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, 1995 p15-16 Ajones
Some have feared that a radical Arab state might fire a nuclear warhead anonymouslly at an Israeli city in order to block a peace settlement. But the state firing the warhead could not be certain of remaining unidentified. Even if a country's leaders persuaded themselves that chances of retaliation were low, who would run the risk? Nor would blackmail be easy, despite one instance of seeming success. ln 1953, the Soviet Union and China may have been convinced by President Dwight D. EisBnhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles that they would widen the Korean war and raise the level of violence by using nuclear weapons if a settlement were not reached. In Korea, we had gone so far that the threat to go farther was plausible. The blackmailer's threat is not a cheap way of working one's will. The threat is simply incredible unless a considerable investment has already been made. On January 12, 1954, Dulles gave a speech that seemed to threaten massive retaliation in response to bothersome actions by others, but the successful sicge of Dien Bien Phu by Ho Chi Minh's forces in the spring of that year showed the limitations of such threats. Capabilities foster policies that employ them. Using American nuclear weapons to force the lifting of the siege was discussed in both the United States and France. But using nuclear weapons to serve distant and doubtful interests would have been a monstrous policy, too horrible, when contemplated, to carry through. Nuclear weapons deter adversaries from attacking one's vital, and not one’s minor, interests.
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