2014 ndi – Pre Camp Natural Gas Negative
Turns case-state patch work-natural gas
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- ***Competition/Legitimacy***
- Genuine key – perm doesn’t solve the internal net benefit of environmental leadership.
- Leveraging access to production key to effective reviews-The permutation removes the incentive.
Turns case-state patch work-natural gasAbsent stable federal regulations of natural gas state patchwork ruins the industryFreeman, 2012 (Jody Freeman, a Harvard law professor, was the White House counselor for energy and climate change in 2009 and 2010. “The Wise Way to Regulate Gas Drilling” http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/06/opinion/the-wise-way-to-regulate-hydraulic-fracturing.html) AMERICA’S energy future has been transformed by the production of natural gas made possible by hydraulic fracturing. This gas is a much cleaner source of electricity than coal. The problem is that the fracturing process used to extract the gas can, if done improperly, pollute surface and drinking water and emit dangerous air pollution. States like Texas, Pennsylvania and New York are now rushing to impose their own rules. But what we really need is a system of federal oversight that will promote confidence in this technique and provide the industry with uniform standards without overregulating it. The federal government has the power to regulate some but not all the risks. For example, the Environmental Protection Agency has set standards to control emissions of toxic and greenhouse gases from the drilling process and is considering new rules for polluted wastewater. But in 2005, Congress exempted the fracturing process itself — a process in which huge quantities of water, sand and toxic chemicals are injected into tight shale rock, to force open the rock and capture the gas trapped within — from federal regulation. The states have moved forward with a patchwork of regulations — some specific and prescriptive, others vague and general. Many states require some disclosure of the chemicals the drillers use, but in some states drillers decide which chemicals constitute proprietary secrets and therefore do not have to be disclosed. Some states allow operators to store toxic wastewater from the fracturing process in open pits, risking surface or groundwater contamination. Some states simply lack the experience or resources to enforce their standards. The uneven approach is bad not only for the environment but also for industry, because under the current system, mistakes by a few bad apples could lead to overregulation or even outright bans on drilling. A better approach is one already reflected in many environmental laws: cooperative federalism. The federal government sets baseline standards, which states can exceed but not fall below. Ideally, these would be general “performance standards” rather than detailed specifications, giving the states flexibility to meet them. States might be required to develop comprehensive plans to manage environmental risks. These plans could account for regional differences and would be based on best practices for disclosure, drilling location, well construction and wastewater treatment. States would implement and enforce the rules and issue and oversee the operating permits. The federal government could step in if states abdicated their responsibility. Such a regulatory system — with minimum federal standards as well as state plans — has been in place for coal mining since 1977. For this to work, Congress must lift the regulatory exemptions for hydraulic fracturing. This would allow the E.P.A. to set minimum requirements for the drilling process, which states would implement through federally approved programs. The E.P.A. and the Interior Department, which regulates gas drilling on federal lands, could then establish a clear, comprehensive and consistent federal framework for hydraulic fracturing. The cost would be reasonable: the International Energy Agency recently estimated that adequate environmental protections could increase drilling costs by 7 percent. Some might say that a federal role isn’t necessary. But pollution risks go beyond state borders. If natural gas extraction is a national priority, its safety and efficacy should be of national concern, too. The Obama administration has taken some initial steps to coordinate the federal government’s approach but has been timid about calling for a stronger federal role. Only a national regulatory system can strike the right balance, simultaneously realizing hydraulic fracturing’s energy promise and minimizing the risks while respecting state authority. ***Competition/Legitimacy***AT: Perm Do BothDoesn’t solve – prior and binding assessments are critical to access any benefitGibbons 91 (John H., Director – U.S. Office of Technology Assessment, “Complex Cleanup: The Environmental Legacy of Nuclear Weapons Production”, February, http://www.princeton.edu/~ota/disk1/1991/9113/911307.PDF) 3. Require DOE and Other Involved Agencies To Consult the Boards Prior to Making Key Decisions and To Report Those Decisions to the Boards To ensure that each board’s input is duly considered by DOE and other involved Federal and State agencies, Congress could require those agencies to consult with the appropriate board on a regular basis prior to making key decisions and then to inform that board how its advice and recommendations were taken into account in arriving at the decision. Congress could either establish this requirement and direct agencies to comply or authorize the boards themselves to develop and enforce the requirement. The frequency of consultation could be specified in advance either by Congress or by the boards, or the boards could determine periodically what specific decisions they wish to consider. Establishing strong public advisory mechanisms at the site-specific and national levels and requiring the agencies to consider, respond to, and incorporate such input in their decisionmaking processes might conceivably slow down some activities. Also, even with extensive public involvement, consensus on outcomes may not be easy to achieve. However, incorporating meaningful public participation into the cleanup process is a worthy goal in and of itself because credibility is required in that effort. Making cleanup decisions through a process that is open and acceptable to the public can go a long way toward achieving sound and credible outcomes. Genuine key – perm doesn’t solve the internal net benefit of environmental leadership.Ivanova and Esty 8 (Daniel C., Professor of Environmental Law and Policy – Yale University and Maria, Assistant Professor of Government and Environmental Policy – College of William and Mary, “Reclaiming U.S. Leadership in Global Environmental Governance”, SAIS Review, 28(2), Summer-Fall) Third, mere U.S. participation in international environmental efforts will be insufficient. The United States must actively take a leadership role in bringing about a successful response to climate change and other issues. The history of past success in galvanizing the global community into action shows that the United States can and must take the lead. However, any attempt at U.S.-led reform without credible proof of genuine U.S. leadership based on common values and the common good is likely to be met with distrust and opposition. Conducting the assessment prior to adoption of the policy is key-the permutation renders the process meaningless.Askin-JD Candidate Berkeley-7 34 Ecology L.Q. 1045 ANNUAL REVIEW OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES LAW: NOTE: Bad Timing: The Ninth Circuit Takes NEPA Backwards The most important purpose of NEPA is to integrate environmental considerations into agency decisions that will have a substantial impact on the environment. 119 The EIS should be a reflection of the fact that an agency has actually taken a "hard look" at environmental [*1059] consequences. 120 In order for this aspiration to be a reality, the environmental impacts of an action must be known before the decision to act is made; this goal is codified in the Council on Environmental Quality regulations. 121 The NEPA process should be a routine part of the agency decisionmaking process. 122 If the courts allow key portions of an EIS to be issued after a critical decision has been made, the process is reduced to meaningless paperwork. Indeed, even leaving aside the question of programmatic and subsequent EISs, EISs come too late in the process. In practice, planning for major federal actions typically begins well before the NEPA process. 123 The courts require that the final EIS be issued when an agency issues "a recommendation or report on a proposal for federal action." 124 However, this requirement enables the EIS process to be conducted on a different track than the actual decisionmaking procedure. Often, the result is that agencies make their plans without a great deal of consideration for environmental consequences, and then complete the EIS when the decision is foregone. 125 Thus, in many cases "NEPA is virtually ignored in formulating specific policies and often is skirted in developing programs, usually because agencies believe that NEPA cannot be applied within the time available." 126 Allowing agencies to push the EIS process even further back than is currently allowed acts as an invitation to agencies to treat NEPA as an unfortunate perfunctory step rather than as a tool to shape policy. There are several reasons why an early EIS is beneficial. To the extent that agencies do take into account environmental factors in their decisions, 127 it allows agencies to plan and possibly reconsider proposals [*1060] before major funding is committed. 128 Further, the preparation of a comprehensive report at the outset of a project, as opposed to a series of tiered reports, results in fewer reports, thereby reducing (or at least not increasing) costs. 129 To an outside observer, an early EIS offers a better indication that an agency has taken environmental factors into account, which is advantageous since EISs are designed to be an outward reflection of agency decisionmaking processes. 130 Thus, in many cases it is wise to do an early programmatic EIS, as in Kempthorne, with more specific analyses as the project proceeds. However, the crucial difference is that in Kempthorne, later site-specific analyses would have little legal or practical effect due to the rights granted to the lessees. Perhaps most importantly, requiring an early EIS prevents a project's momentum from overtaking any environmental considerations that might otherwise factor into the decision. Once an agency makes a general decision to proceed with a project, the decision in itself makes it more difficult for the agency to later change course. This is particularly true in the context of oil and gas leasing. Once leases are issued to energy companies, should oil or gas be found, it would be extremely difficult to substantially change the program in light of newly revealed environmental hazards. The likelihood is very small that the BLM would take a "hard look" at that stage of the program. Conducting the leasing in a different fashion would be irrational. The companies interested in exploratory drilling would be in a difficult situation if their drilling rights could be revoked after having made a significant investment. In Kempthorne, this reasoning is taken a step further, because the proposed leases are such that the agency is legally prohibited from preventing drilling due to the terms of the leases. 131 That is, in fact, the essence of the distinction in Conner between the legal status of NSO and non-NSO leases. The fact that the BLM could not reverse itself by the terms of the lease constituted, in the court's mind, an "irreversible and irretrievable commitment of resources." Leveraging access to production key to effective reviews-The permutation removes the incentive.BARSA-prof law NU-11 38 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 219, * LEARNING FROM DISASTER: LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE FROM THE GULF OF MEXICO: SYMPOSIUM ARTICLE: RECONCEPTUALIZING NEPA TO AVOID THE NEXT PREVENTABLE DISASTER We think the NEPA-as-contract reform also speaks to the group pathologies account of why BP and others did not plan for a failure of blowout protectors. By making the NEPA process one that has potentially very important implications for the company's valuable legal [*243] rights in resource extraction, NEPA-as-contract would change corporations' internal dynamic surrounding environmental review. Environmental review could no longer be seen as simply an obstacle, chore, or tedium to get through; it would have to be seen as something that the company had a financial stake in getting right, even if the company knew that the agency would accept whatever it submitted. Top management, in-house counsel, and very likely outside counsel would take a closer look at reviews than they currently do, and would want to assure themselves that they "covered the bases" by calling on company staff to identify any arguable holes or weaknesses that could later, perhaps years later, be used to challenge the company's legal rights in resource extraction. 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