Russia’s Strategy in the Arctic: Cooperation, not confrontation

13^ The Russian Cabinet on 14 June 2001 approved the draft of a document titled "Foundations of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic”, formulating the outlines of Russia’s national interests in the Arctic. However, it took until 2008 to develop a coherent strategy.

14^ http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/clcs_home.htm.

15^ The national security strategy will not be gone through in the following, as it has already been discussed in the run-through of Russia’s overall foreign policy goals.

16^ One could discuss whether what I here have termed ”the IR-realist/geopolitical discourse” really is one discourse or whether it is more discourses lumped into one. Thus, one could make a valid argument that the more patriotic and geopolitical parts of the discourse, especially the part influenced by for example Alexander Dugin’s use of ”lifespace” (otherwise known as Lebensraum) is rather far from standard IR-realism and actually a separate discourse. Thus, instead of having two overall discourses, I could have chosen to operate with three main discourses on the Arctic: A geopolitical, a realist and a liberalist discourse. This would mean, however, that central actors such as Putin, Patrushev, Shoigu, Gerasimov and Rogozin, would have their speeches or central concepts parted in two, where part of it would belong in the geopolitical discourse and part of it in the realist discourse. Thus, I believe that the Russian realist tradition is somewhat different from the Western realist or neorealist tradition, since it is highly influenced by geopolitical arguments – which makes it hard to discern the two. And if the arguments were divided in two, one would loose the internal logic. Please note that the geopolitical arguments used in the Russian debate are also somewhat different from standard Western geopolitical references, since the Russian geopolitical tradition of for example Alexander Dugin and Alexander Prokhanov is highly influence by the pre-war German geopolitical tradition’s organic state thinking, as presented by Karl Haushofer, Carl Schmitt and Rudolf Kjellén. Which may make the logic seem strange to Western eyes, but are perfectly suitable in a Russian context. Therefore, I have chosen to unite the realist and the geopolitical arguements in one ”realist/geopolitical” discourse. The same goes for the IR-liberalist discourse, which also is a gathereing of discourses that build upon legalist or Internaltional Law arguments, discourses on the benefits of international free trade, as well as discourses stressing the benefits of economic modernization. In dividing the debate into two overall discourses, I follow the path chosen by Marlene Laruell: (Laruelle, Russia's Arctic Strategies and the Future of the Far North 2014, p. 7) (Laruelle, Resource, State Reassertion and International Recognition: Locating the Drivers of Russia’s Arctic Policy 2014).

17^ Terms like ”the Russian debate” or ”the Russian public debate” should be understood mainly as the Russian political elite’s debate on the Arctic.

18^ The Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991 brought along a hope around the world of a less conflict-filled world, also in the Arctic. And while a still greater portion of the ice cap melted, the West’s focus on climate effects and the Arctic environment increased. That changed in the middle of the first decade of the new millennium, after which the Western debate about the Arctic was, for a number of years, characterized by fear of a new “great game” or “scramble for resources”. (Dittmer, et al. 2011) Jason Dittmer, Sami Moisio, Alan Ingram and Klaus Dodds, “Have you heard the one about the disappearing ice? Recasting Arctic geopolitics”, Political Geography, 30 (2011, 204). See also (Laruelle 2012, 566; Berzina 2015, 284)

19^ Russian envoys, which I have spoken with, argue that there was no symbolic claiming of Russian territory in the flag planting event. Rather, they say, it was not unlike the planting of the American flag on the moon: a symbolic gesture of the achievements of the nation.

20^ One may speculate that the reason for this change was the change in presidency from Vladimir Putin to Dmitry Medvedev, but that is a bit off the mark for this article. But Elena Wilson Rowe and Helge Blakkisrud does a very find job in documenting this change in policy. (Rowe og Blakkisrud 2014)

21^ Russia chose to support the Ilulissat Declaration even if many of the Arctic Council’s priorities deal with environmental standards for extraction of natural resources from the Arctic’s vulnerable landscape. This is well in tune with the Arctic Strategy 2008, but is in reality directly contrary to the production culture that rules in the large state energy companies Gazprom and Rosneft, where environmental considerations are given lesser priority.

22^ The Soviet era’s map of the Arctic, for example, showed the Soviet Union’s northern boundary as a line along 32 degrees East longitude from the Kola Peninsula and 180 degrees East longitude from the Bering Strait towards the North Pole, which indicated that approximately a third of the Arctic Ocean was looked upon as being Soviet territorial waters. (Dittmer, et al. 2011, 208)

23^ The theme of ’dialogue of cultures’ has been the focus of a yearly international conference on the Arctic arranged by the Russian Geographical Society, which started in Moscow in 2010, and which has received esteemed Russian and international presence: “The Arctic: Territory of Dialogue”.

24^ The official Russian explanation was that Rogozin after a visit to the floating Russian research station on the North Pole landed on Spitsbergen for ”purely logistical factors and requirements of aviation safety” since the weather had deteriorated. Furthermore, Russia noted Spitsbergen’s special international treaty regulations: ”We are perplexed by this (the Norwegian, J.S.) response. It is inexplicable and absurd from the standpoint of international law. Article 3 of the 1920 Spitsbergen Treaty allows citizens of signatory states to freely enter the archipelago. The above-mentioned unilateral sanctions do not abolish this provision of the Treaty and are, in this case, irrelevant. Therefore there are no grounds in international law for presenting any claims to the Russian side”. (Russian Foreign Ministry 2015)

25^ Russia was asked to re-submit because it’s first submission of claims to the CLCS in 2001 was ruled insufficient due of lack of scientific documentation.

26^ Also Anton Vasiliev, Russia’s former Senior Arctic Official has been steady following the cooperative line: Thus, in an article Anton Vasiliev argues that: “Generally, it is much more effective to pursue national interests in the Arctic together as compared to doing it alone. There is no race between Arctic States for increasingly accessible Arctic resources”. (Vasiliev, The arctic - our home and future u.d.).

27^ Part of the military build-up is related to non-Arctic states prying in Arctic waters. “Some developed countries that do not have direct access to the Arctic Circle are taking certain political and military steps to gain such access”. (Sputnik News 2015)

28^ At least, that is what seems to be feared by Dmitry Rogozin: “They have been planning it for a long time, and under the very bad circumstances the U.S. strategic missile defence would arrive there on board these ships,” Rogozin said in 2009, when he was still Russia’s ambassador to NATO. (Khramchikin 2009)

29^ This also goes the other way around. Thus, traditionally coming from the opposite camp, Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, sometimes expresses himself within the confinements of the realist/geopolitical discourse. For example, in 2010 Medvedev argued that: “Today circumpolar countries are taking active steps to expand their scientific research, economic and even military presence in the Arctic region. At the same time, unfortunately, there are attempts to limit Russia’s access to the exploration and development of the Arctic’s deposits, which, of course, is unacceptable from a legal point of view and unfair due to the geographical location and due to the very history of our country”. (President of the Russian Federation 2010)

30^ Other sources are much more optimistic concerning the presence of energy fields in the claimed areas outside the 200-mile sea limit. Atle Staalense thus argues, that estimates indicate that the area “include 594 oil fields and 159 gas fields as well as two major nickel fields and more than 350 gold deposits. Initial recoverable fuel resources are estimated to 258 billion tons of fuel equivalent, representing 60 percent of Russia’s total hydrocarbon resources” (Staalesen, Russia submits claim for North Pole 2015)

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