24 National Peace Conference Technical Working Group, Social Reform Should Form the Core of Governance ..., pp. 4-6.
25 Ibid., p. 6.
26 Men Sta. Ana, “Coming to Grips with Philippine Poverty,” Farm News and Views IX(1-2)(January-April 1996):8.
27 Ibid., pp. 6 and 8-9. In another observation along parallel lines, it was noted that there was clearly a disjunction between the social reform policy of the Ramos administration and its economic reform agenda. This is because: “The Social Reform Agenda came as an afterthought. Growth first, social reform later. Social reform is viewed separate from the economic reform agenda. From this perspective, from this non-integration of the SRA into the administration’s economic strategy, we can discern why the administration spewed so many incoherent and contradictory policies and programs to this date to the extent of canceling each other [out].” Emy LaVinia, “Social Reform and Poverty Alleviation of the Ramos Administration,” speech delivered during the Anti-Poverty Summit Meeting, Cebu City, n.d., downloaded from http://www.gsilink.net/home/cebungos/poverty.htm on 29 July 1999.
28 Interview with Engineer Alain Bustamante, Malacañang, Manila, 3 September 1999.
29 “Do-able” is a Filipinism that is synonymous with the word “feasible”.
32 Remarks by Commissioner Nemenzo, 9 August 1999.
33 Interview with Ms. Karen Tañada, Women’s Action Network for Development, Quezon City, 21 December 1999.
34 Ellen tordesillas, “Poor Grade for a Pro-Poor President,” Politik 5(4)(May 1999):34. The case was filed by such groups as KATINIG. The case was eventually dismissed by the Supreme Court for lack of merit. According to Engineer Alain Bustamante, the fact that the petition was dismissed by the highest court of the land may be interpreted as a validation of the direct nomination process that was done by President Estrada. Interview with Engineer Bustamante, 3 September 1999.
35 Remarks by Commissioner Nemenzo during a roundtable discussion on “Reflections on the Estrada Administration’s Poverty Alleviation Program: The Experience of the National Anti-Poverty Commission,” Center for Integrative and Development Studies, University of the Philippines, Quezon city, 19 November 1999.
36 Remarks by Commissioner Nemenzo, 19 November 1999.
37 Interview with Engineer Bustamante, 3 September 1999. Despite the initial reluctance, NEDA, for example, eventually accepted the assignment to serve as lead agency of the NGO sector and even had negotiations with the DPWH and the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) for the latter to serve as partner agencies (i.e., government offices that are not NAPC lead agencies but are willing to support the anti-poverty efforts of the government). In the case of the DECS, the lead agency of the youth and students’ sector, they tapped the Commission on Higher Education (CHED), National Youth Commission (NYC), and TESDA as partner agencies.
38 Remarks by Commissioner Nemenzo, 9 August 1999.
39 Remarks by Commissioner Nemenzo, 9 August and 19 November 1999.
40 Remarks by Ms. Quintos-Deles, 16 September 1999.
41 Interview with Ms. Teresita Quintos-Deles, GZO Peace Institute, Ateneo de Manila University, Quezon City, 4 November 1999. In this same interview, Ms. Quintos-Deles pointed out that the clash between the lead groups in the SRA and those in NAPC was not so much ideological as it was political. It was not even that there was a new administration in power which was bringing in its own people. There were groups associated with the Ramos administration which were willing to work with the Estrada administration but those groups which were seen as too independent for comfort were removed. At present, the NPC’s agenda is four-fold: (1) poverty program including raising awareness regarding the importance of asset reform particularly agrarian reform and ancestral domains, housing, and fisheries; (2) charter change which the NPC opposes; (3) legacies of the Marcos dictatorship like human rights violations and illegal wealth; and (4) the peace process. Due to the absence of a venue as comprehensive as the SRC, the NPC is now looking into other arenas where it can articulate its views and continue to do policy advocacy. In another interview, Ms. Jean Llorin explained that with the exit of the NPC, groups associated with the Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement (PRRM) have become more visible in the NAPC. Due to political bickering caused by changes in personalities, some of those who were actively involved in the SRC disengaged with government. However, Ms. Llorin, who was part of the SRC and continues to be part of the NAPC as one of the alternate commissioners for the women’s sector, is of the opinion that disengagement will also result in defeat by default for the basic sectors. While there have indeed been problems due to the transition, the basic sectors should continue to make use of the available avenues that are open to them rather than completely give up access to such opportunities, however small these may be. Interviews with Ms. Jean Llorin, Bahay ng Alumni, University of the Philippines, Quezon City, 9 August 1999 and Ateneo de Naga, Camarines Sur, 14 August 1999.
42 “The National Peace Conference and the Estrada Administration: What Happened to Erap’s Anti-Poverty Program?,” statement read by NPC Secretary-General Emil Yuson during the Philippine Political Science Association Annual Conference on “Politics of Poverty and Poverty of Politics,” Balay Kalinaw, University of the Philippines, Quezon City, 23-24 July 1999, p. 2. During the open forum, Mr. Arnold Obina, NAPC Commissioner for the youth sector, reacted negatively to the statement read by Mr. Yuson and said that the NPC is being extremely critical of the NAPC simply because they are no longer in the body. What is important now, according to Mr. Obina, is for all concerned to move beyond all the bickering and try to work together, whether they are inside or outside of NAPC.
43 To reiterate, one manifestation of this reluctance is the assertion of certain government officials that their agencies are not implementing agencies and therefore, should not be made to serve as lead agencies. According to Engineer Bustamante, this reluctance was more manifest among the upper echelons of government where the traditional view — governance is the government’s sole business — still predominates. Due to this perception that the idea of people’s participation in governance has not yet been mainstreamed, there is the need to reorient government officials and the bureaucracy. On a related matter, equal partnerships were difficult to establish because on the one hand of the negotiating table sat the cabinet secretaries and on the other hand, there were the basic sector commissioners who did not have an equal position. During the latter part of 1999, the DBM allowed only the Vice-Chairperson for the Basic Sectors (i.e., Commissioner Nemenzo) to hold a cabinet secretary rank. While the NAPC pushed for a cabinet secretary rank for all the 14 basic sector commissioners, the DBM countered by saying that would be virtually impossible as this is unprecedented because there is not one government office in the Philippines where one would find 14 individuals with the rank of cabinet secretary. Interview with Engineer Bustamante, 3 September 1999.
44 In addition to the reluctance of some departments to partner with the basic sectors, this view can also be traced to the lack of funds that government extends to the basic sectors to support the latter’s sectoral consultative activities. For instance, last year, the NAPC’s proposed budget was 100 million pesos but this was slashed by 50%. Given that each sector had an annual budget of 4 million pesos for sectoral concerns, the 50 million pesos NAPC budget was not enough sufficient to cover the needs of the basic sectors. This leaves the cross-sectoral activities without any funding. Thus, the NAPC was hard-pressed to get funding support from the lead agencies. This was, however, easier said that done because the departments failed to incorporate the anti-poverty programs into their respective 1999 budgets. What the NAPC did was to take out 2% from the 2.5 million pesos Lingap Fund to support the basic sectors’ agenda. This lack of financial support for their activities has led the basic sectors to question the government’s commitment to anti-poverty programs and to popular participation in governance. Interview with Engineer Bustamante, 3 September 1999.
45 Remarks by Ms. Quintos-Deles, 16 September 1999.
46 Remarks by Mr. Emmanuel Buendia during a roundtable discussion on “Reflections on the Ramos Adminsitration’s Social Reform Agenda,” Center for Integrative and Development Studies, University of the Philippines, Quezon City, 28 July 1999.
47 Remarks by Ms. Jean Llorin during a roundtable discussion on “Reflections on the Estrada Administration’s Poverty Alleviation Programs: The Experience of the National Anti-Poverty Commission,” Center for Integrative and Development Studies, University of the Philippines, Quezon City, 19 November 1999.
48 Interviews with Ms. Llorin, 14 August 1999 and Engineer Bustamante, 3 September 1999.
49 For instance, the NGO and workers’ sectors would be more prepared to engage government having had a longer history of dealing with the latter as compared to such sectors as victims of calamities and disasters which is a sector that, according to observers, is a sector that is a difficult to get a handle on. However, this is not the only factor to consider when assessing the state of preparedness of the sectors. Another factor is the leadership of the sectors. The commissioner for the NGO sector in the NAPC has, for example, has been criticized for her lack of track record in advocacy work. Questions regarding the performance record of a leadership can hamper its ability to consolidate its constituency and lead to further questions regarding its authority and legitimacy.
50 Lack of preparedness was evident during the first exposure of the basic sectors to government decision-making under the NAPC. According to Engineer Bustamante, the first engagement between government the basic sectors under the NAPC took place with the Lingap Fund programs. Here, there were six government agencies responsible for the different Lingap Projects. For each project, a Project Advisory Board was formed consisting of government officials and three representatives (i.e., commissioners only) from the basic sectors. When the commissioners sat in the meetings, they were not ready for the highly technical discussions that took place and therefore, they were unable to effect any changes that would be beneficial to their sectors. Also, while they were able to provide inputs in some cases, there were instances when their positions across projects were contradictory. This was because at that time of their involvement, the basic sectors did not have any common framework to work with and were not familiar with the intricacies of the bureaucracy. Interview with Engineer Bustamante, 3 September 1999.
51 President Estrada, “State of the Nation Address ...,” p. 6.
52 Interview with Engineer Bustamante, 3 September 1999. To a certain extent, the NAPC of today has been emasculated due certain developments early on in its existence. During the initial years under then NAPC Lead Convenor Orlando Sacay, there were fears that the NAPC was going to become a “superbody” that will define all anti-poverty programs and policies. In the process, it may undermine the efforts of government departments and agencies. Mr. Sacay had a short-lived stint as Lead Convenor, having been replaced by DAR Secretary Morales, and there ended the vision of a powerful NAPC.