NUCLEAR DECISIONS LACK ANY FORM OF DEMOCRATIC CHECKS James A. Stegenga. Deterrence Bankrupt Ideology Policy Sciences, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Nov, 1983), pp. 127-1145. If retaliation decisions must be virtually automatic and instantaneous, the decisions can hardly be based on moral choice which requires time-consuming reflection and consideration of alternatives, as well as, in the American system, at least some role for the national legislature and even for public opinion. So nuclear deterrence demands immorally casual decisions, leaving decisionmakers with no choice but to act hastily and leaving citizens and even their elected representatives with no possibility of meaningful participation. As technology continues to yield quicker and evermore accurate missiles, making a disarming Soviet first strike at least theoretically possible, pressure mounts to adopt "launch on warning" policies (Use 'em or lose 'em) or even to turn the enterprise over completely to fully automatic computer operation, thus heightening this particular moral problem of maintaining human, moral choice.
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