A constructed Peace The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963
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| 1445. See, for example, Kennedy-Harriman meeting, July 10, 1963, FRUS 1961-63, 7:789. 1446. Kennedy-Couve meeting, May 25, 1963, FRUS 1961-63, 13:772. 1447. De Gaulle to Kennedy, August 4, 1963, and Bundy to Bohlen, August 4, 1963, FRUS 1961-63, 7:868, 868n. See also Bohlen to Bundy and Rusk (eyes only), August 5, 1963, 7 p.m., DOSCF for 1963, Pol Fr-US, RG 59, USNA, reporting a discussion of the issue with Couve, who was obviously a little exasperated with de Gaulle's attitude on this issue. 1449. Kennedy-Couve meeting, October 7, 1963, FRUS 1961-63, 13:782. 1450. See Bohlen to Bundy, March 2, 1963, FRUS 1961-63, 13:763-765. 1451. Kennedy-Couve meetings, May 25 and October 7, 1963, FRUS 1961-63, 13:773, 786; Ball-Couve meeting, May 25, 1963, NSF/72/France--General/JFKL; Couve-Home meeting, April 8, 1963, Prem 11/4221, PRO; Couve-Rusk meeting, October 7, 1962, 700.5611/10-762, RG 59, USNA. 1452. See, for example, Tyler memo, "De Gaulle and Atlantic Nuclear Matters," November 2, 1964, p. 6, AP/SDWHA/HSTL; Couve-Bohlen meeting, September 15, 1963, FRUS 1961-63, 13:780; Couve-Rusk meeting, October 7, 1963, FRUS 1961-63, 15:589-590. 1453. Ball to Bohlen, giving "highest level guidance" from the White House, September 25, 1963, p. 2, NSF/72/JFKL. 1454. On the issue of America's alleged failure to respond to the September 1958 memorandum, see Debré's claim and Raymond Aron's (and Soutou's) comment in Aron, Articles du Figaro, 2:1281; Bohlen to Rusk, March 6, 1963, DOSCF for 1963, Pol Fr-US, RG 59, USNA (for the leak of the documents to Sulzberger), and Sulzberger entry for March 6, 1963, Last of the Giants, p. 965. On France as a "demandeur" in the nuclear area, note Debré's own use of the term, in meeting with Herter, May 1, 1959, DDF 1959, 1:590. As for the standard Gaullist myth about Yalta and the Anglo-Saxons' acceptance of a divided Europe (see, for example, Peyrefitte, C'était de Gaulle, pp. 380-381), it is worth noting that the French provisional government, headed by de Gaulle, was, if anything, quicker to accept the Soviet domination of Poland than the British and the Americans were, and that de Gaulle was happy that France was not invited to Yalta and did not have to take political responsibility for what was going to be done there. See Soutou, "Le Général de Gaulle et l'URSS, 1943-1945," esp. pp. 339-343. 1455. Adenauer-Rusk meeting, August 10, 1963, AAPBD 1963, 2:974. 1456. Kennedy-Harriman meeting, July 10, 1963, FRUS 1961-63, 7:789. 1457. Ilse Dorothee Pautsch, "Im Sog der Entspannungspolitik: Die USA, das Teststopp-Abkommen und die Deutschland-Frage," in Rainer Blasius, ed., Von Adenauer zu Erhard: Studien zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublic Deutschland 1963 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1994), p. 124; Adenauer-McNamara meeting, July 31, 1963; Schröder-McGhee meeting, August 3, 1963; Schröder-Bundy meeting, September 20, 1963; in AAPBD 1963, 2:860, 905-909, 1151 For the point about the treaty confirming Germany's non-nuclear status, see Schwarz, Adenauer, 2:847. 1458. Adenauer-de Gaulle meeting, September 21, 1963, AAPBD 1963, 2:1201; Schwarz, Adenauer 2:846-848. 1459. Schröder-McGhee meeting, August 3, 1963, and Knappstein to Foreign Office, August 8, 1963, AAPBD 1963, 2:907-908, 958-959. 1460. Note, for example, the Carstens memorandum of August 7, 1963 (with the foreign minister's marginal comments), AAPBD 1963, 2:947-948. 1461. Carstens memorandum, August 7, 1963, and Schröder-Rusk meeting, September 20, 1963, AAPBD 1963, 2:948, 1163-66. 1462. See, for example, Strauss's remarks summarized in Soutou, L'Alliance incertaine, p. 205. 1463. This point is suggested in a Carstens memorandum of August 16, 1963, AAPBD 1963, 2:1035. 1464. Eisenhower interview of October 18, 1963, cited by the new chancellor, Ludwig Erhard, in a meeting with U.S. ambassador McGhee, October 22, 1963, and by Schröder in a meeting with Rusk, October 26, 1963, AAPBD 1963, 3:1365, 1391. 1465. For various documents giving the figures on the payments loss resulting from the American troop presence overseas, and figures for the overall payments deficit during the early 1960s, see FRUS 1961-63, 9:30, 60, 68, 149-150. McNamara himself told Adenauer on July 31, 1963, that the cost of stationing troops abroad was about equal to the total balance of payments deficit. AAPBD 1963, 2:863. Note also McNamara's top secret speech to the NATO ministerial meeting at Paris, December 17, 1963, in FRUS 1961-63, vols. 13-15, mic. supp., no. 51. The linkage between the U.S. troop presence overseas (and above all in Germany) and the balance of payments problem is reflected in many documents in FRUS 1961-1963, vol. 9, especially in the first two sections (pp. 1-188). My understanding of the issue is based in large part on discussions with and written work done by Frank Gavin and Hubert Zimmermann, both of whom have recently completed dissertations in this general area. 1466. Schwarz, Adenauer, 2:721, 746, 841. 1467. Schröder-Bundy and Schröder-Rusk meetings, September 20, 1963; Schröder-Sorensen meeting, September 24, 1963; Schröder-Rusk-Home meeting, September 27, 1963; in AAPBD 1963, 2:1152-54, 1156, 1159-62, 1170, 1226-27, 1240-46. 1468. Krone diary, August 5, 1963, Adenauer-Studien, 3:178; see Schwarz, Adenauer, 2:840-853. 1469. NSAM 270, October 29, 1963, FRUS 1961-63, 9:99; Rusk-Erhard meeting, October 25, 1963, AAPBD 1963, 3:1385. Note also Kennedy's discussion of this issue with Rusk and Bundy, October 24, 1963, audiotape 117/A53, POF/JFKL. 1470. Kennedy-JCS meeting, February 28, 1963; Kennedy-Spaak meeting, May 28, 1963; Kennedy-Couve meeting, May 25, 1963; in FRUS 1961-63, 13:517, 587, 772. 1471. Rusk-Home-Couve-Schröder meeting, May 21, 1963, FRUS 1961-63, 15:515. 1472. Khrushchev-Harriman meeting, April 26, 1963, FRUS 1961-63, 15:510. 1473. Johnson-Erhard meeting, December 20, 1965, FRUS 1964-68, 13:291. On America's German policy during the Johnson period, and in particular U.S. policy on the German nuclear question at this time, see Frank Costigliola, "Lyndon B. Johnson, Germany and the 'End of the Cold War,'" in Warren Cohen and Nancy Tucker, eds., Lyndon B. Johnson Confronts the World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 1474. For some later problems, see, for example, John Ausland, "Six Berlin Incidents, 1961-1964: A Case Study in the Management of U.S. Policy regarding a Critical National Security Problem," NSABF. 1475. Note in this context Kennedy's remarks in the NSC, January 22, 1963, FRUS 1961-63, 8:458, 458n. See also White House meeting, October 24, 1962, May and Zelikow, Kennedy Tapes, p. 382. 1476. Note especially McNamara's then-shocking remark, in an interview in late 1962, that it was good that the United States was losing its ability to destroy the Soviet retaliatory force, and thus her ability to take the initiative in a general nuclear war. See Shapley, Promise and Power, p. 191. This was of considerably symbolic importance, and it also had certain far-reaching material implications. The Americans were saying that they would not press hard for strategic advantage; the Soviets would have a certain interest in not placing that aspect of American policy at risk; this gave them a certain interest in maintaining the great power status quo. The issue of strategic parity also evidently came up in connection with the test ban treaty in 1963. Rusk and Thompson had apparently told Dobrynin that the U.S. "was ahead in tactical nuclear weapons," that the Soviets could "catch up by accepting" a limited test ban, and that there could be a "tacit understanding" that the U.S. "would not go ahead with underground tests unless we decided the Soviets had overdone theirs." This, one well-informed observer noted, might explain the pressure "to go slow on underground testing." William Y. Smith memorandum, August 21, 1963, on "events leading up to the Harriman Moscow Mission," FRUS 1961-63, vols. 7-9, mic. supp., no. 220. 1477. Rusk-Gromyko meeting, July 24, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 15:243, 249, 251; Rusk-Dobrynin meeting, March 26, 1963, FRUS 1961-63, 15:501. The next day Kohler followed up on Rusk's remarks by presenting Gromyko with the texts outlining America's reserved powers with regard to Germany and Berlin. Kohler-Gromyko meeting, July 25, 1962, 110.11-RU/7-2562, RG 59, USNA. 1478. Rusk-Khrushchev meeting, August 9, 1963, FRUS 1961-63, 15:566-568. 1479. See, for example, Soutou, L'Alliance incertaine, p. 264. On this point in general, see pp. xxx and yyy above. 1480. Eisenhower-Khrushchev meeting, September 27, 1959, FRUS 1958-60, 9:46. The U.S. troops arrived at the beginning of July 1945 and left on September 8, 1994. 1481. Secretary of State James Baker, in a talk with Soviet foreign minister Shevardnadze in February 1990, quoted in Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), p. 181. 1482. Gorbachev-Baker meeting, February 9, 1990, quoted in Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, p. 184. Directory: polisci -> faculty -> trachtenberg trachtenberg -> The United States, France, and the Question of German Power, 1945-1960 polisci -> Transylvania university committee on program and curriculum polisci -> Pos 6933: History of American Political Thought Course Description polisci -> Urban politics political science polisci -> International political economy polisci -> J. B. Weter History Honors Fellowship, Stanford University (1965-66) polisci -> Handbook on Migration and Social Policy trachtenberg -> The Economic Decline and Soviet Foreign Policy trachtenberg -> Assessing Soviet Economic Performance during the Cold War: a failure of Intelligence? Download 2.48 Mb. Share with your friends:
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