A constructed Peace The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963
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| Impossible Peace, pp. 15, 21, and Rothwell, Britain and the Cold War, p. 225. For Foreign Office and especially Treasury opposition to the Byrnes Plan and Bevin's reaction, see Troutbeck minute, July 26, 1945; Dent minute, July 27, 1945; staff conference with Attlee and Bevin, July 31, 1945; Waley note, July 31, 1945; Coulson to Cadogan, July 31, 1945, and enclosed memorandum; and Waley to Eady, August 1, 1945; in DBPO, I, 1:920n., 920-921, 1052-54, 1068, 1069-1071, 1105-1106. One should note, however, that there was a certain degree of ambivalence in the British position, and that Waley and Eady and even Churchill himself at first favored the American plan. See the evidence cited in Philip Baggaley, "Reparations, Security, and the Industrial Disarmament of Germany: Origins of the Potsdam Decisions," (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1980) pp. 534-535.
102. For Paragraph 19 of part II of the Protocol, see FRUS Potsdam, 2:1485. This is to be compared with the pre-Byrnes Plan draft in ibid., p. 799. 103. Collado to Thorp and Reinstein, July 23, 1945; report to Byrnes, August 1, 1945; and Clayton and Collado to Thorp, August 16, 1945; in FRUS Potsdam, 2:812, 828, 829-830. 104. Rubin to Oliver, July 25, 1945, FRUS Potsdam, 2:871. 105. For the quotation, see Acheson to Byrnes, May 9, 1946, FRUS 1946, 5:551. For other documents reflecting this aspect of American policy, see n. xxx below. 106. For Bevin's dislike of the idea of spheres of influence, but also his growing sense that this kind of system was unavoidable, see Alan Bullock, Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary, 1945-1951 (New York: Norton, 1983), pp. 134, 193-194, and also DBPO I, 2:15-18 and 565n. Note also the British ambassador's insistence in a May 1946 meeting with Stalin of the importance of the USSR accepting the Middle East as a British sphere of influence, in Rothwell, Britain and the Cold War, pp. 262-263. For Attlee's aversion to the idea of a spheres of influence system, see Bullock, Bevin, p. 117, and Attlee to Eden, July 18, 1945, DBPO I, 1:363-364. 107. Note, for example, his comment at a private meeting with Churchill on July 18: "Marshal Stalin said that he had been hurt by the American demand for a change of Government in Roumania and Bulgaria. He was not meddling in Greek affairs, so he thought it was unjust of the Americans to make the present demand." DBPO I, 1:389. Note also Molotov's handwritten comments in February 1945 on a Vyshinski memorandum on the Polish question. The Soviet foreign minister sincerely resented western interference with what the USSR was doing in Poland, and his reasoning is quite revealing: "Poland--a big deal! But how governments are being organized in Belgium, France, Greece, etc., we do not know. We have not been asked, although we do not say that we like one or another of these governments. We have not interfered, because it is the Anglo-American zone of military action." Cited in Vladimir Pechatnov, "The Big Three after World War II: New Documents on Soviet Thinking about Post War Relations with the United States and Great Britain," CWIHP Working Paper No. 13 (Washington, 1995), p. 23. 108. See Kathryn Weathersby, "Soviet Aims in Korea and the Origins of the Korean War, 1945-1950: New Evidence from Russian Archives," Cold War International History Project Working Paper No. 8 (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1993). 109. Djilas, Conversations with Stalin, p. 114. 110. See, for example, Brimelow to Warner, September 6, 1945, DBPO I, 6:59; Bevin-Hall memorandum, August 25, 1945, DBPO I, 2:34. 111. Bevin-Stalin meeting, December 24, 1945, DBPO I, 2:868. 112. McClellan, "Molotov Remembers," p. 17. 113. See Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East, pp. 270-286, 304-342. 114. See Kuniholm, Origins of the Cold War in the Near East, pp. 255-270. 115. Yergin, Shattered Peace, pp. 142-143. 116. Truman to Acheson (unsent), March 15, 1957, in Monte Poen, ed., Strictly Personal and Confidential: The Letters Harry Truman Never Mailed (Boston: Little Brown, 1982), p. 33. 117. Truman to Bess Truman, July 29, 1945, Dear Bess, p. 522; Ayers Diary, entry for August 7, 1945, p. 59. 118. Ayers Diary, entry for November 19, 1945, p. 97. 119. Harry Truman to Bess Truman, July 31, 1945, in Dear Bess, p. 522. 120. Ayers Diary, entry for November 19, 1945, p. 97. 121. Ayers Diary, entry for December 17, 1945, p. 104. 122. Truman to Byrnes (unsent), January 5, 1946, in Poen, Strictly Personal, p. 40. 123. Truman to Byrnes (unsent), January 5, 1946, in Poen, Strictly Personal, p. 40. Compare this with Truman to his wife, July 31, 1945, in Dear Bess, pp. 522-523. 124. Truman to Byrnes (unsent), January 5, 1946, in Poen, Strictly Personal, p. 40. 125. For the best analysis, see Messer, End of an Alliance, pp. 157-165. 126. Poen, Strictly Personal, is essentially a collection of these unsent letters, some of which are quite extraordinary. Note especially a Truman desk note from June 1946, where he wrote about calling in trade union leaders, telling "them that patience is exhausted. Declare an emergency--call out the troops. Start industry and put anyone to work who wants to work. If any leader interferes, court-martial him. . . . Adjourn Congress and run the country. Get plenty of Atomic Bombs on hand--drop one on Stalin, put the United Nations to work and eventually set up a free world." Ibid., p. 31. 127. Forrestal diary entries for September 21 and October 16, 1945, FD/3/FP/ML. Only the second of these was published, in part, in Millis, Forrestal Diaries, p. 102. 128. Churchill to Attlee, March 7, 1946, CHUR 2/4, Churchill Papers, Churchill Archives Centre, Churchill College, Cambridge University. 129. Edwin Wright, "Events relative to the Azarbaijan Issue--March 1946," August 16, 1965, quoted in FRUS 1946, 7:347. 130. See the president's comments reported in W. Averell Harriman and Elie Abel, Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, 1941-1946 (New York: Random House, 1975), p. 550. 131. Acheson to Byrnes, August 15, 1946, and Acheson-Inverchapel meeting, August 20, 1946, FRUS 1946, 7:840-842, 849-850. On the Turkish crisis, see especially Eduard Mark, "The War Scare of 1946 and its Consequences," Diplomatic History 21 (1997): 383-415. 132. Leahy to Hull, May 16, 1944, FRUS Yalta, p. 107. 133. For a typical example of this kind of thinking, see JCS to Byrnes, March 29, 1946, FRUS 1946, 1:1165-66. 134. On this point, see Leffler, Preponderance of Power, esp. pp. 60-61. 135. "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs 25 (July 1947): 576. 136. Pauley to Clay, August 11, 1945, FRUS 1945, 3:1251-52. 137. Byrnes to Murphy, August 18, 1945, FRUS 1945, 3:1522. On paragraph 19, see chapter one, pp. xxx-yyy. 138. For an example of this type of thinking, see Clay to Eisenhower, May 26, 1946, Clay Papers, 1:214. 140. In September, when the State Department was pressing for a reparation plan based on the idea that Germany was to be treated as a unit, Byrnes objected from London, saying that he seriously doubted whether that approach "correctly reflects the spirit of the Potsdam Protocol or is likely to produce any tangible results." But that was just about as far as he went: he did not put his foot down and insist on a change in policy. Clayton to Harriman, September 6, 1945, and Byrnes to Acheson, September 28, 1945, FRUS 1945, 3:1284, 1319; the Byrnes letter is cited in an unpublished manuscript by James McAllister. 141. Meeting at State Department, November 3, 1945, Clay Papers, 1:113. 142. Ibid., p. 112. 143. French memorandum, September 13, 1945; Murphy to Byrnes, September 29, October 2 and 18, 1945; Allied Coordinating Committee meeting, November 5, 1945; Byrnes-Couve de Murville meting, November 20, 1945; Byrnes to Caffery, December 6, 1945; in FRUS 1945, 3:869-871, 879, 844, 884, 888n, 907, 916. See also Clay to War Department, September 24, 1945, and Clay to McCloy, October 5, 1945, Clay Papers, 1:85, 92. For Soviet unwillingness to go along with the idea, see, Murphy to Byrnes, November 24, 1945, and Caffery to Byrnes, December 11, 1945, FRUS 1945, 3:911 and 918. For British coolness, see, for example, a French Foreign Ministry historical note of January 12, 1946, Y/284/FFMA. 144. G.D.A. MacDougall, "Some Random Notes on the Reparation Discussions in Berlin, September - November 1945," DBPO I, 5:521. 145. For the Level of Industry plan, see DOSB, April 14, 1946, pp. 636-639; for a discussion, see Ratchford and Ross, Berlin Reparations Assignment, chapters 7-13. 147. Clay statement in Allied Coordinating Committee, April 8, 1946, in Murphy to Byrnes, April 10, 1946; Murphy to Byrnes, May 2, 1946; and Acheson to Byrnes, May 9, 1946, in FRUS 1946, 5:538, 545-547, 551. Clay to Echols, April 8 and May 2, 1946, and Clay to Eisenhower, May 26, 1946, Clay Papers 1: 186-187, 203-204, 212-3; and Backer, Winds of History, pp. 122-123. 148. Acheson and Hilldring to Byrnes (two documents), both May 9, 1946, FRUS 1946, 5:549-555. 149. Bevin, "Anglo-American Discussions," May 5, 1946, FO 800/513, and Bevin-Byrnes "Discussion," April 26, 1946, FO 800/446, Public Record Office [PRO], Kew. 150. Clay to Echols, May 2, 1946, Clay Papers, 1:203. The argument that the suspension of reparation deliveries was directed mainly at France was advanced by John Gimbel in his The American Occupation of Germany: Politics and the Military, 1945-1949 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968), pp. 57-61. Evidence published the following year in FRUS 1946, vol. 5, cast doubt on this interpretation, as Gaddis pointed out in 1972; see his United States and the Origins of the Cold War, p. 330n. But Gimbel's views were unaffected. See his "On the Implementation of the Potsdam Agreement," Political Science Quarterly 87 (1972): 250-259. And many other scholars followed Gimbel's lead. See, for example, Yergin, Shattered Peace, p. 229 and p. 458 n. 21; Jean Smith, Lucius D. Clay: An American Life (New York: Holt, 1990), p. 350; and Leffler, A Preponderance of Power, p. 118. 151. Clay to JCS, June 6, 1945, and Clay to McCloy, June 29, 1945, Clay Papers, 1:20, 38. 152. The Army, moreover, had to finance German needs out of its own budget, and therefore had a certain incentive to put the part of Germany the United States was responsible for back on her feet as soon as possible. See Wolfgang Krieger, General Lucius D. Clay und die amerkiansche Deutschlandpolitik, 1945-1949, 2nd ed., (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1988), pp. 99-101. 153. See, for example, Clay to Echols and Petersen, March 27, 1946; Clay to Eisenhower, May 26, 1946; and Clay to Echols, July 19, 1946; in Clay Papers, 1:184, 217, 243. 154. Note especially Clay's comment about the importance of "forcing the issue" in Clay to Dodge, July 31, 1946, quoted in Backer, Winds of History, p. 147. 155. See especially Clay's exchange with Riddleberger (head of State Department division of Central European Affairs), meeting at State Department, November 3, 1945, Clay Papers, 1:112-113. Note also Kennan to Byrnes, March 6, 1946, and Bedell Smith (now ambassador in Moscow) to Byrnes, April 2, 1946, FRUS 1946, 5:519, 535. 156. Acheson to Byrnes, May 9, 1946, FRUS 1946, 5:551, 554. 157. Clay press conference, May 27, 1946, Clay Papers, 1:221. 158. Clay to Eisenhower, May 26, 1946, Clay Papers, 1:217. 159. Byrnes to Caffery, July 19, 1946, and Murphy to Byrnes, July 20, 1946, FRUS 1946, 5:578, 580. Note also the documents cited in n. xxx below. 160. See Backer, Winds of Change, chapter 6, esp. p. 148. 161. See, for example, Caffery to Byrnes, June 11, June 22, August 30, and September 18, 1946, FRUS 1946, 5:566-567, 567n., 596, 605. 163. Bedell Smith to Byrnes, April 2, 1946, FRUS 1946, 5:535. 164. Clay to Eisenhower, May 26, 1946, Clay Papers, 1:214-217. 165. Bedell Smith to Byrnes, April 2, 1946, FRUS 1946, 5:536. 166. See, for example, Clay statement in Allied Coordinating Committee, April 8, 1946, in Murphy to Byrnes, April 10, 1946, and Acheson to Byrnes, May 9, 1946, FRUS 1946, 5:538, 551-552; foreign ministers' meetings (and related U.S. memorandum), May 15 and July 9-12, 1946, FRUS 1946, 2:397-398, 400-402, 849, 873, 876, 884 and 935; and Clay to Echols, April 8 and May 2, 1946, Clay Papers, 1:186-187, 203. 167. Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors, pp. 248, 251. 168. See, for example, his comments in a foreign ministers' meeting, April 28, 1946, FRUS 1946, 2:166-167. On the development of the proposal, see Byrnes's remarks in a foreign ministers' meeting, May 16, 1946, ibid. p. 431. 169. For the text, see DOSB, September 15, 1946, pp. 496-501. See also Backer, Winds of History, p. 134, and Smith, Clay, p. 388. 170. See Joseph Jones, The Fifteen Weeks (February 21 - June 5, 1947) (New York: Viking, 1955), pp. 138-142; Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years at the State Department (New York: Norton, 1969), p. 375; Timothy Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance: The Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Westport: Greenwood, 1981), p. 30; Richard Freeland, The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism: Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, and Internal Security, 1946-1948 (New York: Knopf, 1972), esp. p. 89; and Leffler, Preponderance of Power, p. 145. 171. Acheson to Byrnes, May 9, 1946, FRUS 1946, 5:549. 172. Deighton, Impossible Peace, pp. 80 (for the quotation), 108-109, 125, 134; Rothwell, Britain and the Cold War, pp. 280, 321, 332. 173. Hankey note, October 25, 1946, quoted in Deighton, Impossible Peace, p. 108. 174. For the policy of saddling Russia with responsibility for the failure of the "Potsdam" policy of running Germany as a unit, see, for example, Acheson and Hilldring to Byrnes, and Acheson to Byrnes, both May 9, 1946, FRUS 1946, 5:549, 551-552. See also Murphy to Hickerson, October 26, 1947, FRUS 1947, 2:691, for an example of U.S. concern with German opinion. 175. Quoted in Deighton, Impossible Peace, p. 91. 176. Clay to Echols and Petersen, March 27, 1946, Clay Papers, 1:184. 177. Clay to Eisenhower, May 26, 1946, Clay Papers, 1:217. 178. Lucius Clay, Decision in Germany (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1950), p. 78; Smith, Clay, pp. 378-379. 179. Clay to Echols, July 19, 1946, Clay Papers, 1:236-237; Assistant Secretary of War Petersen to Secretary of War Patterson, August 5, 1945, quoted in Clay Papers, 1:237n. 180. Smith, Clay, pp. 378-389. 181. DOSB, September 15, 1946, pp. 496-501. 182. Soviet document quoted in Scott Parrish, "The USSR and the Security Dilemma: Explaining Soviet Self-Encirclement, 1945-1985" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1993), p. 177. 183. Marshall-Bidault meeting, March 13, 1947, and Marshall-Bonnet meeting, November 18, 1947, FRUS 1947, 2:247, 722; note also Marshall's remarks in a meeting with Stalin, April 15, 1947, ibid., p. 339. Marshall thought the Soviets shared this concern about Germany, and that an understanding could be built on the fact that they and the West had a common interest in keeping Germany in line. It was thus something for a shock for him to discover at the Moscow conference in March that the Russians were "not the least bit scared of a revived Germany." Reston memo, c. March 1947, KP/1/192ff/ML. 184. Marshall to Lovett, December 6 and 8, 1947, FRUS 1947, 2:752, 754. The problem of domestic political support had long been a basic concern of Marshall's. Marshall's sensitivity to domestic politics is also a major theme in Charles F. Brower, "The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy: American Strategy and the War with Japan" (Ph.D. diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1987). 185. Reston memo, c. March 1947, KP/1/192ff/ML. See also Charles Bohlen, Witness to History, 1929-1969 (New York: Norton, 1973), p. 261. 186. On the possibility of a deal, see Caffery to Byrnes, August 24, 1946; Murphy to Matthews, October 14, 1946; Murphy to Byrnes, October 16, 1946; Durbrow to Byrnes, October 23, 1946; Murphy to Byrnes, October 25, 1946; in FRUS 1946, 5:593-594, 622-625, 628-629, 631-633. 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