Sherman’s Meridian Campaign: a practice Run for the March to the Sea

Kevin Dougherty

Meridian was a key strategic point, lying roughly between the Mississippi capital of Jackson and the cannon foundry and manufacturing center of Selma, Alabama. Meridian itself played host to the intersection of three railroads. It served as a storage and distribution center for not just the industrial products of Selma but also for grain and cattle from the fertile Black Prairie region just to the north. ³

This map from the United States Military Academy Atlases at http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/web03/atlases/american%20civil%20war/american%20civil%20war%20index.htm shows Meridian’s strategic location relative to Jackson and Selma as well as its key railroad junction.

Sherman began his march in two columns of a corps each in order to facilitate both speed and foraging. Sherman would be living off the land without maintaining a line of supply. This would deny the Confederates resources but would also force Sherman to keep moving in search of more provisions.

Confederate resistance was light, and Sherman refused to be distracted by minor skirmishes. He pressed forward, precluding the Confederates from disrupting his crossing of the Pearl River, one of the few places where there was a natural line of defense. ¹⁴ By February 9, Sherman was in Morton, covering over half the distance from Vicksburg to Meridian in less than a week. By midafternoon on the 14^th, Sherman’s lead elements were in Meridian. By then Confederate resistance had evaporated.

But while Sherman’s own march had been mercurial, he was frustrated that General William Sooy Smith’s cavalry advance was not so. Sherman had ordered Smith to bring his large force from Memphis southeast in order to arrive at Meridian by February 10. Sherman instructed Smith not to be encumbered by “minor objects” but instead to concentrate on destroying bridges, railroads, and “corn not wanted.” ¹⁵ Part of Sherman’s own haste to reach Meridian had been motivated by his desire to rendezvous with Smith as planned, but now Smith was nowhere to be found. “It will be a novel thing in war,” Sherman lamented, “if infantry has to wait the motions of cavalry,” but such would be the case. ¹⁶

Smith’s failure to reach Meridian was a source of great frustration for Sherman who wrote that “Smith did not fulfill his orders, which were clear and specific,” ¹⁷ but the time was not to be wasted. Sherman waited almost a week for Smith, using the time “to wipe the appointed meeting place off the map,” ¹⁸ and then departed. In the meantime, Smith had turned back toward Memphis and been caught and whipped soundly by the great Confederate cavalrymen Nathan Bedford Forrest.

Surprise: “attacking the enemy at a time or place he does not expect or in a manner for which he is unprepared.” ¹⁹ Sherman would gain much surprise from the speed of his advance, but he would also employ a series of feints, or deceptive movements, designed to keep Leonidas Polk, the Confederate commander at Meridian, guessing. In an effort to maintain flexibility against all possible threats, Polk would never be able to concentrate against Sherman’s true attack. To this end, Sherman played on Polk’s fear for the safety of Mobile. Sherman asked Nathaniel Banks, Union commander of the Department of the Gulf at New Orleans, to have “boats maneuvering” in the Gulf near Mobile and to “keep up the delusion and prevent the enemy drawing from Mobile a force to strengthen Meridian.” Sherman told Banks he would “be obliged” if Banks would “keep up an irritating foraging or other expedition” in the direction of Mobile to help Sherman “keep up the delusion of an attack on Mobile and the Alabama River.” ²⁰ As Sherman advanced, he fueled this deception himself. He wrote, “I never had the remotest idea of going to Mobile, but had purposely given out that idea to the people of the country, so as to deceive the enemy and divert their attention.” ²¹

By threatening Polk with feints, Sherman forced the Confederate to retain forces at Mobile that he could have used against Sherman in Meridian. To further add to Polk’s confusion, Sherman sent gunboats and infantry up the Yazoo River “to reconnoiter and divert attention.” The intention was “to make a diversion” and “confuse the enemy.” ²² Then when Sherman departed Clinton on February 5, he divided his command with General James McPherson advancing on Jackson from southwest to northeast while General Stephen Hurlbut marched due east. Poor Polk had more than he could handle. ²³ Convinced Sherman was headed for Mobile, Polk took up a position at Demopolis and waited to strike Sherman’s rear. Polk’s confusion was compounded by a lack of courage to take the initiative and attack Sherman. Instead Polk merely kept retreating without making any real attempt to confront Sherman.

Sherman’s deception also affected other Confederate commanders. General Joe Johnston feared Sherman was headed for Johnston’s own position at Dalton, Georgia. Rather than reinforcing Polk, Johnston husbanded his forces for an attack that never came. Throughout the Confederate ranks, inactivity, indecision, and confusion reigned.

Sherman called such a tactic “putting the enemy on the horns of a dilemma.” He had helped Grant do this to John Pemberton in the Vicksburg Campaign, and Sherman would do it later by keeping the Confederates guessing if his objective was Macon or Augusta and then Augusta or Savannah on his March to the Sea. ²⁴ Now Sherman achieved the same effect in the Meridian Campaign. The result of this uncertainty is “enemy paralysis and hesitancy”—objectives of surprise and keys to Sherman’s success. ²⁵

William Sherman and Leonidas Polk: Antagonists at Meridian

Modern reenactors demonstrate Sherman’s technique for destroying rails. Photograph from the Annual Civil War Encampment at the Atlanta History Center http://www.hardscrabblefarm.com/ahs_pics.htm.

The completeness of Sherman’s destruction as well as the more recent urban sprawl have left the Meridian Campaign largely unpreserved. One remaining landmark is Merrehope which the City of Meridian website http://www.meridianms.org/culture_attraction.htm boasts as one of less than six buildings left standing after Sherman departed Meridian.

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