A. Creation of National Gov’t and Separation of Power 7


th Amendment and Rational Basis Review for Equal Protection (Economic & Non-suspect classifications)



Download 0.86 Mb.
Page25/31
Date17.11.2017
Size0.86 Mb.
#34146
1   ...   21   22   23   24   25   26   27   28   ...   31

14th Amendment and Rational Basis Review for Equal Protection (Economic & Non-suspect classifications)

  1. Applies to the federal gov’t

    1. Bolling v. Sharpe (1954) – segregation of DC public schools; equal protection applies to fed gov’t through due process clause of 5th amendment

    2. Requirements of equal protection are the same whether the challenge is to the federal gov’t under 5th amendment or the states

      1. “discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to violative of due process.”
  2. Carolene products (1938)

    1. Issue

      1. “Whether the Filled Milk Act of Congress which prohibits the shipment in interstate commerce of skimmed milk compounded with any fat or oil other than milk fat...transcends the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce or infringes the Fifth Amendment.”
    2. Reasoning

      1. Does underinclusiveness – the fact that Congress hasn’t gone after other industries – violate the economic substantive due process in the 5th amendment?
      2. Strength of filled milk legislation
        1. The adulteration argument is a little flimsy, but the fraud case could work – oleo margarine worked b/c it was sold as the same color as butter – and the filled milk was sold as regular milk.
        2. But there was already labeling legislation out there – that the filled milk would have to have its ingredients listed. Yet Congress noted that despite the labeling, people are still buying, so they obviously couldn’t be defrauded. The Depression is still in full swing, and consumers with limited resources are still choosing the cheaper product.
      3. Footnote 4
        1. What is famous about this case is footnote 4 – There may be a narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first 10 amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced with the Fourteenth.
        2. Indicates that other types of classification used by legislatures should be subject to stricter scrutiny:

          1. Restrictions on the right to vote

          2. Restraints upon dissemination of info

          3. Interferences with political organizations

          4. Prohibition of peaceable assembly
      4. Review of discriminatory statutes directed at discrete minority groups will be stricter:
        1. Religious groups
        2. National groups
        3. Racial minorities
      5. Relaxation of certain types of judicial review
        1. Congress is illustrating the types of due process claims which it will really examine – that economic due process infringement claims that hurts certain enumerated classes will be examined.
        2. But that legislation that benefited certain industrial groups will not be subjected to the same type of strict judicial review.
        3. Notable b/c doctrine prior had been that economic due process had been the main substance of prior claims – the right to earn a living w/o legislative interference.
      6. Development of modern day equal protection doctrine with different levels of protection for different classes
        1. “whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry. “
  3. Railway Express Agency v. New York (1949)

    1. Facts

      1. NY city regulation providing that no person shall operate an advertising vehicle; nothing shall prevent putting of business notices upon business delivery vehicles if vehicles are engaged in ordinary work of trade.
      2. Ostensible purpose was to increase traffic safety, but it meant that Railway Express Agency with lots of delivery vans could not rent space on their trucks, but NY times could.
    2. Reasoning

      1. Unequal treatment on the basis of such a distinction is not justified by the aim and purpose of the regulation – no greater distraction for Railways’ trucks than NY Times. But this analysis is superficial, for “local authorities may well have concluded that those who advertise their own wares on trucks do not present same traffic problem in view of the nature or extent of advertising which they use...It would take a degree of omniscience which we lack to say that such is not the case.”
      2. Classification at issue relates “to the purpose for which it is made and does nto contain the kind of discrimination against which the Equal Protection Clause affords protection.”
  4. Williamson v. Lee Optical (1955) – rational basis test very lax; as long as court can conceive of some basis

    1. Facts

      1. SC upholds OK statute that prohibited optician to fit or duplicate lenses w/o a prescription from an optometrist or an ophthalmologist.
      2. Fed court had declared it unconstit since it failed the rational basis test b/c a prescription was unnecessary if a person broke a pair of glasses – the optician could measure the power of the lenses and duplicate them w/o prescription.
      3. OK law was most likely adopted to protect business for optometrists, but as long as Court can find legitimate purpose, it’s ok.
      4. Involved challenges under both Due process and Equal Protection clauses
    2. Douglas’ reasoning

      1. Court treats both clauses as affording same degree of protection in cases of ordinary social and economic regulation. Whether Ps claimed that law violated their economic liberties or that the law made arbitrary distinctions, court subjected it to minimum rationality test.”
      2. OK law may exact a needless, wasteful requirement in many cases. But it is for the legislature, not the courts, to balance the advantages and disadvantages of the new requirement.”
      3. “It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it...”
      4. Possible legitimate purposes:
        1. Legislature might have concluded that the frequency of occasions where a prescription is necessary was sufficient to justify regulation...
        2. Eye examinations were so critical, not only for correction of vision but also for detection of latent diseases – every change needed an examination
        3. Freeing profession from commercialism
      5. Law might be illogical, but “day is gone when the Court uses the Due Process Clause to strike down state laws regulatory of business and industrial conditions, b/c they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony w/ a particular school of thought.”
  5. City of Cleburne TX v. Cleburne Living Center (1985) p. 1119; rationality review w/ teeth; Marshall’s alternate test for review based on sliding scale of constitutional and societal interest at stake

    1. Facts

      1. House purchased for group home for mentally retarded citizens
      2. CLC intended to comply w/ all state regs and applied for special use permit required for construction of “hospitals for the insane or feeble-minded, drug addicts, or penal or correctional institutions.”
      3. City Council denied permit and then CLC filed suit in federal court b/c if group’s residents were not mentally retarded, then its use would be permitted under city’s zoning ordinance.
      4. Claimed that city council’s decision was motivated primarily by the fact that residents were mentally retarded.
    2. Holding

      1. Mental retardation is not a suspect-classification; should be subject to rationality review: Race, alienage, or ethnicity is strict, gender is intermediate, all else is rationality review
        1. Past case law

          1. MA Retirement Board v. Murgi (1976) – Age discrimination subject to rationality review

            1. Where “individuals in group affected by law have distinguishing characteristics relevant to interests the state has authority to implement...the courts have been very reluctant...to closely scrutinize legis. choices as to whether, how, and to what extent those interests should be pursued.”
        2. Reasons why Mental retardation is not a suspect-classification; should be subject to rationality review

          1. How large and different group is to be cared for is complex and is matter for legis., not judiciary

            1. Those who are mentally retarded have a reduced ability to cope and function in world

            2. Very different – range from those who can live on their own and those who must be constantly cared for (immutable diff.)

          2. Distinctive legis. process for mentally retarded demonstrates that they have unique problems but also shows that legis. have been addressing their needs w/o prejudice or antipathy

            1. Requiring strict scrutiny may impede legislature from acting

          3. Legislative response negates any claim that mentally retarded are politically powerless
      2. Rationality review of zoning ordinance
        1. No rational basis for believing that home would pose special threat when other uses (nursing homes, private clubs, hotels, hospitals) don’t need special permit

          1. Fears on behalf of populace are not permissible bases for treating it differently; Palmore – private bias may be outside the law, but the law can’t directly or indirectly give them effect.

          2. Across the street from a high school – worries that students would harass residents – but denying on basis of vague fears is not permissible

          3. Five hundred year flood plain – but why would this be different concern than for nursing homes?

          4. Size and number – but no restriction in other types of living places; congestion – why would this be different?

          5.  Denial of permit rests not on rational reason, but on irrational prejudice
    3. Dissent – Departure from standard rational basis (Marshall) – creates a better test for rational basis which varies with constitutional and societal importance of interest

      1. Rational basis is different from Williamson v. Lee Optical rational basis – The Court never sorts through record to determine if firm factual basis for the reason if you are employing rationality review. In Williamson, as long as the Court could conceive of a rational basis, then it deferred to legislature.
      2. The burden to disprove a rational basis rests with the attacker, not with the gov’t.
      3. No foundation is built to determine when rational basis with teeth is employed.
      4. “Level of scrutiny employed in equal protection cases should vary with “constitutional and societal importance of the interest adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular classification is drawn.”
        1. Interest of retarded in establishing group homes is substantial – deprives them of human freedom and fulfillment
        2. Mentally retarded have been subjected to length and tragic history of segregation and discrimination that is grotesque. State laws frequently deemed them unfit for citizenship and segregated them into homes for life. Also were marriage and sterilization laws. They were also prevented from voting.
        3. Justifies heightened scrutiny
      5. Court says effectively that only discrimination available is that which courts can remedy - why are courts deciding who may be benefited or burdened through legislation?
        1. What was once a natural and self-evidence ordering later comes to be seen as an artificial and invidious constraint on human potential freedom.
        2. When judicial action has catalyzed legislative change, that change certainly does not eviscerate underlying constit. principle
      6. As with women, not all retarded people are alike in their capacities, so this shouldn’t be able to be used as a proxy.
        1. Heightened scrutiny is justified based on the fact that such classifications, as a factual matter are seldom relevant to legitimate state ends, and therefore are presumed to rest on prejudice and bigotry.
        2. The problem with the “abnormal” status is that it misperceives the nature of the difference...
      7. Cleburne’s ordinance sweeps too broadly – means doesn’t fit ends – rests on prejudice. But court only eliminates classification with regard to this particular case, and not others.
        1. Overbroad generalizations are never permissible – require more narrowly tailored means
  6. Romer v. Evans (1996) p. 1259

    1. Facts

      1. 1992, Colorado voters adopted Amendment 2 by statewide referendum. The drive for it came after several municipalities passed ordinances forbidding discrimination based on sexual orientation.
      2. The amendment said that there could be no protected status based on sexual orientation on which to claim minority status, quota preferences, protected status, or claim of discrimination.
    2. Holding

      1. Amendment 2 does more than just repeal the county provisions. Gays are put in a solitary class wrt transactions and relations in both private and gov’t sphere. Amendment withdraws from gays, but no others, specific legal protection from injuries caused by discrimination and forbids reinstatement.
        1. Colorado state and local gov’ts give heightened scrutiny to many additional traits (age, military status, marital status, pregnancy, parenthood, political affiliation, etc.) and reaches many different forms of private disc. than Congress can.
        2. Amendment 2 prevents gays from securing protection against injuries that the public-accommodation laws protect everyone else from. It also nullifies specific legal protections for the targeted class in all real estate, insurance, health, welfare, private education, and employment transactions.
        3. Also rescinds the Colorado Executive Order preventing disc in gov’t hiring
        4. Imposes special disability on gays alone – forbidden to seek safeguards that others enjoy.
      2. Has no legitimate gov’t interest stated.
        1. Bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate gov’t interest.
      3. If a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, will employ rational basis review. But Amendment 2 has no rational relationship to legitimate state interest.
        1. Amendment 2 defies this category, since it imposes broad and undifferentiated disability on single named group – exceptional and invalid form of legis.

          1. Too narrow and too broad – identifies persons by a single trait and then denies them protection.

          2. Gov’t has to remain open to all – a law saying that it will be more difficult for people to access the courts for redress is counter our principles.
        2. Sheer breadth is so discontinuous with reasons offered that amendment seems inexplicable as anything but animus towards gays; lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state interests.

          1. So far removed from interests of conserving resources to fight other disc or preserving freedom of association that there is no rational relationship.
    3. Other ways in which decision could have been made

      1. Could have decided that for equal protection purposes gay classifications require heightened levels of scrutiny.
        1. Scalia – said that you might have well have done this b/c effectively this is what happened.
      2. There are some gov’t acts that are per se violations of the equal protection clause and that have that status separate and apart from the entire apparatus of levels of scrutiny. There are some absolutes – this case is sui generic in the way it raises these per se issues.
        1. The state is not permitted to make classifications that make it harder for one group rather than all other groups to accomplish its goals through the political process. The amendment makes it so that any other group seeking antidiscrimination legislation can do it on the local or state political level, but only on gay rights are those means foreclosed b/c you would have to get a state constitutional amendment.
        2. Require certain scrutiny of any of the rules tinkering of the political process that disadvantages certain groups. So you won’t ask about the gov’t interest, you will just prohibit gerrymandering. Scalia – any time a state decides to issue legislation on the state level that preempts municipalities, or states decide to constitutionalize an issue, that happens – the people who want to organize to change a law no longer have access to the local gov’ts, the state legislature, etc. Scalia says that it just the way politics goes – given that this happens all the time, a broad enough consensus means that the people can take this decision out of the hands of the legislature– federal constitutional does this through different levels of scrutiny for different classifications.
      3. Palmore v. Sidoti – the legislature cannot act out of a naked desire to harm a politically unpopular group.
        1. Animus can never be a valid gov’t interest. This is a per se violation.
        2. Scalia says that the majority has mistaken a Kulturkampf (culture battle) for a fit of spite – the democratic process is a place where people make moral judgments about what the society should be.
        3. The lottery cases – legislating morality by keeping them out of interstate commerce. If a group is disfavored out of some moral objection to that group, this is not permissible.
        4. Scalia says that the constituent group has had criminal legislation enacted against them, but not in Colorado. So the people in Colorado are making a moral judgment, not out of animus, but they want the freedom to make their own moral judgments as landlords, employers, etc.
      4. A simple status/conduct distinction – some people may be gay but not practicing, so it would be criminalizing a status offense.
    4. Evaluation

      1. Is the court simply convinced that prejudice lies behind this, so they are employing rational basis with bite? But why do these particular groups get the benefit of the bite?
      2. But with Romer, how could you determine the collective intent of the voters of CO? Is this really a cultural meaning approach to how this culturally would be interpreted?
      3. Could it be that the voters were in status competition? Of trying to preserve the hierarchy? It is a zero-sum game – giving special privileges to some takes it away from others.

  • Directory: sites -> default -> files -> upload documents
    upload documents -> Torts Outline Daniel Ricks
    upload documents -> Torts outline Functions of Tort Law
    upload documents -> Constitutional Law (Yoshino, Fall 2009) Table of Contents
    upload documents -> Arrest: (1) pc? (2) Warrant required?
    upload documents -> Civil procedure outline
    upload documents -> Criminal Procedure: Police Investigation
    upload documents -> Regulation of Agricultural gmos in China
    upload documents -> Rodriguez Con Law Outline Judicial Review and Constitutional Interpretation
    upload documents -> Standing Justiciability (§ 501 Legal/beneficial owner of exclusive right? “Arising under” jx?) 46 Statute of Limitations Run? 46 Is Π an Author? 14 Is this a Work of Joint Authorship? 14 Is it a Work for Hire?
    upload documents -> Fed Courts Outline: 26 Pages

    Download 0.86 Mb.

    Share with your friends:
  • 1   ...   21   22   23   24   25   26   27   28   ...   31




    The database is protected by copyright ©ininet.org 2024
    send message

        Main page