Air Force Armed Forces Structure

Plans and Programs

Ground Combat Vehicles

A large number of T-54 MBTs captured from Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) have been rebuilt and modernized using locally produced parts. Renamed the Safir-74 (Messenger-74), the modified T-54 incorporates an upgraded engine, transmission, internal fire extinguishing systems and fire control systems. According to Iranian officials, target acquisition and accuracy against mobile and static targets have been greatly improved. The Safir-74 can reportedly operate in water up to 16.4 feet (5 m) deep when fitted with special underwater equipment, and up to 4.9 feet (1.5 m) without special equipment.

Iran is also mass-producing the Boragh IFV, a simplified derivative of the BMP-1.

Iran announced the production of the indigenous Tosan "quick reaction" tank in July 2008.

LATEST UPDATE: 1 August 2010

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Armed Forces Structure
OVERVIEW

The Islamic Republic of Iran is bordered to the south by the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, to the west by Pakistan and Afghanistan, to the north by Turkmenistan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan and Armenia, and to the west by Turkey and Iraq.

Iran's Western-backed monarchy was overthrown in 1979 and replaced with a Shi'ite Muslim theocracy. The government has since been guarded in its relations with the West, and hostile toward the United States, which has been propagandized as the "Great Satan ."

Soon after the revolution, Iran began a bitter eight-year war with Iraq and the Sunni-dominated government of Saddam Hussein.

Terrorist Activity

The Iranian government has been a long-time supporter of the Lebanon-based Hezbollah and several Palestinian groups -- including Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Ahmad Jibril's PFLP-GC -- providing them with funding, safe haven, training and weapons. Iranian agents are even known to operate as senior officials in some of these organizations, such as Muhammad Riza Zahdi, an Iranian intelligence official who succeeded the assassinated Imad Mughniyeh as Hezbollah's military chief.

The United States levied imposed economic sanctions against Iran in 1995, calling its government a state sponsor of terrorism. The U.S. State Dept. has named Iran as the most active state sponsor of terrorism in the world, saying that Tehran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) support terrorist groups in planning and executing attacks around the globe.

U.S. President George Bush in 2002 called Iran, Iraq and North Korea an "axis of evil." In mid-2007, the State Dept. declared the IRGC a foreign terrorist organization. The IRGC became the first government agency on the list.

After Israel's three-week offensive against Hamas in the Gaza Strip that ended in mid-January 2009, Iran almost immediately began to reinforce the terrorist group with weapons and supplies lost during the conflict. Iran and Hamas utilized tunnels from Egypt to Gaza to smuggle the supplies. Iran also reportedly encouraged Hamas to confront Israel and pressured the group not to accept a truce.

Nuclear Ambitions

Adding to the instability of the Persian Gulf region has been Iran's conventional military buildup and suspected ongoing nuclear, chemical and biological weapons development programs.

In December 2000, Russia and Iran agreed to launch a new long-term program of political and military co-operation. This bilateral agreement included military-technical co-operation (including the 2002 development of Iran's first nuclear reactor at Bushehr -- a cause of great concern for the United States and countries in the region), consultations on mutual security threats such as terrorism and drug-smuggling, as well as exchanges of service personnel, including the training of Iranian military officers in Russian academies.

During 2003, concerns from the international community led by the United States prompted International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) officials to call for immediate inspections of suspected atomic weapons programs in Bushehr and other sites. While this round of inspections turned up no evidence of an underground nuclear program, the IAEA rebuked Iran in June 2004 for not fully cooperating with its investigation. Iran maintains its nuclear capacity development is strictly for civilian energy purposes.

Tehran's nuclear program and apparent desire for regional dominance continue to cause concern among Iran's neighbors and the international community. Western countries have offered economic incentives to get Iran to cease uranium enrichment, to no avail. The U.N. Security Council levied sanctions against Iran in 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2010 for its continued lack of cooperation with the IAEA and its failure to suspend uranium enrichment activity. Throughout, Tehran has maintained its right to develop nuclear energy, and has continued to enrich uranium on an increasingly industrial scale.

In August 2007, Tehran agreed on a timetable of cooperation with the IAEA designed to answer questions about its nuclear program. The schedule called for all issues to be resolved by the end of the year. However, the U.S. and French governments criticized the agreement as part of Iran's strategy to give up little information while it drags out the process to avoid further punishment by the U.N. Security Council.

Iran on occasion does offer the IAEA access to declared nuclear sites. Inspectors had reported finding "no evidence on the actual design or manufacture by Iran of nuclear material components of a nuclear weapon or of certain other key components, such as initiators, or on related nuclear physics studies." They also said they could not verify the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program until Iran adopts requested "transparency measures," such as access to centrifuge manufacturing sites.

Testing began at the Bushehr nuclear plant in February 2009, around the time that a new IAEA report indicated that Iran had stockpiled enough nuclear fuel for a weapon. A November 2009 IAEA report suggested that Iran was working on an advanced nuclear warhead that could be equipped on ballistic missiles. Agency documents have indicated that Tehran has mastered many aspects of constructing a nuclear warhead, including uranium metallurgy, heavy-water production and the high-precision explosives used to trigger a nuclear detonation.

In April 2009, Iran was invited to join six other nations -- the United States, Britain, Russia, China, France and Germany -- for joint nuclear talks. The so-called G5 +1 talks began in October 2009 in Geneva, Switzerland. Iran ultimately rejected an offer to export its low-grade uranium in exchange for enriched uranium to be used in a medical reactor. This refusal led to the U.N., E.U., U.S. and other members of the international community imposing a fourth round of sanctions against Iran in the summer of 2010.

Days before the talks began, Iran sent a letter to the IAEA disclosing the existence of a second uranium-enrichment facility at Qom. Tehran apparently revealed its existence because the U.S., the U.K. and France were about to disclose details of the mountain facility.

In January 2010, the New York Timesreported that much of Iran's nuclear program is hidden in underground tunnels similar to the the facility at Qom.

Election Unrest

Incumbent President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad claimed victory in June 12, 2009, elections amid widespread claims of fraud. Reform candidate Mirhossein Mousavi and his supporters took to the streets in protest.

The government reacted swiftly, employing police and the Basij militia to crack down on protesters. The government said there were 36 deaths in the following three months; Mousavi's Green Movement said at least 72 were killed. Hundreds were arrested.

The international community, including the U.S., France and Britain, condemned the crackdown. Independent think tanks and observers, including Chatham House in the U.K., also suggested fraud took place in the elections.

Nine Iranian employees of the British Embassy were arrested for allegedly playing a role in the protests, although eight were eventually released. The final worker was sentenced to four years in prison in October 2009.

Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami endorsed Ahmadinejad in late June, reportedly calling for the execution of the leaders of the demonstration. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was sworn in for his second term on Aug. 5.

Officially, the Iranian government has been neutral during Operation Iraqi Freedom. However, the U.S. has accused Iran of interfering in the reconstruction of post-war Iraq and supplying weapons to Iraqi Shi'ite militias. The U.S. has also maintained that Tehran is arming and training the Taliban f ighting NATO forces in Afghanistan.

President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's rhetoric is notorious. He has questioned the veracity of the Holocaust and called for Israel to be wiped off the map.

Iran has worked to establish closer military ties with Sudan, Iraq and Syria. Tehran has also worked to increase ties with Venezuela, which has allegedly assisted Iran with its nuclear program.

In an attempt to deter a possible strike against its nuclear facilities, Iran has threatened to destroy U.S. and Israeli interests in the Middle East if attacked. Potential Iranian targets could include U.S. bases in Iraq and Afghanistan, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem and Dimona, the Israeli nuclear site.

In August 2009, three American backpackers were arrested in the border area near Iraq's Kurdish region. It is unclear if the hikers crossed the border as Tehran has alleged. As of this update, the three remain in an Iranian prison.

In October 2009, Tehran said the U.S. kidnapped an Iranian nuclear researcher, Shahram Amiri, while he was on pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia. Amiri eventually surfaced in Washington, D.C., and returned home to Iran in July 2010. Via Iranian media, he claimed to have been kidnapped by the CIA. American officials said he had been a willing informant. Upon his return, Iran said he was a double agent.
DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT

The constitution of 1979, drafted after the overthrow of Shah Reza Pahlavi, established a Supreme Defense Council (SDC) to govern all Iranian defense matters. The council consists of the President, Prime Minister, Defense Minister and a Joint Chiefs of Staff, which contains the three regular armed forces commanders. The Pasdaran (Revolutionary Guards) commander and the commander of the Basij (volunteer militia) are also members of the council.

The Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution, the Faqih, supervises the Supreme Defense Council. The Faqih names two representatives to sit on the council.

The position of armed forces commander-in-chief (Wali Faqih) is also technically assigned to the Faqih under the 1979 constitution. In 1980, the Faqih delegated the title to the office of the President, with the Faqih retaining supervisory privileges. In 1989, however, the post was returned to the Faqih.

The regular armed forces include the army, air force and the navy, including a naval infantry/marine corps.

For additional information on the individual services, see separate database entries for Iran

Ground Forces

Air Force

Navy/Marines

Special Operations Forces (Revolutionary Guard Corps)
CONSCRIPTION

Service in the regular military is by conscription. The period of conscription is 16 months for all services, including the Pasdaran. Iran has been gradually reducing the length of its mandatory service from a high of 24 months at the end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988.

The army is the only service to maintain an active reserve. Reservists form battalion-sized units known as "quds" during time of war.
PERSONNEL STRENGTH

The armed forces currently number 545,000 personnel, of which roughly 220,000 are conscripts.

The 40,000-strong Ministry of Interior security forces is available to be mobilized for military action if required. In peacetime, interior land and naval border guard units are under the operational control of the Ministry of Interior where they carry out law enforcement in rural areas and in towns with fewer than 5,000 inhabitants. Equipment reported to be in use with the interior forces includes:

Iran carried out strikes against MKO strongholds throughout the 1990s, forcing the MKO leadership into self-imposed exile in France.

In late April 2003, the U.S. concluded a cease-fire agreement with the MKO in Iraq, despite the fact that the group has been placed on the State Dept. list of foreign terrorist organizations. Under the terms of the agreement, the U.S. allowed the MKO to keep its arms, stay in Iraq and continue to fight. The agreement drew sharp criticism from Tehran.

The U.S. later in 2003 offered group members protection in return for disarming. By early 2009, the Iraqi government was stepping up pressure to expel the group from Iraq. For more information on the MEK, see Military Periscope's Terrorism Database.

Group leader Abdolmalek Rigi was arrested in February 2010 on a flight from Dubai to Kyrgyzstan when Iranian jets intercepted the aircraft over the Persian Gulf and forced it to land. Rigi's brother was executed in May. Rigi himself was executed on June 20, 2010.

A pair of Jundallah suicide bombers attacked a mosque in the southeastern city of Zahedan in July 2010. The attack was said to be in revenge for their leader's execution.

Iran claims that Jundallah is backed by the U.S.

Despite being a member of the Chemical Weapons Convention, Iran has reportedly developed and stockpiled a large arsenal of chemical weapons (CWs) -- including nerve, blood, choking and blister agents -- as well as their delivery systems.

Iran began producing chemical weapons in response to Iraqi CW attacks during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). Recognizing its inability to respond effectively to Baghdad, Tehran began placing a high priority on CW programs in the early 1990s. This culminated in the building of the country's major CW production facility at Damghan, 186 miles east of Tehran. Other major reported CW facilities include sites at Isfahan, Parchin and Qazvin.

The U.S. government believes Iran is able to produce as much as 1,000 tons of weapons-grade chemicals a year; including sulfur-mustard, phosgene and cyanide agents. The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) maintains that Iran has mastered shell and bomb delivery systems and may be producing CW warheads for its short- and medium-range missiles. After 2003, U.S. intelligence began to downplay such assertions, suggesting that dual-use facilities could quickly field chemical agents but were not necessarily active in their production.

Iranian officials insist the CW program was abandoned after the Iran-Iraq War.

Biological Weapons

The Iran-Iraq war was also the catalyst for Iran's biological weapons (BW) program, despite its ratification of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. Tehran is thought to be in the advanced research and development stage, though the program's existence and current status are unconfirmed. Most of the information on such a program comes from CIA reports, uncited writings of experts and claims made by Iranian dissidents.

Iran may have small quantities of weaponized BW agents.

Nuclear Weapons Programs

In April 2003, the U.S. called on the international community to stop all trade in nuclear material with Iran. Washington urged the 187 members of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to declare that Iran violated IAEA regulations when it secretly built two nuclear facilities. The IAEA directive states that signatories to the NPT must declare the existence of nuclear facilities before construction.

Iran has received Russian support on the construction of a 1,000-megawatt nuclear reactor at Bushehr. This arrangement was formalized in February 2005 and the reactor is reportedly nearing completion. The resulting expertise and technology, as well as the establishment of contacts and commercial channels, could be used to supplement the country's nuclear weapons program, according to analysts at the Dept. of Energy.

Iran maintains that its nuclear program is for civilian purposes only.

Iran has also been enriching uranium since 2006. The enriched product can fuel nuclear generators, while highly enriched uranium can be used in nuclear weapons. Iran reported in December 2008 that it has at least 5,000 gas centrifuges working to enrich uranium and plans to have at least 6,000.

An unclassified U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran released in December of 2007 concluded with "high confidence" that Iran had halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003. Other countries, including Israel and France, disagreed, judging that Iran could produce a nuclear weapon by 2009. The United States has continued questioning Iran's intentions. Reports in January 2010 indicated that the NIE about Iran was being revised.

In November 2008, the IAEA announced that Iran has produced 1,390 pounds of low-enriched uranium, enough to make one bomb, assuming Iran has other technologies in place to do so. Iran's nuclear chief announced in June 2010 that his country had produced more than 37 pounds of 20 percent enriched ura nium.

The Iranian government announced in November 2009 that that it would build 10 new enrichment plants. Construction on two of those sites is scheduled to begin by March 2011.