10nfl1-Nukes-Cover
CHINESE READINESS IS HIGH, THEY CANT BE DETERRED
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| CHINESE READINESS IS HIGH, THEY CANT BE DETERRED. (Elizabeth Economy-Fellow for China and Deputy Director of the Asia Studies Program at the Council of Foreign Relations-and Michel Oksenberg-Senior Fellow at the Asia Pacific Reasearch Center @ Stanford University, Professor of Political Science, China joins the World Progress and prospects, ed. By Elizabeth Economy and Michel Oksenberg, p, 1999) However, as Appendix A indicates, China recently has sought to "improve the survivability of its missile forces by reducing the prelaunch time period, to find less vulnerable basing modes, and to make general improvements inaccuracy, range, guidance, and control. In general, China's nuclear weapons modernization pro-ram emphasizes (1) the development of land-and sea-based intercontinental ballistic missiles ICBMs) with improved range, accuracy, survivability, and penetration against limited missile defense (2) the development of anew generation of solid-fuel, short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (3) the apparent development of smaller warheads, which theoretically would allow a multiple, independently targetable reentry vehicle MIRY) warhead capability and (4) an improvement in China's nuclear weapons CHI through the advancement of space capabilities and the continued importation of advanced communication technologies, such as fiber optics, and microwave equipment. These initiatives may reflect changing assumptions about the utility of nuclear weapons and hence Chinese nuclear strategy. In the past, China's nuclear doctrine and deterrence theory comprised what often has been referred to as minimum deterrence (zui di zveishe). This concept hinges on the belief that China's limited number of high-yield nuclear warheads constitute a credible deterrent because they can inflict what is perceived to be unacceptable damage on a handful of enemy cities with a simple, undifferentiated countervalue second strike (a so-called city-busting capability. Under minimum deterrence, there is no need for nuclear force levels beyond what can inflict unacceptable damage is these developments suggest that there are strategists in China who advocate the development of anew nuclear strategy, specifically aversion of what is usually called limited deterrence (youxian weishe). Similarities exist between this concept and the American doctrine of flexible response, which posits a range of strategic and substrategic capabilities to deter or defeat highly damaging or overwhelming conventional attacks, deter any level of nuclear conflict, and in a nuclear war contain escalatory pressures. Download 1.23 Mb. Share with your friends:
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