An Bord Pleanála


Evidence by the first party



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Evidence by the first party

The first brief of evidence for DAA was entitled ‘Transforming Dublin Airport’.

(Exhibit C-16/04/06)
The speaker Mark Foley, was director of DAA Capital programs which was responsible for delivering capital projects for Dublin, Shannon and Cork airports.
He wanted to provide the context for the proposed development before the Board. Dublin Airport has been through a period of unprecedented growth with passenger numbers increasing at 10% compounded. It had also experienced low level of investment. The infrastructure deficit issue was serious, and passenger services were at unacceptable levels. The Government following extended period of consideration on the infrastructure for Dublin Airport and how it can be financed, had issued its decision through Aviation Action Plan of May 2005. Terminal 2 project was one of DAA ‘s response to the AAP.
Dublin Airport played a pivotal role in the Irish economy supporting 50 000 jobs nationally and 14000 on airport campus generating 1.4billlion income for the country and 290 billion for Fingal County. It was in the top ten airports in Europe and a gateway comparable to major airports elsewhere in Europe such as Copenhagen. It needed to provide a broad spectrum of services and options. Tourism was one of critical industries in the Irish economy and with open skies agreement it was posed to become a major gateway to Europe. 75% of all air traffic to Ireland was through Dublin Airport with 122 scheduled services and 161 destinations. 60 000 -90 000 passengers passed through the gates on a daily basis. More than 600 flights took off and landed. It generated 800 scheduled bus movements, 110 scheduled provincial bus movements, 350 car park shuttle bus movements, 6000 parking. It provided fire fighting and police security on c.1000Ha.

Referring to a chart showing the increase of passenger numbers at a rate of 9.3% since 1995, he concluded that it would have to cater for 30 million plus passengers per annum in the next decade.


Over the last decade the investment in Dublin Airport was only 10% of expenditures in other European airports. This under investment coupled with passenger growth had resulted in serious congestion.
The Government Aviation Action Plan had five key points, one of which was to provide a new terminal by 2009 capable of being operated independently, and a tender process was required to choose the operator. DAA was required to increase airside capacity by building new piers. First of these D would be operational by 2007.
In response to AAP, DAA had appointed independent consultants to review the PM/SOM master plan for development of Dublin Airport previously carried out on behalf of Air Rianta. They were mandated to meet the requirements of the AAP. The plan had many components, including terminal, piers and airside infrastructure. Metro north was a critical component of Metro North project. All other elements were designed around T2.
In conclusion he stated that the proposition before An Board Pleánala was directed by Government AAP and supported by business. The cost of T2 was subject of independent verification.
Mr. sweetman requested documentary evidence in relation to the cost of the project including the independent verification report referred to. The inspector ruled that costs were not a matter for consideration in the context of the hearing, and that the questions and answers would be at a later time as indicated on the format of the hearing.
Mr. Hayden for Ryan air reserved his comments on the subject of cost.

The second speaker for DAA was Andrew Evans of Scott Wilson who were responsible for a number of studies to integrate earlier planning and design work into the complete scheme. His evidence was entitled ‘Options Considered’.. (exhibit F-16/04/07)


Reading from a written statement, he talked about a number of options in providing airport capacity (runway, terminal and other airport infrastructure). These included increased use of other airports, provision of a single runway airport elsewhere in the GDA either at an existing airfield or on a completely new site, and replacement of Dublin Airport on a new site. These had to satisfy the requirement to travel to /from a variety of destinations.
Use of regional airports was not satisfactory as it would not be able to satisfy the demand where it arose. The DTO study of 2001 found that 80% of the passengers using Dublin Airport had origin and destinations within GDA. Use of regional airports to serve the GDA would necessitate increased surface access provision.
The option to develop other airports at either existing airfields (such as Baldonnel or Gormanstown) or a new airfield in the GDA was found to be costly in terms of development of facilities and necessary infrastructure including surface access, and displacement of existing military facilities and without significant environmental benefit. Neither were in the ownership of DAA.
The option to replace Dublin Airport on a new site would seek to substitute the environment impacts of the existing airport to another site. The study used constraint mapping to identify characteristics of potential airport sites in the vicinity of Dublin identifying zones of opportunity where such a development might be possible. These indicated that any site sufficiently close to Dublin to offset increase access impacts would likely have similar effect on the surrounding communities as Dublin Airport and sites away form developed areas would have high ecological value. In addition to develop a replacement airport and associated infrastructure would take many years to plan and implement and would not be available to meet the demand in the near future. Therefore this option was not considered preferable as it brought no significant environmental benefits though would have higher total costs.

The option to replace Dublin Airport on a new site was also found to be inconsistent with Government policy, current development plans of bodies such as Fingal County Council and Railway procurement agency.


As none of the off-site alternatives was found to be preferable to providing additional runway capacity with its associated infrastructure at Dublin Airport, it followed that passenger terminal capacity should be developed at Dublin Airport.

Mr. Harley stated that there was information in the presentation which was not included in previous Scott Willson reports. He asked if there was another more recent report. There was none.

The third speaker for DAA Mr. Colm Moran of Project Management (PM), was a director of the company specialising in large projects. His evidence was entitled Master Planning. (Exhibit G-16/04/07)


He described the growth of Dublin Airport from a small airport serving 2.5-5mppa between 1981-1991 to medium airport of 5-15mppa between 1991-2001 and large airport of 15 +mppa from 2001 onwards. Significant step change was required in 2001 as it was no longer possible to provide expansion on an incremental basis.
The Board appointed PM/SOM/TPA to prepare a master plan. SOM (Skid Owen Morrel) were highly experienced in airport developments such as JFK, Hong Kong. TPS specialised in airport property services in British airports.
The brief included growth to cater for 30mppa, future proof of site to its full development potential, examination of all options including land purchase if necessary, balanced development of landside and airside facilities, provision of multi-user, shared facilities.
He explained the need to integrate into the wider planning context (NSS, CDP, Sustainable Development strategy for Ireland, National Roads Needs study, Strategic Rail review, PTPF (public transport partnership forum) measures, DTO platform for change). They also needed to coordinate with other studies for the airport (runways study/ NATS, Metro study, Car parking Study, International airport transportation study).
Outlining the master plan principles of process and product, based on systems approach, he emphasized the importance of delivery of major projects at the appropriate point in time (too early unnecessary cost, too late capacity shortage).
From baseline capacity analysis of aircraft stands, footprint of facility and frontage required on the landside, they developed options driven by stand requirements, facility requirements and landside requirements.
The evaluation criteria was based on functionality, deliverability and cost.
Functionality was betterment of services for airlines, for public, and for operating authority. One of the primary indicators of functionality was LOS (level of service) in terms of space, clarity of way finding, walking distances, lengths of queues at check-ins, security and immigration, baggage handling, catering and retail spaces, new technology). The landside elements included ease of pick up /set down, kerb length and building frontage, access to/ from metro station, Ground Transportation Centre, car hire, taxi hold area, car parking and employee parking, and need for automated people mover. The airside elements included taxiway systems, stand configurations, refuelling operations, cargo operations, ATC and fire rescue services. The flexibility was important in terms ability to support modular expansion, ability to accommodate unforeseen changes, and to adopt different modes of airline operations, and ability to accommodate expansion beyond 30mppa.
Deliverability of required capacity by 2010 and ultimate capacity by 2019, cost certainty, short term deliverability of contact stands, disruption to travelling public, clearance of existing facilities, land acquisition and heritage issues were considered under deliverability.
The third criteria was cost related, including best early value for money, overall capital cost, annual spend and front loading of capital costs.
There were consultations with stakeholders over a 2 year period. Service level ‘C’ was agreed. The baseline capacity study showed that in the existing terminal the arrivals was operating over capacity while departures was under capacity. Piers were operating at service levels of E and F.

He outlined the key assumptions in deciding land use options. These included sterilisation of the land for northern runway, and crosswind runway, protection of the Old central terminal building, and gardens, public transport access to encourage higher modal split for public transport, capacity to grow beyond 30mppa if required.


Arising from these four options for location of terminal facilities for expansion were considered with two runways and cross runway in place. Two were single developments on east or west of the cross runway. One option consisted of the existing terminal at 18mppa with another smaller (12mppa) terminal at a northern location. The last option was for two equal sized terminal facilities on either side of the cross runway at 15mppa each.
The key drivers in deciding on facility requirements were growth scenarios (retaining current mix, increased short haul or increased long haul), ultimate airfield peak hour capacity (based on 93 ATMs per hour), ratio of contact to remote stands , LOS, and landside requirements. 17 different airports were used for benchmarking study. Assumptions were made about people’s use of the facilities, and time. Following examination of these four options were short listed namely east, west, east/west and north.
These options were rated using the three criteria of functionality, deliverability and cost, and were rated. In terms of functionality option west was best because of green filed development and lack of any constraints.
In terms of deliverability option east was best because of availability of existing facilities and services. Option north had problems associated with shallow depth (where only single loaded piers could be accommodated), and traffic being funnelled in front of OCTB. There was also problem of deliverability arising from necessity for removal of existing hangarage facilities. East/west options required two metro stations, raised way-finding difficulties, necessitated duplication of facilities and had deliverability problems arising from land ownership issues.
The south eastern option had adequate depth, good functionality, allowed for double loaded piers, provided improvements to T1 traffic, had minimum impact on the existing airport business, deliverability was possible within required time frame, though it had issues arising from location of Corballis house.
Options east and north had nearly identical cost during the first phases. These were subsequently repeated using sensitivity analysis (at the suggestion of Ryanair) where eastern option again ranked best.
Overall ‘option east’ was recommended on the basis that it ranked highest overall for combination of robust functionality and highest potential to achieve the five year capacity milestone. It offered best value in terms of early deliverability and represented the lowest overall capital costs to complete.
In response to question from the inspector Mr. Moran stated that they concluded the study in mid 2003, and no, they would not consider any changes to their assumptions or conclusions.
The inspector requested copies of a number of studies mentioned in the presentations such as Metro study, car park study.

Mr. Sweetman was not able to read some of the prints. It was confirmed that they were reproductions of Terminal and Piers study circulated by the Board.
Mr. Hayden (Ryanair) inquired about the origin of data used in tables on page 17 and 18 (table2- assumptions about people and appendix B). Mr. O’Donnell would check.

The next paper for the DAA was entitled ‘Capacity enhancement Recommendation Report . (exhibit D-16/04/07)


The speaker Alan Lamond (Director of Pascal Watson and deputy chair of British airports group) had extensive British and international experience in airport and terminal developments (300 projects in 19 airports and 27 terminals including terminal 5 Heathrow). He had extensive knowledge of challenges of designing and delivering additional capacity in airports. He was the principal author of capacity enhancement report and principal architect of T2 project.
Their study was conducted in response to Government AAP (Aviation Action Plan). Their brief was to provide a fresh and independent review of previous studies, and to recommend a location for Terminal 2 in the context of appropriate, well balanced and incremental development plan. The stipulations were that pier capacity would be available by 2007, Terminal 2 be available by 2009, Terminal 2 would be capable of independent operation. The study only examine options in the eastern campus within DAA owned lands and did not consider ‘greenfield’ options.
The study critically examined the previous master planning exercises and considered the PM/SOM/TPS study to be thorough, well considered and very clearly presented.

He described the methodology where there was regular consultations with stake holders in terms of future demands, review of spatial / lad use options and refinement of the design.


The final recommendation agreed with conclusions of PM/SOM/TPS, and recommended a new terminal to the south east of the existing terminal adjacent to pier C. they also recommended that the Metro station is located at the heart of the airport campus, identified an optimised pier alignment and outlined development sequence.
With the help of slides Mr Lamond explained the process. The main considerations for location of Terminal 2 were: stand and pier configuration, OCTB, surface access, airside circulation, functional performance and programme of deliverability.
In terms of stand and pier configuration, main considerations were: optimising use of apron, maximising number of contact stands, maximising double sided piers, location of piers as closely together as possible, and provision of wide and narrow bodied stands close to the passenger processing functions.
The proposed location to the south east of T1 met all these requirements. He explained their proposal to realign pier A, extend pier B, provide pier E and pier F to the south of pier F. there was a lot more apron space to the south of T1, allowing more contact stands to be located as closely as possible to minimise travel distances, and to maximise total and wide bodied stands. Airside circulation would be efficient as these would be closer to the terminals and the existing main runway leading to short taxiing distances.
He provided a critical analysis of why location of Terminal 2 at a northern location would be sub-optimal.
As this side was more compact it required more apron space and only single sided pier could be provided to the airside. A single sided pier was inevitably less compact leading to longer journey distances. Prior to operation of second runway there would also be congestion at the northern end.
OTCB was another factor in deciding where T2 should go. Its location constrained the access to the north. Its very location put northern terminal away from the current centre of gravity at Dublin Airport.
In terms of surface access the southern location offered the opportunity to provide segregated access to both terminals, reducing pressure on the existing congested T1 forecourts. A northern option would require major capacity enhancement to the forecourts of T1, a significant construction challenge. In addition a northern option would have constrained se down/ pick up areas.

Southern location offered segregation of surface access for T1 and T2.


In terms of airside circulation, southern side provided greatest number of stands located close to the runway leading to shorter taxing distances. Investments in taxiways would be optimised. The airside circulation had more than adequate capacity to serve Terminal 2.
In terms of functional performance Terminal 2 allowed location of both narrow and wide bodied stands close to the terminal. It allowed maximum number of double sided piers, and good connectivity between T1 and T2. this was very important particularly during construction stage when passengers could check in either terminal and access to piers. It offered optimal and balanced utilisation of airside, terminal and landside facilities.

The southern location was relatively open and easily accessed site and involved comparatively modest demolitions not withstanding Corballis House. There was minimal disruption to T1 operations and access. A northern option would require removal and replacement of major hangar facilities. The southern option would be capable of delivery by end of 2009.



In summary, having examined alternative potential locations for T2 they considered the proposed southern location to be undoubtedly the most appropriate in terms of optimal utilisation of existing infrastructure and assets, optimal balance of airside, terminal and landside development in ordered, logical arrangement, maximum number of contact stands and good access to runway, location of wide and narrow bodied stands close to new terminal and connectivity between T1 and T2, ideal location to present a new face to Dublin Airport and best deliverability.

Dr. Mary Coveney, currently manager of forecasting and tariffs for DAA presented the paper on ‘Demand Forecasting.’ (Exhibit H-16/04/07)
She had previously worked as operations manager in Aer Lingus, and was former chairman of ACI-Europe statistics and forecasting group, and vice chairman of ACI-Europe economics Committee. Her section was responsible for the development of annual Dublin Airport passenger traffic and aircraft movement forecasts.
She said she would outline the manner in which annual passenger and aircraft movement forecasts are created and how they move from the annual forecasts to the daily schedule used for detailed specification of T2.
The forecasts used as the basis for 2006 CIP (Capital investment programme) were produced using robust methodology and were reasonable when compared with suitable benchmarks. Full details were available in DAPF06/01.
The approach adopted was a combination of statistical an judgemental methods. The traffic would grow in line with a range of drivers, most important of which were GDP and yield. The table showed a number of other drivers, such as fuel prices, exchange rates, market fragmentation, airline strategies, airline route mix and fleet.
The projections were moderated in the short term based on local knowledge about planned new routes or frequency /capacity changes, provided during consultations with key airlines regarding their plans.
The DAA forecast methodology had been reviewed and endorsed on a number of occasions, in 1999, as part of review of Aer Rianta strategy, and more recently by Mott Mac Donald for the CAR (Regulator), who concluded the process to be appropriate for the purposes it was intended and represented the application of nest practice. It was also reviewed by the consultants hired by Fingal County Council as part of their review of DAA plans for building a parallel runway. Further review was carried out by Arup, as a preliminary step for its work on T2 report.
DAA examined a range of scenarios as part of its annual forecasting process rather than a single forecast. The sizing exercise for T” was based on three scenarios (centreline scenario, DAA high growth Scenario and Aer Lingus growth scenario) all finalised in April 2006. In the wake of major expansion plans announced by home carriers. The key factors were Ryanair expansion (18 new routes and 5 aircrafts –some 50% increase in the number of aircraft based in Dublin), and change in Aer Lingus strategy and impending privatisation, moving form a simple strategy of pursuing lowest possible costs to a vision of Aer Lingus.
There were two additional factors which could drive a high growth scenario. First of these was development of common aviation area between EU and US, and changes in current Ireland –US bilateral agreements. The current requirement for 1 for 1 operation levels of Shannon and Dublin would be replaced by 3 (Dublin) for 1(Shannon) giving upwards shift in the level of Dublin –US traffic. Aer Lingus had already announced three additional transatlantic routes.
Second factor was peak hour departures. Particularly the low cost airlines preferred to fly as early as possible so as to maximise the number of flying hours. Therefore while currently only 70% of based short haul aircraft currently departed during the early morning peak period where demand is constrained it was possible to envisage a ‘peakier’ profile developing once the existing constraints were removed.
In order to provide a robust basis for the planning and sizing of the terminal, the pier and other related infrastructure, peak day schedules for carious years were created based on the forecast scenarios, using all information.
The starting point was ‘busy day’ a key metric used in airport planning. This was not an ‘absolute peak day’ for the airport but rather a level where 95% of the traffic can be processed at a specific target level of service. This was calculated on the basis of carious criteria such as movements, departing passengers, total passengers etc. latest available schedule would be used as a base to build a busy day schedule and movements would be added applying busy day ratio to the forecast annual number of aircraft movements for the year in question. The type of flights to add is determined from the forecast growth profile. Forecast schedules developed form this process wer used by ARUP as an input into sizing analysis.
At the end of the paper, Mr. Harley required the figures for the growth diagrams showing growth scenarios. The inspector directed that figures for the graphs and copies of documents referred to in the paper be made available to the hearing.
Mr. Hayden for Ryanair noted that the documents referred to in the paper were not made available. He referred to in particular document DAPF06/01. It was not appropriate or adequate to rely on information not made available.
Mr.O’Donnell stated some of the documents were of some antiquity and rather than making a copy for everybody they would place them on a table. He stated that the other document DAPF06/01 was a public document and Ryanair was already in possession of the same. They would make further copies available but that they would do so withholding confidential information. Mr. Hayden stated that they should have been provided with the appeal documents to enable him prepare questions.
Inspector directed that the copies of documents referred to in the paper be made available, and if they could not be made available then they should not be referred to.
Mr. Hayden stated that he was flagging the failure by the first party on the transparency of the information. Mr. O’Donnell stated that he would provide a second copy for Mr. Hayden. He repeated that some of the information was of some antiquity and they were using the hearing to explain the methodology and everything used in forecasting in more detail.
Mr. Harley stated that he did have a copy of PDAF06/01 but at a recent conference the CEO of DAA Declan Collier had given different figures. He asked for the most up to date figures. The inspector directed that the most up to date information be provided to the hearing.
The document DAPF06/01 (final version) was made available to the hearing, and to the parties.

The next paper for the DAA entitled ‘Peak hour passenger demand and T2 facility Programme’, was presented by Regine Weston part of the ARUP team consulting DAA. (exhibit I-16/04/07)


Her area of expertise was in translating annual demand into peak hour facility requirements. She had taken this type of work at more than 50 airports globally. She was responsible for the peak hour demand development, had reviewed the methodology and the results for T” facility programme requirements.
In addition to the key forecasts identified by Mary Coveney a number of factors were considered when determining the peak hour passenger demand to be used for planning such as dominant peak, based aircraft, percentage of based aircraft departing at peak hour, planning horizons, range of expected values.
Under ‘dominant peak’ she stated that arrival and departures peak hour effected different areas of the airport and at Dublin Airport departures peak was notably higher than arrivals peak as found in other airports worldwide. While both numbers were important the paper concentrated on departure peak hour passenger demand (DPHPD).
Analysis showed that DPHPD occurred in the early morning and was directly related to the number of based aircraft. As Aer Lingus was the primary home based airline at T2, their fleet especially short haul fleet was important to DPHPD.
The next factor was percent of based aircraft departing within a single hour. This was currently 70% (as stated by Mary Coveny) but they had also considered an alternative 80%.
Two primary planning horizons were established 2009 and 2015-2016 when additional capacity may be required. They had adopted an approach where they took the mid point of each period i.e. 2013 and 2018 as their planning year for capacity. Prior to 2013 the LOS (level of service) would be higher, after which it would become lower progressively until additional capacity is provided.
They had also adopted a 5% range for the 2013 and 10% for 2018 planning year reaching a figure of 4200 in 2013 and 5500 for the year 2018.
The sizing of the terminal building was based on a number of factors including number of units needed in each processing area (check-in, security, immigration, baggage claim), the space needed for each functional area (processing area, public concourse, waiting areas, holdrooms) and other areas such as toilets and concession areas. The process was an iterative one where there was regular consultations with operational agencies and architectural team, as a result of which they are converted into actual numbers (such as number of check in desks) as the building is laid out.
The facilities were calculated for each of different types of counter and traffic (EU passengers had different requirements than long haul).
There were discussions to establish the date and the authors of the document DAPF06/01. (exhibit –16/04/07)

The next speaker for the DAA, Alan Lamond (of Pascal Watson architects and the lead architect of the T2 project) outlined the thought process in developing various options and reaching a final decision for the exact location and design of the terminal.



(exhibit A 17/04/07)
The PM/SOM study had indicated that the new terminal be located to the south east of the T1. Their own subsequent review had reached the same conclusion.
In this presentation he would talk about the architectural investigation, the options considered that led them to the chosen design. These included options for avoidance or incorporation of Corballis House.
The capacity studies outlined earlier had indicated a building of 75000m2 would be needed. This could be a building of 25000m2 in three floors, but they examined the option of a two storey building.
Key considerations included provision of a compact building to ensure short walking distance, baggage handling at apron level, easing of traffic congestion, minimum impact on apron and minimum construction impact.
He discussed buildings with varying footprint designed to avoid Corballis House outlining the problems associated with each. Option 4 an elongated building would lead to long journey times for staff and passengers, the baggage handling systems would be seriously constrained, existing operational functions (such as catering facility) would need to be demolished. Larger footprint of building would be required leading to greater environmental footprint arising from increased energy costs. The operational efficiency would be seriously compromised.
He reviewed the functional performance of options 5, 6 and 7 in terms of height, response to site context, integration with pier C, location of baggage hall, provision of combined or segregated forecourt with T1.
They presented the options to DAA where they were instructed to look at an option incorporating operational benefits of option 6 (compact building, short walking distance, baggage handling at apron level) and road system and deliverability benefits of option 7 (splitting of T1 and T2 traffic, leaving of T1 traffic unchanged).
Further studies led to options 8 and finally 9 which provided a compact building with short walking distances, baggage handling at the apron level, provided segregated roads to T1 and T2, and left T1 traffic unchanged, provided minimum construction impact with shortest programme and provide architectural opportunity to provide a building appropriate to its context at the entry to the airport. The building had two sections on either side of the access to T1.
He then outlined various options considered in order to avoid or incorporate Corballis House within the chosen footprint. Incorporation had impacts at both apron and first floor level as it expanded the building volume and footprint. An internal setting would not be in the primary public area and provided co appropriate operational use. It lead to increased complexity of baggage systems and severely constrained primary passenger functions increasing travel distances.
Incorporation of Corballis House within and internal recess had impacts both at apron and first floor levels, its setting would be compromised being viewed only off through to T1 with restricted vies, and an external recess would create a security risk.
Accordingly they had concluded that avoidance was not feasible and incorporation would create unacceptable operational and performance compromises. They recommended its demolition noting Corballis House was of local historical importance rather than national importance.
They studied various options for Pier E and concluded that 2 ½ storey option was by far the most preferred option by all concerned, provided areas required in the programme of requirement and provided the smallest footprint.

The next speaker for DAA, Alan Whelan of Tiros planning consultants talked about the planning context (exhibit E-17/04/07)


He would provide a brief overview of the proposed development in the context of NDP, NSS, Platform for Change, RPG, County Development Plan, South Fingal Study, and LAP. He would also address some of the planning issues raised in third party appeals.
The proposed development complied with two of the four objectives of the NDP 2000-2006, sustainable economic development and consolidating environment for international competitiveness. P44, 51
The NSS supported the critical role of Dublin Airport. P38 and then p42built upon. Proposed 62 referred directly to Dublin Airport serves the city region and country. Essential for competitiveness. P71 good quality links to ports / airports
Sustainable development strategy rcognised the importance proposed 103, irish economy, noise reduction reduce the need to travel, mass transport. T2 complied with these in terms of efficient use of existing airport and supporting provision of Metro.
Regional Planning Guidelines (2004-2006) fully supported 23.3mppa

It also stated that access to Dublin Airport would be improved, QBCs would be provided.


He referred to South Fingal Study, policies TAP3, TAP4, key elements Dublin Airport action plan, how Fingal County Council should work with DAA, and the alternative configurations.
Dublin Airport master plan was adopted as LAP.
In his response to issues raised in third party submissions he stated that the proposed development was not premature in the absence of a decision on the runway and that T2 could be constructed in advance of the runway. He discussed the arguments in relation to demolition of Corballis House and stated there were exceptional circumstances as T2 was of strategic national importance and expansion of Dublin Airport was of critical importance to the economic development of the county. Removal from list of Protected Structures was not a preferred option as it would lead to pre judgement of the terminal application. He did not agree it would set a precedence as each had to be examined in its own merits and in this case there was exceptional circumstances as outlined above. He did not agree with the assertion that there was a need for SEA. The regulations did not require SEA for an individual application. There was an EIS for the project.

Dr. Mary Coveney’s second presentation was in response to two specific issues raised by third parties, in their written submissions. (exhibit B-17/04/07)
The first was in relation to the suggestion that growth at Dublin Airport would have a negative effect on regional tourism. The recent studies by ITIC showed decrease in number of tourists to the regions as well as decrease in length of stay. Indeed there was changing tourist behaviour patterns in other European countries as well where time poor people were now choosing city weekend breaks. Constraint in Dublin Airport did not protect the regions as the tourists simply choose other European destinations. Also as the 75% of the traffic at Dublin Airport originated in Dublin region it would not be feasible to force the passengers to the regions by not allowing Dublin to grow.
The second was in relation to the argument that development of a second Dublin Airport would be preferable to expanding the existing one.
Noting that there has never been a barrier to the development of a second commercial airport at Dublin, but no one had chosen to built a facility elsewhere, she stated that experiences elsewhere showed that this did not work. Montreal second airport opened in 1975 was closed recently as anticipated traffic shift never materialised. EU commission following complaints from carriers prohibited Italian government from forcing mandatory transfer to a second airport at Milan as it would disadvantage them. Belfast had two airports, but this effected both negatively. The only times a second airport was successful was when the old one was closed. Only large conurbations such as London and Paris with 8-9 million populations could support multiple airports.
The argument for provision of a second airport would need to examined in the context of its impact on demand, and how it would be received by the airlines, and by the passengers. For the first group there would be switching costs. These would be market share costs (high risk of losing market share without all competitors moving), stranded assets (loss of investments made at the existing airport) sunk costs (additional costs of replacement facilities), elimination of economies of scale , elimination of economies of network density (splitting over two airports would effect transfer passengers adversely).
For the passengers the level of connectivity would be effected, and the cost would ultimately be paid by the passengers. There were also other costs to the tax payer, and in terms of provision of public infrastructure (roads, rail etc) as well as aeronautical infrastructure.
With such serious impacts without corresponding benefits opening a second airport would not meet the needs of the customer airlines or passengers and would not be supported by experience from other airports. It would be an in appropriate solution to accommodating future growth in air travel in Ireland.


Evidence by the planning authority
The first speaker was Seán ÓFaircheallaigh Senior Planner in charge of Strategic Planning Unit. (exhibit C-17/04/07)
Purpose of the brief was to set out the planning policy framework for the future of Dublin Airport at national, regional and local levels. He referred to specific polices under NSS, NDP (2007-2013), Transport 21, Sustainable development strategy, National climate change strategy (2007-2012|), Public safety zones (2005), Regional Planning Guidelines for the GDA (2004-2016), DTO strategy Platform for change 2000-2016, South Fingal Planning Study (2004), Fingal County Development Plan (2005-2011),and Dublin Airport LAP.
He examined the location of the proposed new terminal and Pier E and stated that the Council had reviewed the locational analysis carried out by Pascall Watson Architects and PM/SOM and accepted the proposed site as providing the most viable and deliverable location for the development of a second terminal in accordance with the Government AAP of may 2005. Deliverability was a critical consideration having regard to the pressures on the existing terminal facilities and the time scale laid down by the Government.
The site identified for a possible northern terminal was not considered to be capable of redevelopment having regard to the existence of extensive hangar facilities which would need to be relocated elsewhere before any work could commence on the development
Northern location would offer no advantages over the proposed site with regard to surface access
Taxiing movements could not be predicted in advance of An Board Pleánala decision on the northern parallel runway. Distances between T1 and T2 was not excessive and significantly less than a possible northern terminal

Location in proximity to T1 would facilitate transfer between transatlantic and European carriers


Vehicular arrangements were acceptable and satisfied the requirements of the LAP for additional separate kerbside drop-off

It was considered essential that additional short term car parking facilities would become available in parallel with the new terminal, but a separate application could be made for such a terminal. The LAP set out for incremental provision of facilities.


In conclusion the proposed development secured planning objectives at national, regional and local levels.

A national level the NSS recognised the critical dependence of the continuing economic health of Dublin and country at large on good international access via Dublin Airport.


The proposed development would facilitate the Government objective of expanding the level of services available form Dublin Airport to an even wider range of destinations in the interest of underpinning Ireland’s future international competitiveness.
The proposed development was specifically provided for in the NDP 2007-2013.

The proposed development would be complementary to transport proposals set out in Transport 21 and would be supported by the proposals included in the Public Safety Zones Study


While sustainable development strategy recognised that air transport is an increasing source of polluting emissions, and that aircraft noise is poses a particular problems in the immediate vicinity of airports, it also asserted that air routes are vitally important to the Irish economy providing access to and from Irish and World markets for both goods and passengers. In the future there might be tensions between air access and climate change, but having regard to Ireland’s peripheral location and open economy the country was likely to remain heavily reliant on air links for the foreseeable future.
At the regional level the proposed development supported the provisions of the Regional Planning Guidelines which identified Dublin Airport as a premier international access point to the Dublin region and to the Country as a whole. The guidelines regarded continued development of Dublin Airport as being crucial to underpinning Ireland’s future international competitiveness. The guidelines explicitly stated that to achieve predicted airport passenger numbers new terminal facilities would be required.
At local level objective DAO4 of the current development plan was to facilitate on going augmentation and improvement of terminal facilities at Dublin Airport. The Dublin Airport LAP provided for new terminal and pier to be located to the south east of the existing terminal. The reconstruction and development of Piers A, B, D would complement the new terminal. Any further terminal capacity would be located int eh Western Campus.
He submitted that thus the proposed development was integral to panning policy in relation to Dublin Airport at national, regional and local levels.
In response to question from the inspector, he stated that LAP was adopted on June 2006. Yes it was subject of an SEA, and was subject of consultation process. No there was no legal challenge to the SEA. The SEA was completed a few months prior to the adoption of the LAP. Yes the period for challenging SEA had expired.




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