A constructed Peace The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963
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| Anfänge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik 1945-1954, 3:148-149; Rupieper, Der besetzte Verbündete, pp. 419-420; Schwarz, Adenauer, 2:184. Adenauer, incidentally, mistakenly thought that it was Eisenhower and not Dulles who was behind this sort of thing; Eisenhower, in his view, was "soft," and only Dulles was "tough." See Schwarz, Adenauer, 2:388 and Adenauer, Erinnerungen, 3:306, 328.
469. For Adenauer's distrust of America, see Schwarz, Adenauer, 2:184, 205-206, 385. Note also the record of Adenauer's long meeting with Dulles on June 13, 1955, which was mainly devoted to a discussion of the issue. Adenauer described a whole series of German intelligence reports indicating the seriousness of what was going on; Dulles did not talk much about the substantive issue, but rather focused on the question of whether the president was pursuing this policy behind his back. DSP/66/64250-55/ML. 470. See Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, chapter three, esp. pp. 149-151. Note also the views of the Soviet diplomat Vladykin paraphrased in Daridan to Foreign Ministry, June 28, 1952, Europe 1949-55/Allemagne/302/FFMA. 471. Soviet note, May 24, 1952, and Kennan to State Department, May 25, 1952; and Smith to Conant, August 17, 1953, FRUS 1952-54, 7:252-253, 625. 472. U.S. Delegation to State Department, February 2, 1954, and Dulles-Molotov meeting, February 6, 1954, FRUS 1952-54, 7:915, 985-987. Note also Dulles-Adenauer meting, February 18, 1954, PPS 1954, box 79, Germany, RG 59, USNA. 473. State Department meeting, August 28, 1955, FRUS 1955-57, 5:557. 474. See especially Heads of Government meeting, July 20, 1955, and NSC meeting, July 28, 1955, FRUS 1955-57, 5:391, 531. On the struggle for power within the Soviet Union and its impact on the USSR's German policy, see James Richter, "Reexamining Soviet Policy Towards Germany during the Beria Interregnum," CWIHP working paper no. 3 (1992). For the discussion within the Soviet leadership, see also Hope Harrison, "The Bargaining Power of Weaker Allies in Bipolarity and Crisis: The Dynamics of Soviet-East German Relations, 1953-1961" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1993), pp. 50-51, 109. Khrushchev (and the East German leaders as well) took what Beria and Malenkov were doing quite seriously. They had been willing, Khrushchev later told Ulbricht, to "liquidate the GDR." Khrushchev-Ulbricht meeting, November 30, 1960, in Hope Harrison, "Ulbricht and the Concrete 'Rose': New Archival Evidence on the Dynamics of Soviet-East German Relations and the Berlin Crisis, 1958-1961," CWIHP working paper no. 5, appendix A. 475. Eisenhower-Churchill-Bidault meeting, December 5, 1953, FRUS 1952-54, 5:1783. U.S. Delegation to State Department, February 3, 1954 (two documents) and February 11, 1954; Dulles-Molotov meeting, February 6, 1954; in FRUS 1952-54, 7:927, 934, 984-986, 1020. U.S. Delegation to State Department, July 20, 1955 (two documents), and Dulles-Ollenhauer meeting, November 7, 1955, FRUS 1955-57, 5:393, 395, 406, 696. 476. Stalin meeting with East German leadership, April 7, 1952, in Pieck: Aufzeichnungen, pp. 396-397. 477. Zubok, "Soviet Intelligence and the Cold War," p. 10; Vladislav Zubok, "Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis (1958-1962)," CWIHP Working Paper No. 6 (Washington: Wilson Center, 1993), p. 3. See also Zarubin's comment in a meeting with Bohlen, July 19, 1955, FRUS 1955-57, 5:387. For another indication (from 1962) that the Soviets wanted West German power to be contained within a system dominated by the United States--that they preferred this to a purely continental system--see Soutou, L'Alliance incertaine, p. 264. The idea that the Soviets had a certain interest in the maintenance of an American military presence in Europe, and especially in Germany, is a central theme of Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, Stalin's Cold War: Soviet Strategies in Europe, 1943 to 1956 (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1995). For a related argument bearing on the later Cold War period, see John Keliher, The Negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions: The Search for Arms Control in Central Europe (New York: Pergamon Press, 1980), pp. 144-145. 478. Yuri Smirnov and Vladislav Zubok, "Nuclear Weapons after Stalin's Death: Moscow Enters the H-Bomb Age," CWIHP Bulletin (Fall 1994), p. 17. 479. It was for the same sort of reason that the Federal Republic did not have a proper constitution, but only a "basic law," and that it had been drafted not by a true constituent assembly, but by a "Parliamentary Council." The Germans at that point were anxious to avoid anything that would suggest that a new sovereign state was being set up. See Murphy to Marshall, July 8 and July 9, 1948, and Ministers President to Clay, July 10, 1948, FRUS 1948, 2:382-386. 480. See Rupieper, Der besetzte Verbündete, pp. 151-180, esp. pp. 169, 178, and Schwartz, America's Germany, p. 238. The argument about Berlin was in fact a major theme in discussions of Germany's legal status. Bevin, for example, warned Acheson in December 1950 that "it might be dangerous for us to abandon the quadripartite concept in Western Germany and at the same time insist on maintaining it in Berlin." Calendar 139i, DBPO II, 3:374. See also McCloy to Acheson, December 1, 1950, and U.S. Delegation to Acheson, December 13, 1950, FRUS 1950, 4:791, 799; Foreign Ministry to Massigli and Bonnet, January 6, 1951, and Sauvagnargues memorandum on question of supreme authority, January 17, 1951, Europe 1949-55/Allemagne/914/FFMA. 481. See McCloy to Acheson, July 6, 1951, FRUS 1951, 3:1489; Conant to Dulles, July 2, 1953, FRUS 1952-54, 5:1588; Schwartz, America's Germany, p. 247; and Steininger, German Question, pp. 22, 118-119. It is also worth noting in this context that Adenauer was prepared to go along with the French idea that America should underwrite the EDC system and take action in the event Germany tried to secede, but only if it were part of a more general system in which the U.S. would block such developments as a Communist takeover in Italy or a Gaullist regime in France. This was a call for a kind of Brezhnev Doctrine in reverse, and the Americans, of course, rejected the idea. But it is yet another illustration of the way pressure for a deepening of the American involvement came from Europe. See Acheson-Eden meeting and Acheson to Truman, both February 16, 1952, FRUS 1952-54, 5:46, 79. 483. NSC meeting, November 21, 1955, FRUS 1955-57, 19:150-151. Note also the president's reference to the importance of western Europe becoming "a third great power complex in the world," in Eisenhower to Gruenther, December 2, 1955, Eisenhower Papers, 16:1919-20. 484. Eisenhower to Bermingham, February 28, 1951, Eisenhower Papers, 12:76-77. Emphasis in original. 485. White House meeting, January 31, 1951, FRUS 1951, 3:449-458. 486. NSC meeting, October 7, 1953, FRUS 1952-54, 2:527. 487. Eisenhower to Gruenther, October 27, 1953, Eisenhower Papers, 14:611. 488. Eisenhower-Dulles meeting, October 2, 1956, FRUS 1955-57, 19:360. 489. NSC meeting, March 26, 1959, FRUS 1958-60, 7(1):444. 490. Eisenhower to Bermingham, February 28, 1951, Eisenhower Papers, 12:77. 491. There are many documents which record Eisenhower expressing views of this sort. For a representative sample, see FRUS 1952-54, 2:456; FRUS 1955-57, 5:274; FRUS 1958-60, 7(1):479, 508, 516, 519; and the references cited in Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, p. 185 n. 56. 492. U.S. Delegation to Acting Secretary, November 27, 1951, FRUS 1951, 3:734. Eisenhower diary, June 11, 1951; Eisenhower to Harriman, June 30 and July 9, 1951; Eisenhower to Lovett, December 13, 1951; and Eisenhower to Pleven, December 24, 1951; in Eisenhower Papers, 12:340-341, 398, 408, 781, 812. Eisenhower to Gruenther, June 19, 1952, Eisenhower Papers, 13:1248. 493. Note, for example, the tone of Dulles's comments in his meeting with German atomic affairs minister Strauss, May 14, 1956, FRUS 1955-57, 4:439-440. 494. Eisenhower to Marshall, August 3, 1951, Eisenhower Papers, 12:458. 495. See Eisenhower-Mayer meeting (for the Coal and Steel Community), February 8, 1956, Dulles-Strauss meeting (for the Common Market), May 14, 1956, FRUS 1955-57, 4:409, 441. For Dulles's threat about the Common Market treaty, see Dulles-Adenauer meeting, May 4, 1957, FRUS 1955-57, 26:240. Dulles took the same line in internal discussions with American officials. See meeting with U.S. ambassadors, May 6, 1957, FRUS 1955-57, 4:587. 496. State Department memorandum on "Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy and European Integration," December 6, 1955; State Department meeting, January 25, 1956; Eisenhower-Etzel meeting, February 6, 1957; in FRUS 1955-57, 4:355, 391, 517. See also Stephen Ambrose, Eisenhower, vol. 2 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), pp. 404-405. 497. Dulles-Strauss meeting, May 14, 1956, FRUS 1955-57, 4:441. 498. State-AEC meeting, January 25, 1956, FRUS 1955-57, 4:395. Gerard Smith, the Special Assistant to the Secretary for Atomic Energy Affairs, was perhaps the leading State Department opponent of the administration's relatively liberal policy. Note especially the tone of his memorandum opposing the sale of the uranium enrichment plant: "we would be making the Europeans independent of us and giving up our monopoly on marketable enriched uranium." Smith to Merchant, December 8, 1955, FRUS 1955-57, 4:361. Note also his opposition a year and a half later to the NATO nuclear stockpile plan. He objected to a passage in a document on this question to the effect that the American government should try to make the allies less "dependent on the U.S. in the atomic field": "I think that such dependence is to our advantage." Smith to Timmons, May 21, 1957, 740.56/5-2157, RG 59, USNA. For the point about a nuclear infrastructure, in principle devoted to peaceful uses, inevitably laying the basis for a nuclear weapons capability, see for example an important State Department memorandum of December 6, 1955, FRUS 1955-57, 4:356-357. As this memorandum pointed out, it was understood, at least by the main Euratom participants, "that peaceful uses of atomic energy cannot, for technical reasons, be dissociated from potential possession of atomic power for military purposes." 499. NSC meeting, June 24, 1954, FRUS 1952-54, 2:690-691. 500. Eisenhower-JCS meeting, February 10, 1956, MR 80-224 No. 2, DDEL, also at the National Security Archive [NSA], Washington; NSC meeting, March 26, 1959, FRUS 1958-60, 7(1):444-445. The president frequently argued along these lines. See, for example, Cutler memorandum, September 3, 1953. FRUS 1952-54, 2:456, and NSC meeting, December 22, 1960, p. 16, AWF/NSC/13/DDEL. 501. Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, August 8, 1953. This key document was the basis of an important NSC discussion of military policy on August 27, 1953. See FRUS 1952-54, 2:444-455. In compiling that volume, the editors of FRUS were unable to find a copy of the document (p. 444n.), but David Rosenberg located it in the archives and gave me a copy. Admiral Radford, the incoming JCS Chairman at the time, considered it so important that he personally managed to get it declassified. See Stephen Jurika, Jr., ed., From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam: The Memoirs of Admiral Arthur W. Radford (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1980), p. 322. 502. NSC meeting, February 28, 1957, FRUS 1955-57, 19:429. 503. Eisenhower-Dulles meeting, October 2, 1956, FRUS 1955-57, 4:100; NSC meetings, December 11, 1958, and November 12, 1959, and Eisenhower-Norstad meeting, August 24, 1959, FRUS 1958-60, 7(1): 367, 479, 509. Note also Eisenhower's comments at a meeting with his top advisors, December 12, 1958 (document dated December 15, 1958), SS/S/DoS/3/State Department/DDEL. 504. See, for example, NSC meeting, August 27, 1953, FRUS 1952-54, 2:445-453, and Dulles to Eisenhower, October 21, 1953, DP/WHM/8/General Foreign Policy Matters (4)/DDEL. For Dulles's differences with Eisenhower, see Eisenhower-Norstad meeting, November 4, 1959, and Eisenhower-McElroy meeting, November 16, 1959, FRUS 1958-60, 7(1):499, 517; Eisenhower-Gray meeting, July 27, 1959 (document dated July 29), OSANSA/SA/P/4/Meetings with the President/DDEL, and Allen Dulles-Eisenhower meeting, August 22, 1961, National Security Files [NSF], box 82, Kennedy Library [JFKL], Boston. 505. Eisenhower-McElroy meeting, November 16, 1959, FRUS 1958-60, 7(1):516. 506. See especially Dulles and Eisenhower remarks in NSC meeting, December 10, 1953, FRUS 1952-54, 5:450-451. Note also Dulles's comments in a July 7, 1955, NSC meeting, FRUS 1955-57, 5:274. 507. Eisenhower meeting with top advisors, October 2, 1956, FRUS 1955-57, 4:100. See also the president's remarks in the NSC, November 12, 1959, FRUS 1958-60, 7(1):508. 508. Eisenhower-Norstad meeting, November 5, 1959, FRUS 1958-60, 7(1):498. For various documents showing the impact of the balance of payments problem at this point, see ibid., pp. 488n, 491, 494, 499. 509. NSC meeting, November 12, 1959, FRUS 1958-60, 7(1):508-509, 514. 510. See Allen Dulles to John Foster Dulles, August 28, 1956, FRUS 1955-57, 26:148. 511. Eisenhower-Dulles meeting, December 12, 1958, and Eisenhower-Spaak meeting, November 24, 1959, FRUS 1958-60, 7(1):370-371, 521, 524. See also NSC meeting, March 26, 1959, ibid., p. 445, and NSC meeting, June 15, 1956, FRUS 1955-57, 26:128. 512. NSC meeting, December 11, 1958, FRUS 1958-60, 7(1):367. 513. Dulles press conference, July 16, 1957, DOSB, Agusut 5, 1957, p. 233. 514. Dulles-Eisenhower meeting, April 19, 1954, Secretary of State's Memoranda of Conversation, November 1952 - December 1954 [SSMC], microfiche supplement to FRUS, no. 424. 515. Notes of meeting between State Department officials and outside consultants, November 6, 1957, DP/GCM/3/Strictly Confidential - N-P (1)/DDEL. This view was widely shared at the time, even by veterans of the Truman administration. Note, for example, Spofford's comments at this meeting: "Sharing nuclear weapons with our allies would indicate that we share confidence in them. It would tend to interest them again in self-defense. Without facing up to that problem it will be very difficult to restore their confidence." 516. NSC meeting, October 29, 1959, FRUS 1958-60, 7(2):290. 517. NSC meeting, November 21, 1955, FRUS 1955-57, 19:151. 518. Eisenhower-de Gaulle-Macmillan meeting, December 20, 1959, p. 16, Prem 11/2991, PRO. See also Eisenhower's remarks in the NSC meeting of November 17, 1960, FRUS 1958-60, 7(1):657. 519. See Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, pp. 126-129. For the figures, see Key Data Book, n.d., PSF/NSC-Reports-Misc/HSTL; Report to the President, "Defense Expenditures of Soviet and NATO States as a Percent of Their Respective Gross National Products," September 5, 1952, DDRS 1988/2259. See also briefing book for Eisenhower, n.d., and Cabot to Acheson, March 27, 1951, FRUS 1951, 3:6, 104; Draft Statement of U.S. Policy on Germany, December 13, 1957, FRUS 1955-57, 26:335. 520. See Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, pp. 119-120, 133-134. 521. On these matters in general, and on the impact of the shifting military balance on American policy in specific parts of the world, see Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, pp. 129-131, esp. n. 111. See also Sulzberger-Gruenther meeting, November 9, 1954, in Cyrus Sulzberger, The Last of the Giants (New York: Macmillan, 1970), p. 107; Dulles statement to NAC, December 14, 1953, and NSC meeting, December 23, 1953, FRUS 1952-54, 5:464, 480; and especially NSC meeting, October 20, 1955, FRUS 1955-57, 4:26. This basic issue--what strategic superiority meant, and why the U.S. had the upper hand in this period--will be discussed later in this chapter. 522. My understanding of these matters is based in very large part on Robert Wampler's work, especially his Ph.D. dissertation, "Ambiguous Legacy: The United States, Great Britain, and the Foundations of NATO Strategy, 1948-1957" (Harvard University, 1991). I have also profited greatly from discussions with Wampler on these issues. There is also some information in the JCS History, 5:311-317. Aside from this official account and the documents published in FRUS 1952-54, 5:482-562, there is relatively little published material on this subject. A certain amount of very important archival material has, however, become available in recent years. The material in Defe 6/26 at the PRO proved particularly instructive, and some French material from the Blanc Papers at the SHAT in Vincennes was also extremely revealing. Some key extracts are given in my article, "La formation du système de défense occidentale: les Etats-Unis, la France et MC 48," in Vaïsse et al, La France et l'OTAN. Note also the French Foreign Ministry memorandum on atomic war, December 13, 1954, DDF 1954, pp. 906-909. The text of MC 48 itself was declassified in 1996; I am grateful to the SHAPE history, Gregory Pedlow, for providing me with a copy. 523. Robert E. Osgood, NATO: The Entangling Alliance (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 116. 524. NATO Military Committee, "The Most Effective Pattern of NATO Military Strength for the Next Few Years," MC 48, November 18, 1954 (approved on November 22, 1954), SHAPE Historical Office. Emphasis in original text. The provision relating to immediate use was the first of three provisos relating to the viability of the new strategy; the other two had to do with a German defense contribution, and the adoption of specific measures that would enable NATO forces to survive an attack and go into action rapidly. See also Comité de Défense Nationale, "Examen du 'Plan des Possibilités' établi par le commandement suprême des forces alliées en Europe," p. 4, September 7, 1954, folder "Comité de Défense Nationale du 10 Septembre 1954," Box 2, Papers of General Blanc (French Army Chief of Staff), fonds 1K145, SHAT, Vincennes. 525. NCS meeting, December 3, 1954, FRUS, 1952-54, 2:805-806. 526. Transcript of Gruenther press briefing, January 11, 1954, Montgomery Papers, file "Philosophy of NATO military build-up," Imperial War Museum, London. 527. For evidence of Eisenhower's willingness to escalate even in local wars in the Third World, see NESC briefing, January 23, 1956 (where the president said he would "never commit our forces to battle where I cannot get at the heart of the enemy's power and support"); NSC meeting, February 27, 1956; Eisenhower-Radford-Taylor meeting, May 24, 1956; NSC meeting, January 3, 1957; and NSC meeting, May 27, 1957; in FRUS 1955-57, 19:191, 211, 313-314, 397, 503. Note also the series of public statements quoted in ibid., p. 61, and also Eisenhower's remark, during the first Taiwan Straits crisis in 1954, about the need "to go to the head of the snake" and attack Russia rather than fight a ground war with China; NSC meeting, September 12, 1954, FRUS 1952-54, 14:617. But the evidence on this question is not unambiguous: some documents indicate a certain reluctance to escalate. See, for example, NSC meeting, May 17, 1956, FRUS 1955-57, 19:307. For the comment about limited wars only being possible in "underdeveloped areas," see NSC meeting, May 27, 1957, ibid., p. 503. For the remark about having to fight a major war if local wars become too common, see NSC meeting, August 4, 1955, ibid., p. 97. For the treatment of this issue in the later period, see Eisenhower-Herter-McElroy-Radford meeting, July 2, 1959; NSC meetings, July 9, 1959, and October 6, 1960; and Furnas to Smith, July 15, 1959; in FRUS 1958-60, 3:228-235 (the quotations are on pp. 233 and 235), 238-248, 255-258, 483-484. 528. See also Eisenhower-Taylor-Radford meeting, May 24, 1956, FRUS 1955-57, 19:311-315; Eisenhower-Bowie meeting, August 16, 1960, FRUS 1958-60, 7(1):612, 614. For other documents reflecting his belief in the uncontrollability of major war in general, and his dismissal of the idea that in a major conflict the fighting might be kept limited because both sides would be too frightened to use nuclear weapons, see NSC meeting, June 24, 1954, FRUS 1952-54, 2:689-690, and Eisenhower-JCS meeting, February 10, 1956, DDRS 1982/798. 529. NSC meeting, March 25, 1954, FRUS 1952-54, 2:640-642. See also NSC meeting, January 22, 1959, FRUS 1958-60, 3:178; Eisenhower-Radford-Taylor meeting, May 24, 1956, FRUS 1955-57, 19:313. For the point that the enemy could not be allowed to strike first, see the November 1957 document cited in Rosenberg, "Origins of Overkill," p. 47. Note also a comment he made in passing in an NSC discussion of general war strategy on March 5, 1959: "if you get into a fight you try to shoot your enemy before he shoots you." FRUS 1958-60, 3:197. 530. NSC meeting, December 20, 1956, FRUS 1955-57, 19:381. 531. NSC meeting, February 7, 1957, ibid., p. 416. 532. David Rosenberg, "Toward Armageddon: The Foundations of U.S. Nuclear Strategy" (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1983), p. 221. See also pp. 197-201. 533. Ernest May, John Steinbruner and Thomas Wolfe, "History of the Strategic Arms Competition, 1945-1972," part one (Office of the Secretary of Defense: Historical Office, 1981), p. 588. Available from the Department of Defense Freedom of Information [DOD-FOIA] Office. 534. Eisenhower-JCS meeting, December 22, 1954, AWF/ACW Diary/3//DDEL. Emphasis added. 535. NSC meeting, July 29, 1954, AWF/NSC/5/DDEL. Emphasis added 536. NSC meeting, December 3, 1954, FRUS 1952-54, 2:805. 537. See Rosenberg, "Origins of Overkill," esp. p. 38. 538. Eisenhower-Radford-Taylor meeting, May 24, 1956, FRUS 1955-57, 19:312. 539. Eisenhower to Churchill, January 22, 1955, Directory: polisci -> faculty -> trachtenberg trachtenberg -> The United States, France, and the Question of German Power, 1945-1960 polisci -> Transylvania university committee on program and curriculum polisci -> Pos 6933: History of American Political Thought Course Description polisci -> Urban politics political science polisci -> International political economy polisci -> J. B. 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