Session 3: Disasters and Philanthropy: Recent Experiences

1. 
   Aid Giving in the Tsunami Disaster of 2004 and its implications on the Role of Philanthropy in Disasters
   

The following is an overview of the APPC & CAF Conference on Philanthropy in Disasters: Tsunami and After held from November 28 -30, 2005 in Phuket, Thailand covering the issues faced by the countries affected by the tsunami. This presentation is taken directly from “Aid Giving in the Tsunami Disaster of 2004 and its implications on the Role of Philanthropy in Disasters: An Internet-Based Review of Literature” by Eugenio Caccam Jr. and Erna Witoelar. I hope it will assist us in our discussions around the role of philanthropy in disasters.

The philanthropic response to the tsunami was unprecedented. Aid came in various forms from practically all countries and peoples of all religions and walks of life. Even societies normally at the receiving end of aid efforts helped with small financial contributions or humanitarian missions, foodstuff, medicines, and the like.

To some, this has ushered in a new era in philanthropy, both in terms of the swiftness and the magnitude of the response. While disasters have often brought philanthropic responses, the massive response to this tragedy is opening new avenues for a more focused and strategic philanthropic involvement in disasters and other emergencies in all their stages: prevention, mitigation, relief, rehabilitation, and long-term development.
Tsunami aftermath – costs

The Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance (COE-DMHA), in its report of April 6, 2005, reported the following costs of the disaster: Indonesia needs US$4.5 billion, Sri Lanka US$3.5 billion, India US$2 billion, Thailand US$235 million and Maldives US$1.3 billion. The total cost is estimated at US$13.6 billion.

The Center adds: “The world’s largest reinsurer, Munich Re, estimates the total cost of the disaster will exceed US$13.6 billion.” (COE-DMHA, April 26, 2005) Economists and political leaders alike agree that, disastrous though it was, the tsunami was not likely to heavily damage macro-economic plans, as the areas affected are chiefly the poorest rural areas and not the urban centres or business districts.

Poverty is the most significant ongoing problem that is created or compounded by this disaster. Many of the victims were already the very poor or marginalised, even before the tsunami struck. The United Nations fears that poverty alleviation might backslide and the MDG might not be met.

Levels of giving to the Tsunami victims have transformed the terrain of private philanthropy and disaster relief work. As of September 2005, financial contributions alone have reached more than US$11 billion, either pledged or committed. Government and multilateral agencies have pledged around US$9 billion in aid. Global private donations amounted to almost US$5 billion.

AlertNet records that, as of September 2005, US$11 billion has been given or pledged, and that about half of this has come from the private sector. The following is a brief discussion on the contributions of the non-government sector.

As of September 25, 2005, these groups have raised $1,808,309,504. (AlertNet, COE-DMHA). They continue to appeal for more support in rehabilitation efforts as well as on-the-ground assistance. Their financial aid is complemented by their work in reconstruction, rehabilitation, provision of basic services, training, and advocacy for human rights and welfare of children as well as displaced and indigenous peoples. Those who have the expertise and the capability to do so, monitor the disbursement and usage of funds while others sit on various disaster management councils and planning committees.

Besides making cash donations and matching staff contributions, companies have also provided goods and services in kind. The total amount raised from corporate foundations and charitable foundations was US$2.5 billion. In many cases they gave more than the government of their countries. Examples include: Offering warehouse facilities and vehicles to UN agencies to ease logistical problems, rebuilding shattered networks, and providing medicines and food aid. Some of these companies are members of the Disaster Resource Network (www.weforum.org), a network started by members of the World Economic Forum in 2002 to mobilise the resources of the international business community in times of either manmade or natural disasters.

People gave in various ways but obvious features to note about the response to the tsunami other than the sheer scale of giving were the spontaneity with which donations were made, on the one hand, and the ingenuity behind fundraising efforts, on the other. Both high net-worth and non-high net worth individuals gave. The amount raised was approximately US$1.2 billion.

Television, radio, and newspapers not only reported the event itself, but also made dramatic appeals for help, acted as advocates, raised funds, and served as referral agencies to donor organisations. The world’s biggest media networks reported on the event daily and supplemented their reportage with emotional images that moved viewers to give.

1. 
   A particular issue that affected donors was the degree of accountability around how and where their money was used. A constant problem seen in the literature reviewed was that there was a general lack of coordination among international aid bodies and donors. It appears that despite their efforts to coordinate, these organisations end up acting on their own, pressured probably by their own mandates and deadlines. Consequently, there is a lack of centrality of information; data are disseminated randomly and, especially where financial data are concerned, it is difficult to say whether there is double-counting or not. Worse, some international organisations have not been willing to share information with others.
   

2. 
   There is reluctance among international organisations to work with local ones. Probably because of the pressure from their supporters or primary stakeholders to show results as quickly as possible, many international organisations have been reluctant to work with local organisations, a process they might presume to be too time consuming. They may also be doubtful of the local organisations’ capability to respond on a grand scale or to demonstrate accountability. Many local relief organisations have been complaining for some time about work becoming inefficient because expatriates who know less of the situation, dynamics, and culture, as well as the real and felt needs of those affected, perform work that could be done by local groups.
   

3. 
   The new standard of compensation and training that the international NGOs give to their staff either draws skills from the local organisations or leaves those remaining feeling demoralised.
   

4. 
   Locals complain that aid, particularly financial, has not moved as fast as it should have due to stringent bureaucratic procedures. In fact, some residents have said they have not received a single cent, prompting them to suspect that the money is in the vault of foreign governments or in an administrative quagmire within the aid agencies. Some of the reasons cited are the unprecedented funds (“glut of money”), poor coordination (the article says, “the vast amount of funding meant aid agencies could afford to hire their own helicopters and boats and make individual assessments and distribution arrangements rather than co-ordinate with one another and through the United Nations.”), failing to consult survivors, and aid mismatch (e.g., “surplus of doctors and lack of midwives,” or heavy sweaters sent to India where this is useless in the tropical heat).
   

1. 
   Distributing aid to the right victims. Many reports show that aid is not going to the right victims. Some victims are considered geographically unreachable and most donors and NGOs work in the urban centres.
   

2. 
   Timeliness and appropriateness of aid. Many of the victims have complained that aid has come too late or, worse, that they have not yet received help either from their governments or the aid agencies. Others complain that the assistance, for example, the types of housing, clothing, medicines or other material relief given to them, are not appropriate.
   

3. 
   This sentiment is shared by some advocacy groups, which also blame the global capitalist system for the manner in which funds are raised or distributed.
   

4. 
   Human rights and gender. Advocacy groups insist that aid should not be patronising and should be seen in the context of human rights as enshrined in the UN Declaration of Human Rights and other internationally agreed documents. These include the rights of children, women, disabled persons, indigenous/ displaced peoples, migrants and migrant workers, refugees, etc. Of course these include the basic human rights to health and sanitation, education, shelter, livelihood and participation as expounded in the Human Development Index and elsewhere. These issues have been raised particularly because of cases of discrimination and selectivity in the giving of aid in some of the countries.
   

5. 
   Lack of capacity and managerial capabilities of locals in both government and non-government organisations. Donor organisations have noted that there is a dearth of conduits that have the necessary capabilities to deliver aid, in terms of either service delivery, governance structures, or accountability.
   

6. 
   Corruption and lack of accountability among local governments.
   Donor organisations, advocacy groups and citizens’ organisations have also complained about rampant corruption among some governments, national or local. These are documented in several articles available on the Internet. However, recent reports suggest that this is being attended to via independent auditing by multinational auditors. Other problems have been identified such as the unwillingness of government to work with partners, failure to put survivors at the centre of the planning and execution of reconstruction and an inability to adopt an approach consistent with human rights documents.
   

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  Ensuring that aid goes to the right parties (effectiveness, efficiency, accountability)
  
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  Donor coordination and partnership
  
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  Working with international donor organisations
  
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  Centralising information
  
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  Making philanthropic contributions more focused and targeted
  
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  Reconstruction and preventing future disasters
  
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  Long-term approaches to philanthropy
  
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  Developing local capabilities
  
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  Promoting basic/ human rights
  

In summary, philanthropy does, can, and must make a contribution to disasters and emergencies. Considering the nature and purpose of philanthropy, a particular area on which it could make an impact is in working with the other sectors — both government and the broad civil society — to set standards for giving — from the “how much” to “how it should be distributed and used.” The articles reviewed strongly suggest this is what donors want to know, and what survivors cry for.

Nine months after the tsunami, the lessons learnt are that there was no proper planning of the rebuilding efforts and the needs of the victims were dealt with unprofessionally. Professional institutions such as those of accountants and engineers were not consulted. Donations were transferred without undue restrictions, with the government claiming that it had the mechanisms for accountability. While the World Bank included a condition that accountability for the transfer of funds be built in, the government claimed that it was already in place. Many donors give funds without requiring accountability.

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  In looking for a model country to emulate in disaster management, in terms of the areas of expertise required, and a reference nation for support services, it is difficult to identify one because the tsunami was unprecedented. But now, with the experience from this disaster, those involved can formulate procedures for the management of aid and rehabilitation programmes.
  

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  The government is ultimately responsible for all funds raised, even by NGOs. The government claims there is a statutory mechanism for accountability while it accuses NGOs of having no such accountability so they are free to do as they like. For example in Sri Lanka, government leaders have accused NGOs of lacking accountability and being corrupt.
  

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  Transparency International, Sri Lanka advocates that all organisations publish their accounts on their website, but none has done so. Now is the time to push for this, because with increased accountability, no government agency can remain opaque.
  

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  There is a need for a local administrator to be in charge of rehabilitation, because such a coordinator can facilitate the work of NGOs for more effective results. For example, India has the panchayat (village council) system.
  

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  Beneficiaries should be provided information so that they are aware of what to expect from donor projects. For example, if they are given the specifications for the houses that will be built, including details such as whether the roof will be of asbestos, etc, the recipient and NGOs can verify that the aid provided was as specified. This will prevent contractors from cheating the recipients.
  

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  In UN projects, assessments showed financial performance at 98 per cent but there is no assessment of the physical performance. Therefore in project reviews, the physical performance must be covered.
  

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  When contracts are given to the politically connected, this displaces local businesses that existed before the disaster. A parallel economy develops.