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Sealift Upgrades key to Hegemony
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Sealift Upgrades key to HegemonyIncreasing port infrastructure for Sealift capabilities is the only way of sustaining global hegemony. A stagnant Navy has caused the collapse of all previous hegemons. Hawkins 05 Senior fellow for National security Studies at the U.S. Business and Industry Council in Washington, D.C. (William, “The Army's Interest in Seapower”, December 2005, Army Vol. 55, Iss. 12; pg. 9, 2 pgs, http://proquest.umi.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/pqdweb?did=938656371&Fmt=3&clientId=17822&RQT=309&VName=PQD) RaPa According to the eminent military historian Jeremy Black, "The rise of European states to a position of power across the oceans and around much of the globe was the military/ political change that most deserves the description of a military revolution." Starting at the end of the 15th century, when the Portuguese sailed around Africa into the Indian Ocean, maritime mobility allowed a number of states to create empires, commercial networks and spheres of influence that dominated world politics. This capability has been further refined by the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq. The drafting of a new Quadrennial Defense Review often pits the armed services against each other competing for limited resources despite the stated emphasis on joint operations. The projection of American power overseas, however, should also be the basis for an alliance between the Army and the Navy as the pillars of jointness, with airpower in a strong but supporting role. The key to understanding this combination is not the American naval strategist A. T. Mahan, who, like many prophets of airpower, overemphasized the decisive potential of a single arm, but the British maritime thinker Sir Julian Corbett. For Corbett, the principal value of seapower was the ability to either move your own army across water barriers or prevent the enemy from moving his, "Since men live upon the land and not upon the sea, great issues between nations at war have always been decided-except in the rarest cases-either by what your army can do against your enemy's territory and national life, or else by the fear of what the fleet makes it possible for your army to do." Science fiction writers have long been fascinated by the movement of vast armies through the air, which would expand on Black's definition of a military revolution. As part of today's transformation effort, few question the need to up-gun light units with air-transportable armored systems that can get American troops into action quickly with improved firepower, but how far can this go? Converting nearly one-third of the proposed active force, 15 of 48 brigades, to the Future Combat System (PCS) would cost more than $100 billion. Additional airlift would be needed to move units in worthwhile numbers. In congressional testimony, Air Force Gen. John Handy, head of the U.S. Transportation Command, said that the Air Force needs 225 C-17 air transports. It currently has 120, with 60 more on order. Adding another 45 would cost $7.4 billion. A single Army Stryker brigade at Fort Lewis, Wash., whose 19-ton vehicles are a proxy for the FCS, would require 270-300 C-17 missions to deploy to Macedonia, according to a Rand Corporation study, and deployment would still take a week because of congestion at the Skopje airport. Air landing facilities in other potential trouble spots, especially in the developing world, are always going to be problematic. It should be noted that when the first Stryker brigade was deployed to Iraq, its 1,000 vehicles were sent by ship from Tacoma, Wash., rather than by air. So how many FCS brigades could ever be actually deployed by available airlift? Throughout the Iraqi campaign, heavy units have proven their worth, whereas more lightly equipped forces have run into trouble. The Marines had taken the lead in training for urban warfare, but were grateful for the support of 70-ton Army Ml tanks in Karbala, Najaf, Fallujah and elsewhere. Experience has shown the need to provide better armor for vehicles and more firepower for support units. FCS weight limits are being prudently relaxed to improve survivability. If fuel, ammunition, armor kits and other supplies have to be flown in separate from the FCS vehicles, it would significantly increase the number of sorties required. In a Defense News interview on September 27, Army Chief of Staff Gen. Peter Schoomaker said that the actual fielding of the FCS brigades has been pushed back to 2030 because it will take time to develop technology that will provide "superior protection and firepower" for a vehicle limited to 20 tons. "We have to find a way to increase the mobility, lethality and survivability of whatever it is that replaces the Ml," said Schoomaker. Is this realistic, and is the 20-ton weight constraint mandated for air transport worth the effort? While this debate will continue, it is clear that between now and 2030, if America wants to get its ground forces into action, it will have to continue to depend on sea transport. The 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) was sent to Iraq in five large, medium-speed, roll-on/roll-off ships (LMSRs), with a cruising speed of 24 knots. These 62,000 ton ships had an average construction cost of less than $250 million. During the January to June 2004 redeployment of some 240,000 troops and their equipment in and out of Iraq, sealift provided 84 percent of the mobility needs. It only took 210 ships to move 1.8 million short-tons of cargo. Airlift primarily moved people. There is no practical alternative to the U.S. Transportation Command strategy of selecting sealift first. The Army wants a "campaign quality Army with joint and expeditionary capabilities." History and current events show that expeditionary forces must be capable of sustained operations. This will particularly be the case when regime change is the objective. America needs some light forces that can conduct rapid operations, especially in this era of global terrorism. Major wars against regional powers that could threaten vital U.S. interests, however, will require substantial boots on the ground, armed with heavy weapons. Only maritime capabilities can deliver this kind of powerful expeditionary force to where it is needed. If recent experience is any guide, seaborne troops can still move faster than diplomats when responding to a crisis. If the United States is to maintain its revolutionary capability of sending powerful armies overseas to wage decisive warfare, it must concentrate its mobility efforts on sealift. Modernizing and expanding the large-deck amphibians, dry cargo ships, LMSRs and tankers available, while sustaining a robust shipbuilding industrial base, are vital. Embarkation ports in the United States need to be improved and more equipment prepositioned in forward areas, as Army units are pulled back from Europe to a central reserve in the United States. The Navy is developing a "sea base" concept aimed at putting 30,000 marines on an enemy coast within a two-week time frame. This will require expanded joint planning, including the Army's new modular brigades, if sufficient mass is to be deployed to rapidly defeat an enemy once engaged. The Navy will also have to control global sealanes and provide security and support for ground forces as they land and move inland. Thus the steady decline in the size of the fleet cannot be viewed with indifference by the Army. The distinguished scholar of international politics John J. Mearsheimer has argued that "the presence of oceans on much of the earth's surface makes it impossible for any state to achieve global hegemony. Not even the world's most powerful state can conquer distant regions that can be reached only by ship." The United States, of course, does not seek hegemony, but it has often projected substantial land power to distant regions of the globe. Its first entry into the European theater of World War II was to land two armored and four infantry divisions in North Africa, most of the troops sailing directly from the United States. By the end of the war, America had moved 15 armored, 43 infantry and three airborne divisions, with a vast array of support units, to Europe by sea, liberating half the continent in concert with allies. No other nation in the history of the world has managed such a feat. While such a massive effort is not again on the horizon, Iraq is not likely to be the last time American ground combat forces will be deployed far from home. Daniel Gouré, vice president of the Lexington Institute, has even suggested that in a future possible confrontation with Beijing, military planners should consider "putting U.S. troops on Chinese soil in ways that are persuasive." While a new land war in Asia would be a daunting prospect, only in America can such an idea even be raised-which may be why the United States is the only truly global power. Directory: files files -> Answer True False 2 points Question 2 files -> Integer programming and game theory files -> 4 Integer Programming files -> Bpa vehicle Window Repair Scenario #1 task: Procure vehicle window relacement. 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