THE FACTS of Lawrence's first contact with the Hejaz, his return to Cairo with a handful of articles for The Arab Bulletin and his being promptly sent back to the Hejaz by Clayton are simple enough. In Seven Pillars he has explained away his troubles in Cairo as wholly due to the stupidity and jealousy of his superior officers on the British Staff, and has expanded the meagre Hejaz experience of a few days into about ten thousand words of excited narrative with a luxury of detail and much literary skill. Our problem here is not to attempt an assessment of Seven Pillars as a "titanic" work of literary art, but to ask how far it is history, how implicitly it can be relied on for the facts. This is a problem which can never be really solved, because the principal witness is Lawrence himself. In the first part of this book, examples have been brought forward of Lawrence's methods of building up his legend. While trying to preserve a reputation for shrinking modesty, he circulated through his friends exaggerated or wholly invented stories always to his advantage, stories which eventually got into print and now form the principal basis of his reputation, and in almost every case they were stories which could only have originated with himself.
The difficulty is to find any adequate means of verifying Lawrence's statements, and one danger is that his unsupported testimony may be doubted when it is in fact as reasonably true as human tendency to error permits. It is the inevitable penalty for the many fanciful stories he unquestionably did tell about himself. How far, for example, are we justified in believing or questioning Lawrence's version of his relations with staff and general officers in Cairo, Ismailia and Basra? His standard of judgment was that those who shared Lawrence's views about "the Arabs" were heroes or at any rate "good men," while
those who disagreed with him were ignorant, foolish and incompetent. Everybody accepts Lawrence's version without question, omitting to observe that, even if the officers in question had wished to reply to the insults rather than criticisms of an amateur, they were debarred by professional etiquette from doing so while they held their commissions. Even supposing Lawrence was right, it is difficult to believe the following tale, which can have emanated only from one of the two participants and in all probability hardly from Major-General Lynden-Bell.
"The chief of staff one day rang him up on the telephone.
" 'Is that Captain Lawrence? Where exactly is the Turkish Forty-first Division now stationed?'
" Lawrence said, 'At So-and-So near Aleppo. The 131st,132nd, 133rd regiments compose it. They are quartered in the villages So-and-So, So-and-So, and So-and-So.'
" 'Have you those villages marked on the map?'
" 'Have you noted them yet on the Dislocation files?'
" 'Why not?'
" 'Because they are better in my head until I can check the information.'
" 'Yes, but you can't send your head along to Ismailia every time.' (Ismailia was a long way from Cairo.)
" 'I wish to goodness I could,' said Lawrence, and rang off." 1
The Turkish 41st Division undoubtedly was in Syria in October, 1916, though perhaps this omniscient young officer might have mentioned that at least one of its battalions had been sent to the Hejaz. 2 The Chief of Staff at that time was Major-General Lynden-Bell. Now, making all allowances for a greater slackness of discipline on the Cairo, as compared with the Western, Front, and for tolerance of a highbrow civilian in uniform, it is hard to believe that the hero of Graves's instructive little anecdote did not find himself next morning on the mat and -- officially, this time -- beltless. It is typical of the cunning way in which such stories were framed by Lawrence that there were no witnesses -- even if Lynden-Bell had denied it, well, it was one man's word against another's. And now, who can deny it?
Take again Lawrence's highly spiced account of his first meeting with Feisal, the white figure "waiting tensely" (why?) to meet Lawrence, "very tall and pillar-like," with his "dropped eyelids" and "face like a mask." And more in the same vein, leading up to Feisal's soft" enquiry: "How do you like our place here in Wadi Safra?" and Lawrence's reply: "Well; but it is far from Damascus." And then the melodrama: "The word had fallen like a sword into their midst. There was a quiver. Then everybody present stiffened where he sat, and held his breath for a silent minute . . ." 3 And so forth. It is an impressive picture of the Hashemite Emir nervously awaiting this all-important emissary of the British Empire, whose words smite the assembled sheiks into quivering breathlessness. But is it true? Is it even probable?
Nobody can assert definitely that it is not a true account, for the simple reason that Lawrence is the only vocal witness to the scene, for if King Feisal left memoirs like his brother Abdulla, they have not been made available, except perhaps verbally to some extent through Mr. Antonius. But we may ask ourselves why Feisal was so eager to meet this unimportant officer of whom he had never before heard, and who was merely spending a few days' leave in the Hejaz with no official mission or authority? Why should the Emir be so stirred at the prospect of meeting this self-appointed Talthybius, this herald of the lightning, as to leave his seated guests while he stood "waiting tensely" at the doorway of the "long, low house?" 4 It is more like a scene from an old-fashioned historical romance than a war record. It is natural to suppose that a messenger had been sent on ahead to announce Lawrence's arrival, but in what capacity? Actually, he was a junior member of the Arab Bureau hoping to pick up some scraps of intelligence, as is clearly shown by his telegram of the 17th October to Clayton. 5 He had no official message or mission. Although Lawrence admits that he was merely on leave because the Staff wanted to get rid of him, 6 he very soon tries to create a totally different impression of his great importance, both to Feisal and to his readers. In his account of the interview with Abdulla, when he is trying to get permission to visit Feisal, he makes Storrs urge (and Storrs has strangely forgotten to note the fact in his contemporary journal) "the vital importance of full and early information from a trained observer for the British Commander-in-Chief in
Egypt, and showing that his sending down me, his best qualified and most indispensable staff officer, proved the serious consideration being given to Arabian affairs by Sir Archibald Murray." 7 It is not easy to reconcile this graceful tribute to Lawrence from Lawrence so modestly recorded, with the fact that far from being "most indispensable," he had just been fired as a nuisance, 8 nor had he in any sense been sent by Murray. And the invocation of Murray's interest in Arabian affairs seems inconsistent when you consider that, according to Lawrence, General Murray "could not be entrusted, with the Arabian affair; for neither he nor his staff had the ethnological competence needed to deal with so curious a problem." 9
The contemporary notes in the so-called Secret Despatches on the interviews with Feisal can hardly be reconciled with the romantic version cooked up in Seven Pillars. In that work, as in his post-war political propaganda, Lawrence desired to present -- and with great literary skill built up -- the effigy of Feisal as the warrior-prophet unerringly picked by the sagacious Lawrence and designed by Fate to lead "the Arabs" to the defeat of the Turks and the establishment of their independence and the winning of the World War. And Lawrence, of course, was instantly recognised by Feisal as the heaven-sent military genius to guide him. Hence the drama of their first meeting and such a build-up as: "His men told me how, after a long spell of fighting, in which he had to guard himself, and lead the charges, and control and encourage them he had collapsed physically and was carried away from his victory, unconscious, with the foam flecking his lips." 10 And yet Lawrence himself afterwards confessed that Feisal. was no good as a military leader. There is also good reason to suppose that Lawrence was not as much in Feisal's confidence as he gave out, for otherwise he would not have reported so confidently that Feisal had been president of the Arab secret society before the war, when Feisal, as he told Antonius, "had not joined any such society." 11
What is really interesting is to find that neither of the two heroes in fact thought very highly of the other. Storrs has expressed resentment at the "good-humoured tolerance" with which Feisal spoke of Lawrence after the war. More detailed and more striking are Liddell Hart's notes of a conversation with Lawrence shortly after Feisal's death in 1933. Lawrence opened up and said that Feisal was a timid man, who hated running into danger, but would do anything for
"Arab freedom." He always was influenced by his adviser of the moment, but was "all right so long as T. E. was his adviser!" Liddell Hart asked why, in that case, Lawrence had made out in his reports that Feisal was such an heroic leader, to which Lawrence replied that only in this way could the British be persuaded to support the Arabs as physical courage is a quality the typical British officer demands. Liddell Hart, whose book was either in the press or about to go to press, then very justifiably asked why he had not been told this important fact -- if it was a fact -- when writing his book, and received the reply that it might have been bad for Feisal's position while he was alive. 12 We may perhaps correlate this with a remark of Lawrence's friend, Sir Hubert Young, who thought Lawrence possessed the qualities that lead to success in statesmen, including the lack of scruple necessary in adapting the means to the end. 13
This sort of thing is very different from the inevitable misprint, pen-slip or error on which the average carpet fixes so gleefully. it is not a question of honest blunder but of intentional write-up and misrepresentation by Lawrence, the more to be noted since the instances are many and to be found in a book most sedulously laboured. And there is even reason to be wary of his reports, though they ought to have the authority of first-hand contemporary evidence.
The question naturally comes up -- if Lawrence actually held the contemptuous opinion of Feisal expressed in his conversation with Captain Hart, why did he attach himself to Feisal rather than to Abdulla? Especially since, having regard to the good opinion of Abdulla expressed by all competent witnesses, Lawrence seems to have invented excuses for not liking him? Well, if we remember Sir Leonard Woolley's pointed remark that Lawrence had for a long time been "an enemy to France in the Levant and that sentiment was the key to many of his later acts," 14 we at once get our clue. At the time of Lawrence's first visit to Feisal (October, 1916), King Hussein had not yet made his modest announcement of himself as "King of the Arabs," but whatever he did, there is not the slightest doubt that his two sons had their own ambitions, and that each, far from sinking them in the interests of a free Arabia, hoped to carve out a kingdom for himself, if not at first wholly independent then under the suzerainty of England. In 1916 Abdulla hoped to be King of Irak, while Feisal's thoughts were wholly turned towards Syria.
An official Arab candidate for the throne of Syria would be a great help to Lawrence's hopes that the "Arabs" would "rush right up to Damascus and biff the French out of all hope of Syria." 15 And he exults over the thought that the French would be furious if they got through to Damascus. 16 Lawrence was far from being the only British officer who wanted to "biff" the French out of Syria (Newcombe is said to have been one, and Cornwallis another, according to Colonel Brémond), but none was so nearly outrageous as Lawrence or behaved in his insulting fashion, as if the French were England's enemy, instead of the ally whose sacrifices made victory possible on the only front which really mattered after the Russian collapse in 1917. A semi-private war of intrigue against France in the Levant was thus super-added to the European war by Lawrence and the Arab Bureau.
A French mission had been sent to the Hejaz under command of Lt.-Col. (afterwards General) Brémond, an officer practised in Arabic and an expert in "native" warfare. In the long debate as to whether or not an Allied brigade should be sent to defend Rabegh (which the Hejaz forces were obviously incapable of doing), Brémond supported those who favoured the plan. Lawrence thereupon wrote a violent note accusing Brémond of having his own motives, which were not military, and quoted (or invented) "words and acts" which "just gave plausible colour to my charge." 17 The last words constitute an admission that Lawrence knew his charges were false, including as they did that Brémond was not concerned with the interests of the Arabs or with the importance of the revolt to the British. At a later date, after describing a difference of opinion between himself and Brémond, Lawrence penned the sneer that Brémond was a realist in war as well as in love, like most of his countrymen. 18 He did not, it seems, look at life dreamily like the British. 19 And, indeed, those who have read General Brémond's book have to confess that he has the bad Gallic habit of lucidly presenting the facts and scrupulously quoting his authorities. At an interview between Feisal and Brémond on the 17th February, 1917, Lawrence says he sat "spitefully smiling" at what he represents as Brémond's clumsy efforts to avoid giving the "quick-firing mountain guns" Feisal asked for. 20 The implication is that out of ill-will to "the Arab cause," Brémond eluded the request. Brémond's note on the conversation, made at the time, records that
Feisal expressed "great confidence, without any precise reasons," and adds that Feisal asked for "auto-mitrailleuses" (machine-guns mounted on cars), saying they could operate along the railway. Brémond tried hard to get them, but the French War Ministry refused them. Lawrence, entirely wrapped up in his own schemes, never troubled to understand that France was too hard-pressed to send more than token material to a minor front of mainly political interest. 21
In contrast to Lawrence's attitude of malicious insolence to the French representative and his unconcealed hatred for France, General Brémond says in his book:
"I was firmly persuaded that European civilisation could only exist through a Franco-British understanding -- a conviction which underwent severe shocks but remained unshaken." 22
Lawrence's friend, Sir Ronald Storrs, though suspected of Francophobia (which he strenuously denied), was at any rate more tactful. He describes General Brémond as "very sympathique." He adds that Brémond once told them after dinner that he had just heard that his only male relative not hitherto killed or wounded had become a casualty, saying that he was proud to drink to his allies and expressed his great pleasure at working with the English. 23 In view of the high, not to say extravagant praise given Lawrence as a great military strategist, may it be suggested that injecting private feuds with one's allies into a war is not really a sound military practice?
It is unfortunate that, when he wrote his interesting account of that conversation with Gilbert Clayton, Lawrence omitted to tell us what his instructions were. Since he went apparently as political and liaison officer, we may be fairly certain that he was not told to be an "Arabian Knight," 24 or to rush up to Damascus and "biff the French out of all hope of Syria." There had hitherto been far too many military cooks of this Arabian broth, and what was needed was not so much a great strategist or even a good tactician but some strongwilled person on the spot to urge concerted action and to secure some sort of continuity. This complex diplomatic errand was more difficult than blowing up trains or joining Bedouin rushes, and probably few professional officers could have done it as successfully. Such a man would have fretted himself uselessly (as Hubert Young did as Quartermaster General to the 600 or so troops of the Hejaz Regular Army) over all sorts of unmilitary horrors and incompetencies which
Lawrence either didn't see or cared nothing about. It is impossible to say whether he was potentially a Great Captain -- A. P. Wavell didn't think so 25 -- among other reasons because he was never in a modern battle, but he certainly had gifts as a political wire-puller. The skill and pertinacity with which he worked to embroil England and France in Syria, and to obtain thrones for his Hashemite friends, are truly remarkable. Lawrence's main task was to persuade the Sharifians to use what military force they had in the interests of the British Empire, which doubtless he interpreted in his own way.
But there were, in the autumn of 1916, certain definite objectives which he was probably told to urge on the Sharifian commanders. One was the capture of Medina, which in those days Lawrence favoured --"Abdulla will talk about his future kingdom, but we shall tell him to take Medina" 26 -- a point of view which he afterwards abandoned. "The Arabs" did not take Medina for exactly the same reason as the Spaniards failed to take Elizabethan England -- they couldn't. But there was another important objective -- Akaba. As early as the 6th July, 1916, the War Committee in London had ordered the occupation of Akaba, on the assumption that this would threaten the Turkish communication. 27 A more valid reason, and one which explains the alacrity with which the Royal Navy supported " the Arabs," is that Akaba was being used to launch mines on the Red Sea, and might possibly even be used by a submarine. The threat, at any rate, had raised marine insurance rates in the Red Sea from one-half to two per cent, and, as an immense amount of shipping went through the canal, the holding of the Red Sea Arabian ports would be a valuable achievement. Hence the two naval raids on Akaba, but to hold the place, Wejh (still in the hands of the Turks) would first have to be taken. On the 14th December, 1916, General Wingate, George Lloyd (afterward Lord Lloyd) and Brémond met in Khartoum and decided that Akaba and Wejh must be occupied (in their view, as bases for operations against the railway), that Rabegh must be defended, but -contrary to the opinion in Cairo which Lawrence was then parroting -that Medina should not be taken until a junction had been effected between the armies of Egypt and Irak, because, if taken earlier, the capture would "cause a development of Pan-Arabism harmful to the Allies." 28
Less than two weeks before that meeting of Allied leaders in the
Sudan, Lawrence had landed at Yenbo and set out at once to join Feisal. In the report made after his first and unofficial visit to Sharif Feisal, Lawrence had taken an optimistic view of the military value of the tribesmen, "a tough-looking crowd, all very dark coloured, and some negroid." 29 Commenting on the difficult nature of the country between Medina and Rabegh, he had described "the hill belt" as "a very paradise for snipers," and thought that each practicable road could be held by "a hundred or two of determined men," especially if they had fight machine guns. 30 In Seven Pillars he specifies Lewis guns, as does Graves 'in his book. 31 The observation and reasoning look perfectly sound, except that Arabs could not correct Lewis gun stoppages, but at that time nobody seems to have grasped the peculiar rules and panics governing this desert skirmishing.
About midnight on the 2nd December, Lawrence and his escort were astonished to see that the valley of NAM Mubarak (far in rear of Feisal's supposed positions) was occupied by men, shouting and firing rifles, amid the smoke of camp fires and the rumblings of camels. These turned out to be Feisal and his men in a disorderly retreat -- Said and his men had been surprised and routed, chiefly by their fear of the Turkish artillery. The Turks had got on so fast that they were now between Feisal and the sea, and might either turn inland to attack his rear or capture his base at Yenbo -- from which Lawrence had just come. In the confusion, Feisal's spy system had collapsed, and he was receiving only wild and contradictory reports; he had therefore fallen back with about 4,000 tribesmen to try to defend the approaches to Yenbo, while he laboured to restore the shaken morale of his followers. 32
Evidently they were in a very jumpy state of nerves, since Lawrence complains of three sleepless nights, and says there were constant alarms by day. 33 His presence in the camp had been explained by the statement that he was a Syrian officer who had deserted from the Turks, which was a handicap to him. 34 Obviously he was in British uniform. Feisal asked him one day if he would wear Arab clothes, and presented him with a magnificent white silk wedding garment embroidered with gold. 35 When he left the camp on the evening of the 4th December, to return to Yenbo, Feisal mounted him on his own camel, "a magnificent animal," which had cost thirty pounds. 36 Whether these wedding garments were gifts in the Arab fashion
or really intended for daily wear is obviously a question impossible to answer, though it seems strange that such elaborate clothes should have been intended for life in camps. Lawrence explains that Arab dress made him less conspicuous and was more comfortable than his own clothes. Now the only one of these Englishmen who really could and did pass as an Arab was Leachman, who had dark eyes and, of course, let his beard grow; but Lawrence shaved and had blue eyes, and himself admitted he could not pass as an Arab. Compare the one extant photograph of Leachman, dressed as a Bedouin, with the nine or ten carefully posed portraits of Lawrence in elaborate dresses and histrionic attitudes in Lowell Thomas's book. The one man looks like an Arab, the other like an amateur actor in a series of posturings in fancy dress. When Lowell Thomas assured the world that his photographs were taken without Lawrence's knowledge, 37 he made exceedingly large drafts on human credulity -- and the amazing thing is that almost everyone believed him. Much of the Lawrence legend was built up on the wearing of this Arab costume in and out of season and on the "Prince of Mecca" nonsense. Was the elaborate and ostentatious costume really any more genuine than the invented title?
Lawrence had barely settled down to sleep at Yenbo when Said and 800 beaten men poured into the little town, followed next day by news that Feisal also was defeated and retiring. The story was put about, as a sort of humorous alibi, that Feisal's left wing had gone off the field and caused his retreat, their reason for going being only to make coffee. Meanwhile the Royal Navy turned up at Yenbo, and, on the 12th December, Storrs arrived in answer to a distress call to meet King Hussein Jidda. Storrs had two conferences with Hussein, and a long discussion on the general situation with Wilson, Lloyd, Brémond and the Italian representative, Colonel Barnabi. Lawrence remained at Yenbo, and was not called to any of these meetings. Storrs reached Yenbo on the 13th, and reports that the night before "there had been a regular panic ashore," and many notables, including Feisal, had slept on board H.M.S. Hardinge. Lawrence had slept on Suva. Later he was told that "old Dakhil Allah" claimed to have guided the Turks near to Yenbo that night, but they were intimidated by the searchlights of so many ships and turned back. Lawrence asserts that he believed the Turks lost the war that night. 38
At 9-15 on the morning of the 13th December, there was a conference between Storrs on the one hand and Sharifs Feisal and Said on the other. In the confusion, Lawrence seems to have been totally forgotten -- at any rate he is not mentioned as having been present. Meeting him for the first time, Storrs thought that Feisal looked like "the legendary noble Arab," but that his demeanour was that of "one chastened by failure." Feisal grumbled about not having been given artillery, whereupon Storrs took him up sharply, saying that the recent retreats had hardly been a testimony of Arab valour. Feisal several times promised that he would make the advance on Wejh if the British would guarantee to hold Yenbo and Rabegh for him. Storrs strongly urged him to put his trust in the Egyptian, Azizel-Masri Bey who, on Storrs's urging, had been given by King Hussein the empty dignity of Hejaz Minister of War. Lawrence is not even mentioned. 39