1ac myth 1ac -critical Introduction of us armed Forces Aff



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Aff Solvency

Preventing Reintroduction of US Armed Forces into hostilities in Afghanistan Key

We are killing the revolutionary potential of Afghani people. We need to stop deploying foreign troops as a first step to ending murder, rape, and lack of freedom.


Ian Sinclair and Mariam Rawi 2009 ( Ian is a journalist with Znet and Rawi is a member of RAWA’s foreign relations committee, “Interview with the Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan” April 29, 2009 http://www.zcommunications.org/interview-with-the-revolutionary-association-of-the-women-of-afghanistan-by-ian-sinclair)
RAWA strongly believes that the withdrawal of foreign troops should be the first step, because today, with the presence of thousands of foreign troops from many countries in Afghanistan, the majority of our people are suffering from insecurity, killings, kidnapping, unemployment, rape, acid throwing on schoolgirls, hunger, lawlessness, lack of freedom of speech and many more awful disasters. Peace, security, democracy and independence can only be achieved by our own people. It is our responsibility to become united as an alternative against the occupation, to rise up, to resist and to organize our people. Right now our people are sandwiched between three enemies. From one side we have the Taliban, from the other side are the US air strikes, and from another side are the Northern Alliance warlords in different provinces. With the troop withdrawal our people will at least get rid of one of these enemies. The justice-loving people of the US and its democratic-minded allies should continue to pressure their government to change its fundamentalists-fostering policy and work for the disarmament of armed groups who are in the pay of the US. We think the peace-loving people around the world should support democratic-minded individuals and forces of Afghanistan who are being suppressed and weakened by the US and its fundamentalist stooges. Only the emergence of a powerful democratic movement can lead Afghanistan towards independence and democracy. Afghan people are deeply fed up with their current conditions and are on the verge of rising up against it. We have already seen protests and rising up of people in the face of threats and terror in a number of provinces of Afghanistan. In the future this wave will without a doubt gain momentum. With the emergence of a third front whose slogan is "Neither Occupation Nor Taliban Freedom and Democracy," Afghans will rise up to get their rights with their own power. This is a long and painful process, but the only option to lead Afghanistan toward peace and prosperity.

AT: Positive Actions by US Armed Forces in Afghanistan

Preventing reintroduction of the Armed Forces is a key signal for ending US imperialism


Ely 2 (Mike Ely, founder Kasama Project, Demand Complete and Immediate Withdrawal from Afghanistan, 2002, http://revolutionaryfrontlines.wordpress.com/2010/03/26/demand-complete-and-immediate-withdrawal-from-aghanistan/)
I think what is posed in Medea Benjamin’s interview is a rather simple and important question: Can U.S. imperialism and its troops play a positive role in some circumstances? The U.S. invades the remote and impoverished Afghanistan in 2001, topples the fragile regime of Taliban theocrats (which never consolidated countrywide power in the civil war). And now it is argued that the U.S. invaders “can’t” leave in an “irresponsible” way because the survival of a number of people (including women’s activists) would be in danger and because their withdrawal would most likely mean a return of the Taliban. Should we carefully evaluate U.S. aggressions on a case-by-case basis? Is this U.S. military base good, and that one bad? Is this U.S. bombing helpful, and that one excessive? Is this U.S. nuclear threat helpful, and that one unfair? Is this U.S. drone doing good work, and that one intruding dangerously? Is this U.S. occupation shielding and promoting positive forces — while that U.S. occupation cultivates more negative puppets? Do we support U.S. domination until someone better comes along (who we approve of) to take their place? Or does the U.S. military (globally and everywhere) represent a coherent means of imposing and enforcing a particular global order on humanity generally — an order that is rooted in horrific oppression and exploitation (including the widespread commodification of women as both workers and sexual slaves, and the traditional domestic servitude of literally billions of women and girls)? What we need is a clear uncompromising unapologetic position: We must demand that U.S. imperialism leave Afghanistan immediately and unconditionally — without finding ways to prop up residual collaborators and puppet forces, without continuing to “provide air cover” for continuing war crimes. The Afghanistan people need to be left to resolve their political affairs (and develop their own very difficult struggle for liberation) without U.S. domination and violence. And because this is apparently quite controversial (even on the left): We should deepen our own understanding that these armed forces cannot and will not help the people in any part of the world. Are there other reactionary forces in the world? Taliban? Al Qaida? Saddam Hussein? Islamic theocrats in Iran? Somali warlords? French colonial troops? Genocidal Israeli settlers and commanders? Turkish military commandos? Russian death squads in Chechnia? Catholic priests and bishops doing their secret crimes against humanity? And so on. Of course. There are many other reactionary forces in the world. Some of them are U.S. allies. Some of them have sharp contradictions with U.S. imperialism. Some of them flip back and forth. But U.S. occupation of Afghanistan (or Iraq) is itself a means of strengthening the world’s most odious and oppressive force. And the impact of a successful pro-U.S. pacification of Afghanistan cannot just be measured in terms of how it impacts people or sections of the people in Afghanistan. A victory for the U.S. in Afghanistan or stabilization of pro-U.S. arrangements in Afghanistan will be a major negative influence on the dynamics of the world as a whole. This is true, objectively. And pointing out this truth is especially important within the U.S. itself — where illusions about the U.S. role in the world are especially strong (even on the left). Far too many people delude themselves that there can be a “more democratic U.S. foreign policy” that “helps” people. No, we have a special responsibility to fight the criminal actions of “our” government — and to expose its nature. Our goal is not to “more effectively” serve “U.S. national interests.” We do not seek to “improve the U.S. image around the world.” We are not worried that “the wrong policies will get even more people to oppose U.S. initiatives.” We do not want to “preserve and promote the American way of life.” We don’t want to figure out some “people’s foreign policy” or some way for the fucking Marines to “play a good role.” We don’t want a “more accountable CIA.” No. We want to bring down U.S. imperialism from without and from within. Not only must we demand that the U.S. withdraw immediately and without delay from its many overt and covert wars — but we must put forward a larger vision that the dismantling of all the vicious U.S. armed instruments of power is in the historic interests of humanity. That means the systematic and unilateral destruction of its nuclear arsenals, the disbanding of its armed forces, the abolition of its CIA, the public revelation of its crimes, the dismantling of its global military bases, listening posts and secret torture prisons, the destruction of its schools for coups and torture like the SOA, the scuttling of its imperial fleet and more.) We should proclaim this publicly — knowing full well that these are not demands that the U.S. government would ever agree to, but they are a much needed program that only the people can carry out through historic actions. The U.S. government, its military and spy forces, are a central prop of global capitalism at this stage in world history. And any confusion about this, any daydreaming that “maybe they can do some good,” needs to be explored and engaged.


S – Our Feminist Critique is K2 PM

As long as we hold onto the policymaking assumptions built upon gendered power relations, the status quo will continue and error replication is inevitable. Our critical feminist analysis of security and military discourses is a precursor to effective political action – we must choose a critical consciousness that seeks to fully deactivate the embedded policy tools used to perpetuate patriarchy.


Bensimon and Marshall 3 [Estela, professor at the University of Southern California, and Catherine, professor at the University of North Carolina, “Like It Or Not Feminist Critical Policy Analysis Matters”, The Journal of Higher Education, 74(3)]

Earlier we said that the master's preoccupation is how to absorb feminism into policy analysis. In contrast, the feminist preoccupation is the inverse, "How to make policy analysis accountable to critical feminism." 4 The difference between the feminist and the master is that they are motivated by different interests. The master's interest is to maintain [End Page 345] policies and practices intact. For example, Anderson applauds "the number of academic texts that claim feminism as a subject heading" (p. 5), but who is reading them? Is feminist critical policy analysis a topic in the policy analysis canon of public administration, higher education, and policy analysis and planning curricula? Do governments ask for studies, and do university presidents pay big bucks to bring in feminist critical policy consultants? Do even the readers of this higher education journal feel compelled to get "up to speed" on such tools and perspectives? When the answers are yeses, policy analysis can assist institutional change. Then, any well-trained and credible policy analyst will know to: Recognize that past policies constructed in arenas where the discourse was conducted without feminist critique are flawed and conduct policy archeology (Scheurich, 1994) to search how and by whom policies were framed as they were, thus facilitating re-framing; Re-construct policy arenas and discourses, knowing the need to engage and even champion the needs and voices of people heretofore excluded, or included in token ways; Include feminist questions as they scrutinize decision premises, language, and labels while constantly asking, "what do feminisms tell me to critique?" Employ alternative methodologies (e.g., narrative and oral history) to uncover the intricacies of meaning systems in individual and collective stories both to expose the emotional and personal results of exclusions but also to create alternative visions that transcend boundaries "to shape the formation of culturally appropriate social and educational policy" (Gonzalez, 1998, p. 99); Search for the historically created and embedded traditions, social regularities, and practices that inhibit women's access, comfort, and success; Take an advocacy stance, knowing that policy analysts are change agents, carriers of insurrectionist strategies and subjugated knowledges that will be subjected to discourses of derision by powerful forces benefiting from the status quo. Anderson worries that policy analysis is a tool of managers, planners, and leaders and is not always seen as an academic discipline. As a result, she believes policy analysts must serve those leaders, must take as given the questions as framed for them. But taking such a servant position is exactly why policy analysis gets no respect. And deeper feminist questions will never come up if we accept Anderson's recommendation that [End Page 346] we recommend step-by-step change. Quoting Anderson, who quotes Gill and Saunders, "Policy analysis in higher education requires an understanding of the higher education environment" (p. 16), we say "of course!" But instead of then concluding, as she does, that we must tread carefully in that environment, we assert that the policy questions must mount major challenges to that very environment! We are not seeking policy recommendations of the "add women and stir" ilk, nor are we seeking simplistic affirmative action. We want policy analyses that rearrange gendered power relations, not ones that simply create our inclusion in institutions that have not been rearranged. We advocate policy analysis that creates a new discourse about gender—one that can facilitate transformation of the academy and "envision what is not yet" (Wallace, 2002). In sum, in our chapter laying out the need for feminist critical policy analysis, we are, indeed, building upon academic traditions, traditions of critique and debate, and now we continue using these master's tools. However, we place our work in power and politics feminisms to show that playing only the master's tools games will leave us spinning our wheels, playing a game that was structured for white males and that has culturally embedded tools for keeping it, basically, that way. Until the questions are asked differently, until we construct policy analyses with overt intentions to create gender consciousness, to expose the limits of gender-neutral practices, to expose the asymmetric gender power relations, certain women will not be welcome in academia. And, finally, no, Anderson and readers should not fear that we want to "invert the old logic of the academic hierarchy and exclude men" (p. 19). However, we are saying that until we use our feminist theory and language of critique as grounding to command forceful critique of continuing cultural exclusions, the only women who will be comfortable in academia are those who expend some of their workplace energies to be pleasing (as women) to men. Anderson wants us to "hold the attention of those [who] are already predisposed to turn the other way when the word feminism enters the conversation" (p. 24). Sure, that is called strategic feminism and recognizes that feminists are challengers from the fringes, trying to get the hegemonic center to listen.

S – Prez War Powers Key

Curtailing presidential war power is necessary check against militarism


Andrew J. Bacevich 13 Jr. (born 1947) is an American political scientist specializing in international relations, security studies, American foreign policy, and American diplomatic and military history. He is currently Professor of International Relations and History at Boston University.[1] He is also a retired career officer in the United States Army. He is a former director of Boston University's Center for International Relations (from 1998 to 2005) and author of several books, including American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of US Diplomacy (2002), The New American Militarism: How Americans are Seduced by War (2005) and The Limits of Power: The End of American Exceptionalism (2008). He has also appeared on television shows such as The Colbert Report and the Bill Moyers Report and has written op-eds which have appeared in papers such as The New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, Boston Globe, Los Angeles Times, and Financial Times. He is also a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. “The new American militarism: how Americans are seduced by war,” 2013, Oxford University Press, DOA: 8-1-13, y2k

Several decades after Vietnam, in the aftermath of a century filled to overflowing with evidence pointing to the limited utility of armed force and the dangers inherent in relying excessively on military power, the American people have persuaded themselves that their best prospect for safety and salvation lies with the sword. Told that despite all of their past martial exertions, treasure expended, and lives sacrificed, the world they inhabit is today more dangerous than ever and that they must redouble those exertions, they dutifully assent. Much as dumping raw sewage into American lakes and streams was once deemed unremarkable, so today global power projection, a phrase whose sharp edges we have worn down through casual use, but which implies military activism without apparent limit has become standard practice, a normal condition, one to which no plausible alternatives seem to exist. All of this Americans have come to take for granted: it’s who we are and what we do. Such a definition of normalcy cries out for a close and critical reexamination. Surely, the surprises, disappointments, painful losses, and woeful, even shameful failures of the Iraq War make clear the need to rethink the fundamentals of U.S. military policy. Yet a meaningful reexamination will require first a change of consciousness, seeing war and America’s relationship to war in a fundamentally different way. Of course, dissenting views already exist. A rich tradition of American pacifism abhors the resort to violence as always and in every case wrong. Advocates of disarmament argue that by their very existence weapons are an incitement to violence. In the former camp, there can never be a justification for war. In the latter camp, the shortest road to peace begins with the beating of swords into ploughshares. These are principled views that deserve a hearing, more so today than ever. By discomfiting the majority, advocates of such views serve the common good. But to make full-fledged pacifism or comprehensive disarmament the basis for policy in an intrinsically disordered world would be to open the United States to grave danger. The critique proposed here offering not a panacea but the prospect of causing present-day militaristic tendencies to abate.rests on ten fundamental principles. First , heed the intentions of the Founders, thereby restoring the basic precepts that animated the creation of the United States and are specified in the Constitution that the Framers drafted in 1787 and presented for consideration to the several states. Although politicians make a pretense of revering that document, when it comes to military policy they have long since fallen into the habit of treating it like a dead letter. This is unfortunate. Drafted by men who appreciated the need for military power while also maintaining a healthy respect for the dangers that it posed, the Constitution in our own day remains an essential point of reference. Nothing in that compact, as originally ratified or as subsequently amended, commits or even encourages the United States to employ military power to save the rest of humankind or remake the world in its own image nor even hints at any such purpose or obligation. To the contrary, the Preamble of the Constitution expressly situates military power at the center of the brief litany of purpose enumerating the collective aspirations of we the people. It was to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity that they acted in promulgating what remains the fundamental law of the land. Whether considering George H. W. Bush1992 incursion into Somalia, Bill Clinton1999 war for Kosovo, or George W. Bush2003 crusade to overthrow Saddam Hussein, the growing U.S. predilection for military intervention in recent years has so mangled the concept of common defense as to make it all but unrecognizable. The beginning of wisdom and a major first step in repealing the new American militarism lies in making the foundational statement of intent contained in the Preamble once again the basis of actual policy. Only if citizens remind themselves and remind those exercising political authority why this nation exists will it be possible to restore the proper relationship between military power and that purpose, which centers not on global dominance but on enabling Americans to enjoy the blessings of liberty. Such a restoration is long overdue. For over a century, since the closing of the frontier, but with renewed insistence following the end of the Cold War, American statesmen have labored under the misconception that securing the well-being of the United States requires expanding its reach and influence abroad. From the invasion of Cuba in 1898 to the invasion of Iraq in 2003 , policymakers have acted as if having an ever larger perimeter to defend will make us safer or taking on burdens and obligations at ever greater distances from our shores will further enhance our freedoms. 3 In fact, apart from the singular exception of World War II, something like the opposite has been the case. Such a restoration is long overdue. For over a century, since the closing of the frontier, but with renewed insistence following the end of the Cold War, American statesmen have labored under the misconception that securing the well-being of the United States requires expanding its reach and influence abroad. From the invasion of Cuba in 1898 to the invasion of Iraq in 2003 , policymakers have acted as if having an ever larger perimeter to defend will make us safer or taking on burdens and obligations at ever greater distances from our shores will further enhance our freedoms. 3 In fact, apart from the singular exception of World War II, something like the opposite has been the case. The remedy to this violation of the spirit of the Constitution lies in the Constitution itself and in the need to revitalize the concept of separation of powers . Here is the second principle with the potential to reduce the hazards by the new American militarism. In all but a very few cases, the impetus for expanding Americas security perimeter has come from the executive branch. In practice, presidents in consultation with a small circle of advisers decide on the use of force; the legislative branch then either meekly bows to the wishes of the executive or provides the sort of broad authorization (such as the Tonkin Gulf Resolution of 1964 ) that amounts in effect to an abrogation of direct responsibility. The result, especially in evidence since the end of World War II, has been to eviscerate Article I, Section 8 , Clause 11 of the Constitution, which in the plainest of language confers on the Congress the power To declare War. The problem is not that the presidency has become too strong. Rather, the problem is that the Congress has failed.indeed, failed egregiously.to fulfill its constitutional responsibility for deciding when and if the United States should undertake military interventions abroad. Hiding behind an ostensible obligation to support our commander-in-chief or to support the troops, the Congress has time and again shirked its duty. An essential step toward curbing the new American militarism is to redress this imbalance in war powers and to call upon the Congress to reclaim its constitutionally mandated prerogatives. Indeed, legislators should insist upon a strict constructionist definition of war such that any use of force other than in direct and immediate defense of the United States should require prior congressional approval.

S – Congress

Congress can stop the president from sending armed forces by cutting funds and burying him under paperwork.


Howell and Pevehouse 2005 (William G. Howell and Jon C. Pevehouse “Presidents, Congress, and the Use of Force” International Organization, Vol. 59, No. 1 Winter, 2005 p 213)

Dismantling the President's Military Venture. Congress can actively work against the president, materially affecting the course of a military campaign. It can refuse to appropriate needed funds, call for the return of troops sent on ill-conceived foreign missions, or raise concerns about the efficacy of an intervention. Grimmett has documented numerous instances since 1970 when Congress cut off military funding to compel the withdrawal of forces, typically using the appropriations powers to restrict military operations.22 In their study of the War Powers Resolution, Auerswald and Cowhey show that Congress regularly places obligations on presidents (reporting requirements, budgetary limitations) that can prove burdensome.23 Having to stave off a mobilized opposition party within Congress during the course of a military campaign may dissuade presidents from initiating force at all.



S – Constitutional Check Key

Militarization of presidency now---constitutional check is key


Andrew J. Bacevich 13 Jr. (born 1947) is an American political scientist specializing in international relations, security studies, American foreign policy, and American diplomatic and military history. He is currently Professor of International Relations and History at Boston University.[1] He is also a retired career officer in the United States Army. He is a former director of Boston University's Center for International Relations (from 1998 to 2005) and author of several books, including American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of US Diplomacy (2002), The New American Militarism: How Americans are Seduced by War (2005) and The Limits of Power: The End of American Exceptionalism (2008). He has also appeared on television shows such as The Colbert Report and the Bill Moyers Report and has written op-eds which have appeared in papers such as The New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, Boston Globe, Los Angeles Times, and Financial Times. He is also a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. “The new American militarism: how Americans are seduced by war,” 2013, Oxford University Press, DOA: 8-1-13, y2k

Rendering this civil-military relationship even more problematic is the ongoing process of militarizing the presidency itself. The framers of the Constitution designated the president as commander-in-chief as a means of asserting unambiguous civilian control. Their clear expectation and intent was that the chief executive would be in all respects a civilian. This point was not lost even on generals elected to the office: upon becoming president, for example, George Washington, Ulysses S. Grant, and Dwight D. Eisenhower each went out of his way to set aside his prior soldierly identity. Since the day that Michael Dukakis took his ill-advised ride in an M 1 Abrams tank, if not before, it has been a political truism that any would-be president must at least be able, when called upon, to strike a soldierly pose. In recent years, however, serving presidents have gone further, finding it politically expedient to blur the hitherto civilian character of their office. Astute political operatives have learned that when it comes to concealing embarrassing blemishes, outfitting a president in battle dress may be even more effective than wrapping him in the flag. In the theater of national politics, Americans have come to accept the propriety of using neatly turned out soldiers and sailors as extras, especially useful in creating the right background for presidential photo ops. 55 Of late, they have also become accustomed to their president donning military garb, usually a fighter jocks' nappy leather jacket when visiting the troops or huddling with his advisers at Camp David. More recently still, this has culminated in George W. Bush styling himself as the nation-first full-fledged warrior-president. The staging of Bush's victory lap shortly after the conquest of Baghdad in the spring of 2003 .the dramatic landing on the carrier USS Abraham Lincoln, with the president decked out in the full regalia of a naval aviator emerging from the cockpit to bask in the adulation of the crew was lifted directly from the triumphant final scenes of the movie Top Gun, with the boyish George Bush standing in for the boyish Tom Cruise. For this nationally televised moment, Bush was not simply mingling with the troops; he had merged his identity with their own and made himself one of them--the president as warlord. In short order, the marketplace ratified this effort; a toy manufacturer offered for $ 39 .99 a Bush look-alike military action figure advertised as Elite Force Aviator: George W. Bush: U.S. President and Naval Aviator.56 Inevitably, given the nature of American politics, the partisan advantage that President Bush derived from portraying himself as a warrior-leader induced a partisan reaction. As the 2004 presidential campaign heated up, Democrats scrutinized Bush's military bona fides and claimed to find his duty performance as a Vietnam-era reservist to be sketchy at best. The more extreme critics asserted that Bush had been AWOL--absent without leave. They contrasted this with the heroics of the Democratic candidate, Massachusetts Senator John Kerry, who had been wounded and decorated for valor for his Vietnam service. Thirty years after the fact, Kerry was still milking his membership in the brotherhood of warriors for all of the political benefit that it was worth and, indeed, presented himself to the nation as his party's presidential nominee with a smart salute and the announcement that he was reporting for duty. Thus did the 2004 presidential election turn, at least in part, around questions of military service in a war three decades past.

S – Openness to other traditions K2 political responsibility


For any political engagement to occur, we just accept that Western/secular reason may object valuable subversions – openness to nonliberal traditions is intrinsic to politically responsible practice


Mahmood 02 [Saba: professor of anthropology at UC Berkeley “Feminist Theory, Embodiment, and the Docile Agent: Some Reflections on the Egyptian Islamic Revival” Cultural Anthropology p. 225]

My argument simply is that in order for us to be able to judge, in a morally and politically informed way, even those practices we consider objectionable, it is important to take into consideration the desires, motivations, commitments, and aspirations of the people to whom these practices are important. Thus, in order to explore the kinds of injury specific to women located in particular historical and cultural situations, it is not enough simply to point, for example, that a tradition of female piety or modesty serves to give legitimacy to women’s subordination. Rather it is only by exploring these traditions in relation to the practical engagements and forms of life in which they are embedded that we can come to understand the significance of that subordination to the women who embody it. This is not simply an analytical point, but reflects, I would contend, a political imperative born out of the realization that we can no longer presume that secular reason and morality exhaust the forms of valuable human flourishings. In other words, a particular openness to exploring nonliberal traditions is intrinsic to a politically responsible scholarly practice, a practice that departs not from a position of certainty but one of risk, critical engagement, and a willingness to reevaluate one’s own views in light of the Other’s. In other words, this is an invitation to embark on an inquiry in which the analyst does not assume that the political positions she upholds will necessarily be vindicated, or provide the ground for her theoretical analysis. Instead, it is to hold open the possibility that one may come to ask of politics a whole series of questions that seemed settled when one embarked on an inquiry.



S Subtle Activism

Don’t let the subtle nature of womyn’s activism fool you – condemning existing initiatives only silences their symbolic and transgressive potential – the subtle acts are the best way to navigate patriarchal systems, comparisons to other regions only destroy local hegemonic power


Skalli 06 [Loubna H.: assistant professor of International Development at American University, Fullbright Scholar, PhD mass comm Penn State, MA cross-cultural studies Essex U “Communicating Gender in the Public Sphere: Women and Information Technologies in the MENA” Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies, Volume 2, Number 2, Spring, Indiana University Press, p. 53].

It is easy to be skeptical about the portent of women’s uses of com­munication within an environment that weakens women’s legal position and marginalizes their political and economic participation. It is also easy to dismiss the implications of women’s communication strategies when access to technology is largely still an urban and elite phenomenon marked by class differences. However, the subtle nature of women’s activ­ism and the fairly limited scope of interventions should not urge us to condemn existing initiatives to silence or invisibility nor minimize their symbolic and/or real transgressive acts. The impact of women’s interven­tions and initiatives are often more subtle and symbolic than openly radi­cal or revolutionary—this is precisely how women activists bargain with structures of patriarchy in the MENA. Attempts to measure women’s interventions by standards of achievement in regions with different po­litico-economic and sociocultural realities are simply counterproductive. Hasty comparisons risk condemning women’s creative efforts to double marginality: overlooked by the local hegemonic structures of power, they are condemned to invisibility by unrealistic comparative measures



S Different Conception of Agency

A conception of agency that is understood as the capacity to realize one’s own interests against the weight of custom, tradition, transcendental will, or obstacles allows for Middle Eastern womyn to subvert dominant hegemonies


Mahmood 02 [Saba: professor of anthropology at UC Berkeley “Feminist Theory, Embodiment, and the Docile Agent: Some Reflections on the Egyptian Islamic Revival” Cultural Anthropology p. 206]

The ethnographic richness of this study notwithstanding, for the purposes of my argument, what is most relevant is the degree to which the female agent in this analysis seems to stand in for a sometimes repressed, sometimes active feminist consciousness, articulated against the hegemonic male cultural norms of Arab Muslim societies.15 Even in instances when an explicit feminist agency is difficult to locate, there is a tendency to look for expressions and moments of resistance that may suggest a challenge to male domination. When women’s actions seem to reinscribe what appear to be “instruments of their own oppression,” the social analyst can point to moments of disruption of, and articulation of points of opposition to, male authority that are either located in the interstices of a woman’s consciousness (often read as a nascent feminist consciousness), or in the objective effects of the women’s actions, however unintended they may be. Agency, in this form of analysis, is understood as the capacity to realize one’s own interests against the weight of custom, tradition, transcendental will, or other obstacles (whether individual or collective). Thus the humanist desire for autonomy and self-expression constitute the substrate, the slumbering ember that can spark to flame in the form of an act of resistance when conditions permit.16


S – Agency Conceptions

The processes and conditions that secure subordination are also the means one gains agency


Mahmood 02 [Saba: professor of anthropology at UC Berkeley “Feminist Theory, Embodiment, and the Docile Agent: Some Reflections on the Egyptian Islamic Revival” Cultural Anthropology p. 210]

In trying to move beyond the teleology of emancipation underwriting many accounts of women’s agency, I have found insights offered by poststructuralist theorists into power and the constitution of the subject useful in analyzing the women’s mosque movement. Germane to this formulation is the reconceptualization of power as a set of relations that do not simply dominate the subject, but also, importantly, form the conditions of its possibility. In following Foucault, feminist theorist Judith Butler calls this the paradox of subjectivation, insomuch as the very processes and conditions that secure a subject’s subordination are also the means by which she becomes a self-conscious identity and agent (Butler 1997b; Foucault 1980, 1983). Stated otherwise, one may argue that the set of capacities inhering in a subject—the abilities that define its modes of agency—are not the residue of an undominated self that existed prior to the operations of power but are themselves the product of those operations. Such a conceptualization of power and subject formation also encourages us to understand agency not simply as a synonym for resistance to relations of domination, but as a capacity for action that specific relations of subordination create and enable. In order to clarify this point, we might consider the example of a virtuoso pianist who submits herself to the, at times painful, regime of disciplinary practice, as well as hierarchical structures of apprenticeship, in order to acquire the ability—the requisite agency—to play the instrument with mastery. Importantly, her agency is predicated on her ability to be taught, a condition classically referred to as docility. Although we have come to associate docility with abandonment of agency, the term literally implies the malleability required of someone to be instructed in a particular skill or knowledge—a meaning that carries less a sense of passivity and more that of struggle, effort, exertion, and achievement.30 Such a way of thinking about agency draws our attention to the practical ways in which individuals work on themselves to become the willing subjects of a particular discourse. Importantly, to understand agency in this manner is neither to invoke a self-constituting autonomous subject nor subjectivity as a private space of cultivation. Rather, it draws our attention to the specific ways in which one performs a certain number of operations on one’s thoughts, body, conduct, and ways of being, in order to “attain a certain kind of state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality” (Foucault 1997:24) in accord with a particular discursive tradition.31


S Context of Subversion/Agency Key

Context of subordination is key – a priori claims of “change” should be rejected, passivity and docility in a progressive sense may be a form of agency in another.


Mahmood 02 [Saba: professor of anthropology at UC Berkeley “Feminist Theory, Embodiment, and the Docile Agent: Some Reflections on the Egyptian Islamic Revival” Cultural Anthropology p. 212]

Simply put my point is this: if the ability to effect change in the world and in oneself is historically and culturally specific (both in terms of what constitutes “change” and the capacity by which it is effected), then its meaning and sense cannot be fixed a priori, but allowed to emerge through an analysis of the particular networks of concepts that enable specific modes of being, responsibility, and effectivity. Viewed in this way, what may appear to be a case of deplorable passivity and docility from a progressivist point of view, may very well be a form of agency—one that must be understood in the context of the discourses and structures of subordination that create the conditions of its enactment. In this sense, agentival capacity is entailed not only in those acts that result in (progressive) change but also those that aim toward continuity, stasis, and stability (see my discussion of the virtue of pabr below).





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