A constructed Peace The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963
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| Histoire des débuts, pp. 369-389.
301. Lovett-Inverchapel meeting, February 7, 1948, and Marshall to Embassy in France, February 27, 1948, FRUS 1948, 3:23, 34. 302. Marshall to Inverchapel and Marshall to Bidault, both March 12, 1948, FRUS 1948, 3:48, 50. 303. Lovett to Douglas, May 11, 1948, FRUS 1948, 2:233n. Bevin and Bidault had asked for the talks in a top secret letter to Marshall on April 17; see FRUS 1948, 3:91. 304. For an account of the making of the North Atlantic Treaty which emphasizes the German question, see Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance. See also Kaplan, The United States and NATO; Baylis, The Diplomacy of Pragmatism; Don Cook, Forging the Alliance: NATO, 1945-1950 (London: Arbor House, 1989); Nikolaj Petersen, "Who Pulled Whom and How Much? Britain, the United States and the Making of the North Atlantic Treaty," Millenium: Journal of International Studies, 11:2 (1982), 93-114; and the various articles in Joseph Smith, ed., The Origins of NATO (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1990), esp. Norbert Wiggershaus, "The German Question and the Foundation of the Atlantic Pact." 305. Tusa, Berlin Blockade, p. 274. On the non-jamming of the radars, see Richard Kohn and Joseph Harahan, eds., Strategic Air Warfare: An Interview with General Curtis E. LeMay, Leon W. Johnson, David A. Burchinal and Jack J. Catton (Washington: Office of Air Force History, 1988), pp. 85-86. 306. Smith to Marshall, July 31, 1948, FRUS 1948, 2:998. Note also Clay's comments in the NSC on July 22 about how the Soviets, whose attitude had been marked by "truculence and arrogance" just a few months ago, had now become "highly correct and considerate." FD/12/FP/ML. 307. JCS History, 2:18-19. 308. Butterworth to Lovett, October 1, 1947, FRUS 1947, 6:820-821. For the best analysis, see William Stueck, The Road to Confrontation: American Policy toward China and Korea, 1947-1950 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981), esp. pp. 75, 86-88. 309. See especially Henderson to Marshall, January 9, 1948, and Hickerson to Lovett, June 1, 1948, FRUS 1948, 4:9-14, 98-99. Henderson's views had been reflected in the draft policy paper on Greece, NSC 5 of January 6, 1948, ibid., pp. 2-8. See also Henderson to McWilliams, Feb. 10, 1948, ibid., p. 39. 310. Henderson to Rankin, March 25, 1948, FRUS 1948, 4:64-65. For JCS views, see JCS to Forrestal, January 8, 1948, and NSC 5/3, May 25, 1948, FRUS 1948, 4:8, 94-95; see also JCS History, 2:28, 43-48. 311. See NSC 1/2, February 10, 1948, FRUS 1948, 3:767-769. 312. Henderson's paraphrase of Marshall's informal testimony, in Henderson to Rankin, March 25, 1948, FRUS 1948, 4:64-65. For U.S. policy on Greece, see especially the minutes of NSC discussions of December 17, 1947, January 13 and February 12, 1948, President's Secretary's Files [PSF], HSTL. For other key documents bearing on the question, see FRUS 1948, 4:2-9, 39-40, 46-51, 93-95, 101, 205-208. 313. On these matters in general, see Williamson and Rearden, Origins of U.S. Nuclear Strategy, and Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, pp. 119-121, 153-158. By far the most important work on American nuclear strategy was done by David Rosenberg. See especially the parts of two of his articles dealing with these issues: "American Atomic Strategy and the Hydrogen Bomb Decision," Journal of American History 66 (June 1979): 62-87, and "The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-1960," International Security 7 (Spring 1983): 9-16. The two most important documents bearing on the problems America would face at the very beginning of a war are the Harmon and Hull reports of May 1949 and February 1950, analyzed in Rosenberg, "American Atomic Strategy and the Hydrogen Bomb Decision," p. 16, and in Richard Rowe, "American Nuclear Strategy and the Korean War" (M.A. thesis, University of Pennsylvania, 1984), p. 26ff. For figures on yield and stockpile size, see Rearden, The Formative Years, p. 439. 314. See, for example, James Forrestal to Chan Gurney, December 8, 1947, Forrestal Diaries, pp. 350-351. 315. Truman talk to Atlantic Pact foreign ministers, April 3, 1949, Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 40 (1992): 416. Note especially the reference here to the problem of using the bomb "against our occupied Western European allies." Note also the reference in a later American document to the "current JCS strategy" of attacking targets in western Europe, such as the Ruhr, in the "event of their take-over by the Soviets so as to deny additional military capabilities to the enemy." Fuller paper on US policy toward Europe, September 10, 1954, FRUS 1952-54, 5:1171. 316. JCS History, 2:360 and 3(1):12-28. Forrestal Diaries, pp. 374-377. Bradley to Joint Chiefs, March 11, 1948; Marshall to Forrestal, March 23, 1948; Forrestal to NSC, April 17 and 19, 1948; in FRUS 1948, 1:539-540, 541-542, 563-564, 566. 317. NSC minutes, February 12, 1948, PSF/HSTL. See also Forrestal Diaries, p. 373. 318. Marshall to Lovett, November 8, 1948, FRUS 1948, 1:655. 319. JCS History, 2:164 and chap. 7; Marshall to Forrestal, November 8, 1948, FRUS 1948, 1:655; Rearden, The Formative Years, p. 319. 320. Stalin to Mao, October 1, 1950, quoted in Stalin to Shtykov, October 7, 1950, cited in Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War, pp. 66-67, and published in CWIHP Bulletin, nos. 6-7 (Winter 1995-96), p. 116. Note also Stalin's advice to the Chinese in early December 1950 to continue their advance in Korea--to "beat the iron while it is hot"--quoted in Mastny, The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity, p. 111. 321. The point was stressed by Marshall in meetings with Schuman and Bevin in October 1948. See Schuman-Marshall meeting, October 4, 1948, p.4, Z/Généralités/23/FFMA, and Schuman-Marshall-Bevin meeting, October 5, 1948, pp. 7-8, BP/1/FFMA. 322. See, for example, Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, pp. 19, 107-108, 119 (for the Bradley quotation), 135. For the Soviet strike capability even in 1950, see CIA Intelligence Memorandum No. 323-SRC, "Soviet Preparations for Major Hostilities in 1950," August 25, 1950, Declassified Documents Reference System [DDRS] 1987/3151; and NIE 3, "Soviet Capabilities and Intentions," November 15, 1950, in Scott Koch, ed., Selected Estimates on the Soviet Union, 1950-1959 (Washington: CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1993), pp. 172, 174. 323. See especially Karel Kaplan, Dans les archives du Comité Central (Paris: Albin Michel, 1978), pp. 94, 162-166, and Kaplan's "Il piano di Stalin," Panorama, April 26, 1977. Kaplan is a Czech historian who had access to Czech documents during the 1960s. Note also the evidence that the Soviets were getting ready to attack Yugoslavia. See Béla Király, "The Aborted Soviet Military Plans against Tito's Yugoslavia," in Wayne Vucinich, ed., At the Brink of War and Peace: The Tito-Stalin Split in a Historic Perspective (New York: Brooklyn College Press, 1982), pp. 273-288; Beatrice Heuser, Western "Containment" Policies in the Cold War: The Yugoslav Case, 1948-1953 (London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 127-129; Mastny, The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity, pp. 71-72, 102. 324. See, for example, Kennan's and Acheson's comments in the "Princeton Seminar," the transcript of a series of discussions held in Princeton in late 1953 and early 1954, pp. 1189-90, Acheson Papers [AP], Box 76, HSTL, and the intelligence briefing on "Soviet Activity in Europe during the past year which points toward offensive military operations," October 26, 1950, CD 350.09, RG 330 (July-December 1950 series), USNA. 325. Central Intelligence Agency, "Soviet Preparations for Major Hostilities in 1950," August 25, 1950, DDRS 1987/3151. 326. Extract from the Intelligence Advisory Committee's "Weekly Report of Indications of Soviet Communist Intentions," May 23, 1951, FRUS 1951, 1:85-86. See also NIE 3, November 15, 1950, in Koch, Selected Estimates, pp. 169-178; NIE-15, December 11, 1950, NIE-25, August 2, 1951, and Watch Committee Circular Airgram, August 24, 1951, quoted in FRUS 1951, 1:7, 126, 169n. On the NIE's, see the editorial note in FRUS 1951, 1:4n. 327. See Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, pp. 113-114. For the East Germans' threats, and in particular for their references to Korea, see Norbert Wiggershaus, "Bedrohungsvorstellungen Bundeskanzler Adenauers nach Ausbruch des Korea-Krieges," Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen (1979), no. 1, pp. 101-103; Konrad Adenauer, Memoirs 1945-53 (Chicago: Regnery, 1966), 274-275; Thomas Schwartz, America's Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), p. 126. Some typical threats cited by Schwartz in his dissertation are quoted in History and Strategy, p. 151n. On the East German defectors, see Gerhard Wettig, Entmilitarisierung und Wiederbewaffnung in Deutschland, 1943-1955 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1967), p. 225. 328. Note Acheson's remarks, quoted in Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, p. 114 n. 46. See also JCS History, 4:67, 79. 329. See Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, pp. 112-114, 123, 126-128. For the point that the extreme postwar demobilization had been a mistake, note, for example, Truman's remarks in the NSC in March 1952. The U.S. government, he said, had torn "up our military machine" after the war. "Everyone was involved in that development, and it is impossible to put the blame any one place." NSC minutes, March 24, 1952, PSF/220/HSTL. For data on the increase in allied defense spending, see extracts from briefing book for Eisenhower, and Cabot memorandum, March 27, 1951, FRUS 1951, 3:6, 104. 330. Bradley remarks of April 5, 1949, quoted in draft aide-memoire attached to Ives memo, June 24, 1949, CD 6-4-18, RG 330, 1947-50 series, USNA. 332. For a typical argument along these lines, see Secretariat Général de la Défense Nationale, "Note sur un système de securité en Europe," August 29, 1955, Europe 1949-55/Généralités/100/FFMA. 333. For the French view of Germany as a buffer area, see especially the Revers report of January 25, 1948, 4Q37/2/SHAT and the Avis du Comité des Chefs d'Etat-Major au sujet des problèmes soulevés par le Plan des Possibilités du Commandant Suprême Allié en Europe, Sept. 6, 1954, p. 9, in Series lK145 (Papers of General Blanc, Army Chief of Staff), box 2, SHAT. For Schumacher's views, see in general Ulrich Buczylowski, Kurt Schumacher und die deutsche Frage: Sicherheitspolitik und strategische Offensivkonzeption von August 1950 bis September 1951 (Stuttgart: Seewald, 1973); see also Schwartz, America's Germany, pp. 145-146. Schumacher wanted the West (including Germany) to build a "powerful offensive army" capable of making sure that any war that broke out was fought in eastern Europe, and not on German (including East German) territory; only if such a force were built up should the German government, in his view, take part in the western defense effort. For British reluctance to commit themselves fully to the defense of western Europe, see, for example, John Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence: British Nuclear Strategy, 1945-1964 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), pp. 76-77. 334. For the point that the Germans should contribute to their own defense, see, for example, McCloy to Acheson, September 23, 1951, FRUS 1951, 3:1523; Massigli, Une Comédie des erreurs, p. 239; and the Ely-Stehlin note quoted in Jean Doise and Maurice Vaïsse, Diplomatie et outil militaire, 1871-1969 (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1987), p. 421. For the consensus view that a defense east of the Rhine would require more troops than a defense based on the Rhine, see, for example, Air Marshal Elliot memorandum, October 19, 1950, DBPO II, 3:177. For the point that the cooperation and support of the German people as a whole were necessary for an effective defense, see Acheson's remarks in western foreign ministers' meetings, September 14 and 15, 1950, FRUS 1950, 3:294, 316. On the sudden interest in German rearmament in late 1949, see, for example, Konrad Adenauer, Erinnerungen, vol. 1 (1945-1953) (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1965), p. 341; Bonnet to Schuman, November 30, 1949, Europe 1949-55/Allemagne/182/FFMA. 335. See, for example, McCloy to Acheson, August 3, 1950, FRUS 1950, 3:182. 336. Acheson to Acting Secretary, May 9, 1950, FRUS 1950, 3:1016. 337. McCloy to Acheson, July 14, 1950, FRUS 1950, 4:698. 338. McCloy to Acheson, September 23, 1951, FRUS 1951, 3:1523. 340. See Yost to Jessup, May 21, 1949, FRUS 1949, 3:874, 890-892, and also Buffet, Mourir pour Berlin, pp. 253, 261. 341. For a revealing glimpse into both French and British feelings about keeping the status quo, see Crouy-Charel to Massigli, May 8, 1955 (handwritten), enclosing an account of a May 6 meeting with a high British official, MP/96/FFMA. For British views, see also Rolf Steininger, The German Question: The Stalin Note of 1952 and the Problem of Reunification (New York: Columbia, 1990), pp. 34-35, and esp. p. 108. As for the French, the argument that a divided Germany was the optimal solution was developed most sharply in the early 1950s by the young Jean Sauvargnargues, head of the German desk at the Quai d'Orsay. See, for example, his memoranda of June 25, 1952, and April 22, 1953, Europe 1949-55/Allemagne/822-823/FFMA, and June 10, 1953, Europe 1949-55/Généralités/100/FFMA. For Schuman's views, see especially Schuman to Bonnet, June 16, 1952, Europe 1949-55/Allemagne/822/FFMA. The basic French attitude is reflected in many other documents. See, for example, Achilles to State Department, November 17, 1953, FRUS 1952-54, 5:1719; François-Poncet to Bidault, February 26, 1954, Europe 1949-55/Allemagne/11/FFMA; and Note de la Direction Politique, April 15, 1955, Documents Diplomatiques Français [DDF] 1955, 1:456-458. France's allies understood what her basic attitude was. "While they would not say so out loud, of course," Dulles noted, "the French would not be at all disturbed by the prospect of the continued division of Germany." NSC meeting, November 21, 1955, FRUS 1955-57, 5:806. On these matters in general, see the analysis in Soutou, "La France et les notes soviétiques de 1952 sur l'Allemagne," pp. 270-273, and also Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, pp. 178-179. 343. Kennan paper, March 8, 1949, FRUS 1949:3, p. 98. 344. PPS meeting with Acheson, October 18, 1949, PPS 1947-53, box 32, RG 59, USNA. See also George Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950 (Boston: Little Brown, 1967), p. 417 and chapter 19; John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 33n.; and Yergin, Shattered Peace, p. 40. 345. Reinstein to Thorp, September 6, 1948, FRUS 1948, 2:1288n. See also Wilson Miscamble, George F. Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), pp. 166-173. At a meeting with Kennan, Murphy and other top officials on March 9, 1949, Acheson did express a degree of sympathy for Kennan's position, but he also said that he did not "quite follow" Kennan's thinking or "understand how the proposed solution would work." He went on to say that he did not understand how the decision to create a West German state had been made, and wondered whether it had been "the brainchild of General Clay and not a governmental decision." Acheson certainly knew better than to think that a decision of this order of importance could possibly have been made in the field and not in Washington; he was probably in effect inviting Murphy to review the story of American policy in Germany, which in any event is what Murphy then went on to do. It seems, therefore, that the Secretary of State was taking his distance from Kennan, but that he wanted to do this in the nicest possible way. He did not want to slam the door on Kennan's face or put an end to discussion of this fundamental issue. Acheson's own views--the official State Department line--were reflected in a memorandum he sent Truman three weeks later which stressed the importance of integrating at least western Germany in a west European system and also in an important analysis of the problem he personally made in May. See Acheson-Kennan-Murphy meeting, March 9, 1949; Acheson to Truman, with State Department paper, March 31, 1949; and Acheson to London Embassy, May 11, 1949; in FRUS 1949, 3:102-103, 142-155, 872-874. 346. Acheson-Truman meeting, July 31, 1950, Nitze in Lewis and Achilles to Byroade, May 2, 1950, and Acheson to Acting Secretary, May 9, 1950, in FRUS 1950, 3:167-8, 914, 1015. 347. U.S. ambassadors' meeting, October 21, 1949, FRUS 1949, 3:287, 289-290. See also PPS, "The Current Position in the Cold War," April 14, 1950, and Nitze's remarks, reported in Lewis and Achilles to Byroade, May 2, 1950, FRUS 1950, 3:859, 914; and Byroade memorandum on "Germany in the European Context," February 11, 1950, FRUS 1950, 4:599. 348. U.S. ambassadors' meeting, October 21, 1949, FRUS 1949, 3:290. 349. McCloy to Byroade, April 25, 1950, FRUS 1950, 4:683. 350. McCloy to Byroade, April 25, 1950, FRUS 1950, 4:633. 351. Key French officials frequently argued along these lines. François-Poncet and Massigli both felt that the West had to move toward a system based on collaboration with Germany. In early 1949, they thought that the occupation statute had to be a lot more liberal than the one the allies were then drafting, and Schuman agreed. Massigli to Chauvel, February 14, 1949, MP/68/FFMA; Kennan-François-Poncet meeting, March 21, 1949, and Schuman-Acheson meeting, April 1, 1949, FRUS 1949, 3:114, 159. 352. Wiggershaus, "Bedrohungsvorstellungen Bundeskanzler Adenauers," pp. 96, 98-99. For Bevin's view that the crisis was still a few years away, see, for example, US-UK meeting, May 9, 1950, FRUS 1950, 3:1020. 353. Evans memorandum, August 4, 1950, FRUS 1950, 3:182-183. 354. NSC 71, June 8, 1950, and Truman to Acheson, June 16, 1950 (2 documents), FRUS 1950, 4:686-688. 355. PPS meeting, October 18, 1949, p. 7, PPS 1947-53, box 32, RG 59, USNA; Acheson-Truman meeting, July 31, 1950, FRUS 1950, 3:167-168. 356. McCloy to Acheson, August 3, 1950, and Acheson-Truman meeting, July 31, 1950, FRUS 1950, 3:167-168, 181. 357. Bruce to Acheson, July 28, 1950, FRUS 1950, 3:157. All the main American policy makers were arguing along similar lines. See, for example, Acheson-Truman meeting, July 31, 1950; McCloy to Acheson, August 3, 1950; and Kirk to Acheson, August 9, 1950; in FRUS 1950, 3:167-168, 181, 193. 358. Bevin to Harvey, October 9, 1950, DBPO II, 3:141. 359. Douglas to Acheson, August 8, 1950; "Establishment of a European Defense Force," enclosed in Matthews to Burns, August 16, 1950; Acheson to Bruce, September 2, 1950; FRUS 1950, 3:190-192, 215, 261. 360. Acheson to Acting Secretary, September 17, 1950, FRUS 1950, 3:316-319. 361. See especially Bevin memorandum, October 6, 1950, and Bevin to Harvey, October 9, 1950, DBPO II, 3:133-135, 140-142. Note also Acheson to Truman, September 15, 1950, FRUS 1950, 3:1229. 362. François-Poncet to Foreign Ministry, November 17, 1950, Europe 1949-55/Allemagne/913/FFMA. 363. Kennan notes of meeting with François-Poncet, March 21, 1949, and Acheson-Schuman meeting, April 1, 1949, FRUS 1949, 3:114, 159. On the undermining of the Schuman policy by the French occupation authorities in Germany, see Massigli to Chauvel, February 14, 1949, MP/68/FFMA. 364. See Bevin to Foreign Office, September 13, 1950; Harvey to Bevin, October 7, 1950; and Schuman-Bevin meeting, December 2, 1950; in DBPO II, 3:35-36, 136, 312-317. Schuman-Acheson meeting, September 12, 1950; meeting of western foreign ministers and high commissioners, September 14, 1950; Acheson to Truman, September 14, and September 16, 1950; and Schuman-Bevin-Acheson meeting, September 12, 1950; in FRUS 1950, 3:288, 296-302, 311-312, 1200. American officials had long felt that Schuman's domestic political problems were quite real and that he had taken France as far as he could. See Ambassador Bruce's remarks in U.S. ambassadors' meeting, March 22-24, 1950, ibid., p. 819. 365. Meeting of western foreign ministers and high commissioners, September 14, 1950, and Acheson to Truman, September 15, 1950, FRUS 1950, 3:298, 1230. 366. 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