A constructed Peace The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963
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| L'Etonnement d'être, p. 379. De Gaulle was talking along these lines even in early 1963; see Peyrefitte, C'était de Gaulle, p. 345. For various comments in the opposite vein, reflecting a conception of France and Germany, or of continental western Europe, as a strategic unit, see de Gaulle's remarks at the German military academy, Hamburg, September 7, 1962, Discours et Messages, 4:13; de Gaulle-Segni-Pella meeting, March 20, 1959, DDF 1959, 1:400, and above all the de Gaulle-Adenauer meeting, January 21, 1963, AAPBD 1963, 1:117. See in addition Soutou, L'Alliance incertaine, pp. 161-162, 248-249, who also notes this basic contradiction in French policy. The Americans, for obvious reasons, made a point of attacking de Gaulle's "two battles" idea when talking with the Germans, and many Germans were in fact put off by de Gaulle's references to two distinct battles in Europe; this was to have a certain bearing on German behavior in 1963, somewhat diminishing the attractiveness of the French option in German eyes and tarnishing German Gaullism in the process. Note, for example, General Speidel's comments in this context in January 1963, and also Chancellor Erhard's complaint about the "two battles" concept in a meeting with de Gaulle in November of that year. De Gaulle at that point tried to cover his tracks and explicitly rejected the concept, but the damage had already been done. Kennedy-Adenauer meeting, November 14, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 13:452; Soutou, L'Alliance incertaine, pp. 162, 255-256 (for Speidel); Erhard-de Gaulle meeting, November 21, 1963, AAPBD 1963, 3:1471, 1474. These contradictions, to my mind, reflect de Gaulle's basic uncertainty about the German question--about whether to treat the Germans as full partners or as something less--an uncertainty also reflected in his ambivalent attitude on the German nuclear question. Indeed, according to the top permanent official at the Quai d'Orsay, de Gaulle recognized these difficulties and was "more uncertain" about the German problem than about any other problem on the European scene. Bohlen to Kennedy, February 23, 1963, State Department Central Files [DOSCF] for 1963, POL 15-1 FR, RG 59, USNA.
1211. The key document is quoted in Soutou, "De Gaulle, Adenauer und die gemeinsame Front," pp. 498-499. 1212. Kennedy-de Gaulle meeting, June 1, 1961, DDRS 1994/2586. 1213. Thomson to Killick, November 6, 1961, FO 371/160563, PRO. The impression that French policy was shifting is based on the evidence to be discussed below, but it should be noted at this point that this evidence is by no means unambiguous. French officials, from de Gaulle on down, continued to deny in 1962 and 1963, that they intended to help Germany acquire a nuclear capability. See, for example, Sulzberger's conversation with Burin des Roziers, "de Gaulle's right hand in the Elysée," March 10, 1962, and Sulzberger-Pompidou meeting, February 1, 1963, in Sulzberger, Last of the Giants, pp. 859, 960. Note also the Couve-Home meeting, April 8, 1963, Prem 11/4221. "The French found this whole problem worrying," Couve told his British counterpart. "They were far from believing the Germans should be given something in the atomic field. On the contrary the German appetite for nuclear weapons was something which must be carefully watched and to which we must not give way." The following month Couve told Kennedy that France "would never help the Germans to make nuclear weapons." He had in fact told Rusk in late 1962 that if Germany acquired nuclear weapons, "this could be a cause for a world war." Kennedy-Couve meeting, May 25, 1963, FRUS 1961-63, 13:772; Rusk-Couve meeting, October 7, 1962, 700.5611/10-762, RG59, USNA. These comments were not simply for external consumption. De Gaulle took essentially the same line in internal discussions. See, for example, the de Gaulle-Alphand meeting, June 26, 1962, in Alphand, L'Etonnement d'être, p.380, and a de Gaulle-Peyrefitte conversation, January 1963, in Peyrefitte, C'était de Gaulle, p. 346. 1214. De Gaulle-Macmillan meetings, November 24-25, 1961 (account dated November 27), Prem 11/3338; also in FO 371/160565, and quoted in Macmillan, Pointing the Way, p. 421. 1215. Couve-Rusk meeting, February 14, 1962, 375/2-1462, RG 59, USNA. There were a number of other indications of this developing French attitude. One key French official (François de Rose) told an American diplomat that the "Germans are going to want nuclear weapons sooner or later, probably sooner than we think," that de Gaulle's goal was to "weld" Germany to France, and that the French leader was "not quite ready to give nuclear information to the Germans now, but he will be later." Paris embassy to Rusk, December 27, 1961, 375/12-2761, RG 59, USNA. 1216. Rusk-Kohler-Shuckburgh meeting, September 17, 1961, FO 371/160552, PRO; Kennedy-Macmillan phone conversation, October 6, 1961, FO 371/160555; Kennedy-Macmillan meeting, April 28, 1962, Prem 11/3783, PRO; and, for the "fall guy" reference, Rusk-Home meeting, December 10, 1961, FO 371/160567, PRO. 1217. Kennedy to Clay, October 8, 1961; Acheson-Grewe meeting, October 11, 1961; Clay to Kennedy, October 18, 1961; in FRUS 1961-63, 14:484, 491, 512. Note also Rusk's remarks in a meeting with Sulzberger, December 16, 1961, Sulzberger, Last of the Giants, p. 826, and the discussion following the Ausland Berlin briefing, August 9, 1962, in audiocassette no. 9, POF/JFKL. On the French attitude in late 1962, see Bundy to Kennedy, October 9, 1962, NSABF, and especially Kennedy-Couve meeting, October 9, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 15:354-355. This is to be compared with de Gaulle's attitude when he was briefed by Acheson during the missile crisis: Lyon to Rusk, October 22, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 11:166. If the Soviets retaliated to the blockade of Cuba by threatening Berlin, the western powers, de Gaulle said, would have to take the countersteps that had been prepared. 1218. Rusk-Home meeting, December 10, 1961, FO 371/160567, PRO. 1219. Gavin's view, cited in Sulzberger, Last of the Giants, entry for January 5, 1962, p. 833. See also an Italian diplomat's comments on Rusk's attitude toward de Gaulle, ibid., p. 876. 1220. Kennedy-Macmillan meeting, April 28, 1962, Prem 11/3783, PRO. 1221. One measure of how bad relations had become is that Rusk, at one point, even threatened the French with an American nuclear attack if they dared to act independently in a crisis. In late 1961, he told the French defense minister, Pierre Messmer, that the United States "could not allow" her "smaller allies" to "use or threaten to use nuclear weapons" independently against the USSR. "This would be a direct menace to U.S. security," and if the French intended to build her own force, he warned Messmer, "they had better think of supplying themselves with inter-continental missiles directed across the Atlantic." Rusk's account in a meeting with Lord Home, December 10, 1961, FO 371/160567; see also Alphand, L'Etonnement d'être, p. 368n; Rusk also touches on this issue in a meeting with top British officials, June 28, 1963, p. 7, DOSCF for 1963, POL 7 US/Kennedy, RG 59, USNA. It is hard to think of any other case in the history of international politics of a great power making this sort of threat to a major ally, and I wondered how the French had reacted. So I asked Messmer about this episode when I met him at a conference in Paris in February 1996. He did not take it very seriously. Rusk, he said, had been worried that the French intended to use their small nuclear force as a kind of "detonator" that could set off a general U.S.-Soviet nuclear war, but the French, he said, had never thought of their force in such terms. It turns out, however, that they in fact were thinking in terms of the "detonator" strategy. See Soutou, L'Alliance incertaine, pp. 88, 223. The "detonator" concept, incidentally, also played a certain role in British thinking on these questions. See Pierre, Nuclear Politics, p. 175. 1222. Gavin to State Department, May 16, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 13:702. 1223. De Gaulle-Spaak meeting, September 24, 1958, DDF 1958, 2:430. 1224. Gavin to State Department, May 16, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 13:703. 1225. Kennedy to Gavin, May 18, 1962, and Gavin to Rusk, May 28, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 13:704-706. 1226. Rusk-Kohler-Shuckburgh meeting, September 17, 1961, FO 371/160552, PRO. 1227. Kissinger memorandum, "Summary of Conversations in Germany about Negotiations," February 21, 1962, p. 5, Mandatory Declassified Review release NLK 89-67, JFKL. 1228. Rusk-Kohler-Shuckburgh meeting, September 17, 1961, FO 371/160552, PRO. 1229. Ambassador Grewe's views, cited in State Department to Embassy in Germany, June 17, 1961, FRUS 1961-63, 14:127. 1230. Gore to Foreign Office, November 1, 1961, FO 371/160559, PRO. 1231. Kennedy-Adenauer meetings, November 21-22, 1961, FRUS 1961-63, 14:616-618, 620, 625-626. 1232. Kennedy-Adzhubei interview, November 25, 1961, PPP Kennedy, 1961: 751. 1233. Adenauer-Rusk meeting, June 22, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 13:422; Rusk-Home meeting, June 25, 1962, Prem 11/3715, PRO; Bruce to State Department, June 26, 1962 (for another account of this meeting and Kohler' remarks), FRUS 1961-63, 13:423-424. Bohlen also seemed to think that Adenauer's reference to Dulles's alleged "rebus sic stantibus" was new and important; Bohlen paper, July 2, 1962, ibid., p. 428. For the Nitze quotation: Kennedy-Nitze meeting, July 30, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 7:521. For McNamara's comment, see Macmillan-McNamara meeting, April 29, 1962, p. 28, Prem 11/3783, PRO. For the U.S. assessment of German nuclear aspirations, see Appendix Six [IS]. 1234. Rusk remarks in western foreign ministers' meeting, December 11, 1961, FRUS 1961-63, 14:656-657. 1235. Hillenbrand-Thomson meeting, November 24, 1961, FO 371/160564, PRO. 1236. Ormsby Gore to Foreign Office, January 5, 1962, FO 371/163564. 1237. Kennedy to Rusk, January 15, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 14:760. 1238. Ormsby Gore to Home, February 19, 1962, FO 371/163567. 1239. Ledwidge to Shuckburgh, memo on Berlin, March 8, 1962, FO 371/163568. 1240. Kennedy to Khrushchev, February 15, 1962; Kennedy-Grewe meeting, February 19, 1962; Rusk to Thompson, March 1, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 14:821, 832-833, 852. Kennedy to Rusk, March 9, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 15:2-3. 1241. Kennedy to Rusk, March 11, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 15:15. 1242. See, for example, Kennedy-Grewe meeting, February 19, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 14:832-833. 1244. Rusk-Gromyko meeting, March 22, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 15:67; for the text of the paper, see ibid., pp. 69-71. 1245. Dowling to Rusk, April 27, 1962, POF/117/Germany--Security/JFKL. 1246. Rusk-Gromyko meeting, March 13, 1962; Rusk to Kennedy, March 19, 1962; Rusk to Dowling, April 28, 1962; Rusk-Dobrynin meeting, May 30, 1962; in FRUS 1961-63, 15:35, 50n., 121, 162. 1247. Rusk-Gromyko meeting, March 20, 1962, and Rusk-Mikoyan meeting, November 30, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 15:54, 452. 1248. See, for example, Kohler-Semenov meeting, December 3, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 15: 456-457. 1249. Kennedy-Gromyko meeting, October 6, 1961, FRUS 1961-63, 14:471, 474; Rusk to Kennedy, March 25, 1962, and Rusk-Gromyko meeting, March 26, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 15:75, 81. 1250. Kennedy-Brentano meeting, April 30, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 15:127. 1251. Rusk-Dobrynin meeting, August 8, 1962, p. 3, 700.5611/8-862, RG 59, USNA; see also the account in FRUS 1961-63, 7:541-547. Note also Rusk's comments in his March 26 meeting with Gromyko, FRUS 1961-63, 15:85. 1252. Western foreign ministers' meeting, May 3, 1962, FO 371/163572, PRO. 1253. See, for example, Kohler-Semenov meeting, March 18, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 15:48. 1254. Western foreign ministers' meeting, May 3, 1962, FO 371/163572, PRO. 1255. Rusk-Dobrynin meeting, April 16, 1962, Rusk to Kennedy, July 24, 1962, and Rusk-Gromyko meeting, July 24, 1962, in FRUS 1961-63, 15:118, 241, 246. 1256. Rusk-Dobrynin meeting, April 16, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 15:116. 1257. Nitze-Adenauer meeting, April 13, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 15:102. See also Schwarz, Adenauer, 2:743-749. 1258. Kohler-Grewe meetings and telephone conversation, April 13-14, 1962; Kohler draft of letter to Adenauer, April 14, 1962; Rusk to Dowling, April 25, 1962; FRUS 1961-63, 15:107, 109n., 111, 112n., 120. 1259. Dowling to State Department, May 9, 1962, and Rusk to Dowling, May 12, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 15:140, 143. Note also Bundy to Dowling, May 9, 1962, giving text of Daniel Schorr broadcast reporting what Adenauer was saying about the Americans in private conversations, and Salinger to Kennedy, May 10, 1962, suggesting that Clay was one of Schorr's sources, 762.00/5-962, and 611.62a/5-1062, RG 59, USNA. On Adenauer's willingness to accept a period of tension with the Americans, see Osterheld, Adenauers letzte Kanzlerjahre, pp. 111-112. 1260. Adenauer-Nitze meeting, April 13, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 15:102. Note also Couve's comment in June that as he understood it the "two main problems with the Germans had arisen over the International Access Authority and nuclear non-diffusion"; Couve-Rusk meeting, June 20, 1962, NSABF. 1261. Bundy to Kennedy, October 2, 1961, FRUS 1961-63, 14:460-461. 1262. Knappstein-Tyler-Hillenbrand meeting, October 10, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 15:355-357. 1263. Rusk-Dobrynin meetings, April 16 and 27, 1962, Kennedy-Dobrynin meeting, July 17, 1962, and Rusk-Gromyko meeting, August 6, 1963, FRUS 1961-63, 15:116, 121, 223, 560. This paragraph takes issue with Schwarz's argument that Adenauer successfully sabotaged Kennedy's "appeasement" policy (he uses the English word) and should thus be considered the "saviour" of Berlin. See his Adenauer, 2:743-749, esp. p. 749. 1264. Rusk-Dobrynin meeting, May 30, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 15:162. 1265. Rusk-Dobrynin meetings, June 18 and July 12, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 15:184, 221. 1266. Kennedy-Gromyko meeting, October 6, 1961, FRUS 1961-63, 14:476-477; Rusk-Dobrynin meetings, May 30 and June 18, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 15:163, 182. 1267. Rusk-Gromyko meeting, March 12, 1962, and Rusk-Dobrynin meeting, May 30, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 15:32, 163. 1268. For the records of the most important high-level U.S.-Soviet discussions of the issue from May 30 to October 18, 1962, see FRUS 1961-63, 15:161-172, 177-89, 215-22, 243-52, 370-387. For the record of the one important meeting from this period not published in this volume, the July 22, 1962, Rusk-Gromyko dinner conversation, see 110.11-RU/7-2362, RG 59, USNA. 1269. Rusk to Kennedy, July 23, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 15:237 and Rusk to State Department, July 23, 1962 (section five of six), 110.11-RU/7-2362, RG 59, USNA. 1271. Bundy to Sorensen, August 23, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 15:284. 1272. Rusk-Alphand meeting, September 7, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 15:312. 1273. Burris to Johnson, September 18, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 15:324. 1274. "Kennedy Warning Nation and Allies on Berlin Crisis," New York Times, October 12, 1962. Note especially the reference here to Robert Kennedy's Las Vegas speech of October 9, in which the president's brother predicted a "great crisis." 1275. Kennedy-Adenauer meeting, November 14, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 15:432. 1276. Kennedy-Gromyko meeting, October 18, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 15:371-372; Khrushchev to Kennedy, September 28, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 6:157. 1277. Rusk-Gromyko meeting, October 18, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 15:379-380. 1278. Ormsby Gore to Foreign Office, October 19, 1962 (no. 2621), and Roberts to Foreign Office, October 22, 1962, FO 371/163582, PRO. 1279. Kennedy-Couve meeting, October 9, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 15:353. 1280. Home to Foreign Office, October 2, 1962, FO 371/163581. 1281. See, for example, the president's remarks in a meeting with Adenauer, November 20, 1961, FRUS 1961-63, 14:592. 1282. There is a large literature on the missile crisis, but still no comprehensive study based on archival materials. The two most important books to appear recently are Fursenko and Naftali, "One Hell of a Gamble," and May and Zelikow, The Kennedy Tapes. I myself published a number of articles dealing with certain aspects of the crisis: "The Influence of Nuclear Weapons in the Cuban Missile Crisis" (with some major documents and an introduction to those documents), International Security 10 (summer 1985); "New Light on the Cuban Missile Crisis?" Diplomatic History 14 (1990); and "L'ouverture des archives américaines: vers de nouvelles perspectives," in Maurice Vaïsse, ed., L'Europe et la Crise de Cuba (Paris: Colin, 1993)--an English language version, somewhat different from the French text, can be found in the Internet Supplement. A mass of new material has recently become available, and much of it is readily available on microfiche: National Security Archive, The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, over 15,000 pages on microfiche with two-volume printed guide. 1283. Kennedy-Macmillan phone conversation, October 22, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 11:164. See also meetings of Kennedy with key advisors, October 18 and 21, 1962, ibid., pp. 109, 133, 146. 1284. See May and Zelikow, Kennedy Tapes, pp. 143, 172, 176, 237, 284. 1285. May and Zelikow, Kennedy Tapes, pp. 90, 172, 179, 286; Kennedy-Macmillan phone conversation, October 22, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 11:164. 1286. Home to Foreign Office, October 2, 1962, FO 371/163581, PRO. 1287. See, for example, Kennedy in phone conversation with Macmillan, October 22, 1962, in May and Zelikow, Kennedy Tapes, pp. 285-286. 1288. NSC Executive Committee Meeting No. 6, October 26, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 11:225. 1289. NSC Executive Committee Meeting No. 7, October 27, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 11:225-226. 1290. NSC Executive Committee meetings 6, 7 and 8, October 26-27, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 11:225-226, 252-255, 264-267; October 27, 1962, White House meetings, May and Zelikow, Kennedy Tapes, pp. 496, 500, 523-528. 1291. October 27 White House meetings, May and Zelikow, Directory: polisci -> faculty -> trachtenberg trachtenberg -> The United States, France, and the Question of German Power, 1945-1960 polisci -> Transylvania university committee on program and curriculum polisci -> Pos 6933: History of American Political Thought Course Description polisci -> Urban politics political science polisci -> International political economy polisci -> J. B. 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