A constructed Peace The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963
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| Anglo-American Defense Relations 1939-1984: The Special Relationship, 2nd ed. (New York: St. Martin's, 1984), p. 90 (for Eisenhower's description of the McMahon Act "as one of the most deplorable incidents in American history, of which he personally felt ashamed").
685. NSC meeting, August 25, 1960, FRUS 1958-60, 7(1):619-620. 686. Eisenhower-Bowie meeting, August 16, 1960, FRUS 1958-60, 7(1):612; see also Eisenhower-Spaak meeting, October 4, 1960, ibid., p. 640. 687. Eisenhower meeting with Gaither committee, November 4, 1957, FRUS 1955-57, 19:623; and Eisenhower-Spaak meeting, October 4, 1960, FRUS 1958-60, 7(1):640. 688. See, for example, Haskell to Nolting, November 3, 1959, enclosed in Haskell to Burgess, November 4, 1959, 740.5/11-459, RG 59, USNA. 689. Meeting of British defense minister with Secretary of Defense Wilson, Admiral Radford and Gordon Gray, December 12, 1956, Defe 7/1162, PRO. 690. Powell notes of meeting with Gray, December 14, 1956, Defe 7/1162, PRO. The State Department earlier in the year had been upset by Gray's dealings with the British; one official in January had "expressed incredulity at report that the United States was proposing to 'turn the control of the IRBM over to the British.'" Ian Clark, Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship: Britain's Deterrent and America, 1957-1962 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994), p. 47. Note also the way the top British atomic energy official described the proposed custody arrangements to the French in December 1957. The custody question was "largely artificial," he said; the same kind of fiction that applied to the American weapons--that they were under AEC and not military control--would also apply to the weapons in the NATO stockpile. Chauvel to Pineau, December 11, 1957, DDF 1957, 2:879-880. Macmillan, it should be noted, saw the IRBM deployment as giving Britain "a rocket deterrent long before we could hope to produce one ourselves." See Baylis, Anglo-American Defense Relations, pp. 89-90. 691. Pineau meeting with U.S. Defense Department officials, November 20, 1957, FRUS 1955-57, 27:202. 692. Quarles-Dulles meeting, December 27, 1957, DSP/69597/ML. 693. Dulles-Pineau meeting, November 19, 1957, 740.5/11-1957, RG 59, USNA (for the U.S. record), and DDR 1957, 2:712 (for the French record). Emphasis added. 694. Defense Department background paper on IRBMs for NATO Heads of Government meeting, circulated December 6, 1957, DSP/229/106963. A week earlier, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, deferring to the basic Eisenhower-Dulles policy, had endorsed the "principle that it is to the mutual advantage of the United States and the host country to plan for the gradual and eventual assumption of manning and control responsibilities of certain units by indigenous forces." JCS to Secretary of Defense, November 27, 1957, CCS 092 Western Europe (3-12-48), RG 218. There was some question about how far this policy should be carried. Some State Department people, for example, were worried about "the Turks misusing IRBMs," but Norstad pointed out that the U.S. could "drag out indefinitely" arrangements under which the weapons would remain under U.S. control; he noted that the Turks "were obviously not ready" to take control of the weapons "immediately." Norstad-Dulles meeting, February 4, 1959, DSP/243/123621. 695. Eisenhower-Norstad meeting, June 9, 1959, FRUS 1958-60, 7(1):462. 696. The Bowie Report of August 1960, "The North Atlantic Nations: Tasks for the 1960's," called for a NATO force that would not be subject to an American veto. See the full text of the report, especially pp. 7-8, and 66, which was made available through the Nuclear History Program in 1991. (The passages referring to a "veto-free NATO strategic force" and so on were deleted from the sanitized version of the part of the report published two years later in FRUS 1958-60, 7(1), p. 623. For Eisenhower's general support for the Bowie approach, see Bowie-Eisenhower meeting, August 16, 1960, and Eisenhower-Merchant-Gates meeting, October 3, 1945, FRUS 1958-60, 7(1): 611-614, 634-635. For the idea of a withering away of the U.S. troop presence down to the single-division level, and the related notion of European-controlled force, see Eisenhower-Herter meeting, October 16, 1959, FRUS 1958-60, 9:70. For Eisenhower's reference to taking all six American divisions out, see NSC meeting, August 18, 1959, FRUS 1958-60, 7(2):249--a passage, incidentally, that had been deleted from the version of the document declassified in 1990. 697. See in general the discussion in chapter 5, pp. xxx-yyy, and especially n. xxx. For Eisenhower's remark that the issue was academic, see Eisenhower-Spaak meeting, October 4, 1960, FRUS 1958-60, 7(1):641. 698. Roberts to Lloyd, "General de Gaulle's Attitude to NATO," December 3, 1959, Prem 11/3002, PRO. See also Norstad's remarks in his meeting with Adenauer, December 16, 1957, p. 2, DDRS 1987/563. 699. Vernon Walters, Silent Missions (Garden City: Doubleday, 1978), pp. 502-503. See also de Gaulle-Norstad meeting, January 21, 1960, FRUS 1958-60, 7(1):568. As noted in the previous chapter, this sort of thinking had already taken hold during the Gruenther period. Norstad's predecessor had called at the end of 1955 for an air defense system which would include arrangements from the "timely" implementation of NATO "atomic strike plans." Gruenther's proposal is described in two JCS documents from late 1955 and early 1956, cited in JCS History, 6:144. 700. The quotation is from a British paraphrase of a study by the NATO command, "MRBMs in Allied Command Europe," annex to UKNMR/8/6(431), March 24, 1960, Defe 11/312, PRO. Emphasis in original text. 701. The central importance of this issue is reflected in a great many documents, especially from the end of the Eisenhower period. See, for example, Norstad's remarks in a meeting with top U.S. officials, August 2, 1960, DDRS 1989/2751, and Kohler's comments in meeting with Spaak, June 13, 1960, NP/Policy File/NATO General (4)/DDEL. 702. Eisenhower-Macmillan meeting, March 28, 1960, FRUS 1958-60, 9:260-261. Even in 1951 and 1952, Eisenhower had felt that the overriding goal had to be to get Germany to come in "wholeheartedly on our side in the struggle against Communism," and had little patience for French concerns about Germany getting too much power. See, for example, his diary for July 2, 1951, and Eisenhower to Truman, February 9, 1952, Eisenhower Papers, 12:399 and 13:959-960; and also NSC meeting, November 12, 1959, FRUS 1958-60, 7(1):511. 703. See especially Owen to Courtney, February 26, 1960, Records relating to atomic energy, box 384, Regional Programs: NATO, RG 59, USNA. 704. Note in this context an exchange between Eisenhower and his national security advisor, Gordon Gray. There had been something of a stir after the president had endorsed the idea of nuclear sharing at a press conference on February 3, 1960. Eisenhower, as he himself noted, had simply said "what he believed and what he had said before," and Gray agreed: "I observed to the President that I had heard him say the same thing at least four times in NSC meetings in forceable terms but that the State Department hadn't really agreed." Gray-Eisenhower meeting, February 9, 1960, OSANSA/SA/P/4/1960-Meetings with the President-vol. I (7)/DDEL. 705. On the specific problems relating to nuclear cooperation with France, see Eisenhower-Macmillan meeting, June 9, 1958, DDRS 1987/2777 (for a reference to Congress being "pretty sore at the French," thus making a change in the law "very doubtful"); NSC meeting, October 29, 1959, FRUS 1958-60, 7(2):292 (for evidence that opposition to nuclear assistance to France was rooted in a sense that the French were "out of step in NATO"); and Gates-McCone-Dillon meeting, August 24, 1960, NP/85/Atomic-Nuclear Policy 1960 (2)/DDEL (for the persuasive Norstad argument "that it would be bad policy to reward General de Gaulle" with nuclear sharing "after his continuous non-cooperation with NATO"). 706. See, for example, NSC meeting, August 18, 1959, p. 16, DDRS 1990/890. 707. Eisenhower-Norstad meeting, August 3, 1960, FRUS 1958-60, 7(1):610. 708. On the FIG agreements, see Colette Barbier, "Les négociations franco-germano-italiennes en vue de l'établissement d'une coopération militaire nucléaire au cours des années 1956-1958," Eckart Conze, "La coopération franco-germano-italienne dans le domaine nucléaire dans les années 1957-1958: un point de vue allemand," and Leopoldo Nuti, "Le rôle de l'Italie dans les négociations trilatérales, 1957-1958," all in the Revue d'histoire diplomatique (1990), nos. 1-2; Peter Fischer: "Das Projekt einer trilateralen Nuclear-cooperation," Historisches Jahrbuch 112 (1992): 143-156, and also pp. 125-129 in Fischer's article, "Die Reaktion der Bundesregierung auf die Nuklearisierung der westlichen Verteidigung," Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen 52 (1993); Schwarz, Adenauer, 2:332, 394-401; and above all Georges-Henri Soutou, "Les accords de 1957 et 1958: vers une communauté stratégique et nucléaire entre la France, l'Allemagne et l'Italie?" in Maurice Vaïsse, ed., La France et l'atome: Etudes d'histoire nucléaire (Brussels: Bruylant, 1994). Another scholar has pointed out that high French military officers (Generals Stehlin and Valluy) had raised the issue of nuclear cooperation with the top German military officer, General Heusinger--in America, incidentally--as early as July 1956. Christian Greiner, "Zwischen Integration und Nation: Die militärische Eingliederung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in die NATO, 1954 bis 1957," in L. Herbst, ed., Westdeutschland 1945-1955: Unterwerfung, Kontrolle, Integration (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1986), p. 275; also cited in Greiner's article in Anfänge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik, 3:737, 739. For the most complete account of the FIG affair, see Soutou, L'Alliance incertaine, chapters 3 and 4. 709. Georges-Henri Soutou, "Les problèmes de sécurité dans les rapports franco-allemands de 1956 à 1963," Relations internationales, no. 58 (summer 1989), p. 229. 710. See, for example, Smith to Dulles, March 3, 1958, and Elbrick to Dulles, on "production of nuclear weapons in Europe" (with Smith concurrence), March 6, 1958, PPS records, 1957-61, box 151, Europe 1958. 711. Dulles-Adenauer meeting, December 14, 1957, DDRS 1987/750. The idea may have been planted in the Americans' minds by the French. A few weeks earlier, France's NATO ambassador, had proposed a NATO "mechanism involving a common effort in the field of modern weapons, including evaluation, production and common use." Thurston to Timmons, October 29, 1957, 740.5611/10-2957, RG 59, USNA. For the development of the NATO nuclear authority idea by Dulles's subordinates in the State Department, see "Franco-German Italian Collaboration in the Production of Nuclear Weapons," enclosed in Smith to Dulles, March 3, 1958, PPS 1957-61, box 151, Europe 1958, RG 59, USNA. 712. Elbrick to Dulles, April 24, 1958, FRUS 1958-60, 7(1):318. Note also Quarles's remarks in meeting with Pineau and McElroy, November 20, 1957, FRUS 1955-57, 27:203. 713. For McElroy's views, see, for example, NSC meeting, July 16, 1959, FRUS 1958-60, 3:261. The defense secretary "disassociated" himself personally here from the views of his own department. As McElroy's remark indicates, the bureaucratic politics of this issue is not easy to sort out. Each of the three major governments involved--France, Germany and the United States--was divided within itself on these matters, and those factional differences interacted with each other in a fairly complex way. See Appendix Four, "The Politics of the Nuclear Sharing Question" [IS]. 714. Pineau-Dulles meeting, November 19, 1957, DDF 1957, 2:713. For an extract from the president's speech, see DDRS 1987/558. A background paper outlined what the U.S. government wanted to accomplish: "A European production capacity for such missiles should be established in the near future. A European missile research and development capacity to design future missile types should also get underway now. U.S. transfer of missile technology will be essential to the success of any such venture. U.S. disclosure policy must be modified to enable this." Nuclear policy background paper, December 4, 1957, Wampler FOIA release. 715. This point was noted in Haskell to Nolting, November 3, 1959, attached to Haskell to Burgess, November 4, 1959, 740.5/11-459, RG 59, USNA. 716. Eisenhower-Macmillan meeting, March 22, 1957, FRUS 1955-57, 27:737-739. 717. Bermuda communique, March 24, 1957, DOSB, April 8, 1957, p. 561. See also Wilson and Herter to Eisenhower, March 14, 1957 (with appended documents), DDRS 1997/1857. 718. Meeting with the president, October 26, 1957, cited in Clark, Nuclear Diplomacy, p. 85. 719. Peacock memo, October 29, 1957, DP/GCM/1/Memoranda of Conversation, General S(4)/DDEL. For more information on the internal politics of this issue within the U.S. government (somewhat at variance with what bureaucratic politics theory would lead one to expect), see Farley to Dulles, November 19, 1957, PPS 1957-61, box 130, Great Britain, RG 59, USNA. 720. Eisenhower-Dulles meeting, October 22, 1957, FRUS 1955-57, 27:800-801. Dulles and Eisenhower were preparing for forthcoming talks with Macmillan. Shortly after those talks, Dulles reported that he had gotten the British to accept "the proposition that nothing would be agreed to between them and us which could not be extended to the free world as a whole. He had tried to avoid any exclusiveness in the United States-British relationship." State Department meeting, November 6, 1957, DP/GCM/3/Strictly Confidential, N-P (1)/DDEL. 721. Couve to Massigli, February 2, 1956, MP/96/FFMA. 722. Dulles-Pineau meeting, November 19, 1957, DDF 1957, 2:712, and (for the U.S. account) 740.5/11-1957, RG 59, USNA. 723. Dulles-de Gaulle meeting, July 3, 1958, FRUS 1958-60, 7(2):52. 724. Dulles-de Gaulle meeting, July 5, 1958, FRUS 1958-60, 7(2):55-56. See also Elbrick-Alphand meeting, July 9, 1958, FRUS 1958-60, 7(2):74. It seems that Eisenhower was behind the policy Dulles presented to de Gaulle; see Eisenhower-Dulles-Quarles meeting, July 3, 1958, DDRS 1995/2903. Dulles's personal views in this area are somewhat unclear; my sense is that he was somewhat more conservative than Eisenhower on the sharing issue, but a good deal more liberal than his subordinates in the State Department. 725. Eisenhower-de Gaulle-Macmillan meeting, December 20, 1959, Prem 11/2991, PRO, and DDF 1959, 2:770. 726. NSC meetings, July 16 and 30, 1959, FRUS 1958-60, 3:260-261, 288-289. 727. Adenauer-Dulles meeting, May 4, 1957, FRUS 1955-57, 26:238-239. 728. Dulles-Brentano meeting, November 21, 1957, 740.5/11-2157, RG 59, USNA. These passages were deleted from the sanitized version published in FRUS 1955-57, 4:202. 729. State-Defense meeting, September 25, 1959, FRUS 1958-60, 7(1):484-488. For the State Department attitude, see also Note de la Direction politique, September 4, 1959, DDF 1959, 2:302-303. 730. I say "ostensibly," because although Norstad claimed the request reflected no change in strategy and that the missiles were simply theater weapons, missiles with this range, armed with a high-yield warhead, would give NATO a true strategic capability of its own. And indeed Norstad wanted to make NATO, as he put it, a "fourth nuclear power." One suspects that whatever his original motivation in pressing for the MRBMs, he was well aware of the fact that deployment of these weapons under the control of SACEUR would allow NATO to get a strategic nuclear capability of its own through the back door. On these matters in general, and in particular on Norstad's idea of NATO as a "fourth nuclear power," which he presented in his Pasadena speech of December 6, 1959, see Pedlow, "Norstad and the Second Berlin Crisis" (unpublished manuscript), pp. 5-6, 24, 26. 731. U.K. SHAPE representative to COS, March 24, 1960, annex, and Annex to JP(60)72 (Final), June 29, 1960, both Defe 11/312, PRO. 732. This was a standard British argument. See, for example, "Mid-range Ballistic Missiles in ACE," annex to JP(60)72 (Final), June 29, 1960, Defe 11/312, PRO. 733. This paraphrase of the thinking at NATO headquarters is from the annex to UKNMR/8/6(431), attached to "MRBMs in Allied Command Europe," March 24, 1960, Defe 11/312, PRO. Emphasis in original. It was for the same sort of reason that Norstad disliked the idea of a sea-based MRBM force. Polaris submarines would not meet his needs: "he himself would have no control over submarines earmarked for SACLANT [Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic], more especially as naval forces were in any case much more loosely attached to NATO than land or air forces." U.K. NATO Delegation to Foreign Office, July 7, 1960, Defe 11/312, PRO. 734. See FRUS 1958-60, 7(1):582n. 735. Herter-Couve meeting, April 15, 1960, FRUS 1958-60, 7(2):339. 736. Caccia to Foreign Office, March 21, 1960, Defe 11/312, PRO. 737. Eisenhower-Norstad-Bowie meeting, September 12, 1960, FRUS 1958-60, 7(1):631. The Bowie study had been proposed by Gerard Smith, one of the high State Department officials most opposed to national nuclear forces. 738. On the fear of "seizure by national forces," see, for example, the Bowie Report, pp. 8, 64. 739. Thurston to Herter, September 10, 1960, SS/ITM/5/NATO(4) [1959-1960]/DDEL. 740. Bowie Report, pp. 9, 61. 741. NSC meeting, November 17, 1960, FRUS 1958-60, 7(1):654. 742. Gates-Watkinson meeting, December 12, 1960, Defe 13/211, PRO. 743. Bowie Report, pp. 7, 8. 744. Merchant in meeting with Eisenhower and top State and Defense Department officials, October 13, 1960, DDRS 1986/3551; Herter in NSC meeting, November 17, 1960, FRUS 1958-1960, 7(1):651. 745. Gates-Watkinson meeting, December 12, 1960, p. 4, Defe 13/211, PRO. 746. Eisenhower meeting with Quarles and military officers, March 12, 1959, FRUS 1958-60, 7(1):436. 747. Thurston to Irwin, October 15, 1960, p. 5, DDRS 1989/2732; Merchant in meeting with Eisenhower, October 13, 1960, DDRS 1986/3551. 748. Eisenhower-Spaak meeting, October 4, 1960, SS/ITM/5/NATO(6)[1959-1960]/DDEL. Eisenhower's reply, released in full in the version of this document declassified in 1979, was deleted from the sanitized version published in 1993; see FRUS 1958-60, 7(1):641. 749. Hood to Shuckburgh, October 17, 1960; Working Party on Policy on Nuclear Weapons for NATO, "United States Proposals for a NATO MRBM Force," PNWN/P(60)3, October 26, 1960; and memo for Macmillan, "NATO MRBM," October 27, 1960; all in Prem 11/3714, PRO. 750. Eisenhower-Spaak meeting, November 24, 1959, FRUS 1958-60, 7(1):519. 751. Eisenhower-Herter meeting, October 16, 1959, FRUS 1958-60, 9:70. 752. De Gaulle-Eisenhower-Macmillan meeting, December 20, 1959, p. 21, Prem 11/2991, PRO and DDF 1959, 2:772; and Eisenhower-de Gaulle meeting, December 19, 1959, DDF 1959, 2:761. 753. Eisenhower-Macmillan meeting, September 27, 1960, FRUS 1958-60, 7(2):421. 754. Eisenhower-Spaak meeting, October 4, 1960, FRUS 1958-60, 7(1):641. 755. Gates-Watkinson meeting, December 12, 1960, Defe 13/211, PRO, and NSC meeting, November 17, 1960, FRUS 1958-60, 7(1):651. 756. Eisenhower meeting with State and Defense department officials, October 3, 1960, FRUS 1958-60, 7(1):635. 757. Macmillan-Dulles meeting, December 12, 1956, FRUS 1955-57, 27:677. 758. Dulles to Eisenhower, December 12, 1956, DSP/141/58630/ML. 759. There is a large literature on British defense policy, British nuclear weapons policy and Anglo-American nuclear relations in this period. John Baylis's Directory: polisci -> faculty -> trachtenberg trachtenberg -> The United States, France, and the Question of German Power, 1945-1960 polisci -> Transylvania university committee on program and curriculum polisci -> Pos 6933: History of American Political Thought Course Description polisci -> Urban politics political science polisci -> International political economy polisci -> J. B. Weter History Honors Fellowship, Stanford University (1965-66) polisci -> Handbook on Migration and Social Policy trachtenberg -> The Economic Decline and Soviet Foreign Policy trachtenberg -> Assessing Soviet Economic Performance during the Cold War: a failure of Intelligence? Download 2.48 Mb. Share with your friends:
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