The United States federal government should: Adopt a policy of flexible response toward China in the South China Sea
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- Transparency solves miscalc and conflict in Asia—increases costs of aggression
- The combo of communication with China and flexible response solves deterrence
Solvency – TransparencyFlexible response with communication solves the affBrendan Cooley is a research assistant at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA). And James Scouras is a national security studies fellow at the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU/APL). This research was completed under the auspices of JHU/APL’s internal research program A CONVENTIONAL FLEXIBLE RESPONSE STRATEGY FOR THE WESTERN PACIFIC, National Security Perspective, Johns Hopkins University 2015, http://www.jhuapl.edu/newscenter/publications/pdf/AConventionalFlexibleResponseStrategyfortheWesternPacific.pdf, /Kent Denver-MB AirSea Battle’s primary objective—to maintain US freedom of action in the Western Pacific—is defensive. However, its proposed strikes on A2/AD capabilities are inherently offensive. Consequently, AirSea Battle by itself is likely to undermine China’s perception of its security. Nevertheless, we recognize the need to protect US freedom of action in the Western Pacific and to strike threatening Chinese assets. We argue, though, that articulating a holistic strategy of flexible response, under which AirSea Battle is but one part, will work to reassure China of US intentions. The capabilities called for under our strategy are more defensive in nature and designed for lower orders of conflict. By better communicating benign intentions, the United States will be able to better avoid unnecessary arms races and encourage cooperative futures. Should our combative scenarios arise regardless, the strategy retains a strong and stable high-end deterrent. Additionally, by providing the US military with a more comprehensive set of capabilities, the strategy provides for deterrence under a larger spectrum of potential conflict scenarios and works to control escalatory incentives should conflict emerge. Capabilities such as blockade are scalable and less escalatory than strikes at China’s command and control networks. Developing these capabilities in concert with AirSea Battle capabilities and organizing US doctrine around a range of potential conflict scenarios will ensure US credibility in these scenarios, as well as provide better options for conflict de-escalation. Although we recognize that China will retain the ability to escalate potential conflicts horizontally, our concept puts the impetus for escalation on China rather than on the United States. A fuller range of capabilities will allow the United States to avoid the unappealing choice of escalating a conflict with a formidable adversary or capitulating. Transparency solves miscalc and conflict in Asia—increases costs of aggressionJackson 2016 (Van Jackson, The Diplomat, 1-6-2016, Rethinking US Asia Policy: 3 Options Between Appeasement and War ," Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2016/01/rethinking-us-asia-policy-3-options-between-appeasement-and-war/, Accessed: 5-28-2016, /Kent Denver-MB) Increasing Transparency Another option is to render the Asian security environment as operationally transparent as possible. Strategic transparency — that is, certainty about the intentions of others — is an almost insurmountable problem in international relations; there’s more to say on that subject another day. At the operational level though, a much greater degree of transparency in Asia is both possible and necessary. Having situational awareness of who is doing what and when provides a basis for responsible (and sometimes collective) decision-making. China’s use of “gray zone” coercion in the South China Sea exploits ambiguities to maintain a “thin veil of deniability” about the fact of aggression, which undermines regional consensus-building against it. Enhancing regional transparency reduces opportunities for accidents and misunderstandings at sea, and makes it harder for China to present smaller states with coercive faits accompli (as in the 2012 Scarborough Shoal incident). Transparency also makes it easier for the region to distinguish aggressors from defenders when incidents do occur, which promotes stability by discouraging aggressive behavior (because the instigator will get caught) and improving the odds that smaller states band together to condemn (or balance) the aggressor. The combo of communication with China and flexible response solves deterrenceBrendan Cooley is a research assistant at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA). And James Scouras is a national security studies fellow at the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU/APL). This research was completed under the auspices of JHU/APL’s internal research program A CONVENTIONAL FLEXIBLE RESPONSE STRATEGY FOR THE WESTERN PACIFIC, National Security Perspective, Johns Hopkins University 2015, http://www.jhuapl.edu/newscenter/publications/pdf/AConventionalFlexibleResponseStrategyfortheWesternPacific.pdf, /Kent Denver-MB A more flexible set of capabilities might prove better at protecting cooperative relations while simultaneously providing more complete and stable deterrent ability should a more openly hostile relationship arise. We thus argue that AirSea Battle should be supplemented and integrated into a larger strategy that emphasizes proportional responses to potential Chinese incursions and that it should be communicated clearly to both China and the American public. The contours of such a strategy are discussed in the following section. Download 156.83 Kb. Share with your friends:
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