1ac heg Advantage Scenario 1 is Leadership

Need Funding

Congress needs to put the overall missile defense program back on track and enact into law a U.S. “protect and defend strategy” to replace the outdated Cold War strategy of strategic deterrence. To these ends, Congress should increase overall funding for missile defense, restore a number of missile defense programs, and make significant changes to missile defense policy in the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2012.

Optimal orbits for engaging missiles from space would de- pend on the satellites’ inclinations, which bound the orbital en- gagement zone between latitudes north and south of the equator at similar distances. With weapons on-orbit, missile defenders would have a capability to engage intercontinental- to medium- range ballistic missiles launched from any region within that zone. Intercepts in the boost and midcourse of that missile’s flight could be possible. Essential work to demonstrate the fea- sibility of critical space-based interceptor functions has already been done (as part of the Brilliant Pebbles development program in the 1980s and early 1990s). The Missile Defense Agency (MDA), should it receive the support of the administration and Congress, could continue development efforts to perfect com- mand and control of space-based assets and long-term storage of propellant, among other things.

Boost Phase

Boost phase is better laundry list- infrared signature

Aubin and Streland 2k- Dr. Stephen P. Aubin and Major Arnold Streland, phd. Director strategy execution at Raytheon and Col Arnold H. Streland, Commander, TSAT Space Group, MILSATCOM Systems Wing, Space and Missile Systems Center, October 2000 , “The Space-Based Laser Integrated Flight Experiment: Global Missile Defense in the Boost Phase”, Team SBL-IFX, http://www.wslfweb.org/docs/SBLWP.pdf

There are a number of advantages to intercepting an aggressor’s missile in the boost phase. The first is that the missile is most vulnerable during its launch. There is a large infrared signature, thanks to the burning fuel; the missile maintains a slowly changing attitude, making it easier to track; and the rocket body is relatively fragile and under great aerodynamic stress. Additionally, because the warhead has not separated from the launcher, there is a relatively large lethal-hit area when attempting to destroy the missile. The boost phase also occurs before any decoys or countermeasures can be initiated by an aggressor. One of the greatest challenges for hit-to-kill kinetic interceptors attempting to destroy warheads in the midcourse or descent phases is the ability to distinguish between the warheads and the decoys. In the descent phase, advanced warheads may also maneuver and be less predictable in terms of their flight paths. The combination of using directed energy intercept in the boost phase and kinetic intercept in the midcourse and terminal phases would increase the likelihood of successfully defeating countermeasures aimed at thwarting missile defense systems. In fact, countermeasures, like deploying decoys and maneuvering outside of the projected target track, which may be effective against kinetic interceptors, are ineffective against directed energy attack during boost phase. Likewise, countermeasures that are aimed at reducing the effectiveness of directed energy systems, like hardening of missiles to prevent laser penetration and fast burn to shorten the boost phase, are ineffective against mid-course and terminal phase kinetic interceptors. Another key advantage and potential deterrent to a would-be aggressor is the fact that ballistic missiles destroyed early in the boost phase usually explode and fall over the aggressor’s own territory, forcing the aggressor to confront the risk of nuclear, chemical or biological debris. The greatest challenge of boost phase intercept is the speed required to catch an aggressor’s missile in the first few minutes of flight. Although the United States has the capability to detect missile launches very early in flight, the speed limitations of interceptor missiles being developed make it unlikely that they could destroy the aggressor missile before its launcher burns out. This challenge, however, can be overcome by using directed energy, which moves at the speed of light ­ 186,000 miles per second (or 300,000 kilometers per second). To illustrate this advantage, consider the speed of the ground-based interceptor being developed for National Missile Defense, which is in the vicinity of 7 kilometers per second. (This is faster than today’s theater interceptors under development, which were capped at 5.5 kilometers per second in the September 1997 Agreed Statement to the ABM Treaty of 1972.) Even if the interceptor were positioned close enough to achieve intercept, it is a very challenging task and not nearly as efficient as directed energy, which travels about 43,000 times faster than the most capable groundbased interceptors. Given its speed, directed energy should be seen as complementing the critical role kinetic interceptors play in the mid-course and terminal phases of a missile attack. Both the Airborne Laser, which is being developed to address short- and medium-range theater ballistic missiles, and the Space-Based Laser, which is being designed to counter ICBMs deep in the aggressor’s 4 territory, can detect and intercept missiles almost instantaneously. Each works by acquiring the infrared signature of the boosting missile, tracking its course with a low-power laser, and then focusing a high-power laser on the body of the boosting missile. The heat of the laser weakens the missile’s skin, and the internal pressures and supersonic aerodynamic flight stresses cause it to explode.
Not focused on effective programs now

No funding for boost phase missile defense now

No funding for SBI

Spring 10- Baker Spring is the F.M. Kirby Research Fellow in National Security Policy at The Heritage Foundation. Spring specializes in examining the threat of ballistic missiles from Third World countries, April 8, 2010, “The Obama Administration's Ballistic Missile Defense Program: Treading Water in Shark-Infested Seas”, The Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/04/the-obama-administrations-ballistic-missile-defense-program-treading-water-in-shark-infested-seas#_ftnref7

No funding for boost-phase missile defenses. The President's budget provides no funding for major boost-phase missile defense programs in FY 2011. In 2009, the Airborne Laser was scaled back, and the Kinetic Energy Interceptor was terminated. In FY 2009, the account for boost-phase missile defenses received $384 million.

No funding for the Multiple Kill Vehicle program. The Multiple Kill Vehicle program was designed to create smaller and lighter kill vehicles so that an interceptor booster could carry more than one kill vehicle. Defense Secretary Robert Gates announced in 2009 that the Department of Defense was terminating this program. Accordingly, the FY 2011 missile defense budget would provide no funding for the program.

Minimal funding for space activities and no funding for space-based interceptors. The FY 2011 budget allocates just $11 million to space activities for missile defense, compared with $12 million in FY 2010 and $23 million in FY 2009. The funds will primarily support space-based sensor and data collection activities of the Missile Defense Space Experimentation Center (MDSEC). Additionally, the FY 2011 budget will provide $67 million for the Precision Tracking Space System (PTSS), a new satellite system to track ballistic missiles. The PTSS will build on lessons learned from the two Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) demonstration satellites. The STSS program will receive $113 million in FY 2011, but its funding is winding down. It received $210 million in FY 2009 and $162 million in FY 2010. The five-year STSS program includes a demonstration project for feeding satellite data to the Aegis fire control system via the missile defense command and control system to permit remote engagement by the Aegis system. This is critically important to the future success of the Aegis system. However, failure to allocate any money to develop space-based interceptors is nothing short of self-defeating.
Need SBI for boost phase interception

Toughest stage

Surface based systems range limited

Impossible against Russia and China

Kleinberg 11- Howard Kleinberg is a member of the graduate faculty of the Department of Public & International Affairs at University of North Carolina Wilmington. The author has a Master of Arts in the Security Studies Program from Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. and a Bachelor of Science in Electrical Engineering from the University of Toronto, Canada. He also has 25 years of experience in the U.S. Defense Sector, the Space Industry, and software engineering, March 1, 2011, “A global missile defense 'network': terrestrial High-Energy lasers and Aerospace mirrors part 1 of 2.” Fires , http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-251954702.html

However, the boost phase is also the toughest phase in which to actually reach it. According to information provided in 2004 by the Missile Defense Agency, a missile's boost phase only lasts between 180- 300 seconds. Any boost-phase missile-defense system must detect, decide, launch and fly out to intercept a boosting ICBM within that time-frame, severely curtailing the effective range of any boostphase interceptor missile. Like its target, a boost-phase interceptor missile must also leave the ground, climb and accelerate to catch its similarly-climbing-and-accelerating target. As a consequence, surface-based boost-phase missile defense is severely range-limited. This is only achievable for defense against missiles from smaller, geographically-accessible states such as North Korea and to, a lesser extent, Iran. Boost-phase interceptions are impossible in most cases against Russia and China, which boast much greater interior distances from their borders to their missile launch areas, i.e., much greater strategic depth. Worst of all, according to the 2000 International Institute for Strategic Studies' Adelphi Paper, "Ballistic Missile Defense and Strategic Stability," by Dean A. Wilkening, these very same states also possess the most numerous, and dangerous, of the ICBMs that could be aimed at the U.S.
Why boost phase is key

Have multiple opportunities

Can reach each stage

Easier to detect

Destroy before counter-measures are deployed

Could land on own country

Counter-measures make it easier to intercept later and make missile less effective

Pfaltzgraff 9- Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. is Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Security Studies The Fletcher School, Tufts University President, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, April 3, 2009, “Boost Phase Missile Defense: Present Challenges, Future Prospects”, http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/Pfaltzgraff_Boost-Phase.Missile.Defense_Capitol.Hill-Marshall.Inst_3.April.09.pdf

Let me first address the question of why it matters whether we have a boost-phase defense. There are several inherent advantages to boost-ascent-phase missile defense. Most important is the fact that our missile defense architecture should be designed to give multiple intercept opportunities once a missile is launched. We should be capable of intercepting and destroying ballistic missiles and warheads in each of the three phases of their flight – boost, midcourse, and terminal. If we have multiple intercept opportunities, the burden placed on any one of these opportunities is less than would be the case if we had only one intercept opportunity. We need to be able to intercept early and often. The layered concept for missile defense applies in other security arenas as well. For example, we should strive for layered defense if we are planning homeland security. Only one of our layers has to be successful to destroy a missile or to thwart a terrorist. To penetrate such defenses, the missile or the terrorist would need to be successful in penetrating all of the layers. So you can see conceptually why logically layered defense offer maximum opportunities to deny missiles, warheads, or terrorists access to their targets. Layered defenses in the missile defense arena begin in boost phase.

Boost-phase missile defense has another inherent advantage. The missile is relatively slow moving, not having yet achieved full acceleration. At this time it emits bright exhaust gases that are relatively easy for sensors to detect and track. Interception during the boost phase has the advantage of destroying the missile before it disperses its payload, which may consist of one or more warheads and possibly countermeasures such as decoys designed to confuse the interceptors. Intercepting a missile in boost phase has the additional advantage that the debris, including warheads, may, depending on how early interdiction occurs, fall on the country launching the missile. This is a situation that could have a substantial deterrent effect on the potential launcher of a missile if its leadership must face the likelihood of inflicting substantial damage on its own territory and people.

Furthermore, let us assume for a moment that the missile has been hardened in order to reduce the possibility of destruction in the boost phase. The result is an increase in the missile’s weight, possibly easing the task of later interception. The corresponding reduction of payload has the added benefit of diminishing the missile’s range and/or its destructive potential.
Boost MD solves EMP and ASATs

Emp can only be in boost phase

Intercept verticle ASATs

Pfaltzgraff 9- Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. is Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Security Studies The Fletcher School, Tufts University President, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, April 3, 2009, “Boost Phase Missile Defense: Present Challenges, Future Prospects”, http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/Pfaltzgraff_Boost-Phase.Missile.Defense_Capitol.Hill-Marshall.Inst_3.April.09.pdf

Finally, let us assume that one of the most devastating asymmetrical strategies that could be used against the United States would come in the form of a vertical launch missile carrying a warhead designed to detonate at an altitude of, say, between 40 and 400 kilometers above the earth’s surface. As the 2004 EMP Commission Report points out an EMP attack would constitute a highly successful asymmetric strategy against a society as heavily dependent as the United States on electronics, energy, telecommunications networks, financial systems, transportation systems, the movement of inventories in its manufacturing sector, and food processing and distribution capabilities. The launching missile would obviously have to be intercepted in boost phase because that is the only phase that it would have. Similarly, if we wanted to prevent an attack by a vertical launch missile such as what China used in its January 2007 ASAT tests, the intercept would need to come in boost phase.

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