Tampa Prep 2009-2010 Impact Defense File
Geographic proximity, doctrine and battlefield norms prevents Syrian use of biological weapons
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- 4. Chemical weapons have no military utility for Syria
- AT: Taiwanese Prolif
3. Geographic proximity, doctrine and battlefield norms prevents Syrian use of biological weaponsDiab, 97 - Syrian-born international security analyst living in London (Zuhair, The Nonproliferation Review, Fall, “SYRIA’S CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS: ASSESSING CAPABILITIES AND MOTIVATIONS”, http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol05/51/diab51.pdf) While the U.S. government may possess secret infor-mation to back up its claim of an offensive Syrian BW capability, there is no hint of its existence from open sources. Syrian armed forces are equipped with defen-sive equipment but there are no reported exercises in-volving the offensive use of biological weapons, making it unlikely that they have been integrated into Syrian mili-tary doctrine. If security concerns have encouraged Syria to acquire and retain a CW capability, these motivations may not necessarily apply BW. Both Israel and Syria presumably recognize the negative military utility of BW because of the geographical proximity of the two states. Moreover, there is no modern precedent of employing BW on the battlefield, and the moral revulsion surround-ing biological warfare is also far stronger than for nuclear or chemical weapons. Since the military utility of BW is uncertain, the functions of denial and punishment in Syria’s deterrent posture could be met more efficiently with CW. Indeed, what advantage could be gained from threaten- ing the use of a completely untested method of warfare? 4. Chemical weapons have no military utility for SyriaDiab, 97 - Syrian-born international security analyst living in London (Zuhair, The Nonproliferation Review, Fall, “SYRIA’S CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS: ASSESSING CAPABILITIES AND MOTIVATIONS”, http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol05/51/diab51.pdf) A more complicated situation pertains to the tactical use of CW, either at the outset of an offensive or to stop the advance of Israeli forces. Although Syrian forces are equipped with field protection and decontamination measures (protective suits, masks, and decontamination vehicles), it is not known whether all Syrian troops have such defenses. A more important disincentive for the offensive use of CW is that if Syria launched a surprise attack, its massed armor would have to advance rapidly to reach the 1967 border line (set by the Armistice Agree- ment of 1949) within 48 to 72 hours, before Israel had time to mobilize reserve units. Yet chemical protective measures are cumbersome and would significantly slow the tempo of military operations. Moreover, the geographic proximity of Syrian population centers, the relatively small size of the likely theaters of operations in the Golan Heights and southern Lebanon, and unpredictable weather conditions (particularly wind direction) would place many constraints on CW use at the start of a Syr-ian offensive. Similar obstacles also militate against use of CW by Syrian forces in defensive positions to repulse an Israeli counterattack. In this case, the proximity of Israeli settle-ments in northern Israel means that Syria would risk a massive retaliatory strike, which would not be to its ad-vantage. Thus, the only realistic scenarios for Syrian tac-tical use of CW are: 1) if Israel launches an offensive involving first use of CW, forcing Syrian units to retaliate in-kind; or 2) if the defensive perimeter of Damascus, the Syrian capital, collapses as a result of an Israeli in-cursion through the Golan Heights or a flanking maneu-ver through the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon. AT: Taiwanese ProlifTaiwan won’t go nuclear. No access to fissile material, launch systems and risk of exposure. Doughert ‘8 (Mimi, Monterey Institute James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, WMD Insights, “Taiwanese Legislator Accuses President Chen of Nuclear Weapons Development,” February, http://www.wmdinsights.com/I22/I22_EA2_TaiwaneseLegislator.htm) While experts agree that Taiwan possesses the underlying technological capability and expertise to produce nuclear weapons, they also acknowledge that the country would face major obstacles before becoming a proliferator. Taiwan would still need to produce highly enriched uranium or plutonium, which would entail constructing a uranium enrichment or spent fuel reprocessing plant. Furthermore, Taiwan would also need a nuclear weapon delivery system, and it is not clear that the Hsiung Feng IIE cruise missile can meet this requirement. Under the watchful eyes of the United States, China, and the IAEA, Taiwan would have great difficulty hiding such a program, and most analysts believe that no Taiwanese government, of either party, would be prepared to risk the consequences of exposure.Fear of abandonment by US prevents Taiwan prolif. Hughes ‘7 (Christopher, PhD – U. Sheffield and Reader/Associate Prof. – U. Warwick, Asia Policy #3, “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Implications for the Nuclear Ambitions of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan”, January, http://www.nbr.org/publications/asia_policy/AP3/AP3Hughes.pdf) At present Taiwan appears, to lack sufficient drivers for it to reconsider the nuclear option. The island’s leaders clearly fear the build-up of China’s military capabilities, and nuclear weapons might provide a cheap “equalizer” in the balance of power. Yet such a strategy carries the danger of exacerbating the security dilemma. China could be provoked either to launch pre-emptive conventional attacks to prevent Taiwan from acquiring the security assurance of nuclear weapons or to switch to a nuclear first-use doctrine.71 Taiwan might also fear the alliance dilemma of abandonment by the United States, especially given the growing strategic importance of China for overall U.S. regional and global strategy. Additionally, Taiwan could possibly interpret Bush administration statements on Taiwan as showing an inconsistent U.S. determination to defend the island. Taiwanese calculations of the risk of U.S. abandonment, though, will surely be tempered by the fear that striking out on an independent nuclear path would only serve to alienate the United States entirely. Such a nuclearization would have destabilizing effects on Sino-U.S. relations and thus make abandonment a “self-fulfilling prophecy.”72 In fact, Taiwan’s military strategy is predicated on building up autonomous military capabilities, while at the same time enticing the United States into closer military ties.73 A renewed and serious Taiwanese attempt to acquire nuclear weapons would appear to largely undercut such a strategy. Pg. 100 DPP and the public oppose nukes. Hughes ‘7 (Christopher, PhD – U. Sheffield and Reader/Associate Prof. – U. Warwick, Asia Policy #3, “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Implications for the Nuclear Ambitions of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan”, January, http://www.nbr.org/publications/asia_policy/AP3/AP3Hughes.pdf) Taiwan’s development of nuclear weapons might be driven by considerations of national prestige, identity, and norms, especially as a means to assert Taiwanese autonomy and eventually even independence. This impulse is countered, however, by the fact that the Democratic People’s Party (DPP), which is most likely to advocate independence, has assumed a non-nuclear stance and that the Kuomintang (KMT) remains opposed to any policy that would force a conflict with China. Meanwhile, there is strong sentiment in Taiwan against both civilian nuclear energy and nuclear weapons.74 Directory: files -> documents documents -> North Mankato Taylor Library documents -> In the Red and Brown Water documents -> - documents -> I. Disaster Summary Sheet II. 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