A constructed Peace The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963
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| it was by no means certain that the choice would not quickly slip from his grasp, given the degree of control over the forces which the operational commanders actually possessed." Given the weak command and control system, this study pointed out, "it appeared possible that a battle over Berlin could precipitate a nuclear reaction from NATO forces without authorization from the U.S. Government and even against its wishes." May, Steinbruner and Wolfe, "History of the Strategic Arms Competition," OSD Historical Office, 1981, pp. 589, 596, DOD-FOIA. Emphasis added.
1075. History of Headquarters Strategic Air Command 1961, p. 24, and Strategic Command Control Communications (1959-1964), p. 3, SAC Historical Studies nos. 69 and 98, Office of Air Force History, Bolling Air Force Base, Washington. 1076. Kaysen interview, August 1988; Rosenberg, "Nuclear War Planning," in Michael Howard, George Andreopoulos and Mark Shulman, eds., The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), p. 172; Rosenberg, "Origins of Overkill," pp. 48-49. For the special interest in the command and control problem in NATO Europe, see McNamara to Kennedy, October 7, 1961, DDRS 1992/1866, and NSC Action, "NATO and the Atlantic Nations," March 10, 1962, DDRS 1994/3463. 1077. Lemnitzer to Norstad, January 18, 1962, NSABF. 1078. JSSC talking paper, August 5, 1961, cited in FRUS 1961-63, 8:121-122. 1079. McNamara memorandum, March 1, 1961, POF/77/DoD, Defense Budget/JFKL, quoted in Kaplan, Wizards of Armageddon, p. 273. For the JCS response (which amounted to a refusal to prepare such a "doctrine"), see Lemnitzer to McNamara, April 18, 1961 (with attachment), FRUS 1961-63, 8:74-78. Note also the Hickey report of December 1, 1961, ibid., p. 196n. 1080. Deborah Shapley, Promise and Power: The Life and Times of Robert McNamara (Boston: Little Brown, 1993), pp. 139-140. 1081. Kaysen interview, August 1988. 1082. Kaysen interview, August 1988. For the text of the briefing and an analysis, see Scott Sagan, "SIOP-62: The Nuclear War Plan Briefing to President Kennedy," International Security 12 (Summer 1987): 22-51. 1083. See Paul Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, p. 201, and Finletter to McNamara, Nitze and Rowen, October 17, 1962, an account of the briefing Norstad gave the North Atlantic Council on the MRBM issue that same day, NSF/216/MLF, General, Stikker Paper/JFKL. 1084. For Norstad's views, see especially Stoessel to Fessenden, April 12, 1962, NSABF. 1085. Stoessel to Fessenden, December 18, 1961, 740.5/12-1861, RG 59, USNA. See also Gregory Pedlow, "General Lauris Norstad and the Second Berlin Crisis," unpublished paper, p. 47. 1086. Draft letter from Kennedy to Norstad, October 10, 1961, NSA Berlin file. 1087. Sulzberger, entry for July 24, 1962, Last of the Giants, p. 908. 1088. Pedlow, "Norstad," pp. 54-55. I heard Gallois tell the same story at a conference in Paris in 1992. 1089. For de Gaulle's reaction, see Lemnitzer-de Gaulle meeting, July 23, 1962, NSF/71a/France: General/JFKL. See also French Council of Ministers meeting, July 25, 1962, in Peyrefitte, C'était de Gaulle, pp. 290-292. 1090. Bundy outline for Kennedy's talk to the NSC, January 17, 1962, DDRS 1991/3578. The passage about not being pushed around was deleted from the version of the document released in 1981, and was released only in 1991. For the quotation about the Europeans counting on American military support, but expecting the United States to give them a free hand in the political area, see the notes of Kennedy's remarkable meeting with André Malraux, May 11, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 13:696. This is an extraordinary document; Kennedy had decided to open up and lay out his most basic feelings about U.S.-European relations. Note also Kennedy's remarks in his meeting with Krock a few months earlier. "The President spoke impatiently," Krock wrote, "of the obstacles to this effort"--his attempt to reach a settlement with the Russians--"constantly being set up by the West German and French governments." People like Adenauer and de Gaulle "seemed to want to operate as makers of United States policy and not as allies." Krock-Kennedy meeting, October 11, 1961, Krock Papers, box 1, vol. 3, item 343, Mudd Library, Princeton. See also Gavin to State Department, May 16, 1962, giving de Gaulle's view that America should stay out of European affairs and only bring her power to bear "in case of necessity," and Kennedy to Gavin, May 18, 1962, giving the president's sharp reaction, in FRUS 1961-63, 13:702-704. For Rusk's remark about "gendarmes," see Rusk-Segni meeting, December 12, 1961, NSABF. 1091. Bundy to Kennedy, April 4, 1961, DDRS 1986/2903. 1092. Rusk-Home meeting, September 15, 1961, FO 371/160551, PRO. 1093. Rusk-Home meeting, August 5, 1961, FO 371/160541, PRO. 1094. See especially the president's references to "walking a rickety fence," and to the difficulty of pleasing both Adenauer and the British, in Eisenhower-Herter meeting, March 17, 1959, p. 3, SS/I/6/Berlin, vol. II (1)/DDEL. 1095. Kennedy to Rusk, August 21, 1961, FRUS 1961-63, 14:359. 1096. Berlin coordinating group, June 16, 1961, FRUS 1961-63, 14:119. 1097. Meeting between Kennedy, Acheson, Rusk, McNamara et al, October 20, 1961, FRUS 1961-63, 14:518-519, emphasis in original text. 1098. Acheson Berlin report, c. July 31, 1961, FRUS 1961-63, 14:255, and Rusk's remarks in allied foreign ministers' meeting, August 6, 1961, ibid., p. 300. See also Stoessel to Kohler, August 11, 1961 (for Norstad's view that the allies would accept the "executive agent" plan), NSABF. Rusk brought up the "executive agent" idea again in a meeting with British and French diplomats, October 6, 1961, NSABF. 1099. Policy Directive, April 20, 1961, FRUS 1961-63, 13:288-290; and "A Review of North Atlantic Problems for the Future" (Acheson Report), March 1961, pp. 43-46, 53-62, Records relating to State Department participation in the NSC, Bbx 107, NATO--NSC 6017--Acheson Report, RG 59, USNA. 1100. NSC Executive Committee meeting, February 12, 1963, FRUS 1961-63, 13:497. 1101. Rusk-Stikker meeting, February 7, 1962, p. 3, DDRS 1996/2056. 1102. Kennedy-Macmillan meeting, April 28, 1962, Prem 11/3783, PRO; Bundy paper for Kennedy, "The U.S. and de Gaulle -- The Past and the Future," January 30, 1963, POF/116/JFKL. 1103. Kennedy's Eight Questions to Ball, with Ball's answers, attached to Ball to Kennedy, June 17, 1962, NSF/226/JFKL, and Kennedy quoted in the British record of the Anglo-American meetings at Nassau, December 19, 1962, morning session, p. 9, Prem 11/4229, PRO. The U.S. record is essentially the same; see FRUS 1961-63, 13:1094. Many documents reflect the same basic assumption. See, for example, Rusk to Stoessel (personal), May 5, 1961: "Key question throughout, in my view, is not so much whether France will achieve some sort nuclear weapons capability but effect on German aspirations and thus on NATO of US posture of encouraging French nuclear effort." NSF/70/France--General/JFKL. See also Kennedy to de Gaulle, December 31, 1961, FRUS 1961-63, 14:718; for de Gaulle's response, see LNC 1961-1963, p. 193. 1104. Anglo-American meetings in Washington, April 5-8, 1961, second meeting, p. 1, Cab 133/244, PRO. 1105. Kennedy's Eight Questions to Ball, questions 1 and 2, May 25, 1962, NSF/226/JFKL. The Defense Department was thinking along similar lines. See Nitze-Norstad meeting, April 4, 1962, 711.5611/4-462. Note also McNamara's comment that same month that "before the French could be helped in their nuclear programme they would certainly have to promise to give very comprehensive safeguards and guarantees that they would not pass on knowledge to the West Germans," McNamara-Macmillan meeting, April 29, 1962, p. 28, Prem 11/3783, PRO. 1106. Fessenden to Kohler, March 7, 1962, 751.5611/3-262, Ball to McNamara, March 10, 1962, 751.5611/3-1062, and Kohler to Rusk, April 12, 1962, 740.5611/4-1262, all in RG 59, USNA. Note also the information (which came from McNamara's staff) about a "new turn" in the defense secretary's thinking, in Tyler to Rusk and Ball, July 26, 1962, 740.5611/7-2662, RG 59, USNA. McNamara was thinking about abandoning the MLF "in favor of a multilateral MRBM force geared more directly to US financial needs." The idea was to create a large, all-European force, probably made up largely of missiles deployed on the continent. Tyler, a top State Department official, was against the plan, but he opposed it in part because of what he saw as "the possible need to save such nuclear concessions as US sale or provision of warheads to a European nuclear force until we can see whether these concessions will be needed to balance off concessions we may be seeking in the economic field." 1107. For the debate on nuclear sharing with France and related issues, see Neustadt, "Skybolt and Nassau," pp. 29-30, and Bundy to Kennedy, May 7, 1962, POF/116a/France--Security/JFKL. For some important documents bearing on this debate, see Gavin to Kennedy, March 9, 1962, White House meeting, March 15, 1962; Taylor to Kennedy, April 3, 1962, and enclosure 2; Kennedy-Rusk-McNamara-Bundy meeting, April 16, 1962; and NSAM 147, April 18, 1962; in FRUS 1961-63, 13:687-688, 366-370, 377-380, 384-387. For Ambassador Gavin's efforts in this area three months earlier and the response at that time of other officials, see ibid., pp. 678-679 and 678n. For the judgment about de Gaulle's unappeasability as the decisive factor and the fundamentally pragmatic approach of the Kennedy administration, see Bundy to Kennedy, "The U.S. and de Gaulle -- the Past and the Future," January 30, 1963, p. 7, POF/116/JFKL. When Kennedy met with Malraux on May 11, he noted explicitly that "as for the atomic difficulty, that came because on every other matter there was trouble" (ibid., p. 698), implying that the United States would have taken, and indeed would take, a much more liberal attitude on nuclear sharing if France were more cooperative in other key areas. The idea that de Gaulle would simply take what was offered without changing his basic policy was fairly common at the time: see, for example, Norstad's views in Nitze-Norstad meeting, April 4, 1962, 711.5611/4-462. Finally, note that the Kennedy approach was attacked as too pragmatic by certain key policy makers, who thought the U.S. should oppose the French nuclear force as a matter of principle. See, for example, Gerard Smith and Bowie to Kohler, May 4, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 13:691n. 1108. "A New Approach to France," n.a., April 21, 1961, NSF/70/France--General/ JFKL. 1109. See the Neustadt, "Skybolt and Nassau," pp. 23-26, 71 (for the basic U.S. policy on the British nuclear force in 1961 and 1962), and pp. 46-47 (for the willingness of certain British officials to cooperate with this American policy). On the politics of this issue within Britain, see especially Andrew Pierre, Nuclear Politics: The British Experience with an Independent Strategic Force, 1939-1970 (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), pp. 202-210. Note also an important document written by Sir Norman Brook, the cabinet secretary, "Some Aspects of our Relations with the United States and Europe," January 18, 1961, Cab 133/244. Macmillan had written president-elect Kennedy on December 19, 1960, to suggest joint talks that would deal with the most basic policy issues facing the two countries, and in conjunction with this he asked Brook to set up a group to draft a report on the whole complex of issues relating to NATO, Anglo-American relations and Britain's relations with Europe. See especially the material in FO 371/159671, PRO. Brook argued in the January 18 report that there was "no great need for an independent British contribution to the strategic nuclear deterrent of the West," that it was declining in value in any case, and that by relinquishing at least a certain degree of independence now, while the British force still counted for something, the U.K. might be able to achieve important political goals. France might be kept from building an independent force, and it was crucial to do so, because if France went nuclear, countries like Germany were sure to follow. Other top officials were thinking along similar lines. See Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence, pp. 278, 307. Such views were very much in line with the thinking of the new Kennedy administration, but a bit too much for Macmillan. For Foreign Office views on this complex of issues, and some insight into how they differed from the prime minister's views, see Ramsbotham memo, "The Prime Minister's Visit to General de Gaulle," January 17, 1961, with Schuckburgh minute, FO 371/159671, PRO. For the policy that emerged, and the cool American reaction, see especially the documents in Prem 11/3311, PRO. 1110. Rusk in White House meeting, April 16, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 13:378; Bundy to Aron, May 24, 1962, NSF/71a/France--General/ JFKL; Kennedy to Gavin (draft, probably written by Bundy), n.d., NSF/71a/France, General, 4/1 - 4/12/61/ JFKL. This last document was probably misfiled, and almost certainly dates from the spring of 1962. It contains a reference to Gavin's March 9 letter to Kennedy, and a letter dated March 9, 1962 to the president dealing with this subject was published in FRUS 1961-63, 13:687-688. 1111. Rusk to McNamara, September 8, 1962, 741.5611/5-1862, RG 59, USNA. This passage was deleted from the version of the document in FRUS 1961-63, 13:1080. 1112. Bundy to Kennedy, April 24, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 13:1068. 1113. Anglo-American talks, April 5-8, 1961, second meeting, p. 1, Cab 133/244, PRO; Acheson Report, p. 31, NSF/220/JFKL. 1114. Policy Directive, April 20, 1961, FRUS 1961-63, 13:288; Acheson Report, pp. 54-55, NSF/220/JFKL. 1115. Bundy to McNamara, "Improving the Security of Nuclear Weapons in NATO Europe against Unauthorized Use," NSAM 36, April 6, 1961, NSAM files, JFKL. See also Acheson Berlin Report, June 28, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 14:145. 1116. Feaver, Guarding the Guardians, pp. 183-198; Stein and Feaver, Assuring Control of Nuclear Weapons, pp. 38-39; Scott Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 106. In March 1963, the PAL development and production program was put in the "highest national priority category." NSAM 230, March 22, 1963, NSF/340/JFKL. For further background, see May et al, "History of the Strategic Arms Competition," pp. 589-590, DOD-FOIA. According to this study, based on many still highly classified documents, it became clear in the course of Berlin planning in 1961 that because of the weakness and ambiguity of arrangements for command and control that a "battle over Berlin could precipitate a nuclear reaction from NATO forces without authorization from the U.S. Government and even against its wishes." A task force under General Earle Partridge was then set up to look into the problem of the control of nuclear forces, and the Partridge Committee reported that with the installation of the PALs, the NATO weapons could be made secure against unauthorized use, but that the other side of the coin was that with this system, the vulnerability of the command and control system meant that "positive control"--that is, the assurance that the weapons would actually be used when use was authorized--could not be assured. It was for this reason, moreover, that the PALs could not be installed on the main American strategic forces. This implied a certain downgrading of the NATO force in comparison with the "external forces" like SAC and the Polaris submarine force. And in fact the value of the forces controlled by SACEUR had already been downgraded by "operational rules that gave overriding priority to SIOP execution and precluded attack" on strategic targets by theater commanders. Ibid., p. 468a. 1117. "Mid-Range Ballistic Missiles," n.d., but probably from around September 1960, and "MRBMs in Allied Command Europe," with annex, March 24, 1960, both in Defe 11/312, PRO; British Joint Planning Staff, "NATO Strategy and the Role of NATO Forces," February 23, 1962, JP(62)22(Final), annex, paragraph 26, attached to COS(62)16th meeting, March 1, 1962, Defe 4/143, PRO. 1118. Herter-Norstad meeting, November 4, 1959, 740.5/11-459, RG 59, USNA; Norstad-NAC meeting, June 30, 1961, NP/91/US Support of NATO/DDEL. 1119. See Pedlow, "Norstad," p. 5. 1120. "MRBM's for Europe?" July 6, 1961, n.a., but probably by Owen; Smith to Rusk, January 17, 1961; and Owen to Acheson, March 9, 1961; all in PPS 1957-61/183/Owen, RG 59, USNA. See also Kohler and McGhee to Rusk, October 27, 1961, NSF/216/Multilateral Force--General/JFKL. 1121. FRUS 1961-63, 13:290; Acheson Report, pp.44-45, NSF/220/JFKL. 1122. Acheson to McNamara, July 19, 1961, PPS 1957-61/183/Owen, RG 59, USNA. 1123. Rusk to McNamara, October 29, 1961, FRUS 1961-63, 13:334-335. 1124. Owen to Acheson, March 9, 1961, PPS 1957-61/183/Owen, RG 59, USNA. 1125. Rusk to Finletter, April 25, 1961, giving text of presentation Finletter was to make the next day to the NATO Council, NP/91/US Support of NATO/DDEL. 1126. Watkinson meeting with McNamara et al, March 21, 1961, Defe 13/211, PRO; Kennedy to Norstad, July 21, 1961, DDRS 1997/1738. 1127. See above, pp. xxx-yyy. 1128. Political Directive, April 21, 1961, FRUS 1961-63, 13:289. This particular policy remained intact throughout the Kennedy period. See especially the president's remarks in a meeting on the MLF question held on February 18, 1963, FRUS 1961-63, 13:503, 505. 1129. See, for example, Kennedy to Adenauer, March 29, 1963, FRUS 1961-63, 13:545. 1130. See, for example, Acheson to Kennedy and Rusk, April 20, 1961, Finletter-Adenauer meeting, July 5, 1961, NSC Executive Committee meeting, February 12, 1963, FRUS 1961-63, 13:294-295, 325, and 494. 1131. Bundy to Kennedy, June 15, 1963, FRUS 1961-63, 13:593. Compare this with Bundy's discussion in Danger and Survival, p. 497, which implies that the U.S. government was serious about the idea of a European nuclear force free of an American veto. Evidence showing that this was not the case, incidentally, is sometimes suppressed, even today. The State Department tried to convince a skeptical Kennedy in mid-1962 that the MLF was still feasible by arguing the Europeans might go along if the U.S. continued "to avoid explicitly foreclosing the possibility that such an approach might eventually lead to a force over whose use the US did not exercise a clear and unfettered veto"--that is, if the American government deliberately misled the Europeans on the veto question. This was the one passage deleted from the version of the document released by the Kennedy Library in 1997; it had been left in the version found in the Ball Papers at Princeton a couple of years earlier. Ball to Kennedy, June 17, 1962, with attached memorandum on the president's eight questions, (answer to question no. 4), NSF/226/NATO: Weapons, Cables, France/JFKL; and Ball Papers, box 153, ML. 1132. "NATO and the Atlantic Community," State Department briefing paper, attached to Bundy to Kennedy, April 24, 1961, para. 3, and "MRBM's for Europe?" July 6, 1961, para. 6, both in PPS 1957-61/183/Owen, RG 59, USNA. "Control over Multilateral MRBM Force: NAC Tactics," April 9, 1962, NSF/216/MLF--General/JFKL. Kennedy-Rusk-McNamara-Bundy meeting, April 16, 1962, and Kohler comments in meeting with British officials, June 26, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 13:379, 424. 1133. Sulzberger, entry for December 5, 1961, Last of the Giants, p. 936. 1134. Memorandum for the President, n.a., n.d., FRUS 1961-63, 13:431, and Taylor to Kennedy, July 2, 1962, Taylor Papers [TP], box 35, 6B NATO, National Defense University [NDU], Washington. See also Stoessel to Fessenden, April 10, 1962, DDRS 1991/1912, for more information on Norstad's conflict with the civilians in Washington. Among other things, Norstad felt that the U.S. government was "misleading" its allies on many "matters connected with nuclear forces," and in particular on questions related to external forces like SAC. 1135. Kennedy-Rusk-McNamara-Bundy meeting, April 16, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 13:380. 1136. Meeting with Kennedy, Bundy et al, March 15, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 13:368. 1137. Rusk-Home meeting, May 23, 1963, FRUS 1961-63, 13:581. In November 1961, the Pentagon was considering the developing of a fast reacting, highly mobile, and very accurate MRBM, to be deployed in Europe, but at a high-level meeting held to discuss funding for the project, it was "vigorously attacked by Bundy on political grounds." Meeting between McNamara, Bundy, Sorensen et al, on defense budget, November 3, 1961, from the TP/NDU, provided by Reynolds Salerno. In 1963, Bundy admitted that a sea-based force made little sense in military terms, and that in fact "ships look silly when you consider the alternatives." Anglo-American meeting, June 28, 1963, p. 6, DOD-FOIA 91-03459. 1138. Memorandum for the Record, June 13, 1962, TP/35/NATO 1961/NDU; Memorandum for the President, June 13, 1962, TP/35/MRBMS/NDU, both quoted from and cited in an unpublished paper by Reynolds Salerno on the MRBM question. 1139. Memorandum for General Taylor, June 1, 1963, TP/39/MLF/NDU. Salerno, in the paper mentioned in the previous note, tells the whole story and quotes at length from this document. The British, incidentally, according to the account in the June 1 memorandum, were now told by supporters of the MLF that the JCS finding proved that the scheme made military sense. This was in spite of the fact that McNamara himself had told the British defense minister that the plan had little military utility. McNamara's views were cited by Thorneycroft in a meeting with Rusk on May 23, 1963, FRUS 1961-63, 13:580. 1140. For McNamara's views, see high-level meetings, November 30 and December 16, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 13:446-447 and 1088-89; and especially McNamara-von Hassel meeting, February 28, 1963, McNamara Papers [MP], box 133, Memcons with Germans, RG 200, USNA. 1141. Nitze-Laloy meeting, September 25, 1962, 740.5/9-2562, RG 59, USNA. See also Neustadt, "Skybolt and Nassau," pp. 23, 26, 28, 71, 76. In 1963, Rusk noted that "the real genesis" of the MLF project "was an effort to keep 600 MRBM's out of Germany"--which was not quite accurate, but which nonetheless reflects the basic thinking behind the proposal. Anglo-American meeting, June 28, 1963, DOS FOIA 91-03459. 1142. NSC Executive Committee meeting, February 12, 1963, FRUS 1961-63, 13:499. For Kennedy's skepticism, see the notes of three high-level meetings, March 15, 1962, and February 5 and 18, 1963, ibid., pp. 173-174, 367, 502-503. Note also Bohlen's characterization of the scheme as a "fraud" in a letter to Kennedy of February 16, 1963, ibid., p. 760. 1143. L. Wainstein et al, "The Evolution of U.S. Strategic Command and Control and Warning, 1945-1972," pp. 283-284, Institute for Defense Analyses, June 1975, DOD-FOIA and also NSA. David Rosenberg gave me a copy of this study and also opened my eyes to its importance. On the point about targeting being the same for a first as for a second strike, see Kistiakowsky to Eisenhower, FRUS 1958-60, 3:492, and also Admiral Burke's comments in Rosenberg, "Origins of Overkill," pp. 7-8. 1144. McNamara remarks, NATO ministerial meeting, May 5, 1962, pp. 3-4, DOD-FOIA 79-481. 1145. Ibid., pp. 9-10. Emphasis added. 1146. Ibid., pp. 11-12. 1147. U.S.-German meeting, June 22, 1962, and Bohlen paper, July 2, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 13:420, 430. See also Albert Wohlstetter, "Nuclear Sharing: NATO and the N+1 Country," Directory: polisci -> faculty -> trachtenberg trachtenberg -> The United States, France, and the Question of German Power, 1945-1960 polisci -> Transylvania university committee on program and curriculum polisci -> Pos 6933: History of American Political Thought Course Description polisci -> Urban politics political science polisci -> International political economy polisci -> J. B. Weter History Honors Fellowship, Stanford University (1965-66) polisci -> Handbook on Migration and Social Policy trachtenberg -> The Economic Decline and Soviet Foreign Policy trachtenberg -> Assessing Soviet Economic Performance during the Cold War: a failure of Intelligence? Download 2.48 Mb. Share with your friends:
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