Ambush marketing



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Contractual obligations

As abovesaid, there is in France no specific anti ambush-marketing legislation. So conflicts of interests between those of the official sponsors on the one hand and, on the other hand, the interests of the sponsors of the athletes, the interests of the sponsors of supporters, or the interest of the public in the other hand has not given rise to any particular rules.


An evident way of resolving such type of conflicts goes through contractual obligations stipulated by federations or organizers in their regulations, forcing athletes or teams not to display any advertisements for their sponsors. In the absence of legal rules, economic freedom shall prevail in principle.

This type of protection essentially consists in laying down contractual obligations on the different participants, spectators and official partners. So the various protagonists of the manifestation can freely organize their relations and the present constraints only result from the possible sporting regulations or the conventions beforehand agreed by the athletes.

Contracts allow the organizers to rebuild the monopoly, between the contracting partners at the least. They give rise to a preventive action against ambush-marketing, which is particularly beneficial for federations and organizers, as ambush-marketing presents the particularity to be sanctioned with difficulty a posteriori.
As a consequence, sponsors' rights are organized into a strict hierarchy. The "Charte du sport de haut niveau" (French high level sports charta) states in its rule IX : "Pour les sports individuels comme pour les sports collectifs, toute équipe de sportifs est directement et exclusivement soumise à l’autorité du responsable désigné par le groupement sportif ou par la fédération (…). Selon les cas, le groupement sportif ou la fédération dispose de droits exclusifs d’exploitation de l’image collective de l’équipe à l’occasion des activités sportives de celle-ci et pour la promotion de ces seules activités. Tout contrat individuel contraire leur est inopposable. L’étendue des droits et obligations de chacun est déterminée par les règlements fédéraux applicables ainsi que par les usages (…). Elle peut être précisée dans des contrats individuels adaptés aux caractéristiques de l’équipe, sous réserve qu’ils soient compatibles avec les principes énoncés dans la présente charte et avec la réglementation fédérale"32.
Thus, rights of teams and athletes (notably the right of publicity) are limited by the specific provisions in favour of federations and organizers. Propriety rights of federations and organizers are logically regarded as superior to individual rights. In case of conflict, the interests of organizers or federations sponsors are taken into account as a priority. Indeed, such sponsors have contributed to the creation of the sport event and have generally been essential to its organisation, which is obviously not the case with athletes' sponsors for example.

So, individual rights of publicity and the subsequent sponsorship contracts are only valid as long as they are not conflicting with upper rights as stated in federal regulations.


Any thing which is not expressly prohibited by contract by federations or organizers is allowed, so that an action on an ambush-marketing basis can not be brought. Therefore, the other forms of sponsorship are not prohibited as such in France. It could only occur if it was expressly provided in the federation or organizers regulations.

As a consequence, in the silence of official regulations, athletes and teams are allowed to display advertisements for their sponsors. This notably results from the fact that the former ban for high level athletes to be associated to a manifestation or an advertising campaign was lifted.





  1. Examples of contractual obligations

It would be possible for federations or organizers to limit sub-licences, and to ban joint promotional operations with possible "ambushers”33. It should equally be possible to control the attitude of spectators, their clothing and the goods they may bring into the sporting arenas.


Contractual clauses that may be envisaged notably include:

  • Selective distribution of products under licence,

  • Organizers' agreements prior to the launching of any new product under licence,

  • Banning of all promotion operations with companies other than official partners,

  • Banning of sub-licences, licence transfers or other forms of sharing of official rights which have already been granted,

  • Right of priority for official partners on advertising spaces and in official publications,

  • Strengthening of legal safeguards by stipulating in the partnership agreements that the partners may exercise, on an exclusive basis, the rights granted, by a set of "intuitu personae" clauses associated with automatic termination clauses,

  • Prohibitions and restrictions on the sale and resale of tickets,

  • Restricted right of entry to the sites (etc.)

Furthermore, strict contractual obligations could be printed on all entry tickets and all other rights of access in order to reserve the right of entry and the right of exclusion to any person who might violate the marketing programme. In other words, the entry tickets can refer to terms and conditions prohibiting the audience from displaying advertisements for non official sponsors34.


Organizers could also force the whole participants to put on the colours of the official sponsor so as to make effective the conventions agreed with him. It is up to those participants of the sport event to anticipate in stipulating for instance some derogatory clauses to exclusivity or certain liability limitations.

But some authors have interpreted a ruling of the French Conseil d'Etat dated November 19th 1997 in this sense, that a delegatee federation exceeds the powers granted by the delegation, when it imposes upon athletes to wear determined sponsored clothes. Indeed, such a decision is not justified by the general interest underlined by the mission of public services35.

On the contrary, the French Court of cassation considers that the existence of a delegation does not matter, so that a federal regulation imposing specific utilities would be certainly valid36.



  1. Consequences of contractual violations

A violation of a sporting regulation has in principle no consequences over the validity of contracts. The Appeal Court of Paris has decided in a ruling dated February 28th 1984 that an advertising contract entered into by an athlete in contravention of a federal prohibition couldn't be threatened37. Indeed, such an agreement would only be cancelled if a general interest was involved by the violated rule, which is not the case for a sporting regulation with a commercial matter.

But the federation could impose disciplinary sanctions on these defaulting athletes (loss of the accreditation for the sporting manifestation and therefore of the participating right, for instance).
Further, each contractual non performance can be compensated by damages. Those have to cover the whole prejudice, which is sometimes difficult to determine. As an example, let us mention a case-law dated May 14th 2004. Judges had to determine the prejudice of a sponsor, resulting from the fact that the French Horseriding Federation members didn't wear the sponsor's suit during the official ceremonies of the international championships. They have decomposed the prejudice in taking into account the following elements:


  • the competition has an international status and is widely covered by the media, so that advertising fallouts could have been substantial;

  • the sponsor was deprived of the benefits of a free advertising campaign (whereas half a page in Cheval magazine costs 2134 euros and a passage in Stade 2, a TV show, 33585 euros);

  • the advertising expected would have caused an heavy increase of the turnover.

So, the French Court of Appeal of Paris estimated that the prejudice amounted to 75 000 euros38.
Moreover, according to article 1184 of the French civil code "The party towards whom the undertaking has not been fulfilled has the choice either to compel the other to fulfil the agreement when it is possible, or to request its avoidance with damages." So in case a party does not faulty carry out his undertaking, the sponsorship contract is not avoided as of right but its avoidance must be applied for in court39.

In order to avoid the inconveniences and uncertainties involved by such a judicial rescission, which is only pronounced for an essential non performance, parties can also stipulate a resolutive clause.

Finally, case-law40 now acknowledges the possibility of an unilateral and therefore extra judiciary rescission, when it is justified by the particularly bad behaviour of the defaulting debtor41.



    1. Competition law

Sponsors and organizers are granted exclusive rights. Thus, enforcement of anti ambush-marketing provisions could be considered as constituting antitrust infringements (abuse of dominant position/ competition restricting agreements).


A priori, we could think, monopolies conferred to the organizers or sponsors by anti ambush-marketing provisions do not comply with the competition law. But according to European Community case-law, the mere fact of securing protective rights is not affected by the prohibitions contained in articles 81 (1) and 82 of the Treaty. The exercise of such rights cannot by itself fall either under article 81(1), in the absence of any agreement, decision or concerted practice prohibited by this provision, or under article 82, in the absence of any abuse of a dominant position42. However, the exercise of such rights may be prohibited by article 82 of the Treaty if it involves, on the part of an undertaking holding a dominant position, certain abusive conducts, or by article 81 if it creates a monopolistic position, in both cases provided that such conduct affects trade between Member States43. The French Competition Council has adopted the same position44.


  1. Competition restricting agreements

Article L.420-1 of the French Commercial Code deals with a specific anti-competitive practice. It provides: "Common actions, agreements, express or tacit undertakings or coalitions, particularly when they are intended to:

       1° Limit access to the market or the free exercise of competition by other undertakings;
       2° Prevent price fixing by the free play of the market, by artificially encouraging the increase or reduction of prices;

       3° Limit or control production, opportunities, investments or technical progress;


       4° Share out the markets or sources of supply, 


shall be prohibited, even through the direct or indirect intermediation of a company in the group established outside France, when they have the aim or may have the effect of preventing, restricting or distorting the free play of competition in a market".

Article 81 of the Treaty prohibits agreements between undertakings in similar words, when trade between Members States is likely to be affected.


The French competition Council stated on several occasions that the fact to enter into an exclusive agreement for supplying facilities to sporting clubs is not by itself contrary to article L.420-1 of The French Commercial Code. Likewise the fact for a federation to allow a company to benefit, in this context, of the representation of the trademark and image of clubs is not contrary to this provision45.
Consequently, a partnership contract is only prohibited if the conditions under which it was negotiated or the enclosed stipulations are aimed at restricting competition or are likely to limit or distort it. To avoid such a situation, it is important to check notably that the exclusivity length of time granted is not excessive46, or that the chosen sponsor is not already in a dominant position on a market. Furthermore, an invitation of tenders has to be issued before the conclusion of the contract47 and tacit renewal clauses are prohibited.



  1. Abuse of dominant position

Article L.420-2 of the French Commercial Code, mainly inspired of article 82 of the Treaty, states: "The abuse by an undertaking or group of undertakings of a dominant position in the internal market or a substantial part of this shall be prohibited in accordance with the conditions specified by article L.420-1. These abuses may in particular consist of refusals to sell, linked sales or discriminatory conditions of sale and the severance of established commercial relations solely because the partner refuses to submit to unjustified commercial conditions (...)".


The dominant position relates to a position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to prevent effective competition from being maintained on the relevant market by affording it the power to behave to an appreciable extent regardless of its competitors, its customers and ultimately its consumers.
Some federations enjoy in France a legal monopoly over organisation and exploitation of sporting manifestations. Indeed, they participate to a public utilities mission organizing and promoting sporting and physical activities. Those are necessarily in the event of a dominant position on the market concerned by their discipline. But a dominant position is not by itself prohibited, as long as it does not give rise to an abusive exploitation of this favourable situation. A violation of competition law can not be deduced from the mere existence of contractual exclusivity. Only the implemented conditions are concerned by this legal prohibition.
Let us mention the ruling of the Court of Appeal of Paris dated November 20th 1995, in which judges have decided : "Le tribunal a relevé à bon droit que les dispositions (du Code de commerce) étaient inapplicables, dans la mesure où ne saurait être qualifié d'abusif le refus de la FFT de voir utiliser par des tiers la marque dont elle est titulaire ou de voir ceux-ci tirer profit sans contrepartie de sa notoriété, de ses activités et des bénéficies qu'elle est en droit d'en retirer" (Court of first instance was right to notice that the provisions of the French Commercial Code can not be applied in the present case, as the refusal of the FFT to let third parties use its trademarks or take advantage without consideration of its notoriety, its activities and and its profits, can not be qualified as abusive)48.
Consequently, the principle remains economic freedom. Commercial practices are only exceptionally sentenced on the basis of an abuse of dominant position. For instance, the French Competition Council has held that clauses granting a pre-emptive right to Adidas, at the end of the exclusive partnership contract with the French Football League, organize an asymmetry in the negotiation of a new contract by allowing to Adidas to limit artificially the risk of losing the partnership49.

Conclusion :
France has not and doesn't plan to enact any legislation specifically aimed at prohibiting ambush-marketing as such. However, French law provides one of the widest protections for sport event, thanks to a very severe regulation, specially in intellectual property field, and to its application by civil and criminal Courts. On the whole, intellectual property and general principles of unfair competition are sufficient to prevent efficiently the most egregious ambush-marketing practices. Moreover, efficient procedures enable to obtain quickly prohibition and discontinuance of any offence which shall be committed.
The scope of the current legislation is sufficient to tackle ambush-marketing practices. The introduction of new specific provisions, prohibiting certain ambush-marketing practices is not necessary and would only lead to a norm accumulation endangering the legal security. As a consequence, in our opinion, there is no need to introduce specific provisions, whereas the existing legislation still offers a great margin of adaptation and is likely to cover the whole of the situations involved by ambush-marketing.
Furthermore, it seems to us that it would be certainly possible to extent the concept of ambush-marketing to the protection of great cultural events whose the specificities are actually similar to the main characteristics of sporting events, i.e a cross-border character as well as a dense media covering. Should we think of the World Fairs, the Academy Awards ceremony, or even a rockstars concert... The risk that the organizers and official sponsors be dispossessed of the event they have organized is equally important.

Of course, the Law on Sport of July 16, 1984 could not be relied on as regards to these cultural events. However, the rights of intellectual property, the common law of civil liability as well as the provisions of the French consumer Code regarding deceptive advertising could indisputably be applied... which evidences the flexibility as well as the worth of the solutions provided by French Law.


Finally, France has not organized any non-legal answer to fence off ambush-marketing. There is not a specific administrative organ in charge of publicly stigmatising the ambush-marketing behaviours. But organizers of sporting events usually come into contact with ambushers to warn them of a possible legal action because of their ambush-marketing practices. On this occasion, they require them to withdraw the litigious advertising and it is not unusual that ambushers undertake to publish an official press release, in which they explicitly acknowledge the rights of the organizers on the manifestation and take the pledge for the future not to violate those exclusive rights.




1 Actually, all the provisions granting sports organizers exclusive rights were introduced in the Law on Sports by the law n°92-652 dated July 13th 1992.

2 Now, articles L.331 and subsequent of the French Code of Sport.

3 It also results from Mister Murat's report on the bill called "Lamour" (session of the Senat, June 13th 2003).

4 Tribunal de commerce of Nanterre (Commercial court of Nanterre), December 12th 2002, ACO and ASAACO vs Dragoon Editions, CCE février 2003 commentaire n°14, note C. Caron. It also results (but implicitely) from a ruling of the Tribunal de Grande Instance of Paris, dated January 28th 2004 (FFT vs Hospitality Group) (final judgement).

5 Cour d'appel of Paris, March 28th 2001, Gemka Production vs Société du Tour de France and ASO, CCE février 2003 commentaire n°14, note C. Caron.

6 Com. March 17th 2004, Andros vs Motor presse France, CCE 2004 commentaire n°52, note C. Caron.

7 Tribunal de Commerce of Nanterre, December 12th 2002, aforsaid.

8 This statute stipulates: "The French National Olympic and Sports Committee is the owner of the national Olympic emblems and depositary of the motto, hymn, the Olympic symbol and the terms "Olympic games" and "Olympiad". Anyone registering as a trade mark, reproducing, copying, appending, removing or modifying the emblems, hymn, symbol and terms mentioned in the above paragraph without the consent of the French National Olympic and Sports Committee shall incur the penalties provided for in articles L.716-9 and subsequent of the French intellectual Property Code".

9 Cependant, les juges ont réaffirmé, dans la décision précitée du Tribunal de commerce de Nanterre (12 décembre 2002), que "les dispositions de l'article 10 de la Convention européenne de sauvegarde des droits de l'homme ne concernent que la diffusion de l'information et non pas l'exploitation commerciale d'un événement". Ainsi, l'exception d'information doit être maintenue dans certaines limites. Il convient d'éviter tout abus.

10 Now, article L.333-7 of the French Code of Sport.

11 Cour d'appel of Paris, September 14th 1993, M6 vs France 2 and France 3, D. 1994 somm. p.278, obs. Th. Hassler. : "une émission quotidienne, à l’occasion d'un tournoi de tennis, et composée exclusivement d‘images de match issues de France 2 ne répond pas aux conditions légales" (a daily show on the occasion of a tennis tournament, and exclusively composed of pictures from France 2 doesn't fulfil the legal conditions).

12 It notably depends on the sport concerned.

13 Dated January 22nd 1992. This "Code de bonne conduite" was initiated by the CSA (Conseil Supérieur de l'Audiovisuel) an independant administrative authority that was created to guarantee broadcasting freedom.

14 Cour d'appel of Paris, January 28th 2004, CCE 2004 commentaire n°56 C.Caron and Tribunal de commerce de Nanterre, October 26th 2005: 30 seconds per match and 90 seconds per competition day ; Tribunal de Commerce de Nanterre, June 9th 2006, L’équipe TV vs TF1: "20 secondes avec un maximum de 2 matches par 20 secondes" (20 seconds and not more than 2 matchs per 20 seconds).

15 Cour d'appel of Paris, aforesaid; this point of view was shared by Marie-George Buffet (at that time, Sports minister) during a session befor the French Senat.

16 Cour d'appel of Versailles, January 11th 2006 and Référé Tribunal de Commerce of Nanterre, June 9th 2006, L’équipe TV vs TF1, CCE 2006 chronique 9 D. Porrachia; previous case-law: each 4 hours (Cour d'appel of Paris, January 28th 2004 aforesaid; Référé Tribunal de Commerce of Nanterre, October 26th 2005).

17 Tribunal de Grande Instance of Nanterre, June 25th 2003, CCE actu N° 134 ; Cour d'appel of Paris, June 15th 1989, RIDA janvier 1990.321 note P-Y Gautier (concerning a football match).

18 The problematic of ambush-marketing is how to take advantage of commercial consequences of a sporting event without sponsoring it.

19 "Roland Garros", "Olympiques", "Jeux Olympiques", "Dakar", "Tour de France" have been acknowleged as well-known use trademarks by courts in several instances. Court of Appeal of Paris, November 8th 2000 : "


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