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The 1AC evidence uses fear of Russia and China to encourage private sector involvement to ensure the future of capitalism. Neg reads blue

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• Russia has been viewed by the West as a systemic rival for much longer
• This leaves the door open to hybrid threats, a mechanism that has roots in authoritarian strategic culture but also has national specificities
• Given
• Against this backdrop, here follow some recommendations aimed to policy-makers and expert communities in
• analysts. Older analysts need to be trained about the new information environment and its functioning. In turn, the younger generation needs to be trained on history, context and connections.

The 1AC evidence uses fear of Russia and China to encourage private sector involvement to ensure the future of capitalism. Neg reads blue. Hanna Smith 21, Director of Research and Analysis at the Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats and visiting professor for the academic year 2020–2021 at the College of Europe, Bruges. “NATO Decision-Making in the Age of Big Data and Artificial Intelligence” Editors: Sonia Lucarelli; Alessandro Marrone; and Francesco Niccolò Moro. Sonia Lucarelli is Professor of International Relations and European Security at the University of Bologna, and member of the Board of Directors of the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI). Alessandro Marrone is Head of the Defence Programme of IAI and teaches at the Istituto Superiore di Stato Maggiore Interforze (ISSMI) of the Italian Ministry of Defence. Francesco N. Moro is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Bologna and Adjunct Professor of International Relations at the Johns Hopkins University Europe Campus. This publication is the result of the Conference “NATO Decision-making: promises and perils of the Big Data age”, organized by NATO Allied Command Transformation (ACT), the University of Bologna and Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) of Rome. https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/978195445000.pdf //pipk Putting together the five characteristics of hybrid threats (use of multiple synchronized tools, ability to create ambiguity and to hide true intentions, deliberate threshold manipulation, exploitation of the seams of democratic societies, and use of decoys); the SEES model (situational awareness, explaining, estimating, and strategic notice); and the new challenges of today’s information environment (speed, volume, AI, and degrading expertise), they result in a mix that can influence decision-making algorithms and, in Omand’s words, “it is our own demons that are most likely to mislead us” (2020). Since hybrid threats are designed to interrupt effectiveness of the SEES model at some point, by trying to create cognitive errors such as those arising from group thinking, 2 mirror imaging or applying unconscious confirmation bias, they can challenge organizations like the European Union (EU) and NATO even more than a state. The multilateral setting – with several, connected national interests – can be more vulnerable to hybrid threat activities. The things that can go wrong in the SEES model are especially vulnerable in a multilateral setting, unless there is a comprehensive approach, willingness to exchange information, joint understanding on resilience, and mechanisms to counter and respond in place. The way Moscow and Beijing think about interference and influence is different from countries with a democratic system. For the EU and NATO, both Russia and China are difficult states to deal with. China is seen in the EU as a global partner, competitor and systemic rival. It has not been on NATO’s radar before the 2019 London Summit, but the Report “NATO 2030” delivered by the Group of Expert appointed by the Alliance’s Secretary General states that “NATO must devote much more time, political resources and action to the security challenges posed by China” (2020: 12). Russia has been viewed by the West as a systemic rival for much longer, but it has also been considered part of the European cultural heritage in the EU. For NATO, Russia has been the greatest military power in the East, which has conflicts of interest with NATO. For the moment, open military conflict is not viewed as very likely neither for Moscow nor for Beijing, although it is not excluded. This leaves the door open to hybrid threats, a mechanism that has roots in authoritarian strategic culture but also has national specificities. The things that can go wrong in the SEES model are challenged by the new information environment being manipulated according to the tactics of hybrid threats. Even if the EU is not a military alliance, while NATO is, both organizations are challenged in similar ways by hybrid threats. Given several factors, including overlapping membership, it is clear that weakening one will also weaken the other. Therefore, in the landscape of hybrid threats, the EU and NATO are considered as a united target by hostile actors – and they can also best counter and respond to these threats if working together. Against this backdrop, here follow some recommendations aimed to policy-makers and expert communities in both NATO and EU countries:  The importance of analysis is growing. Too much effort has been put into collecting data, and not enough into training analysts. Older analysts need to be trained about the new information environment and its functioning. In turn, the younger generation needs to be trained on history, context and connections. Central elements in training are understanding the psychology of the adversary, the assessments of motivations, and rationales. The cultural context of information is lost in the volume of information. International cooperation, especially on the part of an alliance like NATO, needs to be lifted to a new level. This does not only concern joint situational awareness about hostile actors, but also involves understanding partners and their perspectives. Without that mutual understanding among allies and partners, divergences can become over politicized and decision-making paralyzed, which is what the actors behind hybrid threats want. There is a need for more effective training in the use of open-source intelligence, focusing on the sources and tools for finding information, including the biases they may have. In addition, more knowledge is needed to be able to detect linkages between actions. Hybrid threat activities start in a settled way, often on a very legal basis, and the potential for such activities to turn into hostile acts needs to be recognized. Military communities should reach out more often to non-military expert communities. To counter hybrid threats, a multidisciplinary approach needs to be taken, which really means combining different disciplinary fields and expertise coming from practitioners, academics and the private sector. Sharing the vocabulary is important when building situational awareness. Civil-military cooperation is needed here. The civilian side uses different words than the military and sometimes, even if the understanding of a concept would be shared, actors do not understand due to the use of different terms, and discussions can turn into an unnecessary battle of words. Download 2.09 Mb. Share with your friends: