CP Solvency: Congress doesn’t enforce Congress chooses not to act on surveillance oversight—history is on our side
Donohue 15 (Laura, Prof of Law at Georgetown U Law Center, “Security vs. Freedom: Contemporary Controversies: The Thirty-Third Annual Federalist Society National Student Symposium on Law and Public Policy 2014: Article: Section 702 and the Collection of International Telephone and Internet Content,” 38 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 117, Winter 2015, L/N)
What is different, at least with regard to FISA (albeit consistent with other areas of national security law), is the clandestine nature of the reporting and the restrictions placed on committee and non-committee members who may have access to the information. Members may not know of the existence of, or details about, programs that would enable them to ask pertinent questions or to delve further into how authorities are being exercised. The result is that Congress may agree to laws without fully understanding the implications of their actions.¶ One could argue that this happens all the time. It is part of the good faith exercise that is part and parcel of the legislative process. Legislators accord their colleagues, who develop an expertise in certain areas, a degree of deference. But one distinction, in regard to national security, is that the stakes are particularly high. It is precisely this concern that arose during enactment of the FAA in 2008. Congress was being asked to pass legislation that gave telecommunication companies indemnity, but only a minority of the members of both chambers had been briefed on the President's Surveillance Program. The question, according to Senator Specter, was whether the limited briefing amounted to an unconstitutional [*182] delegation of authority. n246 For Senator Whitehouse, the issue was less one of constitutionality and more one of simple legislative prudence: whether the Senate ought to substitute its good faith in the few for a determination that ought to be made by the judiciary. n247 What was at stake was the rule of law.¶ In the case of Section 702, the intelligence community did not just keep the committees informed, but prior to the renewal debates, it made its classified briefings widely available to all Members of Congress. n248 The May 2012 report, for instance, available to [*183] Members of Congress more than a year before the Snowden revelations, detailed PRISM and upstream collection. n249¶ As to the second claim, could Congress have stopped the program if it so wished? The answer to this question is more difficult. Congress ostensibly had both private and public mechanisms it could employ to subject the program to more scrutiny and to change aspects considered repugnant as either a statutory or Constitutional matter. It could have conditioned continuation of the authorities, for instance, on curbing TFA collection, or shifting the assumptions regarding identity or location. Alternatively, it could have suspended funding for the program. It did none of these things. The House did not hold any hearings on how the law was operating prior to voting on whether to renew the FAA. n250 Publicly, Congress could have declassified materials, opened the NSA's programs to broader discussion, and subjected the executive to citizens' scrutiny. It chose not to do so.
Courts CP Congress consistently fails to provide oversight on surveillance issues—TFAs prove
Donohue 15 (Laura, Prof of Law at Georgetown U Law Center, “Security vs. Freedom: Contemporary Controversies: The Thirty-Third Annual Federalist Society National Student Symposium on Law and Public Policy 2014: Article: Section 702 and the Collection of International Telephone and Internet Content,” 38 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 117, Winter 2015, L/N)
[*159] Even if Congress did not initially appreciate the potential for programmatic collection, however, certainly by 2012 the intelligence community had made enough information available to Congress for Members to make an informed decision. This does not mean that all Members were fully informed. But to the extent that Members selected not to access the material or to take a public stand on the matter, particularly in light of the legislature's reading of its authorities with regard to classification, fault lies with Congress.¶ The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court failed to step into the gap. In 2011, FISC realized the implications of the NSA's interpretation of to, from or about (TFA) collection. However, in light of the seriousness of the NSA's aim (protecting national security), and the limitations imposed by the types of technologies being used, the Court read the statute in a manner that found the targeting procedures to be consistent with the statute.¶ To the extent that NSA's TFA and assumptions regarding the target's foreignness undermine the law as it is written, the legislature failed to perform effective oversight. Congress similarly neglected to uphold the limit placed on the intelligence community to not knowingly collect domestic conversations. Instead, it relied on FISC to do so--a task that the Court failed to do. In a classified environment, when so much information is cloaked from public view, it becomes even more important for the government to ensure that the authorities as they are publicly presented are consistent with the manner in which they are being exercised.
AT: Cyber Terror Neg Most cyber terrorism is low-level noise not meaningful intelligence collection
Associated Press 15 (“Cyber-attacks rising in Utah, likely due to NSA facility,” Associated Press, February 6, http://ksn.com/2015/02/06/cyber-attacks-rising-in-utah-likely-due-to-nsa-facility/)
Tim Junio, a cybersecurity researcher at Stanford University, said what officials refer to as “attacks” are likely just “noise from low-tech people rather than concerted efforts for meaningful foreign intelligence collection.”
Share with your friends: |