A constructed Peace The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963
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| Last of the Giants. p. 107.
609. Kohn and Harahan, Strategic Air Warfare, p. 95. 611. Kaysen interview, August 1988. 612. Raymond Garthoff recollection, from the record of a conference on "Europe and the Cuban Missile Crisis" held in Paris in October 1992. Garthoff's comment was made in the morning session on October 17. The tapes of the discussion are in my possession. 613. May et al, "History of the Strategic Arms Competition," p. 475. 614. NSC meeting, January 11, 1957, FRUS 1955-57, 19:407. Note also some remarks by General LeMay, who at the time was one of the more extreme proponents of the strategy of the massive nuclear attack: "I think too many people thought of massive retaliation as automatically pushing all buttons, shooting all guns, that sort of thing, in response to virtually anything the Russians did. Nobody that I knew in the military ever thought of it that way." And General Catton, one of LeMay's main subordinates at SAC in the 1950s, elaborated on the point: "Massive retaliation was a phrase that did not describe what we intended to do at all. The important thing, of course, was always to be able to prevail at the highest level of intensity, so that any kind of an escalation would be to the disadvantage of the enemy." Kohn and Harahan, Strategic Air Warfare, p. 108. 615. See Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, p. 29. 616. M.J. Ruggles and A. Kramish, "Soviet Atomic Policy," D(L)-3297, November 9, 1955, Rand Corporation archives. 617. Joseph Loftus and Andrew Marshall, "Forecasting Soviet Force Structure: The Importance of Bureaucratic and Budgetary Constraints," RM-3612-PR, July 1963, pp. 23ff, 69-72, Rand Corporation archives. The passages quoted were declassified in 1986. On Soviet strategic inaction during the Cuban missile crisis, see Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, pp. 253-257. For additional technical information on Soviet strategic vulnerability in this period, see May et al, "History of the Strategic Arms Competition," pp. 474-476. 618. NSC meeting, September 12, 1963, FRUS 1961-63, 8:499-507. 619. NSC Planning Board study, NSC 5422, June 14, 1954, and Basic National Security Policy (Suggestions of the Secretary of State)," November 15, 1954; FRUS 1952-54, 2:655, 773. 620. In addition to the time chart reproduced here, "timetables" of this sort were the focus of the analysis in two very important reports, the Killian report on the surprise attack problem in 1955, and the Gaither report of 1957. Both reports were published in Trachtenberg, Development of American Strategic Thought, vol. 1; the timetables are on pp. 342-345 and 540-542. For the seriousness with which these "timetables" were taken during the mid-Eisenhower period, see NSC meetings, August 4, 1955, November 15, 1955, and June 15, 1956, and annex to NSC 5602/1, March 15, 1956, FRUS 1955-57, 19:95-96, 147, 258, 319, 324-325, 327-328. But by early 1958, Eisenhower had become fed up with the timetable approach. "He was sick to death of timetables," he told the NSC; "they never proved anything useful." NSC meeting, January 6, 1958, FRUS 1958-60, 3:7. 621. Annex to NSC 5602/1, March 15, 1956, FRUS 1955-57, 19:258. See also NSC 5501, January 7, 1955; NIE 100-7-55, November 1, 1955; Taylor in meeting with Eisenhower, May 24, 1956; Cutler in NSC meeting, February 28, 1957; in ibid., pp. 26, 135, 311, 428-429. 622. Eisenhower meeting with Radford and Taylor, May 24, 1956, FRUS 1955-57, 19:312. 623. NSC meeting, August 4, 1955, FRUS 1955-57, 19:102. 624. Eisenhower meeting with Congressional leadership, February 14, 1956, FRUS 1955-57, 19:198. See also Eisenhower-Quarles-Twining-Killian meeting, March 4, 1959, FRUS 1958-60, 3:185, 187. 625. NSC meeting, January 11, 1957, FRUS 1955-57, 19:409. 626. NESC briefing, January 23, 1956, FRUS 1955-57, 19:190-191. 627. NSC meeting, January 22, 1959, FRUS 1958-60, 3:176-179. 628. NSC meeting, May 1, 1958, FRUS 1958-60, 3:86. For a typical example of an earlier Dulles argument along these lines, see foreign ministers' meeting, December 6, 1953, FRUS 1952-54, 5:1790. 629. Basic National Security Policy (Suggestions of the Secretary of State)," November 15, 1954; and Dulles in NSC meeting, November 24, 1954; in FRUS 1952-54, 2:773, 789. 630. NSC 5501, January 7, 1955, and NSC 5602/1, March 15, 1956, FRUS 1955-57, 19:26, 32-33, 247. 631. For some typical examples, see Dulles-Eisenhower meeting, April 1, 1958, DDRS 1989/3430; State-Defense meetings, April 7 and June 17, 1958, SS/S/A/21/Nuclear Exchange [Sept. 1957 - June 1958](3)/DDEL, and DDRS 1982/1578. 632. NSC meeting, May 1, 1958, FRUS 1958-60, 3:86. 633. Dulles-Anderson meeting, November 6, 1958, DP/GCM/1//DDEL. 634. Anderson-Dulles phone call, December 3, 1958, DP/TC/9/DDEL. 635. See Cutler's and Taylor's remarks in the May 1, 1958, NSC meeting, cited above. For Taylor's acceptance of the "mutual deterrence" argument, see also the notes of his meeting with Eisenhower, May 24, 1956, FRUS 1955-57, 19:311-312. On the Navy's attitude in general, and in particular its support, especially at the end of the 1950s, for a "finite deterrence" nuclear posture, see Rosenberg, "Origins of Overkill," pp. 56-57. 636. Nolting to State Department, October 2, 1957, FRUS 1955-57, 4:170-171. For Norstad's views--increasingly at variance with Eisenhower's--see U.S. Delegation to State Department, December 18, 1958, and Herter-Anderson-McElroy meeting, October 24, 1959, FRUS 1958-60, 7(1):387, 489. Norstad "nearly had a fit" in August 1959 when he heard Eisenhower argue for massive troop reductions. Merchant-Eisenhower meeting, August 24, 1959, Merchant Papers, Box 5, ML. 637. See Wampler, "Ambiguous Legacy," chapter 12, esp. pp. 877, 884, 960. 639. For various documents which reflect the increasing importance of this problem and its growing bearing on strategic issues, see FRUS 1958-60, 7(1):488n, 491, 494, 498-499, 512-513, 679. 640. Smith to Herter, October 29, 1959, FRUS 1958-60, 7(1):495. 641. NSC meeting, May 17, 1956, FRUS 1955-57, 19:306. 642. Eisenhower meeting with Herter et al, October 16, 1959, and Herter-McElroy-Anderson meeting, October 24, 1959, FRUS 1958-60, 7(1):488n, 489. 643. The Army was the great champion of this approach. See especially Taylor in NSC meeting, May 1, 1958, FRUS 1958-60, 3:82. In February 1961, the Army called for a NATO strategy which would "emphasize a concept of limited war with the Soviets in the NATO area," develop a force structure designed to support that concept, and "use nuclear weapons only in response to Soviet use." This extraordinary position, put forth so early on in the Kennedy presidency, obviously reflected the kind of thinking that had taken shape in Army circles under Eisenhower. Briefing sheet for JCS Chairman on JCS 2305/386, "NATO Strategy and Nuclear Weapons," March 1, 1961, CCS 9050 (11 Feb 61) sec 1, JCS Central Files, RG 218, USNA. The State Department position at the end of the Eisenhower period was not very different. See draft record of action for November 17, 1960, NSC meeting, pp. 2-3, DDRS 1992/2709. 644. Wampler, "Ambiguous Legacy," pp. 940-941. The key document summarizing what Wampler aptly refers to as Gruenther's testament is "SACEUR's Force Requirements 1960/62," Annex to JP(56)162 (Final), November 16, 1956, Defe 4/92, PRO. 645. The poker metaphor was often used at the time. Note, for example, Eisenhower's reference to pushing "our chips into the pot" in his meeting with the Congressional leadership on Berlin, March 6, 1959, FRUS 1958-60, 8:433. See also Eisenhower-Kennedy meeting, January 19, 1961, cited in Fred Greenstein and Richard Immerman, "What Did Eisenhower Tell Kennedy about Indochina? The Politics of Misperception," Journal of American History 179 (September 1992): 576, and Kennedy-Norstad meeting, October 3, 1961, p. 7, in FRUS 1961-63, vols. 13-15 (mic. supp.), no. 191. 646. See, for example, Nolting to State Department, October 2, 1957, FRUS 1955-57, 4:170-171, and U.S. NAC delegation to State Department, December 18, 1958, FRUS 1958-60, 7(1):387. 647. For the conventional interpretation of MC 14/2 as representing NATO's adoption of "massive retaliation," see the references cited in Wampler, "Ambiguous Legacy," p. 1058, n. 2. Wampler has shown that this interpretation is not well-founded, and my discussion here relies heavily on his analysis. 648. See Wampler, "Ambiguous Legacy," chapters 112 and 13. 649. Extracts from the Political Directive and MC 14/2 pieced together from a variety of British and American sources are given in Wampler, "Ambiguous Legacy," pp. 1074-1079. The full text of MC 14/2 was declassified after Wampler finished his dissertation, and is available from the SHAPE historical office. 650. Herter statement at NATO ministerial meeting, December 16, 1960, FRUS 1958-60, 7(1):678. 651. Gates statement to NATO ministerial meeting, December 1960, DDRS 1987/1141. 652. Dulles memorandum, September 6, 1953, FRUS 1952-54, 2:457-460. 653. Dulles paper, November 15, 1954, FRUS 1952-54, 2:775. 654. Dulles paper, November 15, 1954, FRUS 1952-54, 2:775; NSC meeting, May 1, 1958, FRUS 1958-60, 3:85, 88. 655. Dulles to Eisenhower, May 7, 1958, DDRS 1991/823. 656. NSC meeting, May 1, 1958, FRUS 1958-60, 3:85. For Dulles's interest in a defense based largely on tactical nuclear weapons, see Dulles-Adenauer meeting, May 4, 1957, FRUS 1955-57, 26:237; Dulles-Eisenhower meeting, April 1, 1958, DDRS 1989/3430; and the editorial note, FRUS 1955-57, 19:60-61. Dulles had long been thinking in terms of an area defense in which nuclear weapons would be "meshed in." Note, for example, his remarks at a meeting with Bidault and Eden on December 6, 1953, FRUS 1952-54, 5:1790. 657. Deputy Secretary of Defense Quarles, in State-Defense meeting, April 7, 1958, SS/S/A/21/Nuclear Exchange [September 1957 - June 1958] (3)/DDEL. 658. On the "constraints policy," see Roberts to Foreign Office, October 7, 1960, Defe 11/313; U.K. NATO Delegation to Foreign Office, October 17, 1962, Prem 11/3715; and Joint Planning Staff, "SACEUR's Revised Emergency Defence Plan," JP(62)18 (Final), March 19, 1962, para. 11, in COS(62)23rd meeting, Defe 4/143; all PRO. 659. Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy), "History of the Custody and Deployment of Nuclear Weapons," p. 50, DOD-FOIA. 660. Legere to Bundy, October 24, 1961, Taylor Papers [TP], box 35, NATO 1961-62 T-38-71, National Defense University [NDU], Washington. 661. Telephone call to General Cutler, April 27, 1957, DP/TC/12/DDEL. 662. See, for example, Dulles's remarks in a meeting with top British officials, October 24, 1957, FRUS 1955-57, 27:819. Dulles here included the U.K. in the nuclear club, but the basic thrust of his thinking is clear. 663. See a high British official's account of Dulles's views in Chauvel to Pineau, October 31, 1957, DDF 1957, 2:617-618. 664. State-Defense meeting, June 17, 1958, DDRS 1982/1578; NSC meeting, May 1, 1958, FRUS 1958-60, 3:89. 665. NSC meeting, May 10, 1956, FRUS 1955-57, 20:399. 666. NSC meeting, December 11, 1953, FRUS 1952-54, 5:451-452. 667. See Wampler, "Ambiguous Legacy," pp. 987-990. 668. "Nuclear Policy," background paper prepared by State Department Policy Planning Staff for NATO Heads of Government Meeting, December 4, 1957, pp. 5-7, Wampler FOIA release. On the French origins of the proposal, see the reference in Dulles to Paris embassy, November 30, 1957, 740.56/11-3057, RG 59, USNA, and Parodi to Foreign Ministry, May 6, 1957, note of general secretariat, May 7, 1957, and Dulles-Mollet-Pineau meeting, May 6, 1957, in DDF 1957:1, pp. 734, 734n, 738-739. 669. From the "Nuclear Policy" briefing paper just cited. 670. Norstad remarks to the NATO Council, April 30, 1959, Norstad Papers [NP], box 85, Atomic-Nuclear Policy 1957-59 (1), DDEL. See also Loper briefing on nuclear sharing, April 26, 1960, p. 6, NP/96/Atomic-Nuclear Policy (2)/DDEL. 671. For the figures, see White House briefing for JCAE, May 1, 1962, 740.5611, RG 59, USNA. 672. For some standard descriptions, see John Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision: New Dimensions of Political Analysis (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), pp. 182-183; Peter Stein and Peter Feaver, Assuring Control of Nuclear Weapons: The Evolution of Permissive Action Links, CSIA Occasional Paper No. 2 (Boston: University Press of America, 1987), pp. 28-31; and Peter Feaver, Guarding the Guardians: Civilian Control of Nuclear Weapons in the United States (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), pp. 178-183. The picture these accounts give of American nuclear weapons under effective allied control is confirmed by various archival sources. See, for example, some comments made by General Truman Landon, the U.S. air commander in Europe in 1961, in an oral history interview. Not just French and British aircraft, he said, but German and Canadian planes as well, were armed with American nuclear weapons. "Theoretically, they were in our hands," he said, but the allied forces had been trained to use those weapons. "I am sure that we violated rules 1 through 13, maybe more. But to us, it seemed necessary that they be trained and they appreciated the fact that they got it." Oral History interview with General Truman H. Landon, p. 481, Office of Air Force History, Bolling Air Force Base, Washington. Note also Acheson's comments in a meeting with the British in April 1961: "The armed forces of many of the European Allies," he said, "--e.g., the Dutch, the Italians and the French--were in fact holding nuclear weapons." "The United States control of these weapons," he pointed out, "was in some cases theoretical; there was not always a duplicate key and sometimes the control amounted to nothing more than a United States sergeant who was supposed to see that the weapons were not released without authority." Anglo-American talks, April 5, 1961 (second meeting), p. 1, Cab 133/244, PRO. The most important archival source, and the source (on p. 31) for the quotation in the text, is the Holifield Report on U.S. nuclear weapons in NATO. Holifield had chaired an ad hoc subcommittee of Congress's Joint Committee on Atomic Energy which had recently gone to Europe to look into the question. The summary portion of the report is enclosed in Holifield to Kennedy, February 15, 1961, and is available at the National Security Archive [NSA] in Washington. 673. See Joel Larus, Nuclear Weapons Safety and the Common Defense (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1967), pp. 80-86; and also David Schwartz, NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas (Washington: Brookings, 1983), p. 78. Note also Albert Wohlstetter's comment at the time that the deployment of the Thor and Jupiter IRBMs in Europe appeared to "give our allies a deterrent of their own, independent of our decision." Albert Wohlstetter, "The Delicate Balance of Terror," Foreign Affairs 37 (January 1959): 224; Wohlstetter was an exceptionally well-informed observer. And even in the government, top officials were by no means certain that control of the IRBMs was firmly in American hands. Norstad, for example, was unsure whether the Jupiters in Italy could be fired by the Italians without American authorization and at one point had to send an American general to check on this for him. Kohn and Harahan, eds., Strategic Air Warfare, p. 94. And during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, the authorities in Washington were worried about whether the Jupiters in Turkey could be launched without specific presidential authorization; CINCEUR was instructed to destroy the missiles or make them inoperable if any unauthorized attempt to fire them was made. White House meeting, October 22, 1962, in Ernest May and Philip Zelikow, The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), pp. 222-223; JCS Joint Secretariat, Historical Division, "Chronology of JCS Decisions Concerning the Cuban Crisis," December 1962, p. 34, DOD-FOIA; Philip Nash, The Other Missiles of October: Eisenhower, Kennedy and the Jupiters, 1957-1963 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), p. 126. The process of installing PALs on these weapons began in the summer of 1962, but had not been completed by the time the crisis began; see White House briefing for Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, May 1, 1962, 740.5611, RG 59, USNA, and Nash, Other Missiles of October, p. 125. Finally, it is worth noting that according to the understanding between the administration and Congress, "custody" meant that access would be controlled to the extent that "it would take an act of force" to gain control of the weapons. Loper presentation to NSC Planning Board, April 26, 1960, p. 8, NP/96/Atomic-Nuclear Policy (2)/DDEL. Thus, almost by definition, the custody arrangements were not proof against a host country effort to take over the weapons by force. 674. Holifield Report, pp. 28, 48-49; Senator Clinton Anderson to president-elect Kennedy, November 16, 1960, JCAE records, General Correspondence/323/International Negotiations: NATO, RG 128, USNA; Feaver, Guarding the Guardians, pp. 179-180. 675. The quotation is from a speech given by Congressman Chester Holifield, a leading member of the JCAE, in February 1960, and quoted in Feaver, Guarding the Guardians, p. 178. 676. For the relatively cautious approach of the military authorities, see, for example, Radford to Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, September 21, 1956, JCS Chairman's Papers (Radford), CCS 471.6 (1 August 1956), RG 218, USNA; and Radford to Wilson, November 21, 1956, CCS 350.05 (3-16-48) sec. 8, RG 218, USNA. See also the discussion of the issue in the NSC on May 27, 1957, FRUS 1955-57, 19:496, 498. Note finally Radford's complaint to Dulles (in the context of an impending discussion on nuclear sharing with the French) that "NATO was going too far in terms of modern weapons." Dulles-Radford meeting, July 2, 1957, DP/GCM/Memoranda of Conversation--General--N through R (1)/DDEL. 677. NSC meeting, November 21, 1955, p. 11, AWF/NSC/7/DDEL. See also his comments in the NSC meeting, November 17, 1960, FRUS 1958-60, 7(1):657. 678. Eisenhower-Norstad meeting, August 3, 1960, FRUS 1958-60, 7(1):609-610. 679. NSC meeting, August 18, 1959, FRUS 1958-60, 7(2):251. 680. Eisenhower-Herter meeting, February 8, 1960 (document dated February 12), DDRS 1985/529. 681. NSC meeting, October 29, 1959, FRUS 1958-60, 7(2):292. These remarks are not attributed specifically to Eisenhower in this sanitized document, but it is obvious from context and from content that this was the president speaking. 682. Eisenhower-Norstad meeting, August 3, 1960, FRUS 1958-60, 7(1):610. 683. NSC meeting, October 29, 1959, FRUS 1958-60, 7(2):292. 684. Anglo-American meeting, October 24, 1957, FRUS 1955-57, 27:820; Eisenhower-Herter meeting, May 2, 1959, and Eisenhower-de Gaulle meeting, September 2, 1959, FRUS 1958-60, 7(2):204, 262; Eisenhower-de Gaulle-Macmillan meeting, December 20, 1959, pp. 15-16, Prem 11/2991, PRO. See also Anglo-American meeting, June 9, 1958, DDRS 1987/2777; Couve to Massigli, February 2, 1956, reporting Dulles's liberal views on nuclear sharing, and saying that the Atomic Energy Act and the attitude of Congress was the only major obstacle, MP/96/FFMA; and John Baylis, Directory: polisci -> faculty -> trachtenberg trachtenberg -> The United States, France, and the Question of German Power, 1945-1960 polisci -> Transylvania university committee on program and curriculum polisci -> Pos 6933: History of American Political Thought Course Description polisci -> Urban politics political science polisci -> International political economy polisci -> J. B. Weter History Honors Fellowship, Stanford University (1965-66) polisci -> Handbook on Migration and Social Policy trachtenberg -> The Economic Decline and Soviet Foreign Policy trachtenberg -> Assessing Soviet Economic Performance during the Cold War: a failure of Intelligence? Download 2.48 Mb. Share with your friends:
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