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SolvencyBoth China and US want to cooperate with one another, starting with transparency and confidence-building measuresXiaodan Wu 14 (6/16/14, The Law Faculty, China Central University of Finance and Economics, "China and space security: How to bridge the gap between its stated and perceived intentions”, http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0265964615300023)//SZ All the states, including China and the U.S., have a long-term interest in maintaining the stability of the space environment and are bound together by mutually beneficial economic relationships in this globalization era. First, both China and the U.S. have strong incentives to avoid the actual use of counter-space weapons, counter-space warfare and actions producing substantial quantities of long-lasting space debris, and shape a more stable and secure space environment for themselves and other space-faring nations.48 War between China and the United States seems unlikely, given their increasing economic interdependence and the ongoing efforts in both countries to improve relations. At any rate, if China or the U.S. attacked the other's military satellites, it would escalate any conflict between them and conflict in space would be a catastrophe for these two nations, even the entire world. The overwhelming adverse security and economic consequences of such warfare should outweigh most other considerations. The risks inherent in space conflict, where vital U.S. and Chinese interests are at stake, suggest that preventing space conflict should be a major security objective of both sides and that all their instruments of power should be brought to bear on preventing space conflict. This common understanding is the firm foundation to increase understanding and develop mutual trust through TCBMs. Second, space collaboration between China and the U.S. represents the best hope for allaying mutual suspicion. The impetus for strategic cooperation comes from the shared interest that potential adversaries have – avoiding mutual disaster.49 The competitors can use formal or informal cooperation at the margins of their relationship to reduce misperceptions and bring about strategic stability.50 A strong U.S. – China bilateral relationship includes a healthy, stable, reliable and continuous military–military relationship. Although this relationship historically has never been without disagreement and difficulty, it is not predestined that the two militaries must be adversaries. Moreover, China's steady integration into the global economy creates new incentives for partnership and cooperation. China has every reason to desire cooperation with a space superpower like the U.S. and sees great opportunity to enhance its capabilities and the well being of its people through joint efforts to explore space and to utilize its resources peacefully. For instance, China's investment in the Beidou system and the remarkable achievement in a few years suggests its common interests with the United States in creating norms and rules for non-attack of PNT systems. Thus, despite a difference of perception between the United States and China on the outer space issues, diplomatic progress should be possible. Third, a certain degree of strategic trust and cooperation in spite of military and ideological consideration is not without precedent. The U.S. and Russia successfully separated their military and civilian space programs and found ways to cooperate. Even during the Cold War, a joint US-Soviet space docking exercise in 1975 achieved important technical and political breakthroughs. The competition between the U.S. and the USSR during the Cold War for dominance of space has evolved into cooperation between the U.S. and Russia on the International Space Station, which marked a key moment for international space cooperation. Another example is India and Pakistan, which together announced in the Lahore Declaration of 1999 that they would provide each other with pre-launch notifications for their ballistic missiles. Consequently, there is no reason why China and the United States cannot move towards interdependence and away from historic mistrust. 3.2. Deepen reformation to further enhance the transparency of China's space policies and activities Transparency and engagement are the primary means of confidence-building measures to establish trust between nations. In other words, transparency is the key for any specific confidence building measures. China used to be reluctant to provide sensitive information due to cultural and strategic reasons. Gradually, it has realized the reassurance value of TCBMs, such as publication of national space policies and confidentiality could prompt the other States to form their own worst-case judgments. But China should deepen reformation to further enhance the transparency and openness of its space policies and activities. TCBMS can help build a relationship to support China and the US ‘s interests in increased bilateral cooperation in space sustainability, science, exploration, and securityBrian Weeden and Xiao He; July 13, 2016 ((Brian Weeden is the Technical Adviser at the Secure World Foundation in Washington, D.C. Xiao He is an Assistant Research Fellow at the Institute of World Economics and Politics in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences). National Bureau of Asian Research; “US-China Relations in Strategic Domains”)//SZ A more promising approach is to focus on transparency and confidence-building measures for both direct ascent and RPO. TCBMs are a means by which governments can share information to help create mutual understanding and trust and reduce misperceptions and miscalculations. Although not new, TCBMs represent a shift for the space world, which has long focused its efforts on pushing for legally binding arms control agreements and treaties. The recent report from the UN Group of Governmental Experts, in which the United States and China both participated, highlights several areas for space TCBMs: information exchange on space policies, information exchange and notifications related to outer space activities, risk reduction notifications, and contact and visits to space launch sites and facilities.70 Improving information on activities in space likely holds the most promise for mitigating tensions in the U.S.-China relationship in this domain. While determining a satellite’s exact capabilities and function is still difficult, SSA capabilities have developed to the point where it is becoming possible to verify actions and activities in space. The U.S. military already maintains a catalog of more than 22,000 human-generated space objects in earth orbit, much of which is available publicly and also shared with all satellite operators.71 China is currently developing its own SSA capabilities and, presumably, its own catalog of space objects. Russia, several European countries, India, and many other spacefaring nations are also increasing their own SSA capabilities, and most recently actors in the private sector have started to develop such capabilities as well.72 As SSA capabilities continue to improve and proliferate to other countries, it becomes increasingly possible that they may be able to serve as a new type of national technical means to underpin bilateral and multilateral political agreements on responsible and irresponsible behavior in space.73 Such agreements should be aimed at limiting dangerous or provocative actions, such as close approaches of national security satellites;74 signaling restraint for kinetic testing and deployment of new capabilities; and making political pledges to refrain from first use of destructive counter-space weapons.75 A key challenge in developing these agreements will be overcoming cultural and bureaucratic incentives for opacity on both sides. In the United States, the national security community has a deeply rooted culture of secrecy and unilateralism in the space domain that results from policy decisions made during the Kennedy administration as well as the consideration that space remains the last domain where the United States has a decisive advantage. For China, which sees itself as significantly inferior to the United States, opacity in space activities and programs is seen as one of the few tools to offset overwhelming U.S. capabilities and resources. Both countries also have the usual organizational silos and impediments to sharing information internally that are inherent to all large bureaucracies and undermine bilateral sharing. Enhancing SSA capabilities and increasing transparency on activities in space are in their national interests. While some more exquisite national SSA capabilities should be reserved for security uses, there is a much broader set of basic SSA capabilities that are relatively common among all spacefaring nations and essential to safe space activities, including those of commercial satellite operators. Increased sharing of data from these capabilities and collaboration on enhancing and improving them will result in positive externalities that will benefit all countries. Given that both the United States and China have considerable national security, civil, and commercial interests in space, this domain will have a significant impact on the future of bilateral relations. Although it is tempting to view the U.S.-China relationship in space through a similar lens as the U.S.-Soviet relationship, the differences between the two relationships and their contexts may ultimately matter more than the similarities. The key question is whether space will be a source of tension that creates instability and risk or an area of positive engagement that can strengthen the relationship. Both the United States and China should look at where their interests in space overlap to find potential areas to strengthen their relationship. Both have interests in working with the rest of the international community to strengthen the space governance regime in a manner that enhances the long-term sustainability of space, including by addressing both environmental threats and security challenges. Both countries should also find a way to engage in bilateral and multilateral civil space projects, including science and exploration. Doing so would create an element to their relationship that has a different dynamic from military-to-military interactions. At the same time, both the United States and China should be cognizant of where their interests in space differ and look to enact confidence-building measures to reduce tensions and the risk of a crisis escalating into outright conflict. While the prospects for legally binding arms control measures are slim at this stage, they could put in place unilateral and bilateral measures to reduce tensions created by the testing and development of direct ascent kinetic-kill and RPO capabilities. Finally, both countries would benefit significantly from improving their national SSA capabilities and increasing data sharing with each other. 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