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PACOM key to Power Projection



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PACOM key to Power Projection


PACOM is crucial for power projection

Matlock 09 (COLONEL PATRICIA, United States Army, March 30, 2009, “ACQUISITION CROSSSERVICING AND MUTUAL LOGISTICS SUPPORT IN THE PACIFIC”, http://www.dtic.mil.proxy.lib.umich.edu/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA494797///TS)

This paper articulates the criticality of ACSAs and MLSAs in the Pacific region and provides a strategic view of their need in the future. In an attempt to understand the variations and manifestations of these support agreements, a review of the definition, doctrine, practice and polices were highlighted. The inclusion of support agreements during the execution of the Theater Security Cooperation Plan, allows the combatant commander to build, during peace, what is critical during war. It also builds interoperability and cooperation skills and relationships which will facilitate flexible and timely logistics support when time is of a criticality. Employment of support and services under an ACSA or MLSA benefits both nations involved in the agreement by decreasing the need for large, standing inventories and support and service providers. Increased material availability and decreased wait times continue to prove these support agreements provide the combatant commander and his force the needed supplies and services. The benefits for the Pacific far outweigh any negatives; for partner and allied nations, the gains in interoperability and good will are immense. Added benefits for the United States Pacific Command are the employment of cooperative agreements while supporting the Theater Security Cooperation Plan and the security strategy. In order for the United States military, and the land, sea, and air forces of the United States Pacific Command, to be as agile and responsive as possible, the methods and systems by which we acquire logistics and supply our Airmen, Marines, Sailors and Soldiers must be equally responsive. The systems and methods of supply and sustainment, when integrated and supplemented by ACSAs and MLSAs, decrease wait time and increase sustainment capabilities. By overcoming the traditional time consuming, bureaucratic, and costly methods of singular nation support, nations in the Pacific, especially the United States, can be as flexible and responsive as required and dictated by our strategic needs. Through a reduction of duplicated and redundant services and supplies resident in the military services and across the capabilities of our friends and allies, logistic planners can maximize support to the commander. These agreements and similar arrangements provide an easily activated program for acquiring goods and/or services from other countries and organizations on a reciprocal basis. Couple this logistics support framework with AGATRS, and the visibility it gives the combatant commands and service components, collectively will lessen capability gaps and logistics shortfalls. At the strategic level, these agreements for cooperative support provide for timely, flexible, and efficient logistics. Being cooperative in nature, they strengthen the ties between countries, and further the goals of the U.S. National Security Strategy.

Concord key to PACOM Rapid Response


Upgrading Concord solves rapid response in PACOM

Hancock and Lee 98 (Sam R. and Peter J., “The Ammuniton Supply Chain and Intermodalism: From Depot to Foxhole,” March, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA343623)//mat

In the Fiscal Year 1991 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress tasked the DoD with conducting a study of the military's future mobility requirements. (This tasking was actually initiated in 1990, before Desert Shield.) The study was headed by the Director for Force Structure, Resources and Assessment (J-8) of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In January 1992 they issued their expectations and recommendations as the Mobility Requirement Study (MRS). The primary focus of this study was strategic mobility, the ability to transport sufficient quantities of men and material in support of military contingency abroad. In the area of containerization there were three main recommendations: • Integration of containerization as the primary mode of ammunition transportation. • Acquisition of a fleet of 20 foot containers and container handling equipment. • Upgrade of existing facilities to appropriate output levels and establishment of a west coast container facility. [Ref. 14:p. VII-7] These recommendations would make ammunition distribution more efficient, and would ensure that adequate amounts of ammunition would arrive in theater in time during a contingency. Establishment of the Concord, CA, Naval Weapons Station as an ammunition container facility would ensure adequate rapid container throughput to the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean areas. The attention given to ammunition by the Mobility Requirement Study prompted USTRANSCOM to develop a series of exercises to test and develop the intermodal transportation of ammunition. These are the TURBO CADS exercises.


Sealift & Prepositoning key to Solve Korean Conflict


Sealift and pre-positioning are necessary to contain a Korean conflict

Di Genio 2000 [John Di Genio, operations research systems analyst with Headquarters, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/U. S. Forces Korea, Assistant Chief of Staff, “Sustaining Combat in Korea”, http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/issues/JanFeb00/MS503.htm, DMintz]

During the Gulf War, the military required a means of projecting and sustaining a force capable of delivering a decisive victory, but the logistics arteries became clogged. Renewed conflict in Korea will create similar problems. General John G. Coburn, now Commander of the Army Materiel Command, observed in 1997—

Today's Army is a mostly continental U.S.- based power projection force that must be capable of rapidly deploying and sustaining its forces. The Army's strategic mobility program depends on a critical triad of pre-positioned unit equipment, strategic sealift, and strategic airlift.

Should fighting break out in Korea, power projection and reception platforms could prove to be inadequate to support the massive influx of manpower and materiel needed to deter one of the largest standing armies in the world. Offloading supplies and military personnel during actual combat poses another concern since the United States has not attempted such an operation in the last half century. Once in theater, large trucks and railcars will find it difficult to navigate Korea's narrow, winding roadways and railroads—potentially clogged with refugees—which will hinder timely delivery of essential personnel and materiel.

As the Army embraces the velocity management concept—substituting speed of supply delivery for forward-deployed stockpiles of materiel—sealift, airlift, and pre-positioned supplies should become the "force enabler triad" that will play a key role in the successful defense of the Korean theater.




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