The lessons from the anarchist experiences on urban social cohesion

However, the most extreme form of individualism was developed by Max Stirner. While praising the intrinsic value of the unique individual, he completely discarded the existence of abstract entities such as the state, society, morality, duty and reason. For Marshall (1993) this means that he rebelled against the rational tradition of Western philosophy and instead of abstraction he proposed the satisfaction of immediate personal experience. Of particular importance for anarchist thought is his rejection of the political party as an entity responsible for fostering conformity and obligation.

Also corresponding to a further development of individualism, libertarianism corresponded to a moderate tendency praising all forms of liberty. Ward (2004) suggests that this vision was associated to 19^th century American figures that mistrusted American capitalism and supported the free association with others for common advantages.

From the beginning of the 1970s the concept of libertarianism has been appropriated by American free-market philosophers such as Robert Nozick, Murray Rothbard, and David Freedman in a current which is also became known as anarco-capitalist (Préposiet, 2005). Being despised by the majority of anarchists, particularly those who are socially committed, anarco-capitalists were also responsible for providing the Right with the philosophic-ideology supporting market capitalism.

Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, the first self-denominated anarchist, was also a prominent thinker of mutualism. In fact, he dealt extensively with mutualist economic systems, intended to explore the possibilities of private property and collective ownership. For him, state control and laissez-faire should be replaced by an economic system based on work and equality, similar to forms of socialism based on exchange and credit (Marshall, 1993). For some, this is a view which makes sense but it does not constitute a real challenge to the status quo as it is incapable of challenging the complex hegemonic power structures.

Proudhon was also one of the first authors dealing with federalism, i.e. ‘the view that society in a wider sense than the local community should be co-ordinated by a network of councils which are drawn from the various areas an which are themselves co-ordinated by councils covering wider areas’ (Walter, 2002: 57). Therefore, the federal system is seen as being simultaneously opposed to governmental centralization and capable of managing issues that take place at scales larger than the local one.
2.1.3. Collectivism, communism, syndicalism
According to Walter (idib.), collectivism goes further than individualism and mutualism in that it directly threats both the state and the class system. It corresponds to the view that ‘society can be reconstructed only when the working class seizes control of the economy by a social revolution, destroys the state apparatus, and reorganizes production on the basis of common ownership and control by associations of working people’ (ibid: 58). Its slogan would be the one used by the French socialists of the 1840s, ‘from each according to his ability, to each according to his work’.

Further developments contributed for the emergence of a more sophisticated perspective, that of communism. The main difference in comparison with collectivism is that whereas the later stresses the necessity to share the instruments of labour, the former also considers that the products of labour should be held in common and distributed according to the other well known socialist maxim, ‘from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs’. However, anarchists are keen to establish a distinction between their own communism and the one under the influence of Marxist doctrine. One of the main principles of authoritarian socialists is the necessity of a central authority, something which is anathema to anarchists.

For more than a century, anarco-communism constituted the dominant force within anarchism and some of its most important figures (e.g. Mikhail Bakunin, Piotr Kropotkin, Errico Malatesta, Élisée Reclus, and Emma Goldman) considered themselves communists.

Syndicalism is a vision that stresses the power of organized industrial workers and considers that society should be structured around trade unions and administrated according to the principle of workers control. In fact, anarco-syndicalism tends to over emphasize the meaning of work and it seems to be rather at odds with contemporary societies in which work lost the meaning it once had.

Contrary to the previous types of anarchist principles, these ones are not passive, quite the opposite, as they defend the necessity of proactive bottom-up political intervention in society in order to destroy the capitalist system (specifically regarding its organization of labour) and its key structural pillar, the state.
2.1.4. Situationism, social ecology, feminism, anti-globalization
This type entails a multiplicity of completely different perspectives, constituting what some call post-classical perspectives, and thus it is not as coherent as the previous three. Moreover, some of them are not de facto anarchist but, instead, remain on the borders of anarchism. Actually, this seems to be a demonstration of Epstein’s (2001) conjecture that anarchism has lost its ideological consistency and nowadays, more than anything else, it has become a collection of ‘anarchist sensibilities’.

The first of these ‘sensibilities’ is Situationism. The Internationale Situationniste was founded in 1957 by a group of experimental artists and young intellectuals, influenced by Dadaism and surrealism. Situationism became very influential during the May 68 events, particularly because of the writings of two of its members Guy Debord (The Society of the Spectacle) and Raoul Vaneigem (The Revolution of Everyday Life). They believed that ‘all individuals should construct the situations of their lives and release their own potential and obtain their own pleasure’ (Marshall, 1993: 552). Although more sophisticated, this uncompromised commitment to liberty and autonomy seems to have been somewhat close to the aforementioned individualism perspective advocated by some anarchists.

More than a ‘sensibility’, Social Ecology is field of knowledge which, unlike deep ecologists, primitivists, and orthodox environmentalists does not criticize the origins and progress of civilization. It also suggests that the causes of ecological crisis are fundamentally social in nature and, as such, can be solved using the societal resources available. As Murray Bookchin (2007: 19) noted, ‘social ecology is based on the conviction that nearly all of our present ecological problems originate in deep-seated social problems’. However, its major contribution for anarchist reasoning has been its political dimension, i.e. libertarian municipalism, a program for restoring the latent political possibilities in existing local governments transforming them into direct democracies (Biehl, 1998; 2006).

Feminism also contributed to develop the libertarian message of traditional anarchism (Marshall, 1993). The subtle but somewhat clear analysis of hierarchies and systems of domination developed by many anarchists has also been appropriated by many feminists. In fact, ‘both see social and economic inequality as rooted in institutionalized power arrangements; both stress the necessity of changing those arrangements as a precondition for liberation; and both work for the realization of personal autonomy and freedom within a context of community’ (Ehrlich, 1996a: 137).

Finally, the so called ‘anti-globalization movement’ which has been emerging during the last decade also contributed to reinvent and to renew the anarchist tradition. Its origins are uncertain but there is a widespread perception that they can be traced back to the 1994 Zapatista rebellion. Afterwards, Seattle, Washington, Prague, Québec and Genoa were its privileged stages (Graeber, 2007). Of particular importance, in my view, is the importance given to prefigurative politics, i.e. modes of organization and praxis which reflect the future society that the movement is aiming for. Arguably, it can be said that these forms of political action resemble what we can call ‘real utopias’ where the process is as important as the goals one wishes to achieve. To illustrate what I mean, I will use a description provided by David Graeber (2001: 84):
When protesters in Seattle chanted “this is what democracy looks like,” they meant to be taken literally. In the best tradition of direct action, they not only confronted a certain form of power, exposing its mechanisms and attempting literally to stop it in its tracks: they did it in a way which demonstrated why the kind of social relations on which it is based were unnecessary. This is why all the condescending remarks about the movement being dominated by a bunch of dumb kids with no coherent ideology completely missed the mark. The diversity was a function of the decentralized form of organization, and this organization was the movement’s ideology.


2.2. Vision-goals nexus
The examination of the different anarchist traditions just made allow us to build the vision-goals nexus. In order to do so, I rely on Chomsky’s (1996: 190) formulation, whereby vision means ‘the conception of a future society that animates what we actually do, a society in which a decent human being might want to live’, and goals means ‘the choices and tasks that are within reach, that we will pursue one way or another guided by a vision that may be distant and hazy’. In other words, goals are concerned with the instruments and the methods used, i.e. the means used to achieve the vision.

The spirit underlying this sketch is one that, in Mueller’s (n.d.: 123) own words, perceives anarchism as ‘a set of practices and actions within which certain principles manifest themselves’, i.e. the goals are not constrained by rigid principles. Instead, the principles are built in relation to them, means and ends having the same weight within the process of political praxis. As a result, the following interpretation privileges goals in relation to vision.

Since anarchism can be perceived as being a synthesis of the most influential political philosophies developed during the last two centuries, i.e. liberalism and socialism, anarchist’s vision is one of freedom and equality. One cannot be conceived without the other, i.e. since one reinforces the other, both can only be fully achieved if in a simultaneous fashion. In a brilliant and very vivid account Walter (2002: 29) suggested that ‘freedom without equality means that the poor and weak are less free than the rich and strong, and equality without freedom means that we are all slaves together’. However, anarchism is not just a mere mixture of both liberalism and socialism. As it rejects the institutions of government, it is qualitatively different, meaning that above all anarchists reject all coercive forms of external authority.

The challenge is how to deal with the tensions between freedom (either in its individual or collective form) and equality, as a concept which goes way beyond the liberal formulation associated to equality before the law or equality of opportunity. Therefore, although celebrating personal and social freedom as a supreme ideal, anarchists are aware that it cannot easily be achieved as there are numerous cultural, political, and social obstacles. However, following the aforementioned definition, a vision does not need to be immediately achieved, it only needs to exist.

All in all, it was Marshall (1993: 50) who better explained the relation between freedom and equality when he pointed out that ‘because [anarchists] adopt a principle of justice that everyone has an equal claim to a maximum of freedom they reject all political authority as an illegitimate interference with freedom’.

Power and authority are also fundamental tenets of an anarchist vision. Basically, authority is one among many possible manifestations of power (e.g. political influence, charismatic leadership, intellectual recognition). As such, power (individual or organizational) may be perceived as the ability to achieve certain ends even if those complying do not accept the arguments supporting them.

Additionally, anarchists are also opposed to all forms of coercive, non reciprocal power as this necessarily implies a relation of domination, something which is obviously obnoxious to anarchism. As a result, anarchism is also suspicious of political authority (e.g. a specific manifestation of power), especially if it is illegitimate and imposed from above. However, this does not mean that anarchists have a naïve understanding of power. On the one hand, it is assumed that, although unequally distributed power permeates society, on the other, there is a general consensual understanding that power has a corruptive effect and that is why anarchists distrust its delegation into the hands of leaders and rulers.

Daniel Guérin (1970) identified three domains which I believe can help to shed some light upon the power-authority relationship from an anarchist point of view: i) horror of the state; ii) hostility to bourgeois democracy; iii) critique of authoritarian socialism (see also Carter, 2000).

The first represents the classical tenet of the anarchist tradition. For Stirner (cited in ibid: 15), ‘every state is a tyranny, be it the tyranny of a single man or a group (…) the state as always one purpose: to limit, control, subordinate the individual and subject him to the general purpose’. Likewise, for Bakunin (ibid.) the state was ‘an abstraction devouring the life of the peoples’. Although contemporary anarchists are also anti-statists they have somewhat replaced these visceral understandings by others, more sophisticated and less embedded in the 19^th century zeitgeist, characterizing anarchist ‘theology’ (see Graber, 2007).

Unsurprisingly, this critique is related to the second domain, i.e. hostility to bourgeois democracy. Anarchists are very suspicious of bourgeois democratic theory because if there truly was a popular sovereignty the distinction between governed and government would no longer be necessary. That is why some anarchists do not believe in emancipation by the ballot. Nevertheless, the anarchist attitude towards universal suffrage is far from logical or consistent and some would argue that under certain circumstances, voting can be seen as a progressive instrument for challenging power relations (Guérin, 1970).

Finally, anarchist’s critique of authoritarian socialism is usually associated to the discussion revolving around the figures of Marx and Bakunin, related to the internal disputes for gaining control over the International (1870s) and also concerning the organizational strategies which should be followed after the destruction of the dominant power structures. Basically, in opposition to the Marxist dictatorship of the proletariat, anarchists deny the need for provisional and temporary stages after seizing power. Bakunin summed his own understanding on this issue as follows: ‘take the most radical of revolutionaries and place him on the throne of all the Russias or give him dictatorial powers…and before the year is out he will be worse than the Czar himself’ (ibid: 26).

In terms of anarchist goals, the classical/modern period, is somewhat similar to other socialist/syndicalist traditions as it was closely linked to wide scale labour organizations such as the IWW in the States and the CNT in Spain. Despite the obvious differences associated to its particular vision, mass demonstrations, organized by labour unions, strikes, and other forms of more or less democratically organized collective action were the predominant form of anarchist goals during this period.

The postmodern period witnessed an explosion in terms of political praxis, a continuous renewal of anarchist methods encompassed by a culture of experimentation, celebration of freedom and contestation of authority. It did not replace modern anarchist goals. Notwithstanding, it represented an input of vitality in these consolidated forms of praxis. Thus, the complexity of postmodern goals has increased significantly and I believe that one should pay further attention to its defining features.

In my understanding, anarchist goals tend to privilege socio-political experimentation in relation to other possible spheres of influence, such as the economic. This happens because since the groups holding power have shifted their attention to the economic sphere, therefore neglecting the political one, anarchists and those with anarchist sensibilities have been filling up the empty gaps with alternative political possibilities. However, there are some theoretical proposals for more durable and sustainable transformations concerning economic systems, such as Participatory Economics (Albert, 2003). Nevertheless, these have yet to face the test of empirical-contextual experimentation.

Therefore, within the scope of what has been already ‘tested’, I believe that it is possible to highlight three relevant postmodern goals: i) consensus; ii) direct action; iii) prefigurative politics.

Consensus is a process of direct democratic decision-making based on the existence of horizontal networks instead of top-down structures as in the case of conventional democratic processes run by states, parties or corporations. It refers to a condition of agreement by all members of a group on the decisions made about specific issues/problems. Accordingly, it has been widely used within the anti-globalization movement, several indigenous communities in Latin America, and other projects of anarchist inspiration.

Therefore, although consensus is somewhat at odds with western democratic processes of decision-making, outside western tradition it is rather usual. However, it still does not seem to count as a form of democracy. The reasons for this understanding were described by Graeber (2004: 87) as follows:
We are usually told that democracy originated in ancient Athens – like science, or philosophy, it was a Greek invention. It’s never entirely clear what this is supposed to mean. Are we supposed to believe that before the Athenians, it never really occurred to anyone, anywhere, to gather all the members of their community in order to make joint decisions in a way that gave everyone equal say? That would be ridiculous. Clearly there have been plenty of egalitarian societies in history – many far more egalitarian than Athens, many that must have existed before 500 BC – and obviously, they must have had some kind of procedure for coming to decisions for matters of collective importance. Yet, somehow, it is always assumed that these procedures, whatever they might have been, could not have been, properly speaking, “democratic”.
In fact, according to the anarchist power-authority relationship mentioned earlier, consensus seems to be a much more legitimate form of making a decision because it lacks the coercive apparatus structuring traditional forms of democracy. Likewise, it also tends to challenge conventional political wisdom, as it is based on the belief that each person has some part of the truth and no one has all of it (Estes, 1996). It must also be acknowledged that because it is unarguably a much more complex process than the traditional one it may be more time consuming but, as the Curious George Brigade (2003) noted, ‘consensus may take more time than voting, but then voting is not as time-efficient as totalitarianism’.

Last, consensus has also contributed to foster the development of a wide array of organizational instruments all aimed at the same goal, i.e. the creation of ‘forms of democratic process that allow initiatives to rise from bellow and attain maximum effective solidarity, without stifling dissenting voices, creating leadership positions or compelling anyone to do anything which they have not freely agreed to do’ (Graeber, 2002:71).

Direct action is a form of action with no intermediaries which can have multiple and very distinct meanings. Boycotts, civil disobedience, sit-ins, freedom rides and freedom walks, street demonstrations, are all forms of direct action. Thus, as a method, it has been used by several radical groups and projects for many years.

Howard Zinn (1997b: 617) believes that it has numerous qualities because ‘it disturbs the status quo, it intrudes on the complacency of the majority, it expresses the anger and the hurt of the aggrieved, it publicizes an injustice, it demonstrates the inadequacy of whatever reforms have been instituted up to that point, it creates tension and trouble and thus forces the holders of power to move faster than they otherwise would have to redress grievances’. Therefore, it can be perceived as being a form of praxis which is simultaneously political and symbolic.

Nevertheless, this goal has to deal with several misunderstandings. Some of them were identified by CrimethInc (n.d.), namely: i) it is terrorism; ii) it is violent; iii) it is not political expression, but criminal activity; iv) it is unnecessary where people have freedom of speech; v) it is alienating; vi) people practicing it should work through the established political channels instead; vii) it is exclusive; viii) it acts cowardly; ix) it is practiced only by college students/privileged rich kids/desperate poor people/etc.; x) it is the work of agent provocateurs; xi) it is dangerous and can have negative repercussions for others; xii) it never accomplishes anything. Obviously, there are no definite answers able to refute all these accusations. Like we have already seen direct action is not an absolute and immutable political goal, instead it is polysemic and polymorphic, therefore only the analysis of specific and contextualized events allows one to evaluate them.

Finally, prefigurative politics means the process of building today the society one wants to achieve in the future, in other words, making one’s vision become true. I believe it resembles what Ehrlich (1996b: 331) called ‘transfer culture’, i.e. an ongoing process of revolutionary change. In his understanding revolution is not an end, but rather a constant process of transforming everyday life.

As such, I consider this particular anarchist goal to be a rather temporary and incomplete crystallization of their vision. This is quite different from the classical socialist traditions, as it can be perceived as an abandonment of the grand modern revolutionary narratives (i.e. vision) animating their goals.

Prefigurative politics refer also to a concern with the coherence between means and ends, i.e. goals and vision. For anarchists, it is not possible to achieve freedom and equality through the use of authoritarian and coercive methods. That would be a completely unsustainable contradiction violating their understanding of the goals-vision nexus. This reasoning is synthesized in Ehrlich’s (ibid: 332) ‘radical catechism’ as follows:

We must develop a view of the “good society”.

We must act on the principles of the society we would like to see.

Our means must be consistent with our ends.

We must act as if the future is today.
To conclude this section, it seems possible to assume that as we move on towards the contemporary age anarchist traditions have also shaped and adapted their goals (more than their vision). In my understanding, the major transformation was the abandonment of the great unifying collective projects which characterized the anarchist traditions of communism, syndicalism and collectivism. During the last couple of decades we have witnessed a pulverization of that unity, a fragmentation of anarchist goals which are increasingly resembling the swarm intelligence Hardt and Negri (2005) referred to. As a result, the understanding of the nexus also seems to have changed. Starting with the situationists, I believe that what happened was a progressive compression of the nexus, i.e. vision and goals are increasingly closer to each other. Symptomatic of this transformation is the fact that, although I considered prefigurative politics as a goal, I still doubt whether it should be in its own category, since it blurs the separation between goals and vision.