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No NB – Japan Not Key – US Would Win
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- Taiwan Conflict ≠ Escalate
No NB – Japan Not Key – US Would WinChina is twenty years behind in military capabilities Brown et al 3 (Harold, Council on Foreign Relations, May 2003, http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/China_TF.pdf) LL The Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force on Chinese Military Power finds that the People’s Republic of China is pursuing a deliberate and focused course of military modernization but that it is at least two decades behind the United States in terms of military technology and capability. Moreover, if the United States continues to dedicate significant resources to improving its military forces, as expected, the balance between the United States and China, both globally and in Asia, is likely to remain decisively in America’s favor beyond the next twenty years. There are multiple drivers of China’s military modernization. The PLA, along with the People’s Armed Police and the People’s Militia, helps maintain domestic stability and ensure regime security. China is developing limited power-projection capabilities to deal with a range of possible conflict scenarios along its periphery, especially in maritime areas. The PLA is acquiring military capabilities designed to defend Chinese sovereignty and territorial interests and to pose a credible threat to Taiwan in order to influence Taiwan’s choices about its political future; or, failing that, to prevent Taiwan from achieving political independence. These capabilities are also intended to deter, delay, or complicate U.S. efforts to intervene on behalf of Taiwan. In addition, military modernization is expected to enhance China’s international prestige. China is a regional power, and the Task Force does not envisage China becoming a globally committed military power in the next two decades. If current trends continue (e.g., if Japan continues to eschew a role as a major regional military power), the Task Force expects that China will become the predominant military power among the nations of East Asia. China’s current force structure and doctrine provide effective “defense-in-depth” against any effort to invade and seize Chinese territory. The PLA possesses power projection across land borders against smaller region- al powers and the ability to dislodge those powers from nearby disputed land and maritime territories. In the next two decades, the Task Force expects China will acquire a greater capability to hold and seize such territories against combined regional forces. However, the Task Force also notes that although China will have the enduring advantage of proximity to Asia, Beijing has traditionally been weakest and the United States has traditionally been strongest in the maritime, aerospace, and technological dimensions of military power. Consequently, although China is already the strongest continental military power in East Asia and destined to become an even greater power beyond its littoral borders, a sustained and robust U.S. naval and air presence can offset the ability of Beijing to leverage future military capabilities into a real advantage against U.S. and allied interests in the Asia-Pacific region over the next twenty years, if not longer. Taiwan Conflict ≠ EscalateTaiwan conflict won’t escalate- US won’t use nukes and China would control the conflict Roberts 5 (Brad, member of the research staff at the Institute for Defense Analyses, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1/26 http://www.carnegieendowment.org/events/?fa=eventDetail&id=740 In Roberts' assessment, there are at least five elements in this picture. While there is no official Chinese description of a possible nuclear confrontation, these elements seem to inform the thinking of Chinese experts both inside and outside their government. The first is the assumption that the burden of crisis escalation would fall on the U.S. The Chinese believe that they would largely hold the initiative in a crisis and would be able to choose the time and manner of engagement. In other words, it would be left to the United States to react to a losing situation by choosing whether or not to escalate. The second element is a belief that that because of the asymmetry of interests, it is unlikely that the United States would be willing to use nuclear weapons in a Taiwan crisis. Whereas Taiwan is vital to Beijing’s sense of national sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as its regime survival, the U.S. interest in Taiwan is seen as less than vital. Thus, they believe that the United States would be unwilling to “trade Los Angeles for Taipei.” Third, the Chinese believe that the threshold for U.S. nuclear retaliation is high. As a consequence, they debate the possibility that there might be ways that China could use nuclear weapons without facing U.S. retaliation. Fourth, Chinese analysts tend to believe that any unwanted escalation would be manageable on their part. This has something to do with Chinese strategic culture and their belief in China’s skill in creating, exploiting, and if necessary prolonging crisis. Moreover, some Chinese analysts cite the experience of 1968 when China confronted the Soviet Union as proof of China’s nuclear crisis management ability. In particular, Beijing could seek to counter U.S. nuclear deterrence by demonstrating its resolve through its own nuclear attacks. The essence of such a tactic would be to exert escalation control by instilling escalation uncertainty. Fifth, and finally, Chinese analysts seem to believe that the final outcome of a worst case scenario in a nuclear Taiwan crisis would be the reversion to the status quo ante. Beijing, thus, would be no worse off than what it started with. Directory: files files -> Answer True False 2 points Question 2 files -> Integer programming and game theory files -> 4 Integer Programming files -> Bpa vehicle Window Repair Scenario #1 task: Procure vehicle window relacement. Objective files -> Pop Warner History files -> North Carolina Inclusion Initiative Mapping Where Children with ieps are Being Served Purpose files -> Fall 2013 Spring 2014 Program Data: Standard 1 Exhibit 4d files -> Hanban – asia society confucius classrooms network 2010 request for proposal files -> Northern England’s set-jetting locations Download 0.88 Mb. Share with your friends:
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