A constructed Peace The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963

But this flexibility related entirely to Berlin and East Germany. There could be no Berlin settlement, Brentano told Herter, "which in any way weakened West Germany or involved moves tending toward neutralization of West Germany."¹⁰²⁰ The Adenauer government was afraid that the western powers--especially the British, but perhaps even the United States--would agree to a special status for West Germany as a way out of the Berlin crisis. The great fear was that they would agree to a settlement which would perpetuate West Germany's non-nuclear status. An agreement on "European security"--the code-term for an arrangement to limit German power, above all in the nuclear area--was widely viewed as one of the key elements of a possible German settlement. Adenauer strongly opposed not just a formal treaty of that sort, but anything that pointed in this general direction. In April 1959, an allied working group had developed a four-phase "Plan for German reunification, European Security and a German Peace Settlement." German representatives had been in on the drafting the plan, but now Adenauer refused to go along with it. His main objection was "in the field of security." According to the plan, the ban on nuclear production already accepted by West Germany "would be extended to cover" a security area including the whole of a reunified German state, plus Poland and Czechoslovakia. IRBMs would also not be deployed in that area, even in the first phase of the plan when reunification was simply being discussed. Adenauer was personally putting his foot down. At his instruction, German representatives, to the astonishment of their allies, now "vigorously opposed" these "discriminatory provisions." These restrictions, targeted so obviously on Germany, were too high a price to pay for reunification--indeed, even for reunification within the NATO framework. This, of course, was a complete reversal of the line Adenauer had taken in 1953 and 1955.¹⁰²¹

This episode typified the German position during the whole period of the Berlin crisis. There was little chance that the Soviets would accept a reunification deal that would allow Germany to remain in NATO, but Adenauer was now not willing to accept even the principle of non-nuclear status under any circumstances. The Federal Republic's nuclear status was the one area where concessions would not be made. Defense minister Strauss, for example, in August 1959 strongly opposed the idea of allowing the question of whether the Bundeswehr should, as planned, be armed with American nuclear weapons "to become a bargaining point in the east-west negotiations."¹⁰²² And in March 1960, Adenauer himself "reacted violently" when Herter brought up the idea of a military inspection zone in Europe.¹⁰²³ This was just a step away from the idea of a security zone and of a special status for Germany: one had to avoid being pulled onto the slippery slope. This remained the German view in the Kennedy period as well. A "special status" for Germany was "unacceptable," Adenauer wrote President Kennedy on October 1961. "To our mind zones of a special military status--no matter of what kind--would be disastrous, if not impossible, in Europe."¹⁰²⁴

By then, the German nuclear question had emerged as the great sticking point. This had now become the fundamental issue for Adenauer. The chancellor, as one key German diplomat put it, understood that the Federal Republic "would have to make sacrifices to avoid the very real danger of war and to save the freedom of West Berlin." But there was one area where he "refused to contemplate any concessions," and that had to do with "the armament of the Bundeswehr."¹⁰²⁵ It was indeed clear to British and American officials at this point that German resistance to concessions in this area would be very strong.¹⁰²⁶

The question of a German nuclear capability was thus fundamental, both for the USSR and for the Federal Republic. Under Eisenhower, the U.S. government was not prepared to push for concessions in this area. The Berlin Crisis brought no change in Eisenhower's nuclear sharing policy. In December 1958, when the weapons were about to be introduced into Germany in accordance with the stockpile plan, Norstad checked with Washington to make sure that he should "move ahead in this matter." Dulles replied immediately that "he saw no objection on political grounds" to Norstad proceeding as he saw fit."¹⁰²⁷ The coming of the crisis was, in fact, a major reason for not drawing back. The "development of an atomic capability by German forces" was not only essential for military reasons, but, in the State Department view, it was also "an indication of the West's firmness and resolve, particularly with respect to the Berlin situation."¹⁰²⁸ The basic American attitude under Eisenhower was that limits on German military power could be made part of a general settlement with Russia, but only as part of a deal that would provide for German reunification. If the country was to remain divided, the feeling was that the West should not commit itself on the "security" issue. An agreement in this area--that is, essentially a promise to keep the Federal Republic from acquiring an independent nuclear capability--was too high a price to pay for a Berlin settlement alone.

What this meant was that there was no chance for a general settlement during the late Eisenhower period. The issue of German power--and above all the question of a German nuclear capability--was fundamental for Russia. But on this issue the Federal Republic was determined not to give way, and the Eisenhower administration was not going to make her. A general settlement was thus not in the cards, and from the Soviet point of view there was therefore little point to pressing the issue. The USSR certainly did not want to come anywhere near the point where war was a real possibility. On the other hand, the Soviets did not want to liquidate the crisis either--for example, by working out an arrangement stabilizing the situation around Berlin.

So the Berlin question was put on hold during the last year of the Eisenhower period. The crisis atmosphere faded. Even the collapse of the east-west summit conference in May 1960 did not lead to a sharpening of tension. But soon a new administration took office in Washington, and by early 1961 the Soviet Union was again threatening western rights in Berlin. A new and more dangerous phase of the crisis was about to begin.

CHAPTER EIGHT

KENNEDY, NATO AND BERLIN
In early 1961, soon after John Kennedy was sworn in as President of the United States, it became clear that the Soviets were again going to press the western powers on Berlin. Khrushchev met with Kennedy at Vienna in June and issued a new "ultimatum." The Soviet leader now explicitly threatened to "liquidate" western rights in the city if a settlement was not worked out by the end of the year.

Kennedy knew what was at stake and was determined not to cave in to these threats. But he was not simply going to dig in his heels and prepare for a showdown. A negotiated settlement would be the best solution. Like Eisenhower before him, he thought that an intransigent position made little sense. The status quo, in his view, was "as undesirable for the United States and the West as it is for the Russians in a good many particulars." The whole Berlin problem, he said, was a "dangerous mess" which he had inherited and which he now sought to clean up by reaching an understanding with the USSR.¹⁰²⁹

Kennedy hoped the two major powers could find some way to live with each other in peace. America and Russia, he felt, were both very great powers. They should deal with each other on that basis and in particular should respect each other's most fundamental interests. The U.S. government, he told Khrushchev at Vienna, did not "wish to act in a way that would deprive the Soviet Union of its ties in Eastern Europe"--that is, the Americans would in effect accept that area as a Soviet sphere of influence. The U.S. government would also make sure that German power remained limited. The United States, Kennedy told the Soviet leader, was "opposed to a buildup in West Germany that would constitute a threat to the Soviet Union"--and, given military realities, that could only mean the development of an independent German nuclear capability. But in return the USSR would have to respect American interests in Europe, and in particular would have to accept the status quo in Berlin. The city itself might not be of fundamental importance. But if America were to capitulate on Berlin, if she were to allow the Soviets to trample on her rights and to treat her most solemn commitments as though they were of no account, then her whole political position in Europe would collapse. The effect on the global balance of power would be profound. Khrushchev, the president said, would not accept a "similar loss and we cannot accept it either."¹⁰³⁰

The basic goal was thus to stabilize the status quo in central Europe. Both sides would agree to leave things as they were. If a general settlement of this sort were reached, Berlin would no longer be a problem for the West and Germany would no longer be a problem for the USSR. But a system based on keeping German power limited meant that the United States would have to remain present in Europe indefinitely. The limitations on German power--above all, West Germany's non-nuclear status--and the maintenance of a sizeable American force on West German soil were two sides to a coin. There had to be some effective counterweight to Soviet military power in central Europe. If Germany was to remain non-nuclear, only American power could play that role, and to play it effectively, American forces had to be physically present on German territory. The Germans were being asked to make major sacrifices--to accept a non-nuclear status and thus to remain totally dependent on America for their security--and they were entitled to something in exchange: the United States would have to protect the Federal Republic by maintaining a military force there on a more or less permanent basis.

This, of course, was very different from the Eisenhower policy. Eisenhower had hoped that the unification of Europe would make it possible for the Europeans to defend themselves, and would thus pave the way for an American withdrawal. A unified western Europe, with a nuclear force under its own control, could effectively counterbalance Soviet power without direct American involvement. But under Kennedy all this was considered quite unrealistic. Whatever the long-term prospects, it was clear that a genuine pooling of sovereignty in western Europe was not imminent. Under present political conditions, any so-called European force would be a simple knitting-together of forces under ultimate national control, and would thus not solve the fundamental problem of how to balance Soviet power without allowing the Germans to get a nuclear force of their own. A European force that included a German contingent was out of the question, because it meant in the final analysis a German finger on the nuclear trigger, and a force built up from British and French contingents alone would scarcely solve Germany's security problem, or lead the Germans to accept a permanent non-nuclear status. So from the point of view of the new administration, there was no purely European solution to the security problem. The American military commitment to Europe was therefore inescapable.

This whole approach was rooted in the premise that the Germans could not be allowed a nuclear capability of their own, and indeed that premise was a very basic part of the Kennedy policy. The new administration felt from the outset that some "mechanism must be provided to make it impossible for the Germans to develop an independent nuclear capacity."¹⁰³¹ It was a "fixed point" of American policy, as McGeorge Bundy, Kennedy's national security advisor, later wrote, "that Germany should not have independent control of nuclear weapons."¹⁰³² The assumption was that the development of a German nuclear force would be a source of instability both in itself and because of the likely Soviet reaction. But if a German force was to be ruled out, that meant that the United States would also have to oppose the French nuclear force and even the British nuclear force. The Federal Republic could not be singled out as the one major ally which would not be allowed to have nuclear weapons. To keep Germany non-nuclear, the United States would therefore have to oppose nuclear forces under national control as a matter of general policy. And that general policy implied that the U.S. government would have to tighten control over American nuclear weapons with the NATO forces in Europe. The deployment of American strategic missiles on European soil would also have to be opposed, because these weapons might fall too easily into the hands of host country forces.

U.S. policy on the nuclear sharing question was thus now utterly transformed. Eisenhower had wanted the Europeans to be able to defend themselves. Since they had to confront a nuclear-armed superpower, that had meant that they needed nuclear forces under their own control. But under Kennedy nuclear sharing was no longer a goal of American policy. The term itself now fell into disfavor, and people were beginning to talk instead about the great problem of nuclear "proliferation." The allies were now encouraged to leave the "nuclear deterrent business" in American hands.

Would the Germans go along with the new U.S. policy? Would they agree to remain non-nuclear in exchange for an American security guarantee, a permanent American troop presence, and a Soviet promise to respect the status quo in Berlin? The other allies, Britain and France in particular, were also being asked to make sacrifices, especially in the nuclear area. Could the U.S. government get them to cooperate? And above all would the Soviets accept a settlement of the sort Kennedy had in mind? Their most basic security interests would be accommodated. But it was by no means clear that they would pay the price Kennedy insisted on. Would they be willing to respect the status quo in central Europe and leave things as they were in Berlin?

So Kennedy had to conduct the struggle on two fronts: with the Soviet Union, but also with his own allies. With Russia, the goal was to avoid both war and a disastrous capitulation over Berlin. That meant that there had to be some iron in the western position, and the president therefore had to think in terms of how force might be used if America were pushed far enough. But he also needed to see whether a negotiated settlement along the lines he had in mind could be worked out. At the same time, he had to get the allies to accept what he was trying to accomplish--that is, a stabilization of the status quo. Positions that the Federal Republic had defended for many years might have to be abandoned. Could the Germans be made to accept such a far-reaching change of policy? Their attitude would depend to a certain extent on the position that the other allies, and France above all, took on these issues. But could de Gaulle be brought along? And all these issues were tightly bound up with the question of the control of nuclear forces within the Atlantic alliance. An arrangement keeping Germany non-nuclear might be an important part of a settlement with Russia; but to keep Germany from building a nuclear force of her own, the United States might also have to oppose the idea of British and French nuclear forces. What would this imply about NATO strategy? What sort of NATO structure might meet the Europeans' concerns about the declining credibility of the American nuclear deterrent, if they were to have no nuclear forces of their own? These were all very difficult questions, and ultimately the president himself needed to decide on the answers.
Nuclear Weapons and the Defense of Berlin

What would the United States do if the Berlin Crisis came to a head--if the Soviets actually carried out their threat to "liquidate" western rights in Berlin and cut off western access to the city? In principle, the Kennedy administration adopted a new defense policy in 1961. The old Eisenhower strategy of "massive retaliation" was to be replaced by a new strategy of "flexible response." A president, the argument ran, should never be forced to choose between "holocaust and capitulation." It was vital that he have a broader range of options. The Soviets were building up their nuclear forces, and a full-scale American nuclear attack on Russia would probably be suicidal--if not now then certainly in the very near future. In such circumstances, the USSR would not take American nuclear threats seriously. America therefore could not rely so heavily on her nuclear capability; instead, NATO's conventional forces needed to be built up.

The basic idea behind flexible response, at least officially, was to "enhance the credibility" of the nuclear deterrent, and not to phase out all reliance on nuclear weapons. By being able to engage in non-nuclear operations on a fairly major scale, the argument ran, the western powers might be able to convince the Russians that "political aggression" on their part was too risky. There would "inevitably" be a "substantial risk" that a non-nuclear conflict in Europe would rapidly develop into a full-scale nuclear war. By being able to use conventional force in a major way, the western powers might be able to get the Soviets to draw back before it was late. This approach, the top civilians in the Defense Department argued, was obviously better than relying on simple nuclear threats that were no longer credible.¹⁰³³

Berlin was the main case in point. The Eisenhower strategy for the defense of Berlin clearly had to be changed. The United States, Secretary of State Dean Rusk explained, "no longer anticipated a situation in which interruption of our access rights would be immediately followed by 'the big bang' of nuclear warfare." The old strategy of launching a full-scale nuclear attack as soon as a few jeeps were turned back on the autobahn was no longer acceptable. Instead, one had to start with non-military actions and then take military measures in "ascending order of violence."¹⁰³⁴

The new administration had thus opted for a Berlin strategy of "mounting pressures"--that is, for a strategy of controlled escalation, or, more precisely, of semi-controlled escalation, because the pressure would result from the growing risk that the conflict would become uncontrollable as the fighting became more intense. The fundamental objective was to make "nuclear deterrence more credible." The assumption was that the nuclear deterrent would not be credible to the Soviets "unless they are convinced of NATO's readiness to become engaged on a lesser level of violence and are thereby made to realize the great risks of escalation to nuclear war."¹⁰³⁵ This would be done by creating a "chain of plausible U.S. response in which each stage would believably lead to the next higher chain of force."¹⁰³⁶ One could begin with a small probe. If that failed, the allies could take various non-military actions and at the same time mobilize and prepare themselves for major military operations. If access remained blocked, the allies could then take non-nuclear action, beginning perhaps with a battalion-size operation, then using a full division, and perhaps eventually a three- or four-division force. If the Soviets still did not back down, nuclear weapons would have to be used, perhaps initially in a limited way in the theater of operations in central Europe, but ultimately, if necessary, a full-scale nuclear attack on the USSR would be launched.¹⁰³⁷ The plan was thus to "provide for a number of measures involving a progressive degree of force, thereby compelling the Russians to take a series of decisions, each more dangerous than the last."¹⁰³⁸ The West would in this way be able to drive home to the Soviets the extraordinary risks they would be running if they persisted with their policy.

American officials at the time often spoke as though this new strategy represented a total break with what had come before, but the shift in strategy was not nearly as radical as the rhetoric implied. Under Eisenhower, the plan for Berlin had never been to order a full-scale nuclear attack as soon as a few jeeps were stopped on the autobahn. Instead, various non-nuclear measures would be undertaken, culminating in a division-size operation. If the division were attacked, the "fat would be in the fire," and at that point an all-out nuclear attack would be launched.¹⁰³⁹ With regard to NATO strategy in general, the importance of a degree of "flexibility" had often been recognized during the Eisenhower period. At the NATO Council meeting in December 1960, Secretaries Gates and Herter, for example, had each stressed the importance of "flexibility of response."¹⁰⁴⁰ And Norstad had been quite outspoken about the need for forces with a strong conventional capability. In September 1960, for example, he told Gates that "we should be very careful not to go overboard in our reliance on the use of nuclear weapons," that it was "necessary to raise the level of conventional response," that nuclear use should "not be considered as the normal immediate response," and that "we should be very careful not to organize ourselves into a position where we must respond at once with nuclear weapons."¹⁰⁴¹

Under Eisenhower, the threat of nuclear escalation was of course the ultimate basis of U.S. defense policy. But under Kennedy as well, the defense of NATO Europe continued to rest on America's ultimate willingness to accept a full-scale nuclear confrontation with the USSR. People like Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara might have been inclined to think that nuclear escalation would for all intents and purposes be suicidal, that nuclear weapons were therefore good only for deterring their use by others, and that the West ultimately needed conventional forces strong enough to balance Soviet conventional power on their own.¹⁰⁴² But Kennedy never saw things this way. In his view, a sizeable nuclear force could keep the Soviets from attacking western Europe, no matter what the conventional balance was, and it was the Berlin problem alone that had created the need for substantial conventional capabilities. "Absent the problem of Berlin," Kennedy thought, nuclear forces by themselves would be enough to stabilize the situation in Europe: in that case, aggression across the line of demarcation in Europe "would in fact lead promptly to nuclear warfare"; "for that reason," he thought, "the nuclear deterrent would be effective."¹⁰⁴³ This was very much in line with the way his predecessor had viewed the problem: a war in Europe, Eisenhower had thought, could not be fought without nuclear weapons; a conflict over Berlin was the only exception.¹⁰⁴⁴

The real difference between the Kennedy and the Eisenhower strategy was one of degree. How far should the western side go--how far would the western side be able to go--before nuclear weapons would have to be used? How hard should the western side try to slow down the escalatory process? The whole thrust of the new thinking in 1961 was that the process needed to be drawn out in order to allow the terrible threat of nuclear escalation time to sink in. The aim, once the crisis had moved into its military phase, was "to produce non-nuclear combat, on a substantial scale, over as extended a period as possible." The Soviet political leadership needed to be forced to make a very serious decision, and "Allied interests appear to be best served by giving the Soviet leaders both motive and opportunity for changing their course. To do this, the Allied objective must be the ability to prolong, not abbreviate, the non-nuclear phase."¹⁰⁴⁵ The goal was to avoid both nuclear war and a massive political defeat; and while there could be no guarantees, the assumption was that this strategy gave the western side its best chance of achieving that objective.