THE NPT INCREASES PROLIFERATION AND UNCERTAINTY. (Michael Wesley, Executive Director of the Lowy Institute for International Policy, Australian Journal of International Affairs, September 2005, Its Time To Scrap the NPT,” EBSCO, p) By prohibiting proliferation, without the capacity or moral authority to enforce such a prohibition, the NPT makes opaque proliferation the only option for aspiring nuclear weapons states Opaque proliferation is destabilising to regional security. It breeds miscalculation*/both overestimation of a states nuclear weapons development (as shown by the case of Iraq, and underestimation (in the case of Libya)*/that can force neighbouring states into potentially catastrophic moves. Even more dangerous, argues Lewis Dunn, is the likelihood that states with covert nuclear weapons programs will develop weak failsafe mechanisms and nuclear doctrine that is destabilising In camera decision making may result in uncontrolled programs, less attention to safety and control problems and only limited assessment of the risks of nuclear weapon deployments or use. The necessary exercises cannot be conducted, nor can procedures for handling nuclear warheads be practised, nor alert procedures tested. As a result, the risk of accidents or incidents may rise greatly in the event of deployment in a crisis or a conventional conflict. Miscalculations by neighbours or outsiders also appear more likely, given their uncertainties about the adversaryʼs capabilities, as well as their lack of information to judge whether crisis deployments mean that war is imminent (1991: 20, italics in original. And because both the NPT and the current US counter-proliferation doctrine place such emphasis on preventing and reversing the spread of nuclear weapons, states such as Pakistan, which desperately need assistance with both failsafe technology and stabilising nuclear doctrine, have been suspicious of US offers of assistance (Pregenzer 2003)