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AFF – No Solvency – Conditions Bad
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AFF – No Solvency – Conditions BadQuid pro quo negotiations fail to address the North Korea nuclearization issue. Niksch 3 (Larry, YaleGlobalOnline, Specialist in Asian Affairs at the U.S. Congressional Research Service, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/washington-needs-roadmap-peace-north-korea)JFS Other governments will have to recognize their responsibilities if a formula like "five plus five" is to succeed. Even while advocating US-North Korean negotiations and US reciprocity, other governments will have to recognize the credibility of the Bush Administration position that nuclear negotiations should not be a quid pro quo proposition and that North Korea must agree and act first to roll back its provocative acts since mid-December 2002, end its uranium enrichment program, and place its entire nuclear program under IAEA safeguards. Other nations also will have to recognize the credibility of economic sanctions if North Korea refuses to negotiate on this basis or crosses "red lines" with new provocations. Negotiating the NPT with North Korea fails and increases provocations Bajoria 9 (Jayshree, Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/publication/13593/sixparty_talks_on_north_koreas_nuclear_program.html)JFS According to the September 2005 pact, Pyongyang would eventually abandon its nuclear program, rejoin the NPT, and allow IAEA monitors to return. In exchange, North Korea would receive food and energy assistance from the other members. The statement also paved the way for Pyongyang to normalize relations with both the United States and Japan, and for the negotiation of a peace agreement for the Korean peninsula. However, negotiations hit a roadblock in November 2005 after the U.S. Treasury Department placed restrictions on Macao-based Banco Delta Asia, which Washington accused of laundering $25 million in North Korean funds. The Macanese government subsequently froze Pyongyang's roughly fifty accounts held in the bank. As the talks fell apart, North Korea stepped up its provocative behavior, conducting missile tests in July 2006 and a nuclear test in October 2006. AFF – No Solvency – Can’t Solve NukesWe cannot solve North Korean nuclearization – empirically proven – 5 examples Dunn 6 (Lewis, Nonproliferation Review, 13(3), The Monterey Institute of International Studies Center for Nonproliferation Studies)JFS U.S. proliferation policy first confronted the threat of a North Korean nuclear weapons program in the early 1980s. In 1985, the Soviet Union, encouraged by the United States, pressured Pyongyang to join the NPT. The North Korean nuclear threat had been ‘‘solved’’ - for the first of five times. (The next four solutions involved: North Korean receipt of an IAEA full-scope safeguards agreement but for technical reasons implementation of full-scope safeguards was delayed for several years; North Korean implementation of full-scope safeguards; the 1991 South Korea ÁNorth Korea agreement to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula; and the 1994 Agreed Framework.) Repeatedly, the conclusion that the North Korean nuclear threat had finally been dealt with has been proved wrong by North Korea’s defiant actions. AFF - NPT FailsThe NPT fails – lack of enforcement Choe 6 (Julia, Harvard International Review, June 22 2006, http://www.allbusiness.com/sector-92-public-administration/national/1187444-1.html)IM At first glance, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) seems to offer a concrete solution to the problem posed by nuclear weaponry. As the most widely accepted arms-control agreement, the NPT attempts to codify the prevention of arms proliferation among states. However, a major weakness of the NPT lies in the enforcement of its policies. This weakness has been highlighted by the current defiance of two states and has brought into question the overall effectiveness of the treaty. Iran's continuing non-cooperation emphasizes the problems of measuring compliance and of determining the course of action to take toward uncooperative states. North Korea's past actions and withdrawal from the NPT question the treaty's usefulness as a means of coping with states that no longer find abiding by the agreement worthwhile. Both cases represent the NPT's ineffectiveness in establishing a consistent and forceful system for preventing nuclear proliferation. Surely future efforts should promote stronger consensus among participating states and uniform mechanisms for addressing illegitimate state action, but it is still uncertain how these goals should be incorporated into a working treaty. Difficulties in NPT enforcement are not necessarily the fault of the treaty itself. Rather, they are intrinsic to the nature of arms control. The NPT would be best served by clearer mechanisms of enforcement that are less dependent on the vicissitudes of current global politics. Mechanisms that might include a clearer agenda of how to address noncompliant states or more concrete punishments for misbehavior could prevent the escalation of potentially dangerous situations. The NPT fails to hold signatories to their obligations Council on Foreign Relations 9 (Nov. 20 2009, http://www.cfr.org/publication/9663/usindia_nuclear_deal.html)IM What effect will the U.S.-India deal have on the NPT? It could gut the agreement, some experts say. Article I of the treaty says nations that possess nuclear weapons agree not to help states that do not possess weapons to acquire them. David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security, says without additional measures to ensure a real barrier exists between India's military and civilian nuclear programs, the agreement "could pose serious risks to the security of the United States" by potentially allowing Indian companies to proliferate banned nuclear technology around the world. In addition, it could lead other suppliers-including Russia and China-to bend the international rules so they can sell their own nuclear technology to other countries, some of them hostile to the United States. On the other hand, experts like Gahlaut argue the NPT was already failing in its mission to prevent proliferation. She says many countries-including North Korea, Libya, Iran, and Iraq-have cheated while being signatories of the NPT. 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