Total Manpower Strength 46,000



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DPRK NAVY 2011 ASSESSMENT 110216

Total Manpower Strength

46,000






SUBMARINES

78

FRIGATES

3

CORVETTES

4

FAST ATTACK CRAFT

348

PATROL CRAFT

58

MINESWEEPERS

24

AIR

0

LANDING CRAFT (including approx. 100 NAMPO crafts that carry up to 30)

200

+/- KONGBANG HOVERCRAFT (Carry 35-55)

30










































Source – Jane’s World Navies Issue 3 – 2009 / Military Periscope 2009

Summary


  • Primarily a coastal defense force; ill-equipped (mostly outdated Russian equipment) and ill-supplied

  • Limited capability in terms of total coastal defense outside of 12 miles off the coast and for special operations insertions into S. Korean territory – cannot defend coast/territorial waters out to 200 m out to see

  • Past decade it has a constant combat ship strength of cca. 840 vessels – with economic problems degrade training/operations capabilities as well as maintenance due to lack of purchasing power for parts, with 20-30 percent of surface fleet in engine/hull repair or in dry docks or graving docks, with an additional 10-15 percent of the surface fleet is stored on land; in the open and tunnels, meaning that major repairs would need to be completed to make them operational



  • Submarine forces in better condition/state of readiness, however numbers are declining due to aforementioned problems



  • Navy responsible for sinking S.Korean ship last March – submarine torpedo action



  • Hindering factors for the Korean People’s Navy (KPN)



    • Limited training

    • Obsolescing equipment

    • Poor material materiel condition of combat ships

    • Unsophisticated Electronic Warfare equipment

    • Shortage of modern equipment

    • Inefficient/inadequate logistics system

    • Too much bureaucracy

    • Poor command and control

    • Moderate morale



  • Were the KPN to engage in a conflict, it would be able to conduct limited short-term and defensive operations, namely

    • Deploy attack surface and submarine attack forces to the Yellow and East Seas to disrupt commercial shipping to ROK and Japan/serve as an obstacle to an attacker

    • Interdict into Japan’s eastern ports with midget and coastal submarines

    • Conduct special operations landings

    • Conduct two-batallion-brigade and multiple company-battalion sized amphibious lift ops to ROK

    • Patrol sized crafts can’t operate outside of 50 miles off the coast



  • In a conflict with ROK and US, the vast majority of KPN surface ships however submarines would be able to continue to fight longer

EQUIPMENT


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