A constructed Peace The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963
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| Kennedy Tapes, pp. 496-531, 552-554.
1292. May and Zelikow, Kennedy Tapes, pp. 541-549, 564, 579. 1293. Robert Kennedy, Thirteen Days (New York: Norton, 1969), pp. 106-109; Arthur Schlesinger, Robert Kennedy and His Times (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1978), pp. 520-523; Bundy, Danger and Survival, pp. 432-434. 1294. May and Zelikow, Kennedy Tapes, pp. 683, 689. 1295. During the crisis, Kennedy had felt the United States could live with the threat posed by IL-28's in Cuba. NSC minutes, October 20, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 11:131, 133. But in the post-crisis talks, the U.S. government took a much tougher line. See ibid., p. 350n, 359. 1296. Kennedy-Macmillan meeting, December 19, 1962, and meeting between Kennedy, Rusk et al, February 15, 1963, FRUS 1961-63, 15:469, 487; Kennedy-Harriman meeting, July 10, 1963, FRUS 1961-63, 7:789. 1297. Rusk-Mikoyan meeting, November 30, 1962, and Kohler-Semenov meeting, December 3, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 15:451, 456-457. 1298. Thompson to Rusk, October 29, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 15:406n. 1299. Foreign Office background note for talks with Kennedy, December 10, 1962, FO 371/163585, PRO. This note presented information that had come from Kennedy's close friend, the British ambassador in Washington David Ormsby Gore. 1300. Rusk-Mikoyan meeting, November 30, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 15:452; Rusk-Gromyko meeting, October 2, 1963, pp. 10, 12, NSF/187/USSR. Gromyko Talks (Rusk)/JFKL. 1301. Meeting of Kennedy, Rusk et al, February 15, 1963, FRUS 1961-63, 15:487. 1302. Kennedy's remarks at Macmillan's dinner party, December 19, 1962, quoted in the British record of the Nassau conference, p. 26, in Prem 11/4229, PRO. 1303. See, for example, Kissinger to Bundy, August 18, 1961, p. 2, DDRS 1993/2331. 1304. See the dossier on the question in Prem 11/3712, PRO, and the following documents: Anglo-American talks, April 5-8, 1961, notes of first meeting, p. 8, Cab 133/244; Macmillan to Kennedy, April 28, 1961 (with enclosures), NSABF; de Zulueta to Macmillan, "The Nuclear," n.d. but around May 5, 1961, Prem 11/3311, PRO; Macmillan-Chauvel meeting, April 19, 1962, Prem 11/3792, PRO; and Note for the Record, October 9, 1962, Prem 11/3772, PRO. See also Alistair Horne, Harold Macmillan, vol. 2 (New York: Viking, 1989), pp. 328, 445. Macmillan's views were by no means universally accepted within the British government. For some insight into the internal British debate, see Ramsbotham, "The Prime Minister's Visit to General de Gaulle," January 17, 1961, FO 371/159671, PRO. For de Gaulle's views, see Macmillan-de Gaulle meeting at Champs, June 3, 1962, Prem 11/3712, and Zuckerman note on "Anglo/French Co-operation," May 25, 1962, Prem 11/3712, both PRO. See also Finletter to Rusk, August 9, 1961, 740.5/8-961, and Nitze-de Rose meeting, August 5, 1961, 740.5611/8-661, both RG 59, USNA. See finally Soutou, L'Alliance incertaine, pp. 193, 225. 1305. Kennedy-Macmillan meeting, December 19, 1962, 9:50 a.m., Nassau conference records, p. 10, Prem 11/4229. 1306. Owen to Bundy, May 3, 1961, PPS 1957-61/183/Owen, RG 59, USNA; Kennedy to Macmillan, May 8, 1961, Prem 11/3311, PRO. 1307. For the State Department view, see Rusk's comments, "Note of a Conversation at Luncheon at the State Department on 28th April, 1962," Prem 11/3712, PRO. Kennedy's views are summarized in a top secret personal letter from Ormsby Gore to Macmillan, May 17, 1962, Prem 11/3712, PRO. 1308. Sulzberger, Last of the Giants, entry for December 16, 1962, p. 942. 1310. See especially McNamara's remarks in the Secretary of Defense Staff Meeting, January 7, 1963, p. 5, CJCS Taylor/23/Secretary of Defense Staff Meetings, RG 218, USNA. See also McNamara-Rusk-Bundy meeting, December 28, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 13:1116. 1311. McNamara-von Hassel meeting, February 28, 1963, p. 8, MP/133/Memcons with Germans, RG 200, USNA. 1312. Neustadt, "Skybolt and Nassau," pp. 29-30. See p. xxx above. 1313. Soutou, L'Alliance incertaine, p. 226. 1314. NSC meetings, October 20 and 21, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 11:135, 148. 1315. Neustadt, "Skybolt and Nassau," is the basic source on the Skybolt affair. See also Rusk to McNamara, September 8 and November 24, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 13:1078-80, 1086-88. 1316. This was basically Neustadt's interpretation in "Skybolt and Nassau"; for the quotations, see pp. 34-35, 42, and 61. Many other scholars have followed his lead. See, for example, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), pp. 856-866, especially p. 861; Horne, Macmillan, 2:432-443; Shapley, Promise and Power, pp. 241-244. See also Theodore Sorensen, Kennedy (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), pp. 564-568. 1317. Neustadt, "Skybolt and Nassau," p. 20. Emphasis in original. 1318. Unsigned memo, "Skybolt," November 19, 1962, Prem 11/3716, PRO. 1319. Ormsby Gore to Home, December 8, 1962, pp. 5-6, Prem 11/4229, PRO. 1320. Rubel transcript of McNamara-Thorneycroft meeting, December 11, 1962, pp. 5-6, Neustadt Papers/19/Skybolt-Nassau (classified)/ JFKL. Rubel is identified as the author in the Neustadt, "Skybolt and Nassau," p. 63. 1321. Blight note for the record, December 9, 1962, Prem 11/3716, PRO. 1322. Rubel transcript of McNamara-Thorneycroft meeting, December 11, 1962, pp. 5-9, Neustadt Papers/19/Skybolt-Nassau (classified) (2)/JFKL. 1323. Neustadt, "Skybolt and Nassau," p. 68. 1324. David Nunnerley, President Kennedy and Britain (New York: St. Martin's, 1972), p. 148. 1325. Anglo-American meetings, December 19 and 20, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 13:1095-1100, 1112 (for the "agonizing reappraisal" threat). It is worth noting that shortly after Kennedy had stated that "of course, in extremes they could be taken out" (p. 1095), Ball, as though deaf to what the president had just said, said point blank that "the right of withdrawal would not be envisaged" (p. 1096). The part of Macmillan's plea deleted from this account (p. 1100) is available in Neustadt, "Skybolt and Nassau," p. 90. 1326. For the point that the Nassau encounter was being stage-managed, see especially Bundy to Kennedy of December 18. Bundy reported the conclusions a number of top U.S. officials had reached about what should go on at the first Kennedy-Macmillan talk: "We assume that you will want to let him [Macmillan] give his full speech on Skybolt, and we assume it may be quite fervent." Ball Papers, Box 154, ML. 1327. Secretary of Defense Staff Meeting, January 7, 1963, p. 5, CJCS Taylor/23/Secretary of Defense Staff Meetings, RG 218, USNA. 1328. Neustadt, "Skybolt and Nassau," pp. 2, 100, 114. 1329. Thorneycroft, for example, said that McNamara had told him that the MLF had no military utility; Rusk meeting with Home and Thorneycroft, May 23, 1963, FRUS 1961-63, 13:580. This rings true, given what McNamara told German defense minister von Hassel on February 26, 1963. In that meeting, McNamara developed the argument against the MLF: "In arguing against it, he would raise three questions. The first was how can one say there is a military purpose for the MLF? The U.S. has said it is providing enough nuclear power to take care of the Soviet target system. It is trebling its alert forces between '63 and '68. The second question would be, since the U.S. is providing this force, at its expense, why should we Germans or we Belgians pay for what the U.S. will pay for anyway? A third question is how does this force fulfill any political purpose? The U.S. will still have a veto over its use." McNamara-von Hassel meeting of February 26, 1963 (memo dated February 28, 1963), MP/133/Memcons with Germans, RG 200, USNA. 1330. White House meeting, December 16, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 13:1089-90. 1331. On the use of military channels, see the Neustadt, "Skybolt and Nassau," pp. 21, 55. Note the use of CIA channels for Bundy to Kaysen, June 29, 1963, which advised the two key officials who were to conduct negotiations in Moscow not to take the rigid State Department line too seriously; FRUS 1961-63, 7:751n. 1332. Compare Kennedy's support for Rusk's view that in the Moscow talks the U.S. delegation should not abandon the MLF, with the president's comment to the principal negotiator the next morning that the U.S. should take a more flexible line on this issue. NSC meeting, July 9, 1963, and Kennedy-Harriman meeting, July 10, 1963, FRUS 1961-63, 7:780-781, 790. Note also the way Kennedy dealt directly with Ambassador Bohlen in late December 1962, instructing him to take a line on the French nuclear weapons issue that was considerably more liberal than what the State Department was ready to countenance. Neustadt, "Skybolt and Nassau," pp. 103-107. 1333. Rubel transcript of McNamara-Thorneycroft meeting, December 11, 1962, p. 4, Neustadt Papers/19/Skybolt-Nassau (Classified) (2)/ JFKL; also quoted in Neustadt, "Skybolt and Nassau," p. 65. White House meeting, December 16, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 13:1088. 1334. See Kennedy's comment in the Anglo-American meeting, December 19, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 13:1102-1103. 1335. Anglo-American meeting, December 20, 1962 (12 noon), records of Nassau meeting, p. 34, Prem 11/4229, PRO. 1336. FRUS 1961-63, 13:1089-90. 1337. Kitchen to Rusk, January 9, 1963, 740.5611/1-963, RG 59, USNA. Emphasis in original. 1338. Anglo-American meeting, December 19, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 13:1097. 1339. Anglo-American meeting, December 19, 1962, Records of the Nassau Conference, p. 13 (for the quotation), pp. 10-11 (for Macmillan's and Lord Home's general views), Prem 11/4229, PRO. See also Anglo-American meetings, December 19 and 20, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 13:1095, 1110-11. 1340. Anglo-American meetings, December 19 and 20, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 13:1096, 1098, 1111 (for the quotation). 1341. Anglo-American meeting, December 19, 1962, Records of Nassau conference, p. 9, Prem 11/4229, PRO. 1342. Ibid., p. 10. 1343. See Neustadt, "Skybolt and Nassau," esp. pp. 100, 103-104; Soutou, L'Alliance incertaine, pp. 236-237. 1344. Neustadt, "Skybolt and Nassau," p. 103. 1345. De Zulueta to Macmillan, January 9, 1963 (and enclosure), Prem 11/4148, PRO. 1346. Rusk to Bohlen, January 1, 1963, and Bohlen to Kennedy and Rusk, January 4, 1963, FRUS 1961-63, 13:743, 745-747; Neustadt, "Skybolt and Nassau," p. 105. Note also Kennedy's later references to this episode. On January 31, 1963, he "recalled that a sizeable part of the Nassau arrangements was designed to please the French"; in a meeting with Couve de Murville in May, he referred to the "open door held out to France at the time of the Nassau meeting," and how this could have led to real "cooperation in the nuclear field." NSC Executive Committee meeting No. 39, January 31, 1963, and Kennedy-Couve meeting, May 25, 1963, FRUS 1961-63, 13:160, 772. See also Soutou, L'Alliance incertaine, pp. 236-237. 1347. See Neustadt, "Skybolt and Nassau," pp. 93, 106. 1348. Neustadt, "Skybolt and Nassau," pp. 101, 107. 1349. This was Bohlen's view. See Neustadt, "Skybolt and Nassau," p. 107; Bohlen to State Department, January 24, 1963, and Bohlen to Bundy, March 2, 1963, FRUS 1961-63, 13:753-754, 765; Bohlen to State Department, February 2, 1963, enclosing memorandum of Bohlen-Malraux meeting, January 23, 1963, DOSCF for 1963, POL France-US, RG 59, USNA. Note also Kissinger-Stehlin meeting, May 25, 1963, DDRS 1996/1999; General Stehlin also thought that Ball's visit had played a decisive role in January. There is, however, a certain amount of evidence to the effect that what Ball did was not crucial--that de Gaulle had made his mind up even before the Nassau Conference to veto Britain's admission to the Common Market at his January 14 press conference, that he never varied from this course, and that he was not for a moment interested in anything the Americans were proposing. See especially the notes Alain Peyrefitte took of his meetings with de Gaulle; Peyrefitte, C'était de Gaulle, pp. 334-350. But this evidence is not necessarily to be taken at face value, since the image of de Gaulle that comes across in the Peyrefitte notes is more extreme and more hardline than the image that emerges from the documents. Compare, for example, de Gaulle's account of what he told Bohlen in ibid., pp. 354-355, with Bohlen's account in FRUS 1961-63, 13:745-748, and in Neustadt, "Skybolt and Nassau," p. 105. Note also Malraux's comment, in the January 23 meeting with Bohlen cited above, that when he saw de Gaulle on January 7, the General had told him that he wanted to keep the door open for talks with the Americans. My basic assumption, in sorting out this conflicting evidence, is that de Gaulle would not have slammed the door on the Anglo-Saxons if he thought there was a chance that something real was being offered--and given what Alphand was reporting, and given what de Gaulle himself was able to learn from his meeting with Bohlen, there was no way it could not have been clear to him that there might be some substance in what Kennedy was now proposing. See Soutou, L'Alliance incertaine, pp. 235-237. In other words, only a fool would have been as dismissive of the American offer as Peyrefitte portrays de Gaulle as being, and de Gaulle, whatever his faults, was no fool. 1350. See above, pp. xxx-yyy. 1351. January 14, 1963, press conference, in de Gaulle, Discours et Messages, 4:69. 1352. De Gaulle, Mémoires d'espoir: le renouveau, p. 182; Alphand, L'Etonnement d'être, p. 343; Blankenhorn memorandum, February 15, 1963, p. 320, AAPBD 1963, 1:320; Peyrefitte, C'était de Gaulle, passim, esp. pp. 282, 346, 348, 350, 374. Sulzberger-Pompidou conversation, February 1, 1963, in Sulzberger, Last of the Giants, p. 959. 1353. De Gaulle-Adenauer talks, January 21-22, 1963, AAPBD 1963, 1:116, 141-143. 1354. Kennedy to Macmillan, May 23, 1961, Kennedy to Ball, August 21, 1961, Anglo-American meeting, April 28, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 13:20, 32, 85. 1355. Note for Macmillan on a conversation with Kennedy, April 6, 1961, Prem 11/3311, PRO. 1356. NSC Executive Committee meeting no. 39, January 31, 1963, FRUS 1961-63, 13:160. 1357. NSC Executive Committee meeting nos. 38 and 39, January 25 and 31, 1963, FRUS 1961-63, 13:158, 160, 487. On February 14, Kennedy asked Bohlen whether de Gaulle was "planning a systematic campaign to reduce American influence and presence on the continent." FRUS 1961-63, 13:758n. 1358. Schwarz, Adenauer, 2:753, 825; Ball to Kennedy, November 15, 1962, and Kennedy-Spaak meeting, May 28, 1963, FRUS 1961-63, 13:123, 586. 1359. Schwarz, Adenauer, 2:822. On the origins of the treaty, see Jacques Bariéty, "De Gaulle, Adenauer, et la genèse du traité de l'Elysée du 22 janvier 1963," and Hans-Peter Schwarz, "Le président de Gaulle, le chancelier fédéral Adenauer et la genèse du traité de l'Elysée," both in Institut Charles de Gaulle, De Gaulle et son siècle (Paris: Plon, 1992), 5:352-373. 1360. See Knappstein to Schröder, January 23, 1963, AAPBD 1963, 1:163-164; NSC Executive Committee meetings nos. 38 and 39, January 25 and 31, 1963, FRUS 1961-63, 13:156-163, 487-491. 1361. In January 1962, for example, the French diplomat François de Rose, who specialized in nuclear issues, told Norstad that if the United States did not help France with her nuclear program, the French might "have to assist proliferation." When Norstad asked him if that meant France would help the Germans attain a nuclear capability, de Rose was evasive. Stoessel to Rusk, January 12, 1962, 611.51/1-1262, RG 59, USNA. Over the next few months, de Rose's warnings became more explicit. In May he told a British official that if it turned out that France was unable "for economical and technological reasons" to build a nuclear force on her own, she might have to turn to Germany--a course of action which he considered "highly dangerous." This British official inferred from that that the matter was obviously being discussed. Zuckerman memo, "Anglo/French Co-operation," May 25, 1962, Prem 11/3712, PRO. 1362. See pp. xxx-yyy above. 1363. See Soutou, L'Alliance incertaine, p. 250; Gavin to Rusk, August 1, 1962, 740.5611/8-162, and Nitze-Norstad meeting, April 4, 1962, 711.5611/4/462, both RG 59, USNA; and Sulzberger, Last of the Giants, p. 913. When pressed to explain what all this talk meant, French leaders were often evasive. See, for example, the exchange between Raymond Aron and former prime minister Michel Debré, in Raymond Aron, Les Articles du Figaro, Georges-Henri Soutou, ed., vol. 2, La Coexistence, 1955-1965 (Paris: Fallois, 1993), p. 1268, and Aron's comment on Debré's remarks, p. 1280. 1364. De Gaulle, Discours et messages, 4:13. 1365. Dowling to Rusk, December 10, 1962, 751.5611/12-1062, RG 59, USNA; Bundy memo for Kennedy, "The U.S. and de Gaulle -- The Past and the Future," p. 8, POF/116/JFKL. For Adenauer at this point, this was at the very least an open question. See Schwarz, Adenauer, 2:819. The Americans, above all Kennedy himself, remained very interested in what was going on in this area, especially in May and June 1963. The U.S. government learned from German officials that "discussions concerning German financial participation" in the Pierrelatte gaseous diffusion plant had been held at French initiative; Pierrelatte was the "principal producer of weapons grade enriched uranium for the French nuclear weapons program." Kaplan to Foley, June 12, 1963 (for the quotations), and Kaufman memorandum, "Pierrelatte Gaseous Diffusion Plant," May 29, 1963 (for the president's interest), both in Bureau of European Affairs, Office of Atlantic Political and Economic Affairs, records relating to atomic energy [MLR 3104], box 2, France, RG 59, USNA, a file containing a number of other documents bearing on this issue. For these matters in general, see also DOSCF for 1963, Pol 4 France-West Germany and Def 4 France-West Germany, especially Tyler to Rusk, May 27 and May 29, 1963. General Stehlin, the head of the French Air Force, told Kissinger in May that in November 1962 he had "sounded out his friend General Speidel" about the possibility of a "Franco-German nuclear effort," but that de Gaulle had then given strict orders "that there was to be no collaboration with Germany in the nuclear field." Kissinger-Stehlin meeting, May 25, 1963, p. 4, DDRS 1996/1999. 1366. 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