A constructed Peace The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963
Download 2.48 Mb.
|
| Last of the Giants, p. 961. De Gaulle made the same point to Rusk a few months later; these remarks were in line with what he had told Adenauer in July 1960. See Rusk-de Gaulle meeting, April 8, 1963, NSF/72/France-General/JFKL; Schwarz, Adenauer, 2:566.
1367. De Gaulle, Discours et messages, 4:78. 1368. De Gaulle-Adenauer meeting, January 21, 1963, AAPBD 1963, 1:117-118. 1369. See, for example, NSC Executive Committee no. 39, January 31, 1963, FRUS 1961-63, 13:157. 1370. NSC Executive Committee meetings nos. 38, 39 and 40, January 25, January 31 and February 5, 1963, FRUS 1961-63, 13:156, 162-163, 178, 488-490. 1371. Kennedy to Gavin, May 18, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 13:704. 1372. NSC Executive Committee meetings nos. 38 and 39, January 25 and 31, 1963, FRUS 1961-63, 13:163, 489. 1373. NSC Executive Committee meeting no. 40, February 5, 1963, FRUS 1961-63, 13:175-176. See also Dean Acheson, "Reflections on the January Debacle," January 31, 1963, esp. pp. 3-5, NSF/316/Ex Comm Meetings 38-42/JFKL. 1374. Knappstein to Schröder, January 23, 28 and 30, 1963; Adenauer-Dowling meeting, January 24, 1963; Knappstein to Foreign Office, January 28, 1963; Carstens memo, February 9, 1963; AAPBD 1963, vol. 1, documents 49, 50, 52, 58, 65 and 88. Kennedy to Adenauer, February 1, 1963, FRUS 1961-63, 13:164. Acheson-Knappstein meeting, January 30, 1963, AP/SDWHA/HSTL (NLT 92-13). The basic story was clear enough at the time. See, for example, d'Harcourt, L'Allemagne d'Adenauer à Erhard, pp. 173, 176, 179. 1375. Kennedy to Adenauer, February 1, 1963, FRUS 1961-63, 13:164; Krone diary, January 25, 1963, Adenauer-Studien 3:173; Schwarz, Adenauer, 2:823. 1376. Rusk-Brentano meeting, March 22, 1963, FRUS 1961-63, 13:191. 1377. Anglo-American meetings, June 27-30, 1963, pp. 9, 10, Prem 11/4586, PRO. This was a common theme in Rusk's meetings with foreign leaders. See, for example, Rusk-Schröder meeting, September 20, 1963, AAPBD 1963, 2:1165. 1378. See also Gilpatric-Adenauer meeting, February 13, 1963, AAPBD 1963, 1:303, 307. 1379. On October 2, 1962, Bundy had told Adenauer that none of the three major European allies would lead Europe, but that Europe would instead by led by America; the chancellor was very upset when he heard this. Osterheld, Adenauers letzte Kanzlerjahre, pp. 147-148; Adenauer-de Margerie meeting, June 11, 1963, AAPBD 1963, 2:621; Hermann Kusterer, Der Kanzler und der General (Stuttgart: Neske, 1995), p. 293. This new American attitude was clear even to the public at the time. See especially Sulzberger's columns in the New York Times, October 20-24, 1962. Kennedy's remarks to the press in a background interview after the Nassau conference were taken as indicating a hardening of the American attitude in this area. See Partial Transcript of a Background Press Interview at Palm Beach, December 31, 1962, PPP Kennedy, 1962: 915, and the report this gave rise to in Le Monde of January 3, 1963, "President Kennedy Has Decided to Direct the Western Alliance Without Bothering Himself Too Much with Possible Objections of His Allies," cited in Newhouse, De Gaulle and the Anglo-Saxons, pp. 229-230. 1380. NSC meeting, January 22, 1963, FRUS 1961-63, 13:486. 1381. Sulzberger, entry for June 6, 1963, Last of the Giants, p. 985. Emphasis his. 1382. Schwarz, Adenauer 2:826, 836; Daniel Koerfer, Kampf ums Kanzleramt: Erhard und Adenauer (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1988), p. 723; "Erhard Challenges Paris Pact After Moving to Oust Adenauer," New York Times, February 6, 1963. On the SPD, see Bahr-Hillenbrand-Creel meeting, February 21, 1963, DOSCF for 1963, POL 4 France-West Germany. 1383. Schwarz, Adenauer, 2:810-839; Koerfer, Kampf ums Kanzleramt, pp. 707-751; d'Harcourt, L'Allemagne d'Adenauer à Erhard, pp. 161-194. 1384. The best study in English is Stephen J. Artner, A Change of Course: The West German Social Democrats and NATO, 1957-1961 (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1985); see esp. pp. 165, 167, 174-182. 1385. Adenauer was very bitter about these developments, and his reaction was a measure of the importance of these changes. He considered the shift in the SPD line to be fraudulent; but many people were taken in by it, and this he considered extremely dangerous. He and Strauss were particularly disturbed, especially right before the 1961 elections, by the new American ties with the SPD. Adenauer and Strauss in CDU Bundesvorstand. September 22, 1960, and August 25, 1961, CDU-BV, 1957-61, pp. 850, 1017-1018. 1386. For some examples, see Dulles-Eisenhower meeting, August 11, 1955, FRUS 1955-57, 5:546; Dulles-Grewe-Dittmann meeting, January 14, 1959, Dulles-de Gaulle meeting, February 6, 1959, and Dulles-Adenauer meeting, February 7, 1959; in FRUS 1958-60, 8:267, 333, 339. For the use of the argument in late 1962 and 1963, see for example the Rusk-Brandt meeting, September 29, 1962, and the Rusk-Schröder meeting, September 24, 1963, FRUS 1961-63, 15:343, 582. 1387. On these matters in general, see Schwarz, Adenauer, 2:660-666, 822-823 (for the views of the chancellor's former right-hand man Blankenhorn), 841 (for the views of foreign minister Schröder). Krone diary, August 18, 1961, Adenauer-Studien, 3:162, and d'Harcourt, L'Allemagne d'Adenauer à Erhard, pp. 70-71, 211, 217-218. For an interesting American analysis of the internal political situation in Germany and its relation to American policy, see Carl Kaysen, "Thoughts on Berlin," August 22, 1961, esp. pp. 1-2, 6, NSF/82/Kaysen Memo/JFKL. Kaysen noted the important changes that had taken place within Germany since the official American position on the German question had taken shape under Eisenhower; he stressed the major shift that had taken place within the SPD; and all this, he argued, increased America's freedom of action vis-à-vis Germany. 1388. Rusk in Rusk-Mikoyan meeting, November 30, 1962, and Kohler in Kohler-Semenov meeting, December 3, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 15:451, 456-457. 1389. Rusk-Gromyko meeting, August 6, 1963, FRUS 1961-63, 15:560. 1390. Khrushchev-Rusk meetings, August 5 and 9, 1963, FRUS 1961-63, 15:553 (for Khrushchev's chiding of Rusk), 567 (for the quotations). 1391. Rusk-Khrushchev meeting, August 9, 1963, FRUS 1961-63, 15:567. 1392. Rusk-Gromyko meeting, October 2, 1963, pp. 10-12, DOSCF for 1963, POL-GER, RG 59, USNA; Rusk-Mikoyan meeting, November 30, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 15:452. 1393. Rusk-Gromyko meeting, August 6, 1963, FRUS 1961-63, 15:561. 1394. Rusk-Dobrynin meeting, August 8, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 7:546. See also Dobrynin's remarks in a meeting with his German colleague Knappstein, February 17, 1963, and Khrushchev's comments in a meeting with German ambassador Groepper, March 9, 1963, AAAPD 1963, 1:330, 381-382. Western officials generally recognized that this Soviet concern was very real. Kohler, for example, referred to the prospect of a German nuclear capability as "a very sensitive Soviet nerve"; Kohler to Bruce, February 8, 1963, HP/540/Test Ban Treaty/LOC. 1395. For the criticism of Khrushchev in 1961, see Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War, p. 261. For the disapproval of Khrushchev's actions in 1962 and the sharp attack on his adventuristic policy at the time of his fall in 1964, see Fursenko and Naftali, "One Hell of a Gamble," pp. 125, 180, 353-354. 1396. Meeting between Romanov and a high British official, March 21, 1963, Prem 11/4495, PRO. See also Rusk-Mikoyan meeting, November 30, 1963, p. 4, DOS- FOIA 91-03439 (the relevant section of the document was not published in FRUS). For various documents giving the standard U.S. response, see FRUS 1961-63, 7:503n, 543, 546, 673, 704. 1397. A leading State Department analyst, Raymond Garthoff, thought the Soviet reaction was quite understandable. The basic lines of the story, he wrote, were clear to the Russians: first assurances, as late as 1950, that "West Germany should never be rearmed," then the 1954 agreements establishing a framework for a limited German rearmament, and finally "the nuclear-armed German fighter-bombers on strip alert today." "Soviet Reactions to NATO Developments," January 4, 1963, pp. 2-3, Ball Papers/154/ML. The French, like the Russians, thought the Germans viewed the MLF as a stepping stone to a full nuclear capability. See, for example, Bohlen-Couve meeting, March 23, 1963, in Bohlen to Rusk, March 26, 1963, NSF/72/France--General/JFKL. 1398. The Soviet view was clear at the time. See, for example, "Moscow Assails Paris-Bonn Pact as Peace Threat: Notes Reported to Discuss Possibility of Germans' Getting Atom Arms," New York Times, February 6, 1963. 1399. Khrushchev-Harriman meeting, July 27, 1963, and Khrushchev-Rusk meeting, August 9, 1963, FRUS 1961-63, 15:543-544, 568-569. The Soviet leader had earlier referred to West Berlin variously as an "ulcer," a "running sore," a "rotten tooth," the "balls" of the West, and as a thorn in his side. 1400. Rusk-Alphand meeting, February 28, 1963, FRUS 1961-63, 7:652. See also Rusk-Dobrybin meeting, August 8, 1962, and Rusk-Adenauer meeting, August 10, 1963, FRUS 1961-63, 7:544-546, 874. 1401. See Soutou, "De Gaulle, Adenauer und die gemeinsame Front," p. 505. 1402. For an elaboration of the point, see Marc Trachtenberg, "The Past and Future of Arms Control," Daedalus, Winter 1991, esp. p. 213. Note also Couve's comment along these lines quoted on p. xxx below. 1403. For the evidence and a brief discussion, see Appendix Seven, "U.S. Arms Control Policy under Eisenhower" [IS]. Note especially Dulles's remarks in a meeting with Adenauer, May 28, 1957, FRUS 1955-57, 26:272, 274-275. 1404. Dulles-Gromyko meeting, October 5, 1957, p. 3, DDRS 1991/925. 1406. Kennedy-Khrushchev meeting, June 4, 1961, FRUS 1961-63, 7:88. On the limited impact of a test ban on the strategic balance, see Harold Brown, "Questions bearing upon the resumption of atomic weapons testing," in McNamara to NSC, May 15, 1961; Kaysen to Kennedy, January 15, 1962; Foster in NSC, July 9, 1963; in FRUS 1961-63, 7:63-64, 297-303, 784. On non-proliferation as the key argument for a test ban treaty: Kennedy in meeting with Rusk et al, July 27, 1962; Kennedy to Khrushchev, September 15, 1962; and especially Nitze's remarks in a top-level meeting, June 14, 1963; FRUS 1961-63, 7:512, 569, 725. The British saw things much the same way. See for example Macmillan's views in a meeting with Rusk, June 24, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 7:471. The French also understood that the main effect of a test ban would be to prevent new nuclear powers from emerging, and it was for this reason that in 1958 they opposed the idea. See, for example, Couve's remarks to Brentano, September 14, 1958, DDF 1958 2:348-349. But in 1961, after France had become a nuclear power, the French defense minister told his British counterpart that he was aware that the Germans "might well wish to be a member of the nuclear club when the French had their own deterrent," but he was "confident that with the help of a nuclear test agreement the Germans could be kept out." Watkinson-Messmer meeting, April 13, 1961, Defe 13/211, PRO. 1407. Harriman quoted in Hailsham to Macmillan, July 18, 1963, FO 371/171223, PRO. 1408. Bundy to Kennedy, November 8, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 7:598. 1409. Kennedy to Harriman, July 15, 1963, FRUS 1961-63, 7:801. 1410. Seaborg diary, entry for February 8, 1963, quoted in FRUS 1961-63, 7:646. See also Kennedy's remarks in the NSC meeting of January 22, 1963, quoted in Gordon Chang, Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), p. 237. 1411. Anglo-American meetings, June 27-30, 1963, p. 16, Prem 11/4586, PRO. 1412. Rusk-Mikoyan meeting, November 30, 1962, DOS FOIA 91-03439. 1413. From a paper by the deputy director of the Arms Control and Disarmament agency, June 20, 1963, FRUS 1961-63, 7:732. This paper presented the "line of thought" that had evolved from discussions among key U.S. officials. Kaysen to Kennedy, June 20, 1963, ibid., p. 728n. 1414. From the draft instructions to the U.S. negotiators, quoted in Kaysen, "Non-diffusion of nuclear weapons," July 9, 1963, HP/541/Test Ban Treaty (8)/LOC. The language in the final draft was more guarded, but the passage quoted shows what the real thinking was at the time. 1415. The French case will be discussed later in this chapter. It is interesting to note that McNamara put France and Israel on the same plane, as two countries whose acceptance of a test ban agreement would require a mix of incentives and disincentives; the "sharing of weapons information" (meaning nuclear weapons information) was the main incentive he had in mind. McNamara to Kennedy, February 12, 1963 (draft), Vice President Security File, Box 7, Disarmament Proposals, February 1963, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin. For a discussion of the Israeli case, see Appendix Eight, "Kennedy and the Israeli Nuclear Program" [IS]. 1416. Chang, Friends and Enemies, pp. 241, 243, 244; William Foster Oral History, p. 37, DDRS 1995/1874.. 1417. Bundy to Kennedy, November 8, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 7:598, especially the sanitized paragraph E. 1418. Taylor memo for Joint Strategic Survey Council, December 6, 1962, CJCS Taylor/ CM File, RG 218, USNA. 1419. LeMay to McNamara, April 29, 1963, FRUS 1961-63, 7:689-690. 1420. Rice to Harriman, June 21, 1963, HP/539/Test Ban Treaty (1)/LOC. 1421. Anglo-American meetings, June 27-30, 1963, p. 15, Prem 11/4586, PRO. 1422. Kennedy to Harriman, July 15, 1963, FRUS 1961-63, 7:801. 1423. Foreign Office brief, "U.S. Attitude on Collateral Measures and Non-dissemination," December 13, 1962, Cab 133/245, PRO. 1424. Macmillan to Kennedy, March 16, 1963, in C(63)61, Cab 129/113, PRO. 1425. Rusk-Gromyko meeting, March 22, 1962, and "Draft Principles" paper, FRUS 1961-63, 15:67, 69-71. There were other aspects to the plan, but Berlin and the "nuclear diffusion" question were the two most important issues, a point which Carstens, for example, recognized on May 22. Dowling telegram, May 22, 1962, ibid., p. 155n. 1426. Rusk-Gromyko meeting, March 26, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 15:81, 85. 1427. Kennedy-Brentano meeting, April 30, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 15:127. Note also Rusk's remarks in Rusk-Schröder meeting, p. 2, June 22, 1962, NSA Berlin File. 1428. Rusk-Gromyko meeting, July 24, 1962, Rusk-Dobrynin meeting, August 8, 1962, and oral message from Gromyko to Rusk, August 23, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 7:503n, 544-546, 557-559. See also Rusk to Kennedy, November 27, 1962, 700.5611/11-2762, RG 59, USNA. 1429. Instructions to Harriman, July 10, 1963, FRUS 1961-63, 7:786; Kaysen memorandum, July 9, 1963, HP/541/Test Ban Treaty (8)/LOC. 1430. Khrushchev-Harriman meetings, April 26 and July 27, 1963, and Harriman telegram, April 28, 1963, FRUS 1961-63, 15:510-511, 510n, 540, 543. 1431. Khrushchev-Harriman meeting, July 27, 1963, FRUS 1961-63, 7:862; "Draft Scope Paper of Harriman-Hailsham Mission with reference to Non-aggression Pact," July 7, 1963, probably by W.R. Tyler, HP/539/Test Ban Treaty (1)/LOC. 1432. "Elements for a Package Deal with Moscow," n.a., July 3, 1963, NSF/365/ACDA--Disarmament--Harriman Trip (3)/JFKL. The term had been used earlier. See, for example, Thompson memo, "Possible Berlin Solutions," c. November 9, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 15:423-424. Note also Klein to Bundy, May 17, 1962, ibid., p. 152. 1433. Kaysen to Bundy, June 28, 1963, FRUS 1961-63, 7:751; the State Department line was laid out in Bruce to Harriman and Foster, June 27, 1963, ibid., pp. 744-746. 1434. Seaborg diary, June 21, 1963; NSC meeting, July 9, 1963; Kennedy-Harriman meeting, July 10, 1963; in FRUS 1961-63, 7:735, 780-781, 790. Note also Merchant to Ball, June 17, 1963, and Harriman to Merchant, June 20, 1963, HP/537/Test Ban Treaty (1)/LOC. Merchant opposed the idea of weakening on the MLF in the talks with Russia, and Harriman reassured him: "Don't worry -- I am not going to be negotiating in areas that need bother you." 1435. Anglo-American talks, June 27-30, 1963, p. 19, Prem 11/4586, PRO. 1436. Home-Harriman meeting, July 12, 1963, FO 371/171222, PRO. 1437. For various documents showing Kennedy's interest in working out an arrangement with the French, and showing the efforts that we made in this area, see FRUS 1961-63, 7:646, 727, 781, 797n., 801n., 828n., 851-853, and AAPBD 2:805-806. See also Ball to Bohlen, September 25, 1963, pp. 7-8, NSF/72/JFKL. 1438. Harriman-Gromyko meeting, July 17, 1963, FRUS 1961-63, 7:806. 1439. Rusk-Dobrynin meeting, May 18, 1963, p. 5, DOSCF for 1963, Pol US-USSR, RG 59, USNA. 1440. Kennedy-Gromyko meeting, October 10, 1963, in State Department to Finletter, October 22, 1963, DOSCF for 1963, Pol US-USSR, RG 59, USNA. 1441. Khrushchev-Harriman meetings, April 26 and July 27, 1963, FRUS 1961-63, 15:510, 543. Note also Semenov-Tyler meeting, October 10, 1963, and Semenov-Scott meeting, October 3, 1963, in which the "senior Soviet expert on Germany" took a very moderate line on Berlin, FRUS 1961-63, vols. 13-15, mic. supp., no. 432. 1442. The idea of using this threat had been around for some time. See, for example, Komer to Bundy, July 20, 1961, in FRUS 1961-63, vols. 13-15, mic. supp., no. 361. Bundy took up the argument in January 1962. He thought that the dangers they were running had to be brought home to the Soviets. Those dangers, he said, were "not hard to spell out." They related among other things to "German revanchism" and to the "diffusion of nuclear weapons." Draft memorandum for the president, January 15, 1962, enclosed in Bundy to Rusk, January 15, 1962, 762.00/1-1562, RG 59, USNA. For Kennedy's use of the argument, see Kennedy-Adzhubei meeting, January 31, 1962, and Kennedy to Khrushchev, February 15, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 14:782, 821, and Kennedy-Dobrynin meeting, July 17, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 15:224. See also Rusk's comment in a meeting with the British and French on February 13 that by "pressing on Berlin too hard," the Russians "might force the Western Powers to allow Germany to acquire a national nuclear capability and thus cause a major change in Power relationships." Ormsby Gore to Foreign Office, February 14, 1962, FO 371/163567. For the U.S. account, see FRUS 1961-63, 14:809. 1443. Carstens-Kohler meeting and Schröder-Rusk-Carstens-Kohler meeting, both March 11, 1962, NSABF. 1444. Couve de Murville speech to French National Assembly, October 29, 1963, quoted in U.S. Embassy Paris to State Department, October 30, 1963, NSF/73/France--General/JFKL. The de Gaulle remark is quoted in David Schoenbrun, Directory: polisci -> faculty -> trachtenberg trachtenberg -> The United States, France, and the Question of German Power, 1945-1960 polisci -> Transylvania university committee on program and curriculum polisci -> Pos 6933: History of American Political Thought Course Description polisci -> Urban politics political science polisci -> International political economy polisci -> J. B. Weter History Honors Fellowship, Stanford University (1965-66) polisci -> Handbook on Migration and Social Policy trachtenberg -> The Economic Decline and Soviet Foreign Policy trachtenberg -> Assessing Soviet Economic Performance during the Cold War: a failure of Intelligence? Download 2.48 Mb. Share with your friends:
|